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OPINIONS
OF

BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER, OF PENNSYLVANIA.
APPOINTED DECEMBER 19, 1881.

IMPORTED LEAF TOBACCO.
Clause in Schedule F of the act 6f March 3, 1883, chapter 121, imposing
a duty upon "leaf tobacco,'' considered and commented on; and advised that the duty attaches to tobacco of the statutory description,
irrespective of the bale or package in which it is imported, and that,
consistently with the terms of the statute, bales and packages may be
broken up in order to sort such different grades of leaf tobacco as may
be contained therein.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

.April 23, 1884.
SIR: In yours of the 21st instant my attention is called to
a clause in Schedule F of the act of 1883, chapter 121 (22

Stat., 503), which imposes duty upon "leaf t\)bacco." Without asking a direct question thereupon, you state a doubt,
from which I gather that you desire advice whet~er that
clause regards a bale or package as the dutiable unit of such
leaf tobacco; and, if so, whether there is enough upon the
face of it to indicate that Congress intended to refer to that
bale or package which was known to commerce in March,
1883, so that a subsequent change thereof, with a view to
avoid the duty imposed, may be regarded as fraudulent,
and therefore be met by such counteracting administrative
methods as may be found practicable.
The clause in question is as follows: ''Leaf tobacco, of
which eighty-five per cent. is of the requisite size and of the
necessary fineness of texture to be suitable for wrappers,
and of which more than one hundred leaves are required to
weigh a pound, if not stemmed, seventy-five cents per
pound; if stemmed, one dollar per pound."
I observe that nothing is said in the act as to packages or
bales, or any other merely commercial form in which the
1
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mercia! form, the duty is levied directly upon the article
rated by its qualities for certain sort of consumption; i. e.,
into wrappers. A like remark is true of each of the seven
paragraphs imposing duty upon tobacco.
Upon the face of the provision, therefore, I submit that
the duty will attach to tobaeco of the statutory description
therein given, no matter what be the vehicle in which that
tobacco is imported.
I submit further that such questions as arise touching the
best way of administering the above statute, however important they may be practically, are at least inferior in degree to such as are presented by the words that convey the
will of the legislature, and therefore give way to that. will.
No mere regulation can defeat a statute. So far as in any
reasonable way is practicable, effect is to be given to the very
words of the act; but no method that is impracticable will
be supposed to have been intended.
I understand that no case has been presented within
the exigencies of public business, and making use of the
machinery of the custom house, to identify the boundary
line betwixt such leaf tobacco as is dutiable at 75 cents per
pound and such as is dutiable at 35 cents. If hereafter, in
consequence of a co-operation by producers of tobacco in the
evasion presented by your letter, the original hands shall be
manipulated so as to mix light and heavy leaves in a manner that will practically prevent an identification at the custom-house of the above-mentioned bottndary line, the matter
will need interposition by Congress. At present, however,
disregarding, as I think we may, certain terms (viz, bale,
etc.) introduced into the discussion apparently because at
one period in the administration of the law these were very
properly supposed to meet questions then arising upon certain cargoes, etc.,-I say disregarding such terms, I ad vise
that there is no reason in the words of the statute why ba,les
and packages, etc., may not be broken up in order to sort
such different grades of leaf tobacco as may be contained
tllerein.
verr respectfully'
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRE'l'A.RY OF THE TREASURY.
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HOLDING STATE OFFICES.
The holding of a State office by an officer or employe in the civil service
of the United States is not prohibited by any act of Congress.
But by executive orders dated January 17 and 28, 1873, which have not
been revoked, persons holding any civil office under the United States
are expected, w bile holding such office, not to accept or hold any State,
Territorial, or municipal office, with certain exceptions; otherwise
they will be regarded as having resigned the office held under the
United States.
In the case of an employe of the United States Fish Commission, not in
the service by appointment, who holds the office of village constable:
Advised that he may properly exercise the functions of the latter office,
provided this does not interfere with the regular and efficient discharge of his employment under the Government.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

. April 26, 1884.
SIR: I have the honor to return herewith the letter of
Prof. Spencer F. Baird, Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries,
addressed to you under date of the 11th instant, which at
his request and by your direction was referred to me for an
opinion upon the inquiry therein submitted, namely,
"Whether an employe of the United States Fish Commission, stationed in Massachusetts, is authorized to exercise
the function of village constable with or without pay."
There is no act of Congress which forbids an officer or· employe in the civil service of the U n~ted States to hold a
State office. But by an Executive order, dated January 17,
1873, issued from the Department of State, notice was given
t hat from and after the 4th of March, 1873, except as therein
mentioned, "Persons holding any Federal civil office, by appointment, under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, will be expected, while holding such office. not to
accept or hold any office under any State or Territorial gov·
ernment, or under the charter or ordinances of any municipal
corporation; and, further, that the acceptance or continued
holding of any such State, Territorial, or municipal office~
whether elective or by appointment, by any person holding
civil office as aforesaid under the Government of the United
States, other than judicial offices under the Constitution of
the United States, will be deemed a vacation of the Federal
.office held by such person, and will be treated as a resigna-
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tion by such Federal officer of his commission or appointment in the service of the United States." From the purview of this order, however, certain State offices, such as •
justices of the peace, notaries public, commissioners of deeds,
etc., were excepted. Certain Federal officers were also excepted from its operation, so far as to permit them to accept
and hold State offices where the same do not interfere with
the discharge of their duties.
The above-mentioned order was supplemented by another
Executive order, issued from the same Department, dated
January 28, 1873. This second order further defines what
offices and positions under the State, Territorial, or municipal governments are within, and what are not within, the
scope and prohibition of the first order; and it declares that
"'employment by the day as mechanics or laborers in the
armories, arsenals, navy-yards, etc., does not constitute an
office of any kind, and those thus employed are not within
the contemplation of the executive order;" but that'' master workmen and others who hold appointments from the
Government or from any Department, whether for a fixed
time or at the pleasure of the appointing power, are embraced within the operatio:r;t of the order."
I am not aware of any other regulations than those found
in the executive orders aforesaid which apply to the holding of State offices by persons who are in the civil service of
the United States. Nor am I aware that those orders have
ever been revoked.
While the office of village constable, whether with or without pay, would seem to be of the class of offices which such
· orders forbid the holding of, yet unless the employe referred
to in the inquiry of the Commissioner be an officer of the
United States, unless he is in the service of the Government
by appointment from some officer or Department thereof invested with the appointing power, be does not appear to
come within the prohibitiQn. Assuming that he is not in
the service by appointment as above, I am of opinion that he
is authorized (i.e., not forbidden) to exercise the functions of
the local office mentioned, and that he may properly do so,
provided it does not interfere with the regular and efficient
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discharge of his employment under the Government, of which
the Commissioner or officer by whom he is employed can
well be the judge.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDEN1'.

CLAIM OF V ANN A\D ADAIR.
Upon the facts presented in the mattN of tbe claim of Vann and Adair
for compensation for their services rendered the Osage Indians in
1869 and 1870 respecting the disposal of the lands of the latter : Advised, that the payment of· the $50,000 awarded by the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs and the Acting Secretary of the Interior in 1874
was a satisfaction in full of any claims that the said Vann and Adair
had for their services.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 30, 1884.
SrR: I have given attentive consideration to the claim of
Vann and Adair, and to the questions in connection therewith, presented in yours of the 1st ultimo.
After the very careful statements of fact which accompa,ny
your letter, it is unnecessary that I shall do more than allude to such outlines thereof as are relied upon to support
my conclusions.
It seems then that in 1868 the Osage Indians had entered
into a project of treaty for the sale of 8,000,000 acres of
land lying in Kansas to certain railroad companies at the
price of $1,600,000, and that in November, 1869, this project
was still pending unratified by the United States. Accordingly, during this last-mentioned month, the Osage tribe, having· become dissatisfied with the bargain, employed V ann
and Adair "to represent their interests before the Government of the United States at Washington, and in that connection to make effort to have set aside and annulled" the
above treaty; and stipulated to pay them as compensation
"one-half of any sum that through their efforts and representations might be allowed for the lands * * * beyond
the amqunt stipulated for in said treaty." Thereupon the
treaty was withdrawn by President Grant about the first of
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the next session of Congress, and one bill, which proposed
to give the Osages about 12:Z cents for their land, having
been defeated in January, 1870, an amendment was adopted
to an appropriation act in July, 1870, which had the effect
of giving to the Indians $1.25 per acre for the same. All
occasion for effort by the claimants ceased in about eight
months after their employment.
I do not find it asserted that the efforts of Vann and Adair
as agents, etc., upon the subject-matter of their contract
during the period important to the transactiOn by which the
Indian Osages escaped from the toils of their treaty of 1868
and secured a position by which necessarily they in the
course of time would receive for their lands some $10,000,000,
or thereabouts-that is, from November 10, 1869, to July 15,
1870-were directed to any other matters than those mentioned above. A voiding all appearance of meeting the
strong terms in which the merits of Vanu and Adair towards
the Osages are characterized in some of the papers in the case
by other strong terms which the law often applies to such
transactions betwixt attorneys on the one hand and clients
inopes consilii, and laboring under a notorious civil imbecility
and inability upon the other, I content myself with saying that
the arrangement of 1869 must be treated now as absolutely
null and void. It lacks legal obligation, because it was never
approved by the United States, acting through the President or otherwise; and it lacks moral obligation,. because
it displays upon its face that improvidence, the attribution
of which to Indian tribes, by a general presumption of law,
has given occasion for the necessity of approval as above.
The treaty against which it was directed hardly awaited a
first push. A pin prick seems to have disposed of it at once.
Nor is there any appearance that the subsequent legislationthat, I mean, abandoned in January and that adopted in
July....:...required important special prosecution. It seem:;
that all this must easily have been anticipated by intelligent
persons acquainted with the circumstances in November,.
1869, and accordingly that to such the chances at that time
appeared good for making under the terms of their contract,
with but little trouble and in no long time, a fee of from one
to several millions of dollars.
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It is significant of the validity of this contract in point of
fairness that the claimants appear never to have asked for
its approval, and that they abandoned all claim thereunder
as soon as they set about discussing with their clients the
claim for compensation.
It is necessary to have a definite view of the character of
the agreement of 1869 in order properly to judge of that of
1873. It is suggested on behalf of Vann and Adair that the
former was binding upon the Osages, and therefore that they
appear in this contention upon the footing of p~rsons who
have displayed great generosity-having voluntarily yielded
up more than $2,000,000 of a justly earned compensation and
contented themselves under the agreement of 1873 with less
than 10 per cent. of what was fairly due. In my opinion
there is, upon the contrary, no ground upon which the contract of 1869 can be considered to have imposed upon the
Osages the debt therein defined, either as a legal or equitable
obligation.
'rhe most that can be said about it is that it created arelation because of which Vann and Adair bad a right to be
paid by the Indians whatever their services should be fairly
estimated at after these had terminated. In other words, by
performing services for which they had been asked, they
were entitled afterwards to an account upon the footing of a
quantum meruit. They must be regarde(l and treated as reasonably intelligent persons. They evidently claim at least so
much in the present transaction. By failing, then, to submit
their contingent compensation to the judgment of the President during the time that the contingency existed, they must
be taken to have waived a consideration of that element, and
to have put their case simply upon, as it were, a count for
work and labor done.
That was really their situation before the Osage council
in February, 1873, as well as before the Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in July, 1874.
In this connection I cannot avoid saying that their professions (conveyed in the agreement of February, 1873), that it
was because of "sympathy and brotherly feeling" towards
the Osages that they were willing to reduce their first fee
and to accept of $330,000 (again reduced by the council to
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$230,000), as if it were a modest compensation ex mquo et
bono for what they had done, partakes strongly of the farcical. They seem to have partaken of the delusion that by this
latter transaction they were themselves benefactors, and not
beneficiaries; were surrendering, and not receiving, a thing
of value.
This view, as I have already said, is plainly inadmissible.
Supposing (as I shall for this argument admit) that all
other requisites, except approval, for a valid contract under
section 2103, Revised Statutes, exist here, I think that the
mere circumstance that the present contract at the time of
its presentation for approval in 1874 had been executed did
not except it (as is suggested in the papers) from the operation of that section. It was at that time a contract requiring the special approval in that section provided; the question· presented being whether the services of Vann and Adair
were worth ex WQUO et bono $230,000, or if not so much, then
what?
I am not called upon to rejudge the terms of the approval
that was given. The claimants received $50,000 for services
the substantial part of which was included within nine
months. Let it be allowed that those services were faithful
(although the virtue of faithfulness to a cause in which one
reckons one's self to be an equal partner is neither very refined nor very heroical) intelligent, and valuable, yet $25,000
apiece compensation seems handsome. And if we allow that
the pregnant period betwixt November, 1869, and July, 1870
(during which as we have seen all that was substantial must
have been done), was followed by a sequel of some months'
attendance, ex abundanti, at the Indian Office; during which
Commissioner Parker enjoyed an opportunity of forming a
favorable opinion as .to their qualities and conduct, nevertheless that compensation does not become inadequate, or indeed
less than ample, by being extended so as to cover even that.
I mention this in order to say that the extent to which the
approval of 1874 was given was to all appearance based upon
arguments which might well control men of good sense and
intelligence, and therefore, having been decided by persons
whose duty it was to decide, it established the operative form
of the contract, and made au end of contro,Tersy. Evidently
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there was no place for protest by either party against payments thereunder. Thai would be mere idle grumbling.
The approval determined all, and was a transaction as to
which protest meant nothing.
It is said, however, that the Acting Secretary, who par
ticipated in this approval, afterwards stated that he under
.stood his action therein not to be final, but only to warrant
.a payment upon acco·ttnt; and besides that, still later he
stated in an official letter that after such approval the Commissioner· and he had opened the approval for further evidence, etc.
A question is made as to the effect of these declarations.
As to the Secretary's statement of his understanding of
what he and the Commissioner had done, I submit that it is
without effect. Their act was required to be in writing, and
also to be indorsed upon the writt~n contract. That indorsement must speak for itself. This would be so even if
both parties had expressed their understanding. Much more
then when only one has done so.
Upon the face of the indorsement I think there is no room
for doubt. The transaction is, although joint, a single one,
and it is to be assumed that the parties united therein. If
the words of one party be clear and those of the other not
so clear, the latter would be referred to the former, and not
vice versa. I sub mit that the language of the Secretary is
not doubtful; but if it be so to any one, then, inasmuch as the
language of the Commisioner cannot be so, this draws to its
own the meaning of that of the Secretary. The case, it is
to be observed, is not one of plain contradiction, for if it
were there could have been no approval for any purpose.
'rhen as to the alleged reopening. If there be no evidence of
a joint reopening beyond what was stated as above by the
Secretary, I should doubt the competency thereof. I see no
reason why rules upon like matters which have long prevailed on other tribunals of justice to the end of securing
certainty and consistency in their action should not apply
here, to the effect that an important quasi-judicial joint act
in writing can be undone only by another joint act in writing, and that also indorsed upon the contract affected; that
is, upon the original paper itself, or upon one duly attached
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thereto. It is difficult to draw a line amongst the requirements of section 2103, and pronounce that those upon one
side are essential, the others not. If, however, such a one
be practicable, I am of opinion that an indorsement of all
action that approves, or that qualifies approval, is essential.
I gather from the papers that there is no such indorsement.
I am inclined to doubt whether section 2103 intends that
there shall be a rehearing as to an approval once indorsed
and acted upon. The circumstances here do not require
this point to be thoroughly considered; but as the courst ·
of the argument might otherwise intimate an opinion by me
that repeated extensions of approval are competent, I may
be allowed to enter this protest thereabout and save it foranother occasion.
I may also add that if reopenings by action aliunde be
competent, the action of Secretary Chandler, in December,.
1875, put an end to the one under consideration. His
pointed and vigorous language imports a review of the case
upon the merits and a determination thereof.
I need hardly add that the joint approval made in 187 4,
supposing it not to have been opened by the parties thereto,
is now beyond the control of any successors of those who
gave it~
Upon the whole, then, I submit, in reply to your first question, that Vann and Adair never had a legal claim against
the Osages under the contract of February 8, 1873, for the
sum of $230,000; and, in reply to your second question, that
the approval of that contract by the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs and the Acting Secretary of the Interior (July 8 and
July 21, 187 4, respectively) was an authoritative definition
of the same, so that the payment and receipt of the $50,000
thereby awarded was a satisfaction in full of any claims that
Vann and Adair had for their services, and so of that for
$230,000 mentioned in the contract of 1873 as ratified by the
Osage council.
I understand that as a consequence of the above answers
you desire no notice by me of the other questions propounded.
It may be that I should add, in connection with the application (May 21, 1877) of the governor, chief counsellor, and
business committee of the Osages addressed to the President,
asking tllat the claimauts sllouhl ht~ paid t!H' n·m~inr1er due
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upon the contract of 1873, which was subsequently transmitted by the President to Congress with a statement that
there was no fund out of which the Execut.i ve can order payment, etc.; that it was wholly irregular; and was given
proper direction by the President-who does not appear to
have considered whether, if there had been a fund, such payment could have been ordered by ~' the Executive," meaning
I suppose such part of the executive department as had jurisdiction of such questions. I doubt whether the President
intended by the words used by him to claim that he could
decide upon or review an approval of the contract of 1873,
or indeed that he intended anything whatever more than a
good-natured reference of the attorneys for the claim to Congress, where such claims generally sleep soundly .
.And as to .Attorney-General Pierrepont's succinct opinion
transmitted by you, I have to say that no copy thereof was
_preserved or probably taken in this Department, nor have I
been able to find here the letter to which it was a reply..
The opinion is short, entirely in his own handwriting, stating results only, and apparently given in haste. The state
of facts therefore upon which it was given does not appear
to me; and, besides, it seems based upon the theory adopted
by Mr. Cushing in 1853 (6 Opin., 49), without adverting to
the fact that in the mean time the act of 1872 had relieved
the President of the trouble of considering Indian contracts
for the payment of money, etc., and had vested that duty
elsewhere.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
ARMY OFFICER HOLDING CIVIL OFFICE.
Where an officer of the Army was tendered a place on a "board of experts," created by a city ordinance to determine the most durable and
best pavement for the streets of the city: Advised that, in view of the
provisions of section 1222, Revised Statutes, the place be not accepted
by the officer.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 9,1884.
Yours of the 7th ultimo asks whether the case therein.
stated would constitute a violation of Revised Statutes, sec·
SIR:
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tion 1222, which, upon pain of forfeiting their commissions,
forbids officers of the Army to accept or exercise the fu,nctions
of a civil office.
The case is that the mayor of Philadelphia has selected
Col. Q. A. Gillmore, Corps of Engineers, one of " a board
of experts" to examine and report upon a pavement in that
city, the authority for such selection having been conferred
by an ordinance of the city of the 28th of May, 1883, which
defines the duty of the board to be that of "pointing out to
the councils the defects of the present system of paving the
streets of Philadelphia, and, in comparison with the advantages of the Belgian block system, making a thorough and
exhaustive report of the most durable and best pavement
that can be devised by them for said streets, particular regard being had to its healthfulness, economy, smoothness,
durability, and drainage, and estimating the probable cost of
a better system;" the compensation of each member of the
board not to exceed $10,000, inclusive of all individual expenses.
The question put by you on behalf of Colonel Gillmore,
who solicits your instructions in that regard, is whether by
taking a place upon that board he will be chargeable with
having accepted or exercised the functions of a civil office
within the meaning of section 1222, cited above.
I have read the papers connected with certain other such
applications in the past, which you have transmitted along
with that of Colonel Gillmore. I own that I should have
found difficulty in coming to the conclusion which seems to
have been reached in some of them-particularly that of Colonel Mendell. But as these have passed, I need say no more.
It is plain that the board in question bas been constituted
with reference to important public needs and is to discharge
an important public duty. In the most comprehensive sense
of the word office, therefore, places upon that board will be
offices, and of course "civil offices."
Are they such within the purview of section 1222 '
It seems to me that notwithstanding the gravity of the
penalty therein inflicted, the policy of section 1222 points to
a very liberal interpretation of the phrase "civil office." In
Evans's case (74 Pa. St. Rep., 124), the question was
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whether a person who had been appointed by the governor
of the State " to collect a single claim, or rather a set of
claims, against a particular debtor" (the United States) was
a public officer. The court decided that he was; Sharswood,
J. saying, arguendo: "Can it make any difference that a
person is commissioned by the governor as a general agent to
collect all claims of the Commonwealth, or as a special agent
to collect only one particular claim."
I quote Evans's case not because the present question can
be made to turn upon any special view as to the meaning of
the word office in the courts of Pennsylvania, but because I
understand the above language to convey t!J e general legal
meaning of that word. (15 Opin., 551.)
I have considered the provisions of the acts of 1838, 1868,
1870 and 1877, which now appear in sections 12!~2, 1223, and
1224, Revised Statutes, together, in coming to a conclusion
upon the question put by you. That conclusion is advice
that Colonel Gillmore do not accept appointmen~ as a member of the board of experts in question.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

DUTY ACT OF MARCH 3, 1883.
Goods which arrived in a port of the United States on the 30th of June,
1883, and from want of time to make other disposition of them remained on board ship until the next day, are to be regarded as in a
public storll or bonded warehouse within the meaning of section 10 of
the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 13, 1884.
SIR: Yours of the 8th has been considered. It mentions
the recent decision in the cases of Frank A. Sartori and John
B. Sartori against Hartranft, collector, and in connection
therewith asks in effect whether that shall be acquiesced in.
The principle therein expressed is, that goods which arrived
in a port of the United States upon the 30th of June, 1883,
and from want of time to make any other disposition of them
remained on board ship until the next day, are to be re-
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garded as in a public store or bonded warehouse within the
meaning of section 10 of the customs duties act of March
3, 1883, and therefore are subject to the less rate of duty imposed thereupon by that act.
I observe and appreciate what you say as to the practical
difficulty in which you have been placed in settling the operation of that section upon goods situated like the present,
the new duties being in some cases greater and in others less
than the old.
Upon the whole, however, I advise that the rule laid
down in the cases of Sartori be acquiesed in.
I may add that there is some color in its ianguage for
thinking that section 10 is to apply only in cases where the
new duty is less than the old: the expression ''shall be subject to no other duty than, " etc., imports a favor; and this
view accords with the fact that the act of li583 in general reduced the rates of duty theretofore imposed ; and perhaps
the expression would have been made clearer if Congress had
not anticipated that, because of the three months which were
to elapse before the statute went into effect, importers would
take care to leave in warehouse none of that class of goods
upon which the duty would be increased. A positive provision of that sort would probably have had little effect; so that,
inasmuch as de minimis non cura,t lex, Congress may have intended to leave the exceptional cases of a transition from less
to greater duty to the operation of existing general law,
which determines the rate by the date of importation.
I suggest this qurere as an obiter d·i ctum pertinent to cases
vice versn to those of the Sartoris and alluded to in yours.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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STATE QUARANTINE GHOUNDS.
Inspectors of customs can not lawfully be prevented by the local health
officers from landing at quarantine stations in the discharge of their
duties; but the former, while visiting and remaining at such stations,
should observe all reasonable regulations in the interest of public
health.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 5, 1884.
SIR: In reply to yours of the 26th ultimo, asking whether
the health authorities of the State of South Carolinia can
legally prevent an inspector of customs of the United States,
who has been assigned to duty at the quarantine grounds,
from landing at that place, I answer that the duty of a State
to police its navigable waters and coasts in the interest of
health does not conflict with the duty of the United States
to police the same grounds in the interest of their revenue.
There is no conflict in point of theory upon these matters,
and the good sense of the officers intrusted with these duties
respectively will no doubt prevent any collision in point of
fact. Such I understand from a recent note to be the general experience of your Department upon the present matter.
The United States have a clear right to see for themselves,
and by the eyes of their own officers, whether their customs
laws are enforced at quarantine stations as well as at other
places. They direct their officers to execute this duty with
a reference to the State health laws and regulations. Such
conformity, however, is not to amount to an abstention from
official duty.
Upon the other hand, that universal rule by which, upon
conflict between State and United States law~, the former
necessa,rily give way would not justify customs officers from
excluding health officers from policing places which the former
might have found jt, necessary to occupy in the course of
duty.
Questions of some delicacy as to relative precedency and
superiority of function may arise between these two classes
of officials. Their happening need not be anticipated; and
they will probably be settled, as generally heretofore, by an
exercise on both sides of liberality and good sense.
The present, however, is not a doubtful matter. Obviously,
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health officers can not prevent inspectors from landing at the
quarantine station. Although inspectors must conform their
official action whilst visiting and remaining at such stations
(as well as elsewhere) to all reasonable regulations jn the
interest of public health, no regulation which forbids their
enjoying ample opportunities for then and there protecting
the public revenue is reasonable.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

INSPECTION OF STEAM FERRY-BOATS.
The word "charter" covers the case of boats licensed, under a general
law, by a county court to traverse ferry routes established by such
courts.
Steam-vessels plying regularly between Albany and Troy, in New York,.
for freight and passengers, would be ferry-boats under the second
clause of rule VII, paragraph 2, of "General Rules, etc., of the Board
of Supervising Inspectors of Steam Vessels."
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 7, 1884.
SIR: 1 have considered the questions which by yours of
the 3d instant are stated in connection with cert.a;t.in sections
of the Revised Statutes upon the subject of inspecting steam
ferry-boats, and with paragraph 2 of rule VII, "General
Rules, etc., of the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam
Vessels" (form 2101), pages 183 and 185, and I now submit
a reply.
First. I am of the opinion that the word "charter," rule
VII, paragraph 2, as above, covers the case of boats licensed,
under a general law conferring that power, by a county
court to traverse ferry routes established by such court.
''Charter" seems to be a proper word to express a power
of granting to individuals rights which otherwise belong to
the public, whether such grant by the State is made directly
or indirectly.
I submit this upon general principles; but if this proposition
were more doubtful than I apprehend it to be, the regulation
in question is not to be construed as intended to narrow the
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legal meaning of the word ferry-boat in sections 4426, etc,
for regulations can not change the meaning of legal terms in
the statute which authorizes such regulations. They have
a well-established but a narrower scope of operation than
this. ·I co-nceive that those who framed rule VII did not intend to limit the meaning of sections 4426, etc., but only to
· convey to subordinate officials engaged in enforcing the inspection laws their own view of that meaning.
By chartered ferry, therefore, I submit is intended any
ferry established in accordance with law.
Second and third. What I have said above probably renders it unnecessary to reply more particularly to your second
and third questions. I observe that the language of sections
4405 and 4462 varies from that of the act of 1870, which is
the basis of those sections. Whether under 4462 the Secretary can modify a regulation really authorized by 4405 may
demand more consideration than seems to be here demanded,
inasmuch as I think that rule VII, paragraph 2, is even now
to be read as if the word license were added to the word
charter.
Fourth. I am of opinion that steam-vessels plying regularly between Albany and Troy, in New York, for freight
and passengers, would be ferry-boats under the second clause
of rule VII, paragraph 2, above referred to.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRI~ BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

POSTMASTERS' SALARIES.
Opinion of February 13, 1884 (17 Opin., p. 658), on the subject of thereadjustment of postmasters' salaries, referred to and explained.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
June 14, 1884.
SIR: Your letter of this date states that it is claimed under
the acts of 1864, 1866, and 1883 (relating to postmasters'
salaries), as interpreted by my opinion of February 13 ultimo,
that a postmaster whose salary was duly readjusted on July
1, 1868, for the ensuing biennial period, and whose readjusted
273-VOL XVIII--2
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salary during that period was 10 per cent. less than the compensation which he would have received during such period
if computed ripon the basis of commissions under the act of
1854, is not entitled to be paid the difference between such
salary received and such computed compensation for the
period in question.
In my judg·ment the claim is not well founded, and there
is nothing in the opinion that was intended to sustain such a
conclusion or that seems to me to have that effect.
In McLean's case (95 13". S., 753), referred to in my ' opinion, the court declared that the readjustment directed by
the legislation of 1864 and 1866 "takes effect in all cases
prospectively." The above claim is for a retrospective settlement; a proceding not warranted by the said acts, according
to my understanding of them and of the opinion of the
Supreme Court.
Very respectively,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PosTMASTER GENERAL.

RELIDF OF FITZ JOHN PORTER.
The bill "For the relief of Fitz John Porter," passed at the first session
of the Forty-eighth Congress, considered, and objections thereto, constitutional and other, stated.
DEPARTMENT OF JU.STICE,

June 23, 1884.
SIR: In- compliance with your request I have examined
the bill for the restoration of Fitz John Porter to the Army,
and now have the honor to submit to you my views thereon.
In March, 1878, an application was made to the President
by Fitz John Porter for relief in his case. Subsequently, in
April of the same year (to the end that the President might
be fully informed of the facts of the case, and be enabled to
act advisedly upon said application), a board of Army officers
was convened to examine, in connection with the record of
the trial by court-martial of Major-General Porter, such new
evidence relating to the merit,s of said case as is now on file
in the War Department, together with such other evidence
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as may be presented to said board, and to report, with the
reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in their
opinion, ''justice requires should be taken on said application
by the President."
The board so convened made a report to the Secretary of
War, dated ~larch 19, 1879, in which, after giving the result
of their investigation, they state that, in their opinion,
"justice requires at his (the President's) hands such action
as m~y be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and
sentence of the court-martial in the case of Maj. Gen. Fitz
John Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which
that sentence deprived him, such restoration to take effect
from the date of his dismissal from service."
On the 5th of June, 1879, the proceedings and report of
the board were transmitted to Congress by the President,
who, in his accompanying message, said: ''I have given to
this report such examination as satisfies me that I ought to
lay the proceedings and conclusions of the board before Congress. As I am without power, in the absence of legislation,
to act upon the recommendations of the report further than
by submitting the same to Congress, the proceedings and
conclusions of the board are transmitted for the information
of Congress, and such action as in your wisdom shall seem
€Xpcdient and just."
On the 4th of May, 1882, upon the application of said Fitz
John Porter, the President, by pardon, remitted so much of
the sentence of said court-martial as forever disqualified him
from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States.
Such being the condition of his case, a bill ''for the relief
of Fit.r. John Porter" was passed at the present session of
Congress, and is now with the President for his approval.
The bill contains a preamble which recites the fact that
the board of Army officers, convened as aforesaid, stated in
their report of March 19, 1879, that in their opinion "justice
required at his (the President's) hands such action as may
be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case of Maj. Gen. Fitz John
Porter, and to restore him to the positions of which the sentence deprived him, such restoration to take effect from the
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date of dismissal from the service," and also the fact that
the President, on the 4th of May, 1882, remitted so much of
the sentence of said court-martial as forever disqualified the
said Fitz John Porter from holding any office of trust or
profit. The preamble then concludes: "Therefore, that justice may be done the said Fitz John Porter, and to carry into
effect the recommendation of said board.'' Following this is
the enacting clause.
The enacting words of the bill read thus: ''That the
President be, and he is hereby, authorized to nominate and,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint
Fitz John Porter, late a major-general of the United States
Volunteers and a brevet brigadier-general and colonel of the
Army, to the position of colonel in the Army of the United
States of the same grade and rank held by him at the time
of his dismissal from the Army by sentence of court-martial
promulgated January 27, 1863, and, in his discretion, to
place him on the retired list of the Army as of that grade,
the retired list being thereby increased in number to that
extent; and all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith
are suspended for this purpose only: Provilled, That said
Fitz John Porter shall receive no pay, compensation, or
allowance whatsoever prior to his appointment under this
act."
The end proposed by this bill, as declared in its preamble,
is "that justice may be done to the said Fitz John Porter,
and to carry into efl'ect the recommendation of said board."
The recommendation of said board is "to annul and set
aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial" in his
case, and ''to restore him to the positions of which the sentence deprived him, such restoration to take effect from the
date of dismissal from the service."
In an opinion dated March 15, 1882, which I had the honor
to give, at your request> upon the application for relief made
by Fitz John Porter in his letter to you of December 23,
1881 (the relief there being asked in the following words :
"To annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the
court-martial and to nominate me to the Senate for restoration tom~' rank in the Army," etc.), I considered the subject
of the power of the President to grant the relief thus sought,
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and, after an examination of authorities, reached the conclusion that where the sentence of a legally constituted
court-martial, in a case within its jurisdiction, has been
approved by the reviewing authority and carried into execution, it can not afterwards be reviewed and set aside; that
the proceedings are then at an end-the action thus had
upon the sentence being, in contemplation of the law, final;
and accordingly that the President, in the case under consideration, could afford the applicant no relief through a
revision of the sentence.
Without assuming to enter into the merits of the charges
submitted to and determined by the court-martial which
tried and convicted Fitz John Porter, I may, in this connection, observe that those charges were preferred in due form,
and that the court, which was ordered on the 1st of December, 1862, was composed of two major-generals and seven
brigadier generals, and continued in the performance of its
duties until the lOth day of January, 1863, when it made its
findings and sentence, and adjourned. .As its records will
show, by it there was a thorough investigation, and the accused was heard fully in his defense. The findings of the
court were then submitted to President Lincoln, and after
careful consideration by him were finally approved, and the
sentence of the court duly executed.
This ended the whole subject in law and in fact; for, as has
been said by a judicial writer of the highest authority, when
such is the result, and" when judgment is once pronounced,
both law and fact conspire to prove the accused completely
guilty." The rank of these officers and their eminent character at that time secured for their findings the approval of
the public, and the known mildness and benevolence of
Abraham Lincoln satisfied the people of the United States
that he would have disapproved any unjust or harsh judgment.
A court-martial is to be respected in its judgments the
same as any other court. Its findings, when rendered and
approved according to the due forms of that law which createsit, are to be treated as would be the final judgments of a court
Qf final jurisdiction in the law. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recently declared that a court-martial
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such as this was "is the organism provided by law and
clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of
cases. Its judgments, when approved as required, rest on
the same basis and are surrounded by the same considerations which give conclusiveness to · the judgments of other
legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest,
under like circumstauces." Such a judgment the President
has no power to review and annul or set aside. Neither has
Congress a right to review and annul or set aside the findings and sentences of such a court.
The people of the United States in their Constitution have
said that one of the first objects of creating that Government
wa~ to" establish justice," and to that end by the Constitution they restrained the authority of Congress, and for the
safety of the people excluded it from assuming any of the
absolute power possessed and exercised -by the Briti8h Parliament. The safety and peace of society stand only on the·
stability of the law and its judgments.
Certainty is the mother of repose and peace, and it is that
which all human law seeks to arrive at; and uncertainty is
the mother of contention. It is all-important that no final
judgment should ever be held precariously at the .fluctuating
discretion of any power. The certainty of the law gives it
its sanction.
However, notwithstanding the declaration in the preamble
above referred to, it will be observed that the enacting clause
of the bill does not directly purport to annul and set aside
the sentence.
When that sentence was passed, Fitz John Porter held
three commissions in the milita1y serviee-one as colonel of
a particular regiment of infantry in the regular Army, another as brevet-brigadier-general in the regular Army, and a
third as major-general of Volunteers-and its execution involved not only the loss of each of these three commissions, but
subjected him to the further penalty of being" forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States." Through the exercise of
the pardoning power of the President he has been relieved
from the latter penalty and thereby become restored to the
right to hold office formerly enjoyed by him. The enacting
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clause does no more than provide tor restoring him to the
position of colonel in the Army formerly held by him. But
this, if accomplished, would not relieve him from all the consequences of the sentence, as, for instance, the loss of the
brevet commission of brigadier-general, and also the majorgeneral's commission. In providing for such partial restoration to his status in the m_ilitary service which was lost by
operation of the sentence, and leaving some portion of the
punishment thereby incurred to stand untouched, the bill can
not be regarded as an attempt to directly annul or set aside
the sentence, but it evidently is an attempt to flo so in an
elusive way.
The effect of the bill, then, is. to authorize the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint Fitz
John Porter to the position of colonel in the Army of the
same grade and rank held by him at the time of his dismissal
therefrom by the sentence, leaving it discretionary with the
President to also place him on the retired list of the Army as
of that grade. It supplies the President and the Senate with
the authority, to that extent, to "carry into effect the recommendation of said board" through the exercise of the appointing power.
Such authority either is or is not coupled with a duty to
exert it. If not, the bill partakes of the character of recommendation or advice only, as it would leave the exercise of the
appointing power in the particular case thereby authorized
wholly dependent upon ~he pleasure of the President and
Senate. On the other hand, could the President and Senate
be required, as in duty bound, to exercise that power, and appoint Fitz John Porter to the position of colonel in the
Army under the authority thus imparted~ In answer to
this it is submitted that Congress cannot impose such requirement, and thus virtually assume a power (that of making an appointment to office) which does not constitutionally
belong to it. Furthermore, if the bill be viewed as making
it imperative upon the President to appoint, it must be
deemed to make it equally imperative upon the Senate to
"advise and consent" thereto. But these terms imply the
right to exercise judgment and discretion, with which right
such requirement would be inconsistent.
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I am aware that the power of Congress over military and
naval appointments has been put upon grounds not applicable
to civil appointments. During the administration of President
Monroe a difference of opinion upon that subject was developed between the Executive and the Senate upon the
occasion of carrying into effect the act of March 2, 1821, for
reducing the military establishment. The President submitted to the Senate certain no{ninations (viz, James Gadsden, to be adjutant-general, awl Nathan Towson, to be colonel of artillery), accompanied by a message explaining his
views of the act and principles adopted by him in executing
it. In this message he observed: "In filling original
vacancies in the artillery and in the newly-created office of
adjutant-general, I consider inyself at liberty to place in
them any officer belonging to any part of the whole military
establishment, whether of the staff or line. In filling original vacancies, that is, offices newly created, it i!::! my opinion,
as a general principle, that Congress has no right under the
Constitution to impose any restraint by law on the power
granted to the President, so as to prevent his making a
free selection of ilroper persons for these offices from the
whole bod.Y of his fellow-citizens." .And further on he
again observeu: "Having already suggested my im·pression that in filling offices newly created to which, on no
principle whatever, any one could have a claim of right,
Congress could not~ under the Constitution, restrain the free
selection of the President from the whole body of his fellow-citizens, I shall only further remark, that if that imlJression is well founded all objections to these appointments
must cease. If the law imposed such restraint it would in
that case be void."
The Committee on Military .Affairs 'of the Senate, to whom
these nominations and the message of the President were
referred, in their report dissented from the above doctrine,
remarkiug: ''The Constitution of the United States provides that 'Congress shall have power to make rules for
the government auu regulation of the land and uaval forces.'
Under this article of the Constitution it is competent for
Congress to make such rules and regulations for the government of the Army and Navy as they may thmk will pro~
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mote the service. This power has been exercised froin the
foundation of our Government in relation to the Army and
Navy. Congress has fixed the rules-in promotions and appointments. Every promotion is a new appointment, and is
submitted to the Senate for confirmation. In the several
reductions of the Army and Navy Congress has fixed the
rules of reduction, and no Executive heretofore has denied
this power in Congress, or hesitated to execute such rules as
were prescribed."
The committee having recommended that the Senate do not
advise and consent to the nominations mentioned, they were
rejected by the Senate. (See Niles's Reg., vol. 22, pp. 406-423.)
One of my predecessors, in an opinion dated January 9,
1873 (14 Opin., 164), in which the same subject is considered,
after reviewing the action of both the executive and legislative branches of the Government in regard to the promotion
.and appointment of officers in the Army, concludes thus: HIt
may therefore be regarded as definitely settled hy the practice of the Government that the regulation and government
.of the Army include, as being properly within their scope,
the regulation of the appointment and promotion of officers
therein. And as the Constitution expressly confers upon
Congress authority to make rules for the governn~ent and
regulation of the Army, it follows that that body may, by
virtue of this authority, impose such restrictions and limitations upon the appointing power as it may deem proper in
regard to making promotions or appointments to fill any and
all vacancies of whatever kind occurring in the Army; provided, of course, that the restrictions and limitations be not
inconsistent or incompatible with the exercise of the appointing power by the department of the Government to which
that power constitutionally belongs."
Conceding, however, all that is here claimed for Congress
under the provision of the Constitution adverted to, it does
not follow that the right to regulate appointments to offices
in the Army can be carried to the designation of particular
individuals to fill such offices, without imposing an unconstitutional restriction upon the appointing power. The right
of Congress to regulate is itself limited by the necessity of
leaving Llue scope to the appointing power for the exercise
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of judgment and will in perrormiug its functions, as contemplated by the Constitution. As was observed by ChiefJustice Marshall, d~livering the opinion of the court in
Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch, 53, 54), the clauses of the
Constitution relating to that power "seem to contemplate
three distinct operations : First. The nomination: this is
the sole act of the President, and is completely voluntary.
Second. The appointment: this is also the act of the President, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be performed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Third. The commission: * • * The last act to be done
by the President is the signature of the commission. He has
then acted on the ad vice and consent of the Senate to his
own nomination. The time for deliberation has been passed.
He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and consent
of the Senate concurring with his nomination, has been made,.
and the officer is appointed." Farther on he also observed:
''The discretion of the Executive is to be exercised until the
appointment has been made."
Whatever powers Congress has upon the subject of appointments in the Army must be derived from some one or
more of the following clauses of the Constitution: ''The
Congress shall have power" * • * "to declare war," etc.
"To raise and support armies," etc. "To make rules for the
go~rnment and regulation of the land and naval forces."
"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers," etc. (Sec. 8,
Art. I.)
But another clause of the Constitution, already adverted
to, declares that the President ''shall nominate and, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, • * * and all other officers of the United States,
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by law," etc. (sec. 2, Art. II).
This is a power expressly given to the President by the same
instrument which gives to Congress the powers above mentioned, namely, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land forces, etc.
From the "foregoing powers" conferred upon Qongress,.
the power to designate b:v law a person to fill a military
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office can not be implied; since this would be in direct conflict with the power of appointment expressly given the President as above. Regarding the bill as imposing, or attempting
to impose, upon the President a duty to appoint the person
designated therein, it is' without any support in the Constitution. It is an assumption of an implied power which is not
based upon any express powrr, and clearly invades the constitutional rights of the President.
Congress has no right to enact as a law that which will be
ineffectual. It can not enact advice or counsel. It must
make laws that are. rules of action, not "expressions of will,
that may or may not be followed." Counsel is a matter of
persuasion, law is a matter of injunction; counsel acts upon
the willing, law upon the unwilling also. (Blackstone's
Commentaries, 44.) If, then, this bill be an injunction commanding the President to appoint, it is a usurpation; and if
it be only counsel, it is without the essential element of a law;
and Congress can enact nothing but that which is to have
the full vigor and effect of a law.
But, again, the bill is subject to objection upon the ground
that Congress thereby in effect creates an office only upon
condition that it is to be filled by a particular individual
named. If this principle were adopted generally in the creation of offices, it would obviously result in constraining the
appointing power to accept the condition imposed and fill the
offices with the individuals designated by Congress; thus
frustrating the design of the Constitution, which is that officers must be alone selected according to the judgment and
will of the person and body in whom the powers of nomina,.
tion, advice and.consent, and appointment are vested.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
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FILLING VACANCIES IN OFFICE.
The provisions of section 1769, Revised Statutes, relat1ve to filling vacanciel:i during a recess of the Senate, are limited to vacancies happening by
death or resignation or expiration of term of office, but do nvt apply
to original vacancies.
When an office is created by a law taking effect during a session of the
Senate, and no nomination is made thereto, the original vacancy thus
existing may be filled by the President during the ensuing recess of the
Senate by a temporary appointment.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 25, 1884.
SIR: In reply to your inquiry, I have the honor to state
that the provisions of section 1769, Revised Statutes, for
filling vacancies during recess of Senate, are limited to those
that happen by reason of death or resignation or expiration of
term of office, and do not apply to original vacancies-i. e.,
vacancies existing in newly created offices, where the offices
have never b~en filled.
The provisions of the tenure of office act of March 3, 1867,
for filling vacancies during recess of Senate, were even more
restrictive; they extending only to such va~ancies as happen
by death or resignation. Yet in an opinion dated August 17,
1868 (12 Opin., 455), while that act was in force, AttorneyGeneral Evarts held that where an office is created by a law
taking effect during a session of the Senate ~nd no nomination
is made thereto, the original vacancy thus existing in the office
may be filled by the President during the recess of the Senate.
The case considered by Mr. Evarts was that of the collectorship of customs for Alaska, an office then .recently created,
but to which no nomination had been made prior to the adjournment of the Congress creating it. His opinion concludes
with the remark: ''I do not find this case embraced within
the operation of the tenure of civil office act, and, under the
accepted construction of the constitutional authority of the
President, I have no doubt of his power to grant a commission to a collector of customs for Aiaska \\:hich shall expire
at the end of the next session of the Senate." ·
In the above view of the constitutional authority of the

•
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President to fill an original vacancy during the recess of the
Senate, which existed while the Senate was in session, I
concur.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

VACANCIES IN OFFICE.
The power of the President to fill vacancies in office by temporary
appointment, derived under section 2, Article II, of the Constitution,
comprehends all vacanCies that may happen to exist in a recess of the
Senate, irrespective of the time when such vacancies first occur.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 25, 1884.
SIR: The provision in the · Constitution (Art. II, sec. 2),
giving the President "power to fill up all vacancies that may
happen during the recess of the Senate," etc., as construed
by Attorney-General Wirt, in an opinion given to President
Monroe in 1823 (1 Opin., 631 ), comprehends all vacancies
that may happen to exist in a recess of the Senate, irrespective of the time when such vacancies first occurred ; and
this construction has been reaffirmed by later Attorneys-General, among whom may be named Attorney -General Taney,
Legare, Mason, Cushing, Bates, Stanbery, Evarts, Williams, and Devens. Moreover, the pract,ice of the Executive
has, as it appears, uniformly accorded with this view.
The whole subject is elaborately reviewed in an opinion of
Attorney-General Devens, dated June 18, 1880 (16 Opin.,
523), given upon a question which then arose as to the
authority of the President to fill~ during a recess of the Senate, a vacancy in the office of collector of the port of Philadelphia caused by expiration of term while the Senate was in
session. The opinion holds that the President had power to
fin the vacancy by a temporary appointment; and General
Hartranft was appointed to fill the vacancy, his commission
to expire at the next session of the Senate.
The considerations which support the construction mentioned are so fully presooted ic that opinion, that I deem it
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unnecessary to undertake to restate them here. I will
merely add that I am impressed with their weight, and am
entirely satisfied as to the soundness of that construction.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR OF STEAM-VESSELS.
The provision for assistant inspectors in section 4414, Revised Statutes,
is not <;!On trolled by the details of section 4415, as to either the method
of their appointment or the professional qualifications which may be
required by the appointing power.
Should an inspection of life-preservers be found necessary, and in order
to effect this some assistant to the local board must needs be appointed,
the appointment of such assistant would be warranted by law.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Ju-ly 3, 1~84.
SIR: Yours of the 30th ultimo calls my attention to a
recent recommendation Jo you by the Board of Supervising
Inspectors of Steam-Vessels to appoint an "assistant inspector," under the provisions of section 4414, Revised Statutes, whose duty it shall be personally to inspect life-preservers. Thereupon you ask :
:F irst. Can the Secretary of the Treasury, under the statutes, appoint an additional inspector ot,her than of hulls or
of boilers ~
Second. Can he appoint an additional inspector of hulls
(or of boilers) and detail him to life-preserving work?
Third. Is he required in the appointment to conform to
section 4415, so as that the appointee shall have the qualifications there named ~
I observe that by sectio·n 4421 the local inspectors are required to inspect and give a certificate as to (amongst other
matters) the" equipment" of steam-vessels, and that by section 4482 ''good life-preserv·ers, made of suitable material,"
are a part of such equipment. It may be taken for granted
that such inspection, in order to be effective, should be made
by experts. But section 4415, which gives a detailed state-
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ment of the qualifications required for local inspectors, is
silent in respect to those obviously needed here.
·
The provision for assistant inspectors in ·section 4414 is not
controlled by the details of 4415 as to either the method of
their appointment or the professional qualifications which the
appointing power shall demand. All that is ne~essary for
these is that they shall be qualified to assist their principals
in official duties, and that they shall be "actually required."
Therefore if experience has shown that an inspection of lifepreservers is necessary, and that in order duly to effect it
some assistant to the local board must be appointed, I am of
opinion that Title LII of the Revised Statutes warrants such
appointments.
I therefore submit the following answers to the questions
which you put:
· First. The person appointed by the Secretary will be not
a member of the "local board", but merely an assistant to the
inspectors of hulls and boilers in such of their official duties
as the Secretary may designate.
Second. He will not be an '' additional inspector"; and
his assignment to duty will properly be . made a matter of
express designation, as suggested by· you.
Third. He need not have the qualifications mentioned in
section 4415.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CHARWIN LAND GRANT.
An appeal does not lie to the President from a decision made by the
Secretary of the Interior touching the correctness or validity of a resurvey of a private land claim.

DEP.ARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,
July 10, 1884.

SIR: The communication addressed to you by Messrs.
Ewing and others, representing the claimants under the
"Charwin grant," dated the 4th of May, 1883, together with
the papers accompanying the same and referred to me for
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my opinion as to the action desired by the said claimants at
your hands, has received my consideration.
On the 26th August, 1879, an order was issued by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office for a resurvey of
the "Charwin grant." This resurvey was made and returned to the Commissioner, who is at the same time acting·
surveyor-general of Missouri, the State in which lies the land
alleged to be covered by the grant.
The Commissioner was of opinion to approve tbe resurvey
made under the order of the 26th of August, 1879, but did
not feel warranted to do so because a previous resurvey corresponding exactly with the one in quest.ion had been disap-·
proved by a former Secretary of the Interior.
Impressed with the correctness of this resurvey, the Commissioner addressed a communication on the subject to the
Secretary of the Interior, dated the 27th of September, 18so;
a copy of which is among the papers transmitted to me.
In reply to that communication the then Secretary, the
Ron. C. Schurz, went into an elaborate consideration of the
validity or correctness of the resurvey in the light of certain
alleged new evidence, and also considered the question
whether the decision of his predecessor on a similar resurvey
was a bar to action on his part touching this one, and arrived
at the conclusion that on both grounds the resurvey should
be rejected.
Application to you is now made to set aside this action of
Secretary Schurz, on the ground that the case was before the
latter only on tLe question whether the decision of his predecessor was a bar to action on his part and not on the
alleged new evidence, and that therefore his act in passing
on this evidence was an exercise of original jurisdiction, and
for that reason void.
I am of opinion that an appeal to ;you does not lie in this.
matter. If an appeal lay in such a case, it is apparent that
it would lie in every case and from all the Executive Departments, and soon you would be overwhelmed with the details
of administration.
In the exercise of an admitted power Congress has committed the subject-matter involved in this case to the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of
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the Interior, but has not provided for an appeal to you from
the action of those officers.
It has been repeatedly held that the observance of ~·our
constitutional duty of taking care that the laws be faithfully
executed does not of itself warrant your taking part in the
discharge of duties devoh·ed by law upon an exEcutive officer.
Upon a question so well settled I do not deem-it necessary
to do more than to refer to the opinion of Mr. Attorney General Bates on the Illinois case (11 Opin., p. 14), where will
be found references to other opinions on the same point.
The delay in sending you this opinion is the result of my
compliance with the request of the counsel prosecuting this
appeal that action might be suspended to allow further
discussion.
I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.

HOSPITAL PATIENTS.
Under a statutory provision making an appropriation "for the care, support, and medical treatment of seventy-five transient paupers, medical
and surgical patients in the city of Washington, under a contract t~
be made with such institution as the Surgeon-General of the Army may
select," etc., that officer may, within the limits of such appropriation,.
contract with one or more hospitals, as in his judgment will best fulfill its purposes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 12, 1884.
SIR: Your letter of the 11th instant directs my attention
to the following provision in the act making appropriation
for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1885, and for other purposes, viz :
''For the care, support, and medical treatment of seventyfive transient paupers, medical and surgical patients in the
city of Washington, under a contract to be made with such
institution as the Surgeon-General of the Army may select,"
etc., and also presents for my consideration the question
"whether it would be competent for the Surgeon-General to
make one contract for twenty-five patients with the Garfield
273-VOL XVIII--3
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Memorial Hospital, and another contract for the remainder
with some other hospital to be selected by him, if he shall be
of opinion that such a division of the appropriation is for
the public interest."
I have the honor to submit, in reply, that the provision referred to does not require the Surgeon-General, in exercising
the authority thereby conferred, to select and contract with
but one hospital for the care and treatment of patients.
Under some circumstances (e. g., where suitable accommoda·
tions could not be had in any one institution for the whole
number) such requirement might partially defeat the charitable purposes of the statute; and a construction admitting
this result under any circumstances must be rejected, unless
it is imperatively demanded by the language of the law,
which I do not fiud to be the case. The provision may well
be construed to authorize the Surgeon-General, within the
limits of the appropriation, to contract with one or more hospitals, as in his judgment may best fu1fill its purposes,
namely,'' the care, support, and medical treatment of seventyfive transient paupers," etc.
I accordingly answer the question submitted by you in the
affirmative.
I am, sir, with great respect,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. ROBERT T. LINCOLN,
Secretary of War.

CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW PERMIT LAWS.
In the absence of treaty or statutory provisions to the contrary, the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations have power to regulate their own
rights of occupancy, and to say who shall participate therein l)nd upon
what conditions; and hence may require permits to reside in the nation from citizens of the United States, and levy a pecuniary exaction
therefor.
Treaties of 1855 and 1866, in so far as they relate to this subject, considered and construed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 19, 1884.
SIR: Yours of the 9th instant states a question as to the
validity of the Choctaw and Chickasaw permit laws; and in
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that connection asks whether, supposing these laws to be
valid, the United States, through the proper Department,
have power to revise them so as to s~cure reasonableness in
the amount of the fees which they require from persons who
apply for permits.
I observe your reference to the fact that an opinion in
favor of the validity of these laws has already (July 25, 1881)
been rendered in this Department; and that the present review thereof is asked in consequence of earnest protest
against that opinion from among the people of the two nations concerned-the more because such protest is in accordance with the judgments of some members of' Congress and
,o ther prominent gentlemen from StateJS adjoining.
I have therefore carefully considered the matter so submitted.
I have before me no authenticated copy of the permit law
in question. I assume that it is substantially that which is
contained in Senate Report No. 698, Forty-fifth Congress,
third session, and that it is admitted that such law has been
duly adopted by the authorities of both nations.
The copy before me contains nine sections, substantially
and in brief as follows :
(1) Citizens of the United States wishing to rent land, or
to be otherwise employed in the nation, shall enter into contract with a citizen, who shall report the same to the clerk
of the county where he resides.
(2) The citizen shall apply to the clerk for permits for male
non-citizens over the age of eighteen years in his employ,
and for each permit the non-citizen shall pay $25, which
shall be paid into the national treasury.
(3) Foreigners coming into the nation in order to farm, or
be employed, without authority of the United States, shall
be intruders" by virtue of" Revised Statutes, section 2134.
(4) Licensed residents, teachers, and physicians (non-citizens) shall procure permits, and shall pay for such $25.
(5) Permits shall be annual; "and in case of violation of
any law of this nation the offender shall be ordered out of
its limits."
(6) If a non-citizen having a permit shall leave the employ
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of the citizen without his consent, he shall forfeit the permit
and he incapable of receiving another.
(7) Regulating number of cattle, etc., which a person having a permit may hold.
(8) Certain freedmen to procure permits.
(9) Conflicting acts repealed.
The general question, therefore, is whether the nations have
th e power to require permits to reside from citizens of the
United States, and to levy a pecuniary exaction therefor r
and, if so, whethe-r that power is absolute, or is liable to revision by the United States.
That question may arise from the fundamental relations
betwixt the United States and such nations, or because of
the terms of some treaty or statute.
(1) In the absence of a treaty or statute, it seems that the
power of the nation thus to regulate its own rights of occupancy, and to say who shall participate therein and upon
what conditions, can not be doubted. The clear result of aU
the cases, as restated in 95 United States Reports~ at page
526, is, ''the right of the Indians to their occupancs is as
,sacred as that of the United States to the fee."
I add, that so far as the United States recognize political
organizati<;ms amongst Indians the right of occupancy is a
right in the tribe or nation. It is of course competent for the
United States to disregard such organizations and treat Indians individually, but their policy has generally been other. •
wise. In such cases presumptively they remit all question
of individual right to the definition of the nation, as being
purely domestic in character. The practical importance here
of this proposition is that in the absence of express contradictory provisions by treaty, or by statutes of the United
States, the nation (and not a citizen) is to declare who shall
come within the boundaries of its occupancy, and under
what regulations and conditions.
What has thus been said will of course be understeod as
having no application to cases in which the United States, in
connection with their own paramount rights, authorize employes of their own to enter such boundaries. The present
question concerns only such persons as have no employment
within the nation upon behalf of the United States.
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(2) I am now to consider the provisions of the statutes of
the United States, and their treaties with the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Nations.
My attention has not been called to any statutory provision by the ·united States which is thought to apply here,
nor upon examining the United States statutes have I found
such. I have therefore assumed that there is none.
The treaties of 1855 and 1866 show, of course, by their
very existence, an intention by the United States to resort
to the national organization of these Indians as a means of
their civilization. In other words, the existence of these
treaties indicates a general purpose by the United States to
leave to these nations control of that clas.s of questions which
in ordinary diplomatic intercourse is styled domestic. In
the absence of a contrary intent expressed or strongly implied from the "dependency" of Indians, questions of Choctaw and Chickasaw policy are domestic where they would
have been so in case of a foreign nation.
I understand that such contrary intent is thought to be
shown in article 7 of the treaty of 1855 and the corresponding provision in article 43 of the treaty of 1866, an intention
to the same effect appearing also in article 47 of this latter
treaty.
(a) Article 7 (1855) secures to the Choctaws and Chickasaws, amongst other things, "the unrestricted right of selfgovernment and free jurisdiction over persons and property
within their respective limits, excepting, however, all persons or their property who are not by birth, adoption, or
~therwise citizens or members of either tribe," etc.
I submit t.hat whatever this may mean it does not limit the
right of these tribes to pass upon the question, who (of persons indifferent to the United States, i. e., neither employes,
nor objectionable) shall share their occupancy and upon
what terms. That is a question which all private persons
" decide for themselves; and even wild animals,
.are allowed to
not men, have a certain respect paid to the instinct which in
this respect t;hey share with man. The serious words "juris·
diction" and "self-government" are scarcely appropriate to
the right of a hotel-keeper to prescribe rules and charges for
persons who become his fellow occupants. It is therefore im-
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probable that the above proposition in the treaty of 1855 has
any relation to this plain natural right and natural instinct
of an Indian nation.
•
(b) By article 43 (1866) the United States promise that no
white person, except their officers, etc., shall be permitted to
go into the territory of the two nations, unless formally incorporated and naturalized by the joint action of such nations;
such promise, however, not to affect parties already adopted,
or white persons temporarily employed as teachers, mechanics, or as skilled in agriculture, etc.
It is not necessary to say more about the meaning of
this article than that it has no bearing upon the question
whether the nations may not themselves, and at their own
discretion, exclude from their boundaries persons whom
th~ United States have not promised to exclude-so that
these be not persons that the United States have licensed. orotherwise authorized to enter. It is to be borne in mind that
however true it may be that the United States recognize that.
residence among the Choctaws of teachers, etc., will be a benefit to them, they do not appear to intend that such residence
shall be licensed by themselves without the consent of thenations, or that education and agriculture, etc., shall be furthered by white residents at the will of the United States and
individual Indians without consent of the nation. Whilst
the United States might have so provided, it seems that as
yet they have not.
(c) Nor has the provision in article 47 (1866) any bearing
upon the right of the nation to require the exaction in question. The condition that the President should approve of
the tax there mentioned depends upon the circumstance that
its levy was to have the effect of diverting from its original
purpose a certain trust fund in his hands. That before paying that fund out, the President was to be satisfied of the
propriety and efficiency of the tax whose procetds were to besubstituted to the public ends theretofore served by the fund,
does not argue that such supervision is to be general, or that
as respects other matters a right to tax does not belong to
the nation. The presumption indeed is to the contrary.
In the same connection article 39 of the same treaty (1866)
may be referred to. In that power is given to tax traders,_
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even persons licensed by the United States. A ud to
the same effect is article 16 of the treaty of 1855. The peculiar ground of exemption in which licensed intercourse
with Indian nations stanlls in this respect in general has
been well understood, as I suppose, ever since the opinion of
Attorney-General Wirt in 1824. (1 Opin., 645.)
As I have already said, there is not in these treaties-or,
as J gather, anywhere else-action by the United States
licensing the intercourse upon which the exaction in question
bas been imposed. All to that effect which appears is au
exception of such intercourse from a prornise that the United
States will exclude certain white persons from the Indian
Territory.
In conclusion I have to say, that my attention has not been
called to any statute by which Congress has delegated to a
Department or officer of the United States its power to control such taxation. I therefore conclude that p.o Department
or officer has such power.
I believe that th~ above opinion substantially covers all
that you have asked in relation to the perrnit laws or to the
former opinion of this Department.
Seven papers transmitted by you are herewith retul'ned.
With great respect, your obedient servant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE IN'rERIOR.
i.

WIDOW'S PENSION.
A pensioner, previous to his death, was in receipt of a pension of $72 per
month under the provisions of the act of June 16, 1880, chapter 236,
and after his death a pension certificate granting $30 per month was
issued to his widow under section 4702, Revised Statutes; but the latter claims to be entitled under that section, as widow, to the same
amount of pension which her husband was in receipt of, viz: $72 per
month: Held that the widow's pension is limited to the amount given
for "total disability" by section 4695, Revised Statutes.

DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,
July 26, 1884.
SIR: By your letter of the 23d inst. it appears that General Ward B. Burnett, at his death, was a pensioner, in re-
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ceipt of $72 per month, under the provisions of the act of
June 16, 1880, chapter 236, and that a pension certificate
granting $30 per month has since been issued to Mrs. H. A.
Burnett, as his widow; under the provisions of section 4702,
Revised Statutes, but that Mrs. Burnett claims to be entitled under that section, as widow, to the same amount of
pension which her husband was in receipt of, namely, $72
per month.
Section 4702 declares that the widow "shall be entitled to
receive the same pension as the husband would have been
entitled to had he been totally disabled," and the question
suggested by the present case is, whether this provision is
limited to the pension of" total disability" given by section
4695, Revised Statutes, or extends to pensions given for the
class of disabilities mentioned in section 4698, and elsewhere
described in the statute as ''permanent specific disabilities."
I understand that, in the practice of your Department, the
provision referred to has heretofore been construed to give
the widow a pension for" total disability" as granted by section 4695, and no other, and that the pension certificate
issued to Mrs. Burnett is base.! upon t.his construction.
Upon examination of the pension laws I perceive no .
grounds for adopting a different construction.
In section 4692, Revised Statutes, three distinct classes of
disabilities are designated, namely : "total," 41 permanent
specifict and "inferior," and for each of these classes separate rates of pension are provided. Going back to the act of
July 14, 1862, chapter 166, we find but two classes of disabilities mentioned: "total disability" and "inferior disability"; the pension given for the latter being, of course, less
in amount than that allowed for the former. The provision
for the widow's pension in that act (sec. 2) was similar to the
provision in 4702, Revised Statutes. It entitled her to "the
same pension as the husband would have been entitled to
bad he been totally disabled"; and that was fixed by a provision in the same act (section 1) prescribing the rate of
pension for "total disability." In other words, the amount
of the widow's pension was to be ascertained by reference
to the provision for a ''total disability" pension.
Subsequent acts made separate provisions for particular
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disabilities : as the loss of both feet, both hands, or both eyes
(sec. 5, act of July 4, 1864, chap. 247), the loss of one foot
.and one hand (sec. 3, act of March 3, 1865, chap. 84. See,
also, act of June 6, 1866, chap. 106, sec. 1; act of ,June 8,
1872, chap. 342; and sees. 3 and 4 of the act of March 3,
1873, chap. 234; sees. 4697 and 4698, Rev. Stat.; act of
June 18, 1874, chap. 298; act of ,June 16, 1880, chap. 236.)
Thh; legislation, however, made no change in the law as
regards the amount of the widow's pension. The particular disabilities described therein form a distinct class,
termed" permanent specific." The widow's pension is not
governed by the rate provided for a disability of that class,
but by the rate provided for a "total disability," as distinguished in the statute from a "permanent specific disability" or an "inferior disability."
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.

The

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

TRANSPORTATION OF INDIAN SUPPLIES.
The provision in the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 101, requiring certain
contracts for the transportation of goods for Indian tribes, etc., to be
let to the lowest bidder after advertisement, does not supersede or
repeal the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 133, section 5260, Revised Statutes, touching payments to land-grant railroads for services to the
Government.
""
Wherever it is practicable to obtain for the Government the benefit of
the act of 1877, without yielding the benefits secured to it by the other
legislation referred to, this should be done.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 8, 1884.
SIR: Yours of the 29th ultimo calls attention to the stat. utes of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 291); March 3, 1875 (18 Stat.,
453); and to Revised Statutes, section 5260, and asks whether
the first named, by requiring certain contracts for the transportation of goods for Indian tribes, etc., to be let to the
lowest bidder after advertisement supersedes or 'repeals the
two latter, which to a certain extent prohibit payment to
land. grant railroads for services to the Government; and
whether contracts for transportation as above can he made
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irrespective of any obligation to the Government upon the
part of railroads which may or must be made use of by the
contractor.
In reply I submit, in the first place, that that statute of
1877 neither repeals nor supersedes the others. Upon the face
of the three statutes it does not appear that a joint effect may
not well be derived from all for any cases that in one respect
or another are affected by all, and where this can be done it
should be done.
Again, wherever and so far as it is practicable to obtain
for the Government the benefit of the statute of 1877 u,itho1J:t
yield·ing that given by the others, this is to be done. If transportation by a railroad which receives from the Government
only 50 per cent. of its charges to the public is lower than a
lowest "bid," the transportation should be made by the railroad. And whatever advantage in any case the element of
such privilege of the Government provides is to be had if
practicable. If the routine forms of contracts heretofore in
use do not secure the benefits of this statutory economy, new
forms are to be devised, and of course new details in the corresponding advertisements also.
How far, in the great variety of such cases that must occur,
this rule may be practicable, I do not know, although probably not in all. This, however, does not forbid its application
so far as may be. One or other or all of these statutes are
to be made use of according as the interests of the public
require. The necessary or probable use of a land-grant road
may in one case constitute it de facto the lowest statu~tory bidder; in another may suggest the breaking up of the transportation into stages and separate contracts; and in a third
may be so uncertain or so unsubstantial an element as in
prudence properly to be disregarded.
These simple examples occur to me as proper to illustrate
the above views.
The difficulty seems to be one of administration, rather than
as to the meaning of the legislature.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting .Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR .
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APPRAISEMENT OF VARNISH.
The subject of the proper appraisement of varnish imported into the
United States from a bonded warehouse in Canada, wherein it had
been manufactured-a component of such varnish of chief value being
distilled spirits produced in the United States and exported thence
into the said warehouse, where it was compounded into the varnishconsidered.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 18, 1884.
SIR: I have attentively read and considered yours of the
12th instant and its inclosures.
The question which you present concerns the proper
appraisement of'' varnish" that has been imported from a
bonded warehouse in Canada, having been manufactured there·in, a component part thereof of chief value being 4 ' distilled
spirits" produced in the United States and exported thence
into the wgrehouse, from which, after being compounded into
varnish, it is now returned.
Three theories as to such appraisement have been heretofore presented :
(1) That the varnish is to be taxed as "a compound of distilled spirits."
(21 That, inasmuch as "varnish" is mentioned in the customs act and has a particular duty imposed upon it by that
name, no attention can be paid to its character as a compound;
but, following herein a well-known rule of statutory interpretation, varnish duty alone can be exacted.
(3) Inasmuch as varnish duty is in part an ad valorem duty,
a secondary question arises as to the rule of appraisement;
i.e., does that rule refer to (a) values in the general markets
of Canada, or (b) values in the bond market, it being shown
thaii_ varnish made with distilled spirits is largely, if not generally, sold in Canada in bond.
The importers press the theory of a bond-market valua.tion.
for the article considered as ''varnish."
For the Government it has been argued heretofore that
the article should be treated with a reference to the "distilled spirits" which it contains. If that theory is untenable,
then it is said that appraisement should be according to the
general Canada market, and not under this or that special
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condition to which the article in question may in fact have
been subjected.
But for what has passed in court upon this matter, I should
adhere without hesitation to the conclusion suggested to you
by Attorney-General McVeagh in his letter of May 28, 1881;
or, in other words, that in view of the very special revenue
policy of the United States as to "distilled spirits," articles
which come within the verge of that policy are to be regulated thereby, and that rules of construction otherwise applicable must give way. I see no reason why the principle upon
which the Supreme Court has drawn special conclusions as
regards the treatment of ''cotton," because of the special war
policy towards that article adopted by Congress (Young's
case, 97 U. S., 58, etc.), does not apply to the effect above
suggested as regards "distilled spirits." As a guide to statutory meaning, a clear public policy must be allowed to outweigh presumptions arising from the usus loquendi as to
matters outside of such policy. (De Forest v. Lawrence, 13
How., 274). The well-known caution against sticking in the
bark applies here.
The question is an interesting one, and with all deference
to the learned court that has held otherwise it seems to me
that it has not so far been satisfactorily adjusted.
In this connection I may add that my communication to
yourself, under date of June 29, 1882, certifying that no writ
of e~or would be taken from the judgment in Birmingham's
case, which is the decision just alluded to, was based upon the
view which generally governs such certificates, viz, that writs
of error are not to be taken in cases with which the customs
office and the district attorney do not express dissatisfaction.
In conne0tion, however, with your recent note, I have
looked into the question more at large~ and ask your attention to the following considerations as specially confirming
the conclusion above drawn in general from _policy.
The definition of "distilled spirits," for tax purposes, under
.section 3248, includes all substances into which 4 ' ethyl alco·
hoi," etc., is transferred, ''either in the process of original
production or -bY any subsequent process.''
This definition governs through the whole ''act," i. e., as
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appears by a reference to the :first page of that book, throughout the whole Revised Statutes.
Therefore, if varnish could have been made with distilled
spirits in a domestic warehouse, the product for revenue
purposes would still be "distilled spirits." Can it make any
difference that the place of manufacture is a Canadian warehouse¥ Would a court read this and the connected provision
as giving protection to the foreign as against the domestic
manufacturer¥
And even if, as is not to be admitted, the word "act" in
seqtion 3248 is to be restrained to the meaning which it had
whilst part of the act of 1868, it is to be considered that
merely as a context, and as declaratory of an important policy
which otherwise would be maimed, it indicates that the expression " compounds or preparations of which distilled
spirits is a component part of chief" value," in paragraph 3 of
page' 464, Revised Statutes, is in reason to be preferred to the
name'' varnish" in determining the duty upon that sort of
varnish of which distilled spirits is such component. This
conclusion goes upon the ground that whilst for customs purposes the paragraph just mentioned affects the definition of
"distilled spirits" in section 3248, it does so only by excluding therefrom those compounds in which it is not a component
part of chief value.
The origin of the above paragraph defining the rate of duty
upon compounds of distilled spirits also shows that it is emphatic, and therefore to be excepted from the rule of interpretation applied in Birmingham's case. That paragraph is
to be found first. in the act of 1866, chapter 298 (14 Stat.,
328), which is entitled "An act to protect the revenue, and for
other purposes," and imposes duties upon only cigars, cigarettes, and cheroots, cotton, and compounds of which distilled
spirits is a component part of chief value. It seems plain,
therefore, that these provisions were inserted ex industria,
and, as said in a late historical book of great intelligence
(Mr. Blaine's), were required in order to conform the customs
law to the internal revenue statute, which had been enacted
only a few days before. In other words, an independent
conclusion is to be drawn from its history that the above
provision for compounds of distilled spirits is not of a merely

46

HON. S. F. PHILLIPS
Appraisement of Varnish.

------------------------

residuary character, as is the case generally with those
clauses which come under the rule of interpretation above
cited, but was intended to furnish an additional and supreme
regulation applicable to all articles, however otherwise
named, in which a certain proportion of distilled spirits
should be found.
(2) If this be not so, or if there be good reasons for not
renewing this contention, I submit that t'ahtes, referred to in
paragraph 3 of page 482, Revised Statutes, are to be appraised
under sectio~ 2906 according to the market value in the
general Canadian markets, and not in Canadian markets for
articles in bond.
Additio probat minoritatem; i.e., if in section 2906 Congress
had intended, in cases of questions raised between the principal general market values and other special market values
in which the article in question had in fact bfen sold, to refer
appraisements to the latter, some additional word would have
been employed to show it. The value of spirits in the principal markets of the United States is not, no more being
said, the value of spirits as exportable from bonded ware·
houses, even if more spirits should be exported than is con·
.sumed.

The question as to value refers to Canada, and not to any
limbo within Canada.

I add that I am not informed of the grounds upon which
the customs office has decided to refer tbe appraisement of
tea and malt (as you say) to the value of these articles in bond,
and therefore do not know whether some special reason may
not control this action.
I may also say that Jones's case (103 U.S., 87), referred to
on behalf of the importers, does not affect the argument
bere. That was a case of tax against a vendor upon the
amount of sales by him. It was argued for the Government
that upon sales in bond the true wmount could be known only
by adding the tax that would be exacted whenever the goods
should be taken out of bond. But the court replied that
"amount of sales" meant actual amount, or what had actually been received; and could not refer to what in addition
the purchaser might have to pay to the Government before
hA could reduce the things into possession. Obviously, as I
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think, this judgment does not bear upon a question as to the
·m arket value of an article so sold. For that phrase prima
facie refers to prices the payment of which gives tile purchaser a legal right to control the possession of the article
ad libiturn; which is not the case .here, where the only right
obtained was that of sending out of Canada an article that
had never been mixed with the general property of that
countr~', but had existed there only as an ear-marked article
in close public custody.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting .LJ..ttorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE 'TREASURY.

DUTY ON PLATED SILVER CORDS, ETC.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 21, 1884.
SIR: Accepting, as is my duty, the facts stated by you in
yours of the 18th instant in regard to "certain plated silver
cords and braids and plated embroideries" recently imported, I hereby submit an opinion that the same are dutiable at the rate of 25 per cent. ad valorem.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY.
Upon the facts stated : Advised that so much of the road of the St. Louis
and San Francisco Railroad Company as lies between St. Louis and
Pacific (a distance of about thirty-five miles) should not be treated as
a land-grant road.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 22, 1884.
In reply to yours of the lOth instant in regard to
the claim of the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company that its road shall not be treated as "land grant" beSIR:
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twixt St. Louis and Pamfic-that is, for a distance of thirtyfive miles-! beg to say : That as you make no statement of
' facts-but for these merely refer to a number of detached
papers inclosed-inasmuch as it is no part of my duty to
settle questions of fact, I shall assume that the circumstances
of the c~se upon which advice is asked are those which appear, without any special scrutiny Qf these papers, as follows:
In 1852 a land grant was made by Congress in aid of a
railroad which afterward was duly located and constructed
from St. Louis, via Pacific, to Seneca; that subsequently, in
the course of bona fide business transactions, the title to so
much of the road as lay betwixt Pacific and Seneca was
separated from that to the remainder thereof, and became
vested in the company above mentioned, whose it is yet~
that, still subsequently, this company constructed a road
.. for itself, connecting its terminus at Pacific with the city of
St. Louis; and that now United States freight, etc., from
Seneca to St. Louis, and vice versa, is transported by the
company over its road as thus defined, viz, betwixt Seneca
and Pacific, over the purchased part, and betwixt Pacific
and St. Louis, over the part recently constructed.
Under this state of facts, I advise you that the amount of
mileage for which the company can be dealt with by the
United States, upon a land-grant footing, is only that betwixt
Seneca and Pacific.
The circumstance that, previously to the completion of its
Pacific-St. Louis division, the company had, by arrangement
or otherwise, transported Government freight between the
points Pacific and St. Louis over the road which formerly
had been united with that which as above it had purchased
(the mileage of which at that time therefore, as a matter of
course, had been reckoned in .<;;ettlements with the Government) is a matter of no significance in the present state of
dealing, which is that of the road aided only so much as
runs west from Pacific is traversed by the freight, etc., in
question.
Very respectfully.
S. F. PHILLIPS,
.Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRE1'.A.RY OF WAR.
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REGISTRY OF MAIL MATTER.
Under the second proviso of section 3 of the act of J nly 5, 1884, chapter
234, a departmental officer, in the discharge of his official duties, may
register letters and packets elsewhere than in the post-office at Washington.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 2, 1884.
Sm : Yours of yesterday, asking whether the second proviso to the third section of the act of July 5 last, " .Making
appropriations for the service of the Post-Office Department,"
etc., allows Departments to register "letters and packets"
elsewhere than in the post-offices of this city, the seat of
Government, has been received and considered.
I answer that question affirmatively.
Understanding a ''Department" as not extending to certain officers of the Government-such, for instance, as are
excluded specifically and by . name in the opmion of the
Attorney-General addressed to the Postmaster-General May
lG, 1877-I advise you that a "Department" officer who, in
the course of public business, is called temporarily to discharge his official duties at some place away from the seat
of Government, during such absence and for such duties.
comes within the meaning of the words "Executive Department or bureaus thereof," as used in the proviso to which
you call attention; and therefore, if required by such discharge to make use of the facilities of registry, may do so
without the payment of any fee.
I have, in this connection, attentively observed that the
opinion of the 16th of May, 1877, differs with this conclusion
· as to the rights of a Department to use official postal pn vileges elsewhere than in this city. Whilst it is to be admitted
that the Departments are, as Blackstone might have said,
somewhat 'regardant as to Washington, yet it seems that
such quality is not absolute and for all purposes. It is not
necessary, perhaps not possible, now to define its extent.
It is, no doubt, for many purposes, substantial and important. Time will gradually establish the boundary of such ex-·
ceptions thereto as are to be allowed. At present I need
only say, that the exigencies of public business often require
that officers strictly departmental shall pass to some other
273-VOL XVIII - 4
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part of the country for its transaction. Where such transaction is itself valid, it may be done with the aid of any help
thereto that Congress bas devised therefor, in general terms,
as has been done here.
Very respectfully,

S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General. ·
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

PERFORMING DUTIES OF VACANT OFFICE.
Where the office of Sixth Auditor became vacant by the death of the incumbent, and the duties thereof devolved by operation of the statute
upon the deputy auditor; .Advised that the period during which such
duties may be discharged by the deputy is limited by statute to ten
days.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 27, 1884.
SIR: Yours of this date, referring to the recent death of Mr.
Ela, the Sixth Auditor, states that 1\{r. Crowell, the deputy,
is now performing the duties of the office so vacated; and
asks how long the latter can continue to discharge these
duties by mere virtue of his place as deputy.
The statutory deputation created by the act of 1875, chapter 130, for, amongst other officers, Auditors, differs from that
at common law, and as regards, for instance, the application
of section 180, Revised Statutes, cannot be referred to for elucidation.
For instance, these deputies do not at any time represent
their principals; and they are empowered to fill the offices in
connection with which they are appointed even although such
principals are dead.
_
The only question therefore as to the term of office of a
deputy after the death of an Auditor is as to the meaning of
the statute of 1~68, chapter 227, now to be found, so far as
important here, in sections 178 and 180 of the Revised Statutes.
The temporary term therein authorized either by the mere
operation of the statute, or by the action of the President,
is for no longer period than ten days.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURL

51

Printing Public Documents.

The theory seems to be ( and very properly ) that iu its
normal equipment with Auditors and deputy auditors the Treasury has no more than a sufficiency of officers to transact the
public business properly; and therefore that in case of death,
etc., this normal equipment is to be restored within the brief
period named.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
.1tcting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
PRINTING PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
'The joint resolution of July 7, 1882, "to provide. for the printing of public documents," etc., applies to all documents or reports ordered to be
· printed by Congress, whether by special act or otherwise, so that
such legislation does not forbid the printing of the "usual number"
of the document.
'The" usual number," within the meaning ofthe resolution, indicated.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
Septernber 1, 1884.
'SIR: You ask whether joint resolution No. 43, approved
July 7, 1882, entitled ''To provide for the printing of public
documents," etc., includes such documents as are ordered by
act or resolution continuous in its authority from year to year,
or Congress to Congress, as well as those ordered by special
.a ct or resolution, the authority of which is exhausted by the
publication of a single specific edition.
The resolution is in these words: "That whenever any
document or report shall be ordered printed by Congress,
there shall be printed, in addition to the number in each case
.stated, the ''usual number" of copies for binding and distribution among those entitled to receive them; and this shall
apply to all unexecuted orders now in the office of the Public
Printer."
Upon a first reading this language appears to be very general and comprehensive.
Upon reference to the debates in Congress for information
as to the occasion for its passage, I find that it was originally
introduced into the House by the Committee on Printing,
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and that, in reply to repeated questions, it was plainly and
briefly stated that it had been drawn by the Clerk of the
House and presented to the committee simply for the purpose
of restoring a state of things which had existed from early
times until a short time before, when inadvertently some legislation had changed it. There was no contradiction of this,
the only question raised thereabout being whether the words
of the resolution did not go further. In the Senate, the
chairman of the like committee stated that its purpose was
to provide for a defect caused by the circumstance that when
documents were ordered to be printed in an appropriation
bill, the distribution thereof being fixed by law (so many to
each House and so many to the Departments), no provision
arises for what is known as the" usual number," which "usual
number" is distributable by law, one to each Senator and
Representative, others to the libraries and document-rooms
of each House, and others again to the Interior Department
for transmission to public libraries.
At the ·time of the introduction of this resolution section
3792, Revised Statutes, provided that '' 1550 copies of any
document ordered by Congress shall be printed, and that number shall be known as the usual number. No greater number
shall be printed, unless ordered by either House or as hereinafter provided."
I understand that this usual number had an express, specific destination, as stated to the Senate.
If so, in case any other number were expressly ordered to
be printed for a different destination, a reasonable construction would hold such other number to be additional to the
"usual number," to wit, so many under the special order for
one purpose, and so many more under the general provision
of section 3792, or any amendment thereof, for another and
standing purpose.
Reconciliation of the explanation given by the House committee, with that by the Senate committee as above, sug-gests
that the occasion for the resolution of 1882 was, that the construction above suggested had previously prevailed, at least
to a considerable extent, but that more recently it had been
rejected, at least perhaps in the case of some document more
t}lan ordinarily deGirable. By comparing what theretofore
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had occ~red as to some documents with what more recently
had occured as to others, the Clerk, and following him the
committee in the House, may have concluded that a change
had somehow or other been made affecting all documents.
And therefore the occasion for legislation may have been so
represented and so met.
Upon the whole, therefore, the words of the resolution are
not restrained by the circumstances calling for its adoption,
and they amount to a construction of section 3792, the present " usual number" being 1900.
The word "document" in the resolution therefore has a
general application to everything that is a document, no matter by what kind of legislation ordered, so that such legi.slation do not actually forbid the printing of the "usual number" of the document upon which it operates.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-(feneral.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
TONNAGE DUTIES.
Section 14 of the act of Jm.e 26, 1884, chapter 121, does not subject the
suspensions mentioned in its first proviBo to the discretion of the President.
Meaning of the phrase " government of the foreign country," in the same
section.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
September 2, 1884.
SIR: In reply to yours of the 30th ultimo, relating to tonnage duties upon the '' Tin to" from Trinidad: ·
(1) The shipping act of June 26, 1884, sebtion 14, does not,
as I understand it, subject the suspensions mentioned in its
first proviso to the discretion of the President; and therefore I am of the opiniou that a right thereto arises upon the
happening of the condition tllerein mentioned, i. e., the state
of foreign law which in the opinion of the legislature warrants such suspensions.
(2) The phrase "government of the foreign country," in
the same section, refers, as appears by the context, to the
special government of such ~'country," as distinguished from
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that of the empire or other ultimate sovereignty of which it
may be a member.
And it seems to me also that the question in each case is
as to the tonnage and light-house dues exacted by that ·government at the particular port from which the vessel arrives,
irrespective of those exacted at other ports of the same '~ country."
.
.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting A ttm·ney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

REGISTRY OF OFFICIAL LETTERS OR PACKETS.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 2, 1884.
SIR: I am of opmwn that section 3 of ti.Je act of July·
5, 1884:, entitled" Making appropriations for the service of
the Post-Office Department," etc., does not authorize Indian
agents, or receivers and registers of land offices, to free registry of official letters and packets. Such letters and packets are not registered by either a Department, or a bureau of
a Department, within the provisions of that act.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

SHIPPING COMMISSIONERS.
A shipping commissioner bas no authority to ship seamen on "sail orsteam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade," unless such vessels come
within the exceptions of the act of June 9, 1874, chapter 260; nor will
the consent of the master and seaman operate to give such authority.
He should not receive fees for shipping seamen on coasting vessels not
within said exceptions.
Anything received by a shipping commissioner for such service is not
required to be accounted for by the terms of section 27 of the act of
June 26, 188~, chapter 121.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 6, 1884.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of August 29 ultimo, inclosing a letter from Shipping
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Commissioner J. A. O'Brien, of Philadelphia, of date August
~3 ultimo.
You say: "The question is submitted for your opinion,
whether the shipping commissioners may ship such seamen
when desired to do so by the master and the seamen; whether
he may collect or accept a fee for the service; and whether
such fee may be paid into the Treasury of the United States
under section 27 of the act of June 26, 1884."
I have to reply as follows: The act of June 7, 1872, commonly known as the shipping act, provided, inter alia, for the
appointment of certain officers to be known as '' shipping
commissioners,'' for their bonds, oaths, seals, clerks' offices,
fees, duties, etc. The principal duties prescribed by the act
for such an officer, and the only ones for which fees were
provided therein, were those of engaging and discharging
seamen and for apprenticing boys. For engaging a seaman
in the manner and form prescribed by the act the commissioner was to receive a fee of $2. This was to be paid by the
owner, master, etc., of the vessel or the ship engaging the
seaman, and such owner or master might deduct from the
seaman's wages 25 cents in part recoupment of this fee. The
law further made it a penal offense for any shipping commissioner to "demand or receive any remuneration whatever,
either directly or indirectly, for hiring or supplying any seamen for any merchant ships, excepting the lawful fees payable
under this act."
The above are among the "provisions'' of the act of June
7, 1872. These provisions were applicable to all vessels,
whether engaged in the foreign or coaeting trade. But it soon
became evident that the operation of the law would become
very onerous to those vessels of the latter class which matl.e
short voyages. So that on June 9, 1874, an act amendatory
thereof was passed. The purpose of this act, as stated by
Senator Buckingham, at the time of its passage by the Senate,
was "to relieve men engaged in short voyages and in domestic
trade from those requirements of the existing law," among
which requirements was this of paying a fee of$~ for engaging seamen.
The legislative intent evidently was to permit masters, etc.,
engaged in the coasting trade to ship their own seamen
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without the intervention of a shipping commissioner. The
act recites that" none of the provisions of" the act of June
7, 1872, "shall apply to sail or steam vessels engaged in the
coastwise trade," excepting certain classes of such vessels
which are thereafter mentioned in the act.
From the above recital it will appear what my answer to
your first question must be. A shipping commissioner has
no authority under the law, as it now stands, to ship seamen
on "sail or steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade"
unless such vessels come within the exceptions of the act of
June 9, 1874. Nor will the consent of the master and seaman
operate to give him such authority. The jurisdiction of the
commissioner is exactly defined by the law. No consent of
parties can operate to enlarge it.
The act of 1872 gave to this officer authority to ship seamen in all vessels engaged in the coastwise trade. The act
of 1874 took it away again, except in certain stated cases.
A shipping commissioner can do no more now, by virtue of
llis office, in respect of shipping sailors on unexcepted coasters, than he could have done in his private capacity prior to
the act of 1872.
In regard to your second question, I am of opinion that
shipping commi~sioners should not receive fees for shipping
seamP.n on ub.exceptecl coasters. While the act of 1874 has
declared the penalty provision of the act of 1872 (sec. 7) not
to apply to these cases, it has also declared the provisions in
regard to fees to be equally inapplicable. While a shipping
commissioner probably could not be prosecuted under section
7 of the act of 1872 for receiving a fee for shipping a sailor
ou an unexcepted coasting vessel, still, as he has now no
authority in law for making such shipment, he certainly has
no warrant for charging or accepting a fee for such service.
In answer to your third question, I am of opinion that anything received by a shipping commissioner for service of this
sort is not required to be accounted for to the Secretary of
the Treasury by the terms of section 27 of the act of June 26,
1884. This conclusion will naturally follow from what has
gone before. As I am of the opinion that shipping commissioners have no authority to render such service by virtue of
their office, ansthing received by them tllerefore would not
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come under the head of receipts of the office, and it is only
for such receipts that they are required to account by the act
of 1864.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Where a question is submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the
Solicitor of the Treasury for the opinion of the latter thereon, the
Attorney-General will not, at the request of the Solicitor~ consider
such opinion and express his views as to its conclusions.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
September 10, 1884.
SIR: It is not the usual course for the Solicitor of the Treasury or for the Assistant Attorneys-General assigned to other
Departments to transmit to the Attorney-General their opinions upon matters submitted to them therefor, in order that
be shall consider and express his views upon their conclu.sions.
The ''course of office" is that such opinions shall be returned to the Secretary in charge to govern his official action
if he concurs; as otherwise he may submit the same question
again to the Attorney-General, giving to the latter, if he so
choose, the advantage of perusing any opinion already rendered as above supposed.
Section 369, Revised Statutes, cited by you in this connection, is treated as referring to the officers of this Department strictly so called, jnasmuch as the legal gentlemen
formally assigned as arlvisers, etc., of the Treasury, the Interior, and the Post-Office Department are assistant to the
Secretaries and the Postmaster-General without an intervention by the Attorney-General.
I therefore herewith return the papers received in connection with yours of the 6th, being papers relating to Gris-
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wold's case, in order that the routine in such matterR shall
be observed.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
HENRY S. NEAL, Esq.
Solicitor of the Treasury.

PERFORMING DUTIES OF VACANT OFFICE.
In the case of a vacancy in the office of Secretary of the Treasury, caused
by the death of the incumbent: Advised that the duties of the office
can not be performed by some other officer, under sections 177, 179,
180, and 181, Revised Statutes, for a longer period than ten dayf.i.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Septembe·r 11, 1884.
SIR: I have examined the legislation which concerns the
appointment of a Secretary of the Treasury. In general it
appears not to have been changed since the year 1789. The·
statutes of that year made provision for the Departments of
State, War, and Treasury only (1 Stat., pp. 28, 49, and 6o).
As to the method of appointing the respective ''Secretaries"
.thereof nothing is said expressly. In each this matter is left
to that bare provision of the Constitution, which vests such
duties in the President; as follows:
"There shall be at the seat of Government an Executive
Department to be known as the Departmp,nt of, etc., and a
Secretary of, etc., who shall be the head thereof." (Stat.
of 1789 and Rev. Stat.)
" He shall nominate, and by and with the ad vice and consent of the Senate shall appoint, * * • all other officers
of the United States whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for," etc. (Constitution, Art. II, sec. 2.)
Upon consideration, therefore, of the question which has
arisen upon the rec~nt death · of Secretary Folger, I have
taken occasion to recur to the opinion which, upon the 31st
of March, 1883, I submitted to you upon the death of Postmaster-General Howe, and I advit5e you that the conclusion
in that case applies also in tl1e present-that is, that under
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sections 177, 179, 180, and 181 of the Revised Statutes no
statutory succession or assignment of some other officer to
the vacancy is valid for a longer period in all than ten days.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
· An opinion of the Attorney-General upon any question arising in the
administration of the Treasury Department can only be had at the
instance of the Secretary.
Where a question has been submitted by the Secretary to the Solicitor
oftbe Treasury for advice thereon, t.be latter is not entitled, by virtue
of section 361, Revised Statutes, to call upon the Attorney-General for
his views on such question.
The Solicitor should, in such case, return his advice directly to the Secretary, who may, if he choose, require an opinion from the AttorneyGeneral upon the same question.

DEPAR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,
September 15, 1884.
SIR : I observe that yours of the 12th instant, now before
me, changes the form of your previous application in Griswold's case, and brings it within the practice to which you
refer as having obtained in four cases entertained here bet'Yeen January and October in 1879, whilst Mr. Raynor held
the responsible place now occupied by yourself. (16 Opin.,.
259, 385, 571 and 617.)
I think that such practice should be changed, and will
state my reasons therefor.
The question as to Griswold which you state is, of course,.
one arising within section 356, Revised Statutes, in the ad~
ministration of the Treasury Department.
I observe that the duty in that section imposed upon the
Attorney-General to give an opinion in such case at therequirement of the Secretary of the Treasury implies that be
is not to give such opinion at the requirement of any other
officer thereof.
This conclusion is strengthened by a provision of the
next section (366), which in the same connection makes an
express distinction betwixt the War and Navy Departments
and all others, and directs that all questions arising in the

60

HON. S. F. PHILLIPS
Attorney· General.

administration of the two former, the cognizance of which is
not given by statute to some other officer, shall be sent to
the Attorney-General.
If it be granted that this allows questions in the War and
Navy Departments to be sent to the Attorney-General by
somebody else than the Secretaries, it is evident that it
makes a distinction therein betwixt these Departments and
all others, and that for a reason which upon its face it suggests. And if it be not granted that such questions can be
transmitted otherwise than by the Secretary, then it fo1lows
that under even a more general provision offic3rs of theW ar
and Navy Departments, other than their heads, can not regularly ask for opinions by the Attorney-Genm·al.
Admitting this, it may however be replied that the Solicitor of the Treasury is himself expressly an officer of the Department of Justice (sec. 349), and therefore by virtue of section 361: which was cited in your former letter, is entitled to
the direction of the Attorney- General.
Whatever this direction may include, I am of opinion that
it does not extend to opinions asked and given in the course
of a formal correspondence in writing.
If the Solicitor of the Treasury can authorize such correspondence as to matters which in due course come before
him, why may not the Solicitor-General do the same~ And,
if the Secretary of the Treasury ask for an opinion by the
Attorney-General, why may not the latter (under sec. 358)
refer the question to be answered by the Solicitor of the
Treasury~

My view is that section 358 does not apply in cases where,
as in the Department of the Treasury, Interior, etc., the
Secretary has a right to ask for an opinion from the subordinate directly; i. e., without an intervention by the Attorney General; i. e., in other words, where for the purposes of
the particular matter the formal "subordinate" is really not
.so, but is subordinate to another "head." So whenever, as
by section 3469, a substantive duty is expressly imposed
upon the ''subordinate" in regard to some ''bead" of
another Department, in my opinion such duty is not performed "under the direction of the Attorney-General" within
the words of section 361. This section, originally enacted in
1870, was intended, in a quasi residuary character, to cover
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cases not th~retofore provided for, and therefore not a '' recommendation" under section 3469; i. e., originally an act of
1863.
Without undertaking to state the difference betwixt the
''opinions," "directions," and "recommendations" mentioned
in the statutes before me, I think it plainly intended that
opinions by the Attorney-General upon questions like the
present, arising in the administration of the Treasury Department, can be had only at the instance of the Secretary.
There is the same advantage to the Secretary in first obtaining a deliberate opinion of the Solicitor of the Treasury,
and in reserving to himself a right of afterwards, by way of
review, applying to the Attorney-General for another, that
litigants have in a series of courts before which to contend
for their rights. And it is the same sort of defeat of public
policy for a Supreme Court to intervene in proceedings pending in a superior court, and for an Attorney-General to give
an opinion to the Solicitor of the Treasury without requirement by the Secretary. If the Secretary have a right to the
opinion of the Attorney-General in such cases by way of
review, he has equally a right that the latter shall not previously commit his judgment thereupon.
This question was not considered in the cases to which
you refer, and probably did not really occur. It seems to
me that these cases make a breach of good form, and should
not be followed. There is some account to be given of their
passing so easily in that your able and experienced predecessor was known not to have practiced law for perhaps
forty years, and therefore, if he chose to go outside of his
own office for aid, to have unusual claim for indulgence upon
merely technical questions. Now that the office is in the
hands of a lawyer tout temps prist, the practice may better
be recalled to its original course. (See 14 Opin., 21.)
I therefore return herewith the original papers inclosed
with yours, and await any requirement that the Secretary
may choose to make.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney General.
HENRY S. NEAL, Esq.,
Solicitor of the Treasury.
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INTERNAL-REVENUE STAMPS.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized, under certain conditions, to cause internal-revenue stamps, for the payment of tax upon
tobacco, to be prepared elsewhere than in the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 16, 1884.
In reply to yours of the 2d instant, asking whether
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized, under
the appropriate legislation for the present fiscal year, to cause
certain internal-revenue stamps, for the payment of tax upon
tobacco, to be prepared elsewhere than in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, I have to say that I am of opinion
that he is so authorized, provided that the United States are
at no expense thereabout beyond that for the provisional
payment of the salaries of one stamp agent and one counter,
"to be reimbursed by the stamp manufacturers."
The sundry civil act of July 7 last prohibits any expenditure for stamps prepared elsewhere than at the bureau above
named, but leaves the authority of the Commissioner thereabout in other respects untouched, whilst the provision in
the act of the same date, providing for the legislative, etc.,
expenses, clearly contemplates a continuance of the practice
of procuring stamps from ordinary manufacturers, who are
there required to repay the salaries of officers whose appointment is rendered necessary by that practice.
Three original papers inclosed in yours are herewitb. returned.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
SIR:

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS LAWS.
The "Foxhall" gold and silver cup is free of duty under sections 2499
and 2502, title XXXIII, Rev. Stat., as enacted by the act of March 3,
1883, chapter 121.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

ljeptember 19, 1884.
Yours of the 17th instant, referring to the "Foxhall"
gold and silver cup won at Ascot, which was the subject of
SIR:
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my letter to you of the 2d instant, asks whether it may not
properly be held to be an article having similitude in " material and quality and texture and the use to which it may be
.applied" to a "medal" made of those materials. and therefore whether it is not free under section's ~499 ~nd 2502 of
the customs act of 1883.
Upon consideration I answer this question in the affirmative.
As has been suggested, the purpose of the cup, like that of
a medal, is to commemorate a particular event. Substantially it is a trophy, and has no other value, except in point
()f material, and that is free.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

•
REFUNDING FINE UNDER SHIPPING ACT.
Section 26 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, does not require that a
protest shall have accompanied the payment of the fine, etc., a refunding of which by the Secretary of the Treasury is asked.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
September 19, 1884.
SIR: In .compliance with yours of the 13th instant, I have
-examined the question already presentt:d in the case of the
Bessie May, without regard to the special circumstanees for·
merly (2d instant) stated in that connection.
That question is, whether section 26 of the shipping act of
the 26th of June last requires that a protest shall have accompanied the pa~·ment of the fine, etc., a refunding of which is
sought from the Secretary of the Treasury.
In my opinion it does not.
The section under consideration provides in substance that
whenever any fine, etc., under laws relating· to vessels and
seamen, has been paid to a.ny collector or consular officer, and
application has been made within o11e year therefrom for its
refunding, the Secretary of the ·Treasury, if he find that it

•
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was illegally imposed, shall have power to refund so much
thereof as he may think proper.
This is, therefore, not a case in which the United States
define the circumstances under which they will submit themselves to coercion by a court in respect to money which some
officer in the executive department may have adjudged to be
justly due, as IS the case in section 2931, Revised Statutes; but
it is one in which the executive department is intrusted with
the power of rejudging its own judgment, and of doing thereabout what~oever it may think right, without control.
I am therefore of opinion that the omission in the provision
before me to require a protest by the applicant as a foundation for the refund is deliberate.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS.
Right of the United States to occupy and use soil within the bed of a
river for the improvement of its navigation affirmed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 21, 1884.
SIR: I submit the following opinion in reply to yours of
the 24th instant, relating ·to the improvement of the Falls of
the Ohio, at Louisville, Ky., and asking whether the engineer officers of the United States in charge thereof, under
the act of the 5th of July last, may enter upon certain premises, necessary to be occupied and used in the course of
such improvement, without making preliminary compensa·
tion to the owners under the law of eminent demain.
It would have been better if the communication of the
Chief of Engineers had stated the facts as to th.e site of the
premises directly, so as to avoid all chance of error in considering the various papers which accompany that letter.
I gather, however, that the premises are within the bed of
the Ohio at its average stage, and at that stage are coverrd
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with water; or, at all events that, but for improvement
works heretofore erected by the United States, they would
be so covered.
In either case I am of the opinion that in the present connection they do not raise any question under tht law of eminent domain, being held by their owners subject to the higher
rights and duties of the United States in regard to navigation. The exercise of those higher rights is not attended
by such obligations to the lower as on behalf of these are
suggested. The latter, so far as. concerns the degree to
which at any time they may be enjoyed, are contingent upon
and recede before the development of the former. There is
consequently no collision betwixt the two.
If, during the progress of an improvement requiring years
for its completion, and in consequence thereof a piece of land
within the bed of a river becomes dry or more dry than before, I am of opinion that this circumstance does not impair
the original right of the United State~ to deal therewith.
In exercising their important rights and duties in respect
to navigable rivers, the United States may divert the current.
thereof-the deep wate:rr-to any portion of their beds ; and,.
equally, they may use any other portion of those beds to
secure such primary purpose, and both without being amenable for a violation of rights of private property.
The cases in 16 Opinions of Attorneys-General, cited in the
papers inclosed by you, are in point for this conclusion ; and
so is the general course of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in 99 United States Reports, 635. The whole bed of
the river is a road, and may be improved or be made to contribute to an improvement of the rest.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R.
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POTOMAC FLATS.
The existence of certain claims of title to the "Potomac flats" is not
an obstacle to the expenditure of the appropriation made by the act
of July 5, ltl84, chapter 229.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Sep.temb.er 29, 1884.
SrR: In reply to your communication of the 20th Septem.
ber instant, asking whether the existence of certain undet"ermined claims of title to the Potomac fiats is an obstacle to
the expenditure of the appropriation of $500,000 under the
act of the 5tb of July, 1884, I submit that in the communication of the 2d of September, 1882, which you cite, the Attorney-General was of opinion that the claims in question
were no obstacle to the expenditure of the appropriation
then under consideration. In conformity therewith I now
advise that they are no more an obstacle to the expenditure
of the appropriation to which you now refer.
In addition to the probability of the former opinion of
itself, the silence of Congress on this matter in thP- act of the
5th of July, 1884, may very properly be taken as a confirma .
tion thereof.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
INDIAN TERRITORY-INTERNAL REVENUE IN.
Internal revenue taxes on distilled spirits, fermented liquors, tobacco,
etc.,-produced in the Indian Territory, and special taxes on the manufacture and sale of those articles in that Territory, may lawfully be
collected within the same.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
September 29, 1884.
SIR : I submit the following reply to yours of the 27th inst.,
which asks "Whether the Interilal-Revenue taxes on distilled spirits, fermented liquors, tobacco, snuff, and cigars,
produced in the Indian Territory, and the special taxes on
the manufacture and sale of those articles in that Territory,
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can be lawfully collected within said Territory from any person therein who manufactures or sells said articles, notwithstanding the provisions of article 10 of the treaty of August
11, 1866, with the Cherokees ( 14 Stat., 799), or of any other
treaty or treaties now existing between the United States
and any of the Indian tribes or nations re~iuent in the said
Territory."
In that connection I have carefully read the letter and in-closure from the Commissioner of Internal Re"euue addressed
to yourself, which you have done me the favor of transmitting.
I do not see that the authority of the Cherokee tobacco
case (11 Wall., 616) has been done away with by anything
authoritative which has since passed. I feel free to go that
far, although all that is necessary practically here is for me
to say that until that decision bas formally been overruled
it will be the duty of all the authorities of the United States
to enforce it, and leave to the other side the part of questioning it by another writ of error.
The full strength of the case, however, is that the authority of that case for everybody (excepti11g the court itself, as is
the meaning of Mr. J astice Field's remark in the Forty-three
·gallon case, 108 U. S., 491 ), so long as it stands, is final; and
it is an official duty to enforce it.
For the rest, the judgment in 108 United States Reports,
491, does not touch the principle involved in the case whose
authority over the public is now in question. Statutes imposing a tax upon licenses import nothing as to whether in
any special case a license is otherwise valid. Therefore they
do not conflict with previous police statutes which, operating
upon their subject-matter from another point of view, render
licenses in certain cat-ies invalid. Where there is no conflict
there can of course be no suggestion of an implied repeal.
Then as to the act of 1880, chapter 123 (21 Stat., 544), for
the relief of Boudinot, wh~ch is cited as perhaps discrediting
the principle of the decision in the Cherokee tobacco case
11ow questioned, I submit that it expressly affirms it, alleg·
iug that the act superseded the treaty, and as expressly placing tile relief which it g'i'\es upon a circumstance which it
a.sserts that the court '~ was not called upon to decide and did
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not decide; " i. e., whether the United States officials "hail
taken the necessary steps to make said one hundred and seventh
section operative in the Oherokee Nation anterior to said seizu.re of the property of said Elias C. Boudinot." lt then proan act which
ceeds to find that for that reason a wrong (i.
for want of the steps required by the tax act was an infraction of the treaty) had been done t9 Boudinot, and gives
relief accordingly.
If the legislature had regarded the principle in the decision of the Supreme Court improperly applied as between the
Cherokee treaty and the subsequent internal-revenue act, it
would have provided for all cases past and to come; but instead of that it not only makes a carefully detailed provision
for one case, the exceptional features of which are stated,
but accompanies that provision by an express legislative
concurrence in the general doctrine of the judgment by which,
on account of defective administrative action, Boudinot had
suffered 'wrong.
I do not find that the specific question in the Cherokee tobacco case has been before the Supreme Court since; but that
decision is quoted as an authoritative announcement of this
principle by a unanimous court in J.fcBratney's case (104 U.S.,
621).
.
I believe that this will sufficiently indicate my opinion as
to the question above stated.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney-General.

e.,

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DUTY ON SAWED LUMBER.
Boards and other articles of sawed lumber of pine are dutiable at $2 .pel"
thousand feet under the act of March 3, 18R3, chapter 121.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 8, 1884.
SIR: The question submitted in your communication of
the 18th ultimo is whether the duty on sawed boards, etc., of
pine is $1 per thousand, as claimed by the importers, or $2,
as assessed by the collectors.
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The question arises upon the following provision in ScheduleD, act of 3d March, 1883 (22 Stat., 501): "Sawed boards,
plank, deals, and other lumber of hemlock, white-wood, sycamore, and bass- wood, one dollar per one thousand feet, board
measure; all other articles of sawed lumber, two dollars per
ohe thousand feet, board i..Jeasure."
The tariff previously in force provided as follows: "Sawed
hoards, plank, deals, and other lumber of hemlock, white
wood, sycamore, or bass-wood, one dollar per thousand feet,
board measure. .All other varieties of sawed lumber, two dollars per thousand feet, board measure." (Rev. Stat., Schedule K, p. 470.)
Your interpretation of the latter provision was that the
duty of $1 applied only to sawed boards, plank, and deals
manufactured out of hemlock and the other woods specified,
and consequently that sawed boards, plank, and deals of pine
wood were subject to a duty of $2 per thousand feet. You
place the same interpretation on the similar provision in the
new law.
I am of opinion that the difference in wording between the
two acts (i. e., the substitution of" articles" for" varieties"),
so far as this bears upon the present question, is immaterial,
and therefore concur in your ruling above stated.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

SEIZORS AND INFORMERS IN REVENUE CASES.
Where a claimant was both seizor and inforruer under the act of June 22,
1874, chapter 391, in the case of goods forfeited for violation of the customs laws, compensation may be allowed him by the Secretary of the
Treasury in either capacity; and the fact that the claimant originally
presented his claim as seizor does not estop him from subsequently
changing its form and making claim as informer.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 18, 1884.
SIR: Yours of the 11th instant, referring to the ~Jase of
Egan and Smith, claimants for compensation upon a late
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seizure of opium at San Francisco, and calling attention to·
section 4 of the act of June 22, 1874 (Rev. Stat., Supp., p. 77),
asks the following question:
·
'' If the facts in the case of seizure of goods for violation of
the customs re\enne laws show that the seizure was .not made
by a customs officer, but by 'other persons,' and that the
goods were turned over by the seizors to the customs officers,
who at the same time gave information of tlle smuggling tosuch officers, is the Secretary of the Treasu~y bound under
the statute in question, in making an award, to treat them
as seizors only, or may he at his option treat them as seizors
or informers~"
It appears that the claimants, having had information or
reason to suspect that a considerable quantity of opium was
about to be smuggled into San Francisco, an option presented
itself to them under the above-namerl statutes, viz, either to"inform" (under paragraph 2, Rev. Stat., Supp.) and thereupon apply for the $5,000 or less which the Secretary should
conclude to be a fit compensation therefor, or to "seize''
(under paragraph 1), and thereupon entitle themselves to perhaps one-half of the value of the opium.
They exercised their option in favor of the second alternative, and with reasonable prudence, too, inasmuch as the
value turned out to be some $26,000.
By some unforeseen and unexplained circumstance, i. e., in
the language of the law by some accident, it subsequently
turned out that the opium produced at public sale only some
$7,000, which was not enough to pay the duty thereupon;
and so, according to the statute, the claimants can get nothing for their services.
The question put by you above, when stated in technical
· form, is substantially, "whether Egan and Smith are thereupon equitably estopped from go-ing back, as it were, and
making claim as informers."
'):here is no appearance or suggestion that the United
States have been put in any worse condition by the option
which Egan and Smith exercised as above than if at first
they had chosen to be informers. Their real merit is in
bringing the 3,880 boxes to justice, so to say, and that this
bas been done in one way rather than another is matter of
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form. If in any case a selection of such forrn Las not prejudiced the Government in the result, no reason occurs why
the Secretary, in his discretion, may not allow the claimants
to change that.
In this connection it cannot be regarded as prejudice that
under one form the Government will pay no compensation,
whilst under the other it will. Congress has said in effect
that compensation in these cases is for the public good.
There is no adverse interest in that respect betwixt the claimants and the public. I think that the jurisdiction of the
Secretary to allow a claim is not defeated by the circumstance that since it originated there has be~n
change in
its form, no harm having come to the public because of the
original selection or because of such change. The United
States are to-day, as I understand, just where they would
have been if Egan and Smith bad by information procured
a customs officer to seize the opium instead of seizing it themselves.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

a

MAIL TRANSPORTATION.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
October 31, 1884.
SIR: I have considered your communication of the 22d
instant, requesting to know whether the construction placed
by the Post-Office Department on section 4002, subordinate ·
section 2, prescribing the mode in which the average of the
·weight of mails transported on railroad routes shall be ascertained, is correct, and am of opinion that that construction is
correct, and that a departure from it would defeat the intention of the law and cause no little embarrassment.
I have the honor to be, your ooedient serYant,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Acting Attm·ney-General.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
OF
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COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS.
Where judgment was recovered in the name of the United States against
G. for damages and penalties, under sections 3490, 3491, 3492', and
3493, Revised Statutes, the action having been instituted and prosecuted
by D.: .Advised that the Secretary of the Treasury has power, by
virtue of section 3469, Revised Statutes, to compromise !>uch judgment,
irrespective of the quasi interest which D. may have therein.
DEPARTMENT OF ,JUSTICE,

November· 13, 1884.

SIR: Yours of the 4th ultimo states the following case:
"There has been transmitted to me for official action a
proposition made by one W. C. Griswold to compromise a
judgment recovered against him in the name of the United
States in the district court of the United States for the district of Oregon.
"It appears that the original action was for damages and
penalties provided for in sections 3490, 3491, 3492, and 3493,
of the Revised Statutes, for acts committed by Mr. Griswold
which are prohibited by some of the provisions of section.
5438, Revised Statutes., and that one Dowell instituted the
action and pro~ecuted the same to final judgment under the
provisions of the first above cited sections."
Upon this statement you ask whether such judgment
comes within the scope of ·section 3469, Revised Statutes,
which authorizes you to compromise "any claim in favor of
the United States," after report, etc., the only reason to the
contrary arising out of the interest which Dowell claims
therein.
It appears from the papers that after a large part of the
judgment had been collected it became, and . remains, a matter of doubt whether anything more can be made; and t,hat
the proposed compromise relates merely to this latter part.
Upon consideration, I advise that this question comes
within the principle announced in United States v. Morris (10
Wheat., 246).
In that case a jud~ont of forfeiture had been entered
again~t one Ogden; a judgment therefore which,-as might
have been thought, had conclusively ascertained all matters
necessary to such forfeiture. The suit had been prosecuted
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in tl.te interest of certain officers who, under a statute, were
-entitled to one-half thereof. Nevertheless, the Secretary of
the Treasury remitted such forfeiture. Thereupon it was
.argued that after judgment the Secretary had no .such power
as to the share of the officers. The court, however, held that
he had, and this under a train of general reasoning which
seems to be pertinent here.
It seems that the phrase, "in favor of the United States,?'
in section 3469, includes judgments like that before you,
under ·the reasoning in the case in Wheaton. Nor can the
circumstance that in suits under sections 3490, etc., the pros·e cutor is liable for costs, make any important difference in
poip.t of principle between the case of Griswold and that of
Morris.
I therefore advise that you have th power to compromise judgments in the situation of this one, where the only
.objection arises out of the quasi interest of the prosecutor
therein.
Even if this conclusion were somewhat uncertain, I might
still give the above advice, seeing that if it be mistaken the
prosecutor may have relief by proceetlings in court; wherea~
if the advice were to the contrary and mistaken, Griswold
.could have no means of so correcting it that occurs to me.
Very respectfully,
S. ~'. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
CLAIM OF MRS. WARD B. BURNETT.
The claim of Mrs. Burnett for a pension, as widow, considered in connection with the acts of June 18, 1874, chapter 298, and June 16, 1880,
chapter 236: and held that those acts did not change or increase her
rights, which are still governed, as to the amount of the pension to
which she is entitled, by section 4695, Revised Stli.tutes.

DEP ~RTMENT OF JUSTICE,
- N O'l.,em ber 15, 1884.
SIR: In the matter of the pension certificate of Mrs. Ward
B. Burnett I repl} to your reference as follows:
Congress, by act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 665), directed
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the name of Ward B. Burnett to be placed upon the pension
roll 'at the rate of $50 per month, and a certificate was issued
to him accordingly. In July, 1882, be surrendered his certificate, relinquishing his claim under the special act and
electing to receive a pension of $72 per month under the
general act of June 16, 1880 (21 Stat. 281) . . Un the 25t.h
day of July, 1882, it was enacted that no person who is now
receiving or who shall hereafter receive a pension under a
special act shall be entitled to receive in addition thereto a
pension under the general law, etc. His application for mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Interior to return the
certificate issued under the special act was refused by the
Supreme Court of the United States, on the ground that t.b e
act of 1882 forbade payment of a double pension, and therefore a judgment ordtring that the certificate be returned to
him would be futile. (107 U. S., 64.)
At the time of his death he held a certificate entitling him
to a ~ension of $72 a month, but the certificate issued to his
widow, there being no surviving children, is· only for $30 per
month.
Upon objection by Mrs. Burnett to this allowance the Secretary of the Interior requested the opinion of this Department. His action in fixing her pension at $30 per month received the approval of Acting Attorney-General Phillips, as
appears by the following opinion.
(Here follows the opinion referred to, which is dated July
26, 1884, see page 39, supra.]
I submit also the following considerations:
Section 4702, Revised Statutes, under which the certificate
has been issued to Mrs. Burnett, provides :
"If any person embraced within the provisions of sections
4692 and 4693 her~after dies by reason of any wound * * •
which under * * * said sections would have entitled
him to an invalid pension had he been disabled, his widow
* * • shall be entitled to receive the same pension as the
husband • • • would h~Ye been entitled to had be been
totally disabled, " etc.
4
Section 4695 provides that" The pension for total disability shall be as follows: For
lieutenant-colonel and all officers of higher rank in the mil-
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itary service * * * thirty dollars per month," and for
lower ranks the pension ranges from $20 down to $8.
Section 4697 and 4698 provide pensions for permanent specific disabilities irrespective of rank for persons who, if taking
under section 4695, would, on account of their rank, receive
less than the amounts provided in sections 4697 and 4698.
None of the rates mentioned in these sections exceed the $30
per month which General Burnett could have taken under section 4695, except the allowance of $31.25 per month to persons so totally disabled as to require the regular personal aid
and attendance of another person. To persons totally disabled, but not requiring personal aid and attendance, section
4698 gave but $24.
Since December 1, 1883, two statutes have been passed
amending sections 4697 ~nd 4698.
The act of June 18, 1874 (18 Stat., 78), gives a pension of
$50 a month to pensioners so tota1ly disabled as to require
the regular personal aid and attendance of another person,
and the act of June 16, 1880, gives to all soldiers and sailors
receiving $50 per month under the act of June 18, 187 4, $72
per month.
Mrs. Burnett claims that instead of receiving the $30 per
month fixed by section 4695 for lieutenant-colonels and officert; of higher rank, she should receive the $72 given by the
act of 1880 to soldiers and sailors, irrespective of rank, who
were so helpless as to require personal aid and attendance.
If the acts of 1874 and 1880 had been accompanied by a
provision defining the rights of the surviving widow and
children, saying either that the new legislation should not
affect tbeir pensions, or that the pension given them on the
death of the husband or father should correspond to the
amount received by him at his death, tbe case would be free
from all doubt. But Congress has not done this, and we are
left to ascertain from the language of the statutes whether
Congress, in increasing in 187 4 and 1880 the pensions for specific disabiiity, meant to enlarge and increase the pension for
the survivors. The key to the solution of this question
seems to me to be found in that clause of the act of 1874
which confers the increa~e only upon those who have been so
permanently and totally di~abled as to require the regular
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personal aid and attendance of another person. The certificate to 'G eneral Burnett for a pension of $72 is sufficient evidence that he did require such personal aid and attendance;
but if General Burnett had been so stricken as to be unable
to assist in the least degree in the maintenance or support of
his family, and yet did not require regular aid and attendance, his pension would have been limited to the $30 fixed by
section 3695. There seems to be no hardship in giving to
Mrs. Burnett only that sum which her husband would have
received if he could have dispensed with personal attendance.
It is my opinion that if General Burnett had died prior to
the passage of the act of 1874 his widow would have been
entitled to the amount received by him for total disability as
set forth in ·section 4695, and that the acts of 1874 and 1880
did not change or increase her rights, t.hough passed in the
life-time of her husband.
I have endeavored to answer your inquiry in full 1 but as
Mrs. Burnett retains the letter of reference, declining to
allow it to go upon the files of this Department, it is possible that I have omitted something. If such be the case I
will be glad to make further answer.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT RAILROAD.
A tunnel constructed in the manner proposed by the S'taten Island Rapid
Transit Railroad Company acros8 a part of the light-house grounds
at New Brighton, Staten Island, is within the provision of the act
of February 9, 1881, chapter 41, granting right of way through said
grounds.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 15, 1884.
SIR : By letter of the 18th ultimo your predecessor in office called my attention to tbe act of February 9, 188J., chapter 41, which grants to the Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company, for the purpose of constructing a railroad,
"the right of way, by tunnel not exceeding 30 feet in width,
through the lands of the United States now occupied by the
United States Light·House Establishment in the village of
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New Brighton," etc., and after stating that the alJove-named
company desire " to make an open cut through at least a portion of the light-house grounds, to build a brick or masonry
arch over this portion of their road, and to then restore the
surface of the ground to its original level by filling in earth
above the arch," requested my opinion upon the question
''whether the method of building referred to should be considered a tunnel within the meaning of the act."
I perceive nothing in the terms of the act that forbids the
construction of a tunnel in the manner proposed, which, I
understand, meets with no objection from the Light-House
Board. The substance of the grant is, the right to establish
a railroad through the light-house grounds by means of a
tunnel. Whether the tunnel shall be constructed by burrowing under the surface of the ground, or by making an open
cut, turning an arch, and l'efilling, is not prescribed by the
statute, but is left to depend upon the topography and nature
of the ground and other circumstances connected with the
location of the tunnel, which is placed under the control of
the Secretary of the Treasury, being subject to his approval.
To the question submitted I accordingly reply, that in my
opinion a tunnel built in the manner proposed by the abovenamed company may be considered a tunnel within the meaning of the act.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BEN.TAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Bon. HUGH McCuLLOCH,
Secretary of the Treasury.
DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
It is not the duty of the Attorney-General to give an opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury upon questions relating to the past action of
the Board of Supervising Inspectors, which was had on a matter properly submitted to such board under the provisions of section 4491,
Revised Statutes, and which is not reviewal?le by the Secretary.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

November 19, 1884.
SIR: In a communication dated the 23d of September last

the Hon. Charles E. Coon, then Acting Secretary of the
Treasury, called my attention to a letter inclosed therewith,
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addressed to your Department by J. Chandler, esq., containing an extract from the proceedings of the Board of Supervising Inspectors at its annual meeting held in January,
188!, in relation to the "Edson recording steam-gauge,"
which had been submitted for the approval of the board.
By these proceedings it appears that that instrument was not
approved, on the ground that it failed to meet all the requirements of the statute (sees. 4418 and 4419, Rev. Stat.,
especially the latter section) as understood by the board.
Hereupon two questions (suggested by l\Ir. Chandler with
reference to the view of the board as to the meaning of section 4419) are proposed for my opinion in the above-mentioned communication.
By statute, the duty of the Attorney-General to give offieial opinions to heads of Departments upon questions of law
is limited to such questions as arise in the administration of
their Departments (sec. 356, Rev. Stat.). The questions proposed to me as above do not seem to be of that character.
They apparently relate to the past action of the Board of
Supervising Inspectors, which was had upon a ma.tter prop·e rly submitted thereto under the provisions of section 4491,
Revised Statutes, and which is not reviewable by your Department. It is true that, under the provisions of the same
section, the same matter (i.
the subject of the approval
of the instrument aforesaid) may be submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for his action, in which event~ should simHar questions arise, the opinion of the Attorney-General
thereon might properly be invoked. But I do not understand this to be the case now.
While I shall, with great pleasure, respond to any call
from your Department for an opinion upon questions of law
arising in tl1e administration thereof, I conceive that, for the
reason already intimated, I have no authority to pass upon
the particular questions - ~bove referred to, and therefore
feel constrained to return the papers which accompanied
the Acting Secretary's communication without expressing
any opinion on those questions.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. HUGH McCuLLOCH,
Secretary of the Treasury.
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PUBLIC BUILDING AT MINNEAPOLIS.
The first section of the act of April 11, 1882, chapter 75, authorized a
public building to be erected at Minneapolis, Minn., limiting the cost
of the building, inclusive of its site, to$175,000, and the second section
of same act approprjated $60,000 for ptlrchase of site aud toward construction of building; by act of March 3, 1883, chapter 143, an appropriation of $60,000 was made for continuation of the building; and, by
act of July 7, 1884, chapter 332, a further appropriation of $70,000 was
made for extension of site and continuation of building-the whole of
the appropriations aggregating $190,000: .Advised that the limitation
'fixed by the act of 1b82 as to cost of the building, etc., is not 'repealed
by the subsequent appropriation acts, the only additionai expenditure
allowable being for an "extension of site."
DEP .ARTMEN1' OF JUSTICE,

Novembm· 21, 1884.
SIR: A note from your predecessor, some weeks since,
submitted the general inquiry whether, under existing legislation upon the matter of erecting public building at Min:aeapolis, the question hefore yourself as to plans, cost, etc.,
is at large, or lies within certain statutory limits, and, if so,
what'
The answer to this inquiry depends upon the meaning of
the statutes which define your duties therein. These are
substantially to the following effect:
Section 3732. No contract for the erection of any public
building shall bind tile Government to pay a larger sum than
the amount appropriated therefor.
Act of 1882, chapter 75, section 1: That the Secretary of
the Treasury purcllase a site and cause to be erected a .b uilding for post-office, etc., at Minneapolis, the site and building,
whe.n. completed upon plans and specifications to be previously made and approved by the Secretary of the Treasury,
not to exceed the cost of $175,000.
.S~ction 2 appropriates $60,000 for purchase, of site and
towards construction of building.
Act of 1883, chapter 143 (22 Stat., 604), appropriates ''For
post-office, etc., at Minneapolis, Minn., for continuation,
$60,000."
Act of 1884 (sundry civil, July 7), appropriates "For postoffice at Minneapolis, Minn., for extension of site and continuation, $70,000."

a
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Upon this it is suggested that inasmuch as regularly, if the
limitation of the act of 1882 had been observed, the last enactment would have provided in terms for a "completion,,
instead of" continuation," and for an appropriation of only
$55,000, it is to be concluded that Congress has done away
with the previous lirnitation entirely, and left the question
as to the total expenditure for the building at la·rge, to be decided, as in former times, by the executive authority in charge
upon its own judgment of what the public interests at the
locality in question demand. This conclusion is thought tobe made more clear by the significant express provision forextending the site of the building.
In discussing this matter it is to be considered that it
would have been quite easy, and a matter of course, for Congress, by inserting a proviso of less than a dozen words, expressly to repeal the limitation in question; and that if it
had done so it would probably have substituted some otherlimitation. That it did not, but has left the matter under
the ~horoughly familiar rules as to the extent to which a
later statute operates upon a previous one merely by inconsistency therewith, is noticeable.
Besides this, the words which impose the limitation are
plain, deliberate, and peremptory; whilst to these are opposed
(in order to claim a repeal, I mean, for as to mere rnodi.fication.
there is no dispute) arguments which at most are only probable. Of itself the word "continuation" does suggest that
the appropria,tion is not to .finish the building; but if previously a limitation had been placed upon the cost, and the
appropriation for ''continuation" had only exhausted such
limited amount, I suppose that it would not (by reason of
such word, I mean) be open to the executive to take fresh
measure for erection, etc., without regard to the original inhibition.
·
And inasmuch as "site" does not mean so much ground
only as is included by the foundation-as indeed is expressly
provided here by the act first authorizing the erection-an
appropriation for more than the remnant of the original estimate, when accompanied expressly by a provision "for extension of site," would throw no valuable light upon the point
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whether Congress intended thereby that the foundation or the
superstructure should be enlarged.
Besides, the short-hand language of the subsequent appro. priations is to be read as incidental to ·the original act, so that
their obscurities are to be cleared up by its fuller and more
deliberate expressions, and not vice versa. Here, then, the
"post-office," etc., appropriated for is no other than the one
defined by the plans and specifications, which had been
already made in accordan~e with the act of 1882. It is the
erection so planned and specified that is to be "continued."
It may be that the original estimate_s for such buildings
sometimes turn out to have been miscalculated; so that Congress, when the time arrives at which previously it had
reason to anticipate that what would be needed would be
only the remnant of the original estimate, finds itself under
some coercion to go further.
Or it may happen that the Supervising Architect reports
that certain changes in construction are demanded, and submits this to Congress, with estimates therefor.
In both of these cases, it being entirely competent for Congress to com :ply with the new situation, language like that in
the appropriation item before me would have a significance
which in their absence it rloes not have, except by a strain·
ing, which is wholly inadmissible.
Upon the whole, I submit that the words of the appropriation of'' 1884" naturally suggest that the only new item of
expenditure allowable is an ''extension of site"; there being, besides, a suggestion that the amount appropriated
for the uses of the building itself-the one, I mean, theretofore
planned and specified-may not be sufficient for its completion, in which case of course Congress expected to be
applied to again.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- Gen'eral.
I concur.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
273-VOL XVIIT--6
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CUSTOMS LAWS.
A lot of rum was exported December 3, 1883, and reimported October
20, 1884, which had been m~tnufactured within the United States from ,
imported molasses whereon drawback was allowed upon the exportation of the rum: Advised that the rum is dutiable under section 2500,
Revised Statutes, and not under the a.ct of March 3, 1883, chapter 121;
furthermore, that the importers are entitled to remove the same under
section 3433, Rev. Stat.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 29, 1884.
Yours of the 19th instant states a case of bona fide
exportation (December 3, 1883), and reimportation (October
20, 1884:), of rum originally manufactured within the United
States, under section 3019, Revised Statutes, from imported
molasses, which was allowed drawback upon the exportation
ofthe rum.
·
It seems to me that such rum is dutiable under section
2500, Revised Statutes, and not under the act of March 3,
"102 T. 1," as the paragraph is designated in your
1883 (i.
letter). It is a manufacture of the United States, notwithstanding the foreign origin of its material.
I am also of opinion that the word imported in section 3433
is used generally, and includes reimported. Section 2500
forms a context for '' 102 T. 1," and the like provisions, by
which it is seen that reimportations of distilled spirits are
not within those other provisions which impose duty upon
such spirits when imported. But for that context those other
provisions would include reimported spirits. I see no context, and no reason is suggested why the word "imported" ·
in section 3433 (Revised Statutes, first sentence, beginning
on page 377) does not include reimported.
I therefore answer the two questions which you have put:
(1) The importers are entitled to remove the rum in ques·t ion under section 3433, Revised Statutes.
(2) That rum is dutiable according to section 2500, Revised
Statutes.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
I concur.
. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREvVSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
SIR:
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CIVIL SERVICE-ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTMENT.
·where a father and daughter held each au office in the classified service
in one of the Departments, and another daughter, having passed the
required examination, was proposed for appointment in another Department: Held that, by force of section 9 of the act of January 16, 1883,
chapter 27, the last-mentioned daughter, so long as the above state of
facts exists, is ineligible for appointment to any office or place in the
-classified service.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 9, 1884.
SIR: You:- letter of the 8th jnstant presents for my consideration the following case and question:
A father and one daughter are now employed as clerks in
the Treasury Department, and the name of another daughter,
who has passed the required examination for appointment in
•t he classified civil service, has been sent to the Post-Office
Department by the Civil Service Uommission for appointment
therein. Both daughters, though of age, live with their
father and are members of his household. In view of these
facts and of the provisions of section 9 of the act of January
16, 1883, chapter 27, you inquire whether the last-mentioned
-<:laughter is eligible for appointment in the Post-Uffice
Department.
The section cited above declares: "That whenever there
·are already two or more members of a family in the public
service in the grades covered by this act, no other member
Df such family shall be eligible to appointment to any of said
grades."
This enactment applies to all offices, places, and employments in the public service which are classified within the
meaning of the aforesaid act; the words ''grades .covered by
this act," as employed in said section, manifestly signifying
the several cla-sses into which such offi~es, places, and employments are arranged. It virtually prohibits the appointment
of an applicant to an office or place falling within either of
these classes where two members of the same family to
which the applicant belongs are already in the public service
in any of the same classes; and this prohibition is not
limited to offices or places in the same Department, but extends to all offices or places in the public service which are
-classified as above.
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In the present case, then, assuming that the father and
daughter, now employed in the Treasury Department, hold
offices or places belonging to any of the classes referred to, I
. am of opinion that, so long as this state of facts exists, the
other daughter is, by force of the provision above quoted,
made ineligible for appointment to any office or place in the
classified service ofthe Post-Office Department.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. JOHN SCHUYLER CROSBY,
Acting Postmaster- General.

ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.
Consideration of certain propositions relating to the enforcement of judgments of foreign tribunals in civil and commercial matters, suggested
by a resolution adopted at the Conference held at Milan in 1883 by t,he
Association for the Reformation and Codification of International Law ..
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 12, 1884.
SIR: I have examined the papers which accompanied your
letter of the 25th ultimo, relative to a proposed international
agreement on the subject of the enforcement of the judgments of foreign tribunals in civil and commercial matters.
A.mong these papers is a resolution adopted at the Conference held at Milan, in 18~3, by the Association for the
Reformation and Codification of International Law, which
proposes as the bases of such an agreement the following:
'' (1) The decision must have been rendered by a competent.
judge, etc.
"(2) The parties must have been duly summoned.
'' (3) In the case of a judgment by default, the party against
whom it has been rendered must have had knowledge of the
suit and have had an opportunity to defend himself.
" ( 4) The decision must contain nothing opposed to good
morals or to the order or public law of the State in which it
is to be executed.
"(5) The judge who is requested to execute the decisiou
is not to examine the merits of the case, but simply to inquire
whether the aforesaid legal conditions have been fulfilled.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

85

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments.

"(6) A decisioll pronounced by a foreign court, and fulfilling these conditions, is to have the same effect as one pronounced by a home court, whether its execution be requested
or it is to be used as a res adjudicata.
"(7) The forms and methods of execution are to be regulated by the law of the country in which the execution is
requested."
In compliance with your req nest, I have now the honor to
state my views upon the foregoing propositions,
The first three propositions quoted relate solely to the
subject of the competency or jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal. I do not perceive that their adoption by this Government would effect any material change or lead to any
improvement in the e:8:isting state of our law with respect to
the enforcement of foreign judgments.
According to the general current of American authority,
the judgment of a foreign tribunal having jurisdiction of the
parties and of the subject matter of the controversy, where
no fraud is shown, is recognized by the courts of this country
as creating an obligation upon which an action can be maintained, and where an ~ction is brought to enforce the obligation thus created such judgment is taken to be con_clusive
upon the merits. Among the several States of this Union
the same doctrine applies to judgments rendered by the
courts of sister States; so that these judgments practically
stal)d on no higher or different footing than the judgments
of foreign courts. The prevailing doctrine just indicated,
both as regards State judgments and judgments of foreign
countries, is believed to be as liberal as the interests of justice require.
In an action brought here on a foreign judgment, the defendant may show that the foreign court had no jurisdiction
'of the subject-matter of the suit, or that he was never summoned to answer, and had no opportunity of making his defense. These are facts which go to the question of the competency or the juris<iiction of the foreign court, and, if
.established, defeat the action. The result would be the same
under the rules embodied in the three propositions above referred to.
The fourth proposition expresses nothing more than what
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is already implied in our law as a necessary condition for the
maintenance of an action upon a foreign judgment. It is a
good defense to such an action that the judgment was obtained by the fraud of the party seeking to enforce it; and,
moreover, no court will lend its aid to enforce a judgment
opposed to good morals or to the public law of the State.
The fifth proposition, in Sltbstance, makes the foreign judgment conclusive upon the merits where the requirements of
the preceding propositions are fulfilled. I have already
stated the prevailing American doctrine on this subject.
The remaining propositions relate to the rrwde of enforcing
and the effect of foreign judgments.
Under our law the mode of enforcing a foreign judgment
(and the same mode exists among the several States of the
Union with respect to the judgments of other States) is by
the institution of a suit theraon; and a judgment obtained
in the suit thus instituted has the same vigor and effect as.
other domestic judgments, and is executed in the same way.
The foreign judgment has no effect of itself, other than t()
create an obligation upon which an action may be brought,
or to constitute an exceptio rei judiccttm available in defense
of an action.
I do not see that the propositions last referred to would,
if adopted, call for any modification of our law as regards
the effect and enforcement of foreign judgments.
The papers received with your letter are herewith returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon, FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary of State .
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DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General is not authorized by law to give au official opinion
to the Honse of Representatives in response to a resolution thereof.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 17, 1884.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the
following resolution, dated December 15, 1884:
''Resolved, That the Attorney-General of the United
States be respectfully requested· to report to this House,
whether, in his opinion, the section 3738 of the Revised Statutes with reference to eight hours employment constituting
a day's labor for all laborers, etc., employed on behalf of the
United States applies to the letter-carriers of the United
States."
To this I must reply that I can not furnish the legal opinion requested. The authority of the Attorney-General to
give his official opinion is limited by the laws which create
and define his office, and will not permit him to give advice
at the call of either house of Congress, or of Congress itself,
but only to the President or the head of an Executive Department. Early in the history of the Goyernment this was established and suggested to the Bouse of Representatives by Mr.
Attorney-General Wirt (1 Opin., 335). When the Department of Justice was created the law in this respect was not
changed.
This opinion has been invariably observed by many Attorneys-General, including Attorneys-General Taney, Crittenden, Bates, Evarts, Williams, and Devens. (2 Opin., 499; 5
Opin., 561; 10 Opin., 164; 12 Opin., 544; 14 Opin., 17; 14
Opin., 177; 15 Opin., 475.)
Of course it would be my wish to conform to any request
that the House of Representatives might make, but such
wish I could not comply with without reversing the law and
the precedents hitherto established.
I have the honor to be, with great respect,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SPEAKER OF TRE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
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CONTRACT WITH: SOUTH BO.s'TON IRON COMPANY.
The contract entered into by the Chief of Ordnance with the South
Boston Iron Company in October, 1880, and subsequently transferred
by that company to the South Boston Iron Works, may still be tre'ated
by the Government as obligatory upon the former company, notwithstanding such transfer.
Under the provisions of section 3737, Revised Statutes, such transfer
operated to annul the contract so far as the United States are concerned; but these provisions were not made to enable .a contractor to
avoid his agreement with the Government and relieve himself from
his obligations by a mere transfer.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Decembe1· 20, 1884.
SrR: I return herewith the papers which accompanied
your letter to me of the 27th of June last, relative to a certain contract with the South Boston Iron Company for the
construction of a shop building and machinery for making
cannon, etc., and have the honor to state my views upon the
questions proposed.
From these papers it appears that in October~ 1880, the
said company entered into a contract with the Chief of Ordnance, by which it agreed to construct for the United States,
upon the company's grounds at the South Boston Foundry, a
shop building, with foundations for lathes, etc .., and also to
make and alter certain lathes, together with a traveling
crane, etc., for all of which, upon completion thereof, the
United States were to pay the company a stipulated amount;
the payment, however, being subject to the folJowing condition, namely, that the amount so paid ''shall be reimbursed
to the said United States by the said South Boston Iron Company when a reserve of 5 per centum from the price of all
work for the United States subsequent to, and not including,
the four 1~-inch breech-loading rifles contracted for under
the date aforesaid, which may be executed by the machines
herein contracted for, should amount to a sum sufficient for
that purpose, the said shop building, etc., lathes, traveling
cranes, etc., to remain the property of the United States until
the sums above specified shall be paid to the United States
by the said company."
After the shop building, lathes, etc.• had been constructed

TO THE SECRETARY OF W .A.R.

89

Contract with South Boston Iron Company.

'b y the said company and paid for by the United States the
-company leased its works to another company, called the
.South Boston Iron Works, and subsequently sold the latter
·company its property and rights under these existing contracts, including that entered into with the Chief of Ordpance above referred to. And this lease and sale have given
rise to the following questions, on which my opinion is re·quested:
"Whether the contract entered into with the South Boston Iron Company, as stated above, is in force anrl can be
.enforced against the South Boston Iron Works, or whether
a similar contract is to be entered into with the South Boston Iron W.orks covering the same thing, or what other
action should best be taken to secure the interest of the
United States."
Under the provisions of section ;{737, Revised Statutes,
which are expressly incorporated in the contract itself, the
transfer of the latter by the South Boston Iron Company to
the South Boston Iron Works was forbidden, such transfer
by the terms of the same provisions operating to annul the
contract so far as the United States are concerned. But
(hose provisions were not meant to enable a contractor to
avoid his agreement with the Government and relieve him.s elf from his obligations thereunder by a mere transfer. (See
16 Opin., 278.) Hence, as against the South Boston Iron
Company, the contract in question may still be treated by
the Government as obligatory upon that company, notwithstanding the transfer. As against the South Boston Iron
Works, the transferee, the case is different. Between this
company and the United States no privity exists by reason
.of the transfer, and in the absence of any agreement between
the company and the United States, ill{ porting an undertaking by the former to perform the contract referred to,
such con tract cannot be enforced against it by the latter.
Thus far I have considered and answered only such of
the questions presented as relate to the contract with the
South Boston Iron Company. The remaining questions appear to me to be administrative, rather than law questions.
Whether it is expedient under the present circumstances to
re nter into a similar contract with the South Boston Iron
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Works, or what other action the interest of the United States
requires in the premises, are, I submit, subjects that do not
properly come within the province of this Department to
examine.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

Bon.

RoBERT

T.

LINCOLN,

Secretary of War.

CHINESE EXCLUSION.
Where a ·sheriff in Washington Territory apprehended certain Chinamen
and brought them before a Uniterl States commissioner, who, having
found them to be in the country unlawfully, remanded them to the
custody of the t~heri:ff, to be sent out of the country: Held that the
expenses incurred by the sheriff in the performance of such service art'\'
payable from the appropriation made by the act of July 7, 1884, chapter 332, to meet expenses incurred in executing the act relating to the
Chinese, approved May 6, 188~.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 22, 1884.
SIR: Your communication of the 28th October ultimo
and the inclosures therewith sent present the following state
of facts:
Certain Chinamen were apprehended in Washington Territory by the sheriff of Skagit County and taken before a
United States commissioner, who, having found them to be
in the country unlawfully, remanded them to the custody (,f
the sheriff, to be deliYered to the collector of customs, to be
returned to British Columbia.
The sheriff who made the arrests and took the Chinamen
before the commissioner and executed the latter's order has
applied to the collector of customs of Port Townsend, Washington Territory, to be paid the costs and charges for said
services which are authorized by the twelfth section of the
act of May 6, 1882, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884,
entitled, "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to execute
certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese, approved May
sixth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two,"' and the question
submitted for opinion is, whether expenses of this kind are to
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be paid out of the appropriation made by the act of July 7,
1884, ''to meet such expenses as may be necessary to be in .
curred in Cflrrying out the provision of the act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese, approved May 6,
1882," or out of some one of the appropriations to defray the
expenses of the United States courts.
Upon· an examination of the appropriations to meet the expenses of the United States courts made by the act of July
7, 1884, I see no bead under which an expenditure tor the
purpose in question could be made, and I am of opinion that
the sheriff should be paid out of the appropriation made by
the act of July 7, 1884, first abo\e indicated.
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DRIVING STOCK ON INDIAN LANDS.
Sheep-are" cattle" within the meaning of section 2117, Revised Statutes, which imposes a penalty for driving any stock, etc., to range and
feed on Indian lands without the consent of the tribe.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTH1E,
December 22, 1884.
SIR: In reply to your communication asking an opinion as
to whether :sheep are embraced by section 2117, Revised Statutes, I beg to say that I am of the opinion they are.
Section 2117 reads thus: "Every person who drives or
otherwise conveys any stock of horses, mules, or cattle, to
range and feed on any land belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe, without the consent of such tribe, is lial,>le to a
penalty of one dollar for each animal of such stock."
The standard lexicographers place sheep under the head of
cattle, and it would seem to be in derogation of the manifest
intention of Congress to take the word in a more confined
sense.
Very respectfully,
BENJ A'MIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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DISTILLERY WAREHOUSE.
The Secretary of the Treasury has power to make a regulation under
which distilled spirits may be permitted to remain in warehouse after
the expiration of three years, upon the distiller or owner of the spirits
filing a declaration of his purpose to export the same in good faith,
and giving a bond to do so within a given period.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 23, 1884.
SIR: Yours of the 15th instant asks the following question:
Whether the Treasury Department has the power to make
a regulation by which distilled spirits can be permitted to
remain in a distillery warehouse after the expiration of three
years from the date of entry therein, upon the filing by the distiller or owner of the spirits of a declaration of his purpose to
export the same in good · faith, and the giving of a bond to
do so within a given period.
Upon consideration, I submit that it has such power.
The exportation or transportation bond frees the spirits
for the time being from any obligation for a domestic tax,
and of course from the operation of the distillery warehouse
bond. The giving of such first-named bond is one of the
acts by the owner which go to constitute the complex transaction of exportation. Until exportation is perfected the
spirits also remain subject to a tax lien on behalf of the Government. Therefore, whilst by the inception of the transaction of exportation the spirits are transformed into a different suQject-matter from that upon which the distillery warehouse bond had operated, they nevertheless remain one upon
which the United States have a specific contingent charge,
in all reRpects perhaps, except that of contmgency, the same
as what it previously had. There Is, therefore, no statutory
reason why it may not for a period reasonably required in
the process of exportation remain in the same custody as before, even after the three years. Manifestly upon the face
of it a wide difference exists in this respect betwixt the
condition towards the Government of such spirits and that
of tax-paid spirits. This difference is recognized in the provision of section 3288, Revised Statutes.
I have spoken of statutory reasons, because it is this class
only that affects the power of the Secretary of the Treasury
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hereupon. The regulatory reasons, so to say, for this or that
custody are for him to adjust. These latter reasons control
the subject-matter of which you speak.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHIL LIPS,
Solicitor- General.
I concur in the above opinion. ·
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
,lJNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION CONGRESS.
The fund appropriated by the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 234, to defray
the expenses of delegates to the Universal Postal Union Congress at
Lisbon, Portugal, is subject to the restrictions, as to advances, contained in section 3648, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 31, 1884.
I have considered your inquiry of yesterday, · viz,
whether, under the provisions made by the act of July 5,
1884, chapter 234, to pay the expenses of delegates to the
Universal Postal Union Congress to be held at Lisbon, Portugal, you are authorized to make advances for that purpose,
and submit the following in reply:
The money appropriated by that act to defray such expenses is to be " expended under the direction of the Postmaster-General." But the control of the fund thus given the
Postmaster-General would seem to be subject to the restriction as to advances contained in section 3648, Revised Statutes. Adopting this view of the effect of that section, I am
of the opinion that, to authorize advances out of the appropriation referred to for the purpose of meeting th\e expenses
of the delegates, the previous direction of the President is
necessary. By his direction the money may be ]awfully advanced for that purpose to the Postmaster-General, under
whose control its expenditure is placed, or to any agent
designated or appointed by the latter to disburse it.
lam, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. :FRANK HATTON,
Postmaster General.
SIR:
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SCHOOL MEETINGS IN UTAH.
The Utah Commission, appointed under the act of March 22, 1882, chapter 47, have no duties or powers as regards the school meetings in
Utah Territory.
Voting at meetings of tax-payers called to fix the rate of taxation for
school purposes is not voting at an "election" within the meaning of
that act. Hence, polygamists may vote at such meetings, provideu
they are property-tax payers and residents of the school district in
which the meeting is held.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 5, 1885.
SIR: In compliance with a request made the 20th ultimo
by the Ron. M. L. Joslyn, then Acting Secretary of the Interior, I have considered the following questions, proposed
by the Bon. Alex. Ramsey, chairman of the Utah Commission, appointed under the act of March 22, 1882, chapter 47,
in a communication addressed to you dated the 18th ultimo,
namely:
"(1) Have we (i.e., said Commission) any jurisdiction in
regard to the school meetings of Utah~
" (2) If yea, by what modus operandi are we to proceed t
"(3) Can polygamists vote at the school meetings of taxpayers~"

'rhe powers of the Commission or Board established by said
act are defined in the ninth section thereof. · That section,
after declaring vacant "all the registration and election
offices of every description 1n the Territory of Utah,'' provides that all duties ''relating to the registration of voters,
the conduct of elections, the receiving or rejecUon of votes,
and the canvassing and returning of the same and the issuing of certificates or other evidence of election in said Territory, shall, until other provision be made, etc., be performed
under the existing laws of the United States and of said Territory by proper persons, who shall be appointed to execute
such offices and perform such duties by a board of :fi. ve persons," etc. By this provision t~e Board or Commission is
invested with power to appoint persons to execute such offices
and perform such duties as are above described, and no other~ .
On examining the school laws of Utah Territory, to which
attention is called in the communication referred to (viz,
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<lhapter 19 of the Laws of 1880, chapter 47 of the Laws of
1882, and chapter 30 of the Laws of 1884 ), I find no registration or election offices created thereby, nor tlo I discover
:any duties there prescribed relat1ng to the conduct of elections, etc., as above. Those laws provide for the establish·
ment of school districts, and for the holdmg of school
meetings annually in each district, at which school trustees
are to be chosen by the registered voters of the district by
ballot. Yet the orgamzatwn of the meetings and the conduct of elections thereat are not made the subject of statutory regulation, but are left to be effectuated by such
methods as the persons assembled on the spot may adopt.
And in the absence of any statutory provision requiring the
performance of ·specified duties at the school meetmgs relative to the conduct of elections, 'etc., or creating electiOn
offices therefor, it seems to me that, as regards such meetings, there is no room for the exercise of the aforesaid power
conferred upon the Board or Commission by the act of March
22, 1882. That power, I think, can only be exerted where
offices or duties of the character ,mentioned exist, and are
to be executed or performed under the statutes In force within
the Territory.
I am accordingly of the opinion that the first question
should be answered in the negative, and so answer it. This
disposes of the second question also.
The remaining question is whether polygamists can vote
at school meetings called for the purpose of fixing the rate of
taxation for school purposes. At these meetings, under the
laws of the Territory, the property tax-payers residing in
the district, and they alone, are entitled to vote. By the
eighth section of the act of March 22, 1882, polygamists
are disqualified from voting at any ''election'' held in the
Territory. But to vote at the meetings of tax-payers called
as above, on propositions to fix the rate of a school tax, is
not voting at an election within the meaning of that act; ·
the term "election," as there used, manifestly signifying
only a proceeding to fill a public office or employment.
Though not qualified to vote at any proceeding of this kind,
or.1 :n the language of the statute, "at any eiection" in the
Territory, a polygamist may nevertheless, in my opinion,
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vote at such meeting of tax-payers on propositions of the
character above described, provided be is a property-tax
payer and resident of the school district in which the
meeting is held.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER~
Bon. H. M. TELLER,
Secretary of the interior.

RETIRED LIST OF THE NAVY.
An officer retired on furlough pay under section 1454, Revised Statutes,
cannot be transferred on the retired pay list under section 1594, Revised Statutes, with increase of pay; such increase is forbidden by the
act of August 5, 18tl2, chapter 391.
Nor can an officer be s1.multaneously retired on furlough pay, and transferred to the retired pay list, so as to give him the pay of the latter.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 5, 1885.
SIR : Yours of the 17th ultimo, after calling attention to
the provisions upon the matter of pay, etc., for officers retired
from the Navy by sections 1588, 1593, 1594, and the act of
1882, chapter 391 (22 Stat., 286), asks the following questionR:
First. Can an officer who, not being amenable to the provision in the act of 1882 relating to discharges for misconduct, has been found incapacitated for active service, and
under section 1454 retired on furlough pay, be transferred
under sections 1594 to the retired pay list with the pay incident thereto ~
If this question shall be answered in the ·negative, it becomes necessary to inquire :
Secondly. In the case of an officer found by the retiring
board to be incapacitated for active service, such incapacity
not being the result of misconduct on his part nor of any jncident of the service, and in view of the considerations which
lead to the President's determination to retire instead of discharging the officer, and the same considerations being regarded as sufficient to warrant the transfer of such officer
from the furlough to the retired pay list, can the President,
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by and with the consent of the Senate, make the retirement
and transfer simultaneous by placing such officer at once on
the retired pay list '
The provision in the act of 18S2, which is important here, is
as follows: "Hereafter there shall be no l)fOmotion or increase of pay in the retired list of the Navy, but the rank
and pay of officers on the retired list shall be the same that
they are when such officers shall b~retired."
In my opinion that provision prevents either rank or pay
of officers on the retired list from being increased in an'!} way
q,fter such officers shall have been placed thereupon; and
therefore that a transfer from the furlough pay list to the retired pay list under section 1594 can have no such effect. I
am also of opinion that transfer immediately after retirement
does not differ in this respect from transfer at the end of (say)
a month or a year. The power of the PreRident to make such
transfer depends by the section upon the fact that the officer
is already upon the retired list, whether he has been so for
a minute or longer. Whatever time therefore may have
elapsed since the officer has been put upon that list, has
elapsed of course after that point of time which fixes the pay
of all retired officers.
There can be here no contempo'raneous occurrence of the act.
by which an officer is retired upon the furlough pay list, and
of that by which he is transferred therefrom. The former
precedes the latter necessarily; and so its effect in fixing
pay precedes the existence of any question as to the effect of
transfer thereupon. In other words, tbe transfer finds the
pay already fixed by the act of 1882.
I therefore answer both of the above questions in the negative . .
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor General.
I concur in the above.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
273-VOL XVIII--7
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ASSISTANT COLLECTOR AT NEW YORK.
The appointment of the assistant collector at the port of New York (who
was formerly employed by the collector with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury) should now be made by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 6, 1885.
SIR: I have considered the question which was referred
to me by your direction on the 2d instant, namely, whether
an appointment to the office of assistant collector at the
port of New York should be made by the Secretary of the
Treasury or by the President with the concurrence of the
Senate, and I now have the honor to submit to you my views
thereon.
The office of the assistant collector at New Y:ork was orig.
in ally created by section 16 of the act of March 3, 1863, chapter 79, which provided that it should be filled ''in the mode
prescribed by law for t,b e appointment of deputy collectors."
These officers were then, as now (see sec. 7 of the act of
March 3, 1817, chap. 109; sec. 2630, Rev. Stat.), employed
by the colleetor with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury. This moue of appointment is, in contemplation of
law, an appointment by the Secretary (United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall., 385). But in the Revision of the Statutes the
provision above adverted to, directing in what mode the office
of assistant collector should be :filled, was omitted, and thus
became repealed by the effect of section 5596, Revised Statutes. So that, as the law now stands (see sec. 2536, Rev. Stat.),
that office remains established, but without any statutory
provision on the subject of appointment thereto.
Such being the existing state of the law, the general rule
which is deducible from Article II, section 2, of the Constitution becon,es applicable to and controls the q ue~tion under
consideration, namely, that the appointment of all officers of
the United States belongs to the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, where the appointment
thereof is not otherwise provided for in the Constitution itself
or by legislative enactment. This rule has been laid down
by several of my learned predecessors (see 6 Opin., 1; 15
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Opin., 3, 449), and acted upon in the practice of the Government in cases like the present.
I am therefore of the opinion that, although previous to
the Revision of the Statutes an appointment to the office of
assistant collector at the port of New York was required to
be made by the Secretary of the Treasury in the mode above
indicated, yet that, in consequence of the modification of the
law effected by the ReviRion, such appointment is now devolved upon the President by and with the advice and con.sent of the Senate.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
AMERICAN VESSELS UNDER ACT OF 1884.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

J anuat·y 6, 1885.

SIR : In reply to yours of the 30th ultimo, inclosing a dispatch of November 3 from the consul at Shanghai to yourself, I submit the opinion t.hat the act of June 26, 1884, section 12, by the expression H American vessels,'' does not intend only ''vessels of the United States" as defined by section 4131, Revised Statutes, but includes as well "foreignbuilt registered American vessels."
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF S'l'A'l'E.
AMERICAN AND MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION.
Question considered as to whom payment should be made, under the circumstances stated, of an award of the American and Mexican Claims
Commission in favor of a claimant, a resident of Mexico, who has
deceased.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
January 16, 1R85.
SIR: By a letter of the 18th of November last, received
from the Ron. John Davis, then Acting Secretary of State,
which inclosed an authenticated copy of the proceedings in
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the matter of the probate of the will of Jorge Hammeken y
:Mexia, deceased, before the judge of the first civil court
of the City of Mexico, in Mexico, it is inquired "who the
proper person is to whom payment should be made, under
this will, of moneys coming into the hands of this [the State1
Department on account of an award made by the late
American and Mexican Claims Commission in favor of
George L. Hammeken." To this inquiry I have now the
honor to reply :
·
The papers which accompanied that letter, and which I
return herewith, afford satisfactory evidence that the abovementioned proceedin~s were bad in the proper forum at the
place of the domicile of the deceased, Jorge Hammeken y
Mexia, and his will may be regarded as duly probated there- ·
under.
The testator, in his will, declares himself to be the legitimate son of George Lewis Hammeken and Adela Mexia,.
both deceased, and claims as his property, by inheritance,.
the right to the indemnity awarded in favor of his father
by the Claims Commission. He leaves all his estate, in the
proportions assigned by the la'f (excepting part of certain
property in Texas and of certain concessions elsewhere, as
to which other disposition is made), to his wife, Dolores
Lebrisa de Hammeken, and their only son, Jorge Juan
Harumeken y Lebrisa, and names. the son (a minor) his
executor, who, in the discharge of the executor~hip during
minority, is to be represented according to provisions of the
ci vii code of Mexico.
The testator's widow, Dolores Lebrisa de Hammeken, was
in ~aid proceedings appointed by the court to represent
the executor, her son, during his minority, and letters testamentary have been issued to her. The appointment and
issue of letters, which are properly authenticated, must be
presumed to be regular and in conformity with the local
.law.
It thus appears that the testator's widow, by virtue of her
appointment and letters testamentary as aforesaid, is clothed
with ample authority to receh·e moneys due the testator's
estate. And such authority being conferred by the forum
domicilii of the testator, a. voluntary payment made to her in
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this country of a debt due his estate will be good and dis-charge the indebtedness, in the absence of any adverse claim
based on a conflicting grant of administration here in the
interest of domestic creditors. (See Wilkins v. Ellett, 9 Wall.,
740.)
If, then, the award referreu to in the present inquiry,
though made in favor of the testator's father, now constitutes
part of the assets belonging to the testator's estate and is
to be dealt with as such, and if there be no ad verse claim
as above, I am of the opinion that payment of the award
.should be made to Mrs. Dolores Lebrisa de Hammeken, to
whom the letters testamentary have been issued.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN,
Secretary of State.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW CRUISERS.
The Secretary of the Navy may assent to a modification of the contract
for building the new cruisers where the interests of the Government
will not be prejudiced or any statutory provision violated thereby.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
Janunry 20, 1885.
SIR: Referring to your letter of the 19th instant, relative
to the subject of payment for the construction or the new
.cruisers, I have now the honor briefly to state my views upon
the case and question there presented.
It is clearly competent to the Secretary of the Navy to
.assent to a modification of the contract for building thes~
vessels, where the interests of the Government will not be
,p redjudiced or any statutory provision violated thereby. In
United States v. Corli8s Steam-Engine Company (91 U. S., 321 ),
the Supreme Court remark: "With the improvements constantly made in ship-building and steam machinery and in
arms, some parts originally contracted for may have to be
.abandoned and other parts substituted, and it would be of
serious detriment to the public service if the power of the head
.of the Navy Department did not extend to providing for all
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such possible conti11gencies. by modification or suspension
of the contracts and settleJDent with the contractors."
Undoubtedly the Secretary has power in the present case
to modify the contract in regard to the construction of the
shafts, and since this will involve delay and bear heavily
upon the contractor, be may, I think, in consideration of these
circumstances, also modify the contract to such extent as to·
make the 10 per centum reserved upon each installment
available to the contractor uefore the time originally stipulated. But payment in full for the vessel, in advance of its
completion and acceptance, is forbidden by section 3648, Revised Statutes, and hence a modification of the contract tothis extent would be beyond the power of the Secretary.
I may here add that the assent of the contractor's sureties
should be obtained to any change in the contract which affects them before the same i8 consummated.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. WiLLIAM E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.
CLAIMS OF SUPERVISORS OF ELECTIONS.
Statutory provisions relating to the appointment and duties of supervis-·
ors of elections considered; and held that when they have served any
giveu number of days not exceeding ten, and. it is so duly made to
appear, they are entitled to be paid a per diem therefor, and that it is
not for the Attorney-General to determine whether their period of service is reasonable or unreasonable.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 21, 1885.
' SIR: Having had my attention directed by you to the subject of the payment of supervisors of elections, under the·
act of February 28, 1871, and the action of the Department
of Justice upon the number of days of their employment
and their payment, I have examined the su~ject, and I have
learned that, soon after the enactment of the law, the .Attorney-General was requested by the 'rreasury Department .
to take charge of the accounts that were rendered by the
marshals, in wbich were included the sums that were to bepaid for supervisors. The Attorney-General declined at one,
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time to entertain jurisdiction over the payment of the supet·
visors, or to have anything to do with auditing the claims
for their payment, because, as was said, the law nowhere
directly puts that duty upon him or gives him any authority
to act in the premises.
After this, at the urgent instance of the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice did take charge of the
claims of supervisors, presented by marshals, in connection
with their accounts; and this was done, no doubt, because
it was considered inexpedient to separate the accounts, to
wit, the accounts for supervisors and those rendered by the
marshals for special deputies, who were created by the same
statute, and because the Treasury Department stated that
it had no special diRbursing offier for such a fund, and that
the marshal, who is a disbursing officer of the Department
of Justice and gives bonds for moneys that are committed
to him for disbursement, would be a suitable and responsible
person to pay this money to. In this way the Department
of Justice assumed jurisdiction; and these two claims for
allowance_;_those rendered by the marshals for special deputies and the claims for these supervisors-became blended;
and the rule adopted by the Department of Justice torestrain and control the expenditures for special deputy marshals came to be considered as the proper t:ule to apply to
supervisors.
To avoid an abuse of the law such as was charged would
and did take place, "it seems that a firm hand was from the
first held upon both of these allowances, and this policy
was not improper, as it was for the protection of the public
Treasury. However, in doing this the Department has apparently exceeded its jurisdiction, and has given an interpretation of the law as it relates to these supervisors which, if
persisted in, might result in frustrating the very purposes of
the statute. The object of the law was to prevent the perpetration of frauds at the elections; and to that end it was
intended, as it appears, to give the supervisors the fullest
opportunity for investigation and oversight of the elections
in all that related to them, and not to limit them for any
length of time less than ten days in the discharge of their
duties.
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The circuit court of each judicial district is required to
choose from the commissioners of that district an officer
known as the chief supervisor, whose duties are prescribed,
requiring him to prepare and furnish books, etc., and in~truc
tions for the supervisors, and to receive applications from all
parties for appointments to such positions. He shall present
such applications to the judge, ami furnish information to
him in respect to the appointment by the court of such supervisors; and he shall require of the supervisors, when necessary, lists of the persons who may register and vote, etc.,
and cause the names of those upon any such lists, whose right
to register or vote is honestly doubted, to be verified by proper
inquiry and examination at the respective places by them assigned as their residences. When the appointment of such
supervisors is solicited as provided for in sections 2011, 2012,
two citizens of different political parties are appointed and
commissioned .by the court for each election district or voting
precinct; and these supervisors, so appointed, are required
to perform various duties in connection with the registration
of voterR, and the casting, counting, and certifying of their
ballots, which are of vital importance to the preservation of
the elective franchise of the citizen in Congressional elections. For their services they are to be paid $5 per diem,
not exceeding ten days; and such appointments with such
pay are restricted to cities and towns not under 20,000
i nha bi tan ts.
Thus it appears that the purpose of the law is to secure the
appointment, at least ten days before the registration, if necessary, of supervisors, who, being thus appointed, are authorized and required to scrutinize that registration and to verify
it, for the purposes of registration and election, so that no
fraud can be committed, and their authority continues and
their duties are continued down to th~ very last moment of
counting the votes, provided the time fQr which they are to
be paid shall not exceed ten days. To undertake, therefore,
by an arbitrary rule, to restrict or limit their payment within
any period less than the ten days allowed by the law would
be to cripple or perP.aps to utterly destroy the purpose of
their cre~tion and the object of the law.
The court creates them upon the call of citizens; they
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.are selected from both parties; they are subject to the control of a chief supervisor; they are all under the eye and control of the court from the nioment of their appointment to
the last minute of their employment; and when a call was
made upon this Department for the allowance of a sum to
provide for their payment, the Department can not say how
many days these supervisors shall be limited to for payment within the ten days allowed by law. In fact it has
been denied that the Department has }urisdiction over the
subject, and in my judg·ment it is to be doubted, except to
exercise the duty, when called upon, of interpreting the law,
so as to guide others as to the proper rule in paying them.
And it is my opinion, after having thus examined the law,
that when they have served any given number of days not
exceeding ten, and it is so duly made to appear, they are
entitled to payment therefor, and that the Attorney-General
can not determine whether their time of service is reasonable
or unreasonable. The only question for him is, Did they
serve under the control of the supervisor, being duly appointed by the court¥ and if they did, the~r ought to be paid
according to the number of days claimed, provided they do
not exceed ten days.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
CONTRACTS l!"'OR THE NEW CRUISERS.
Section 3648, Revised Statutes, does not preclude a payment in any case
where the money has been actually earned and the Government has
received an equivalent therefor; its object is to prevent payment
being made to con tractors in ad vance of the performance of their contracts, whether for services or supplies.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 22, 1885.
Your letter of yesterday presents the following ad.
ditional circumstances in connection with the subject upon
which I had the honor to communicate to you my views on
the 20th instant :
''In the case now under consideration, the tenth payment
(i. e.~ instalment) on the ship wholly finished has been earned,
SIR :
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but by reason of the fracture of the shaft the full trial tripand formal acceptance provided for by the contract cannot
take place. The United States has, however, a lien upon
the ship for all payments made; a named sum is to be reserved for three months, and the contractor and his sureties.
guaranty full completion and good workmanship."
You inquire if, under these circumstances, should your
Department deem it safe and advisable to pay the tenth
instalment, less the.named sum referred to, such payment
would fall within the prohibition of section 3648, Revised
Statutes.
To this inquiry I reply: The object of that section .i s not.
to preclude a payment in any case where the money has.
been actually earned and the Government has received an
equivalent therefor, but to prevent payments being made to
contractors in advance of the performance of their contracts,
whether for services or the supply of articles of any kind.
Agreeably to this view of the statute, I observed in my
opinion of the 20th instant that payment in full for the vessel, in advance of its completion, is forbidden thereby. The
circumstances of the case now under consideration, however,
are essentially different from those there contemplated; and
consistently with the same view' of the law, with which I
remain satisfied, I am of the opinion that, the tenth installment having been already earned, payment thereof, less the
named sum reserved as above, would not be forbidden by
section 3648.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. WILLIAM E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.
CUSTOMS LAWS.
"Alizarine assistant," an article used in dyeing, Js dutiable, as a chemical compound, at 25 per centum ad valorem.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 30, 1885.
SIR: Yours of the 19th ultimo states that ''Alizarine
assistant," an article used in dyeing, is a "chemical com-
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pound," in which castor oil is a large element. A question
thereupon has risen whether upon importation it is to be
assessed for duty as a "chemical compound," at the duty
expressly imposed upon articles so called (viz, 25 per cent.
ad valorem), or under the similitude clause (sec. 2499, Rev.
Stat.), by which, from its connection with castor oil, it would
pay $1 per gallon. As I conceh·e it, that question is, in substance, whether" chemical compounds," the highest assessed
material in which pays a rate other than 25 per cent., are for
that reason (und0r section 2499) to be charged otherwise than
at 25 per cent.
I think it plain that the operation of the si'militude provisiou upon this article can be ascertained only after that of
the " chemical compound '' clause has been fixed. The meaning of the latter get~ no light from that of the former, but
vice versa. Sussjield's case (96 U. S., 128) is in point.
I advise you that 25 per cent. is the true duty; and that
any decision in your Department to the contrary should be
changed.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

'

DUTY OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
Where a call for an opinion from the Attorney-General was made by the
head of a Department, in compliance with a resolution of the House of
Representatives, for the information of the latter, and without reference to any question of law arising in the administration of such Department: Advised that the Attorney-General is without authority t()
give an official opinion in such case.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 30, 1885.
Your letter of the 19th instant informs me of the
receipt by you of a copy of a resolution recently passed by
the House of Representatives of the following tenor: '~That
the Postmaster-Geueral ask the Attorney-General for his
opinion whether section 3738 of the Revised Statutes with
reference to eig.ht hours' employment constituting a day's
lahor for all laborers and so forth, employed on behalf of the
SIR:
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United States, applies to letter-carriers of the United States,"
and you request me to furnish you an opinion "in accordance with the above resolution."
In response to this request I now have the honor to reply:
It is the duty of the Attorney-General to give an official
opinion at the call of the bead of any Department only upon
"questions of law arising in the administration of such Department" (sec. 356, Rev. Stat.), and as the present call does
not appear to be made with reference to any question of that
.character, but solely in compliance with the resolution and
for the information of the House, I am not satisfied that it
is my duty or that I have the authority to furnish the opinion
requested. I therefore feel constrained to decline giving an
opinion.
I may add t,hat a similar request for an opinion upon the
same matter was made by a previous resolution of the House,
and I felt compelled, from want of authority, to decline compliance therewith, in a communication to the Speaker dated
December 17, 1884. There the request came directly from
the House. Here the request, though coming from the head
of a Department, is to all intents and purposes an application
by the House; and accordingly, wi~h respect to complying
with it, the same want of authority ~xists. In this connection I beg to refer you to an opinion of one of my predecessors in 14 Opin., 177.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. FRANK HATTON,
Postmaster- General.

BOARDS OF IMMIGRATION.
It is not the duty of aU 'ted States attorney to advise or defend boards
<'f immigration; but the Secretary of the 'freasury is empowered by
the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, to employ, and pay out of ihe
immigrant fund, counsel for those purposes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l.'ICE,

February 4, 1885.
SIR: In reply to your communication asking my opinion
•
as to the employment of United States Attorneys
by boards

•
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of immigration, a~ting :under the statute of .August 3,
1882 (22 Stat., 214), I have the honor to submit that the
duties of United States attorneys are prescribed by law
(Rev. Stat., sec. 771), and that among those duties are not
those of advising or defending such boards of immigration.
By the first section of the said act 9f .August 3, 1882, the
Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to pay out of the
immigrant fund "the expense of regulating immigration"
under the act, of taking care of immigrants and relieving
such as are in distress, and what may be required ''for the
general purposes and expenses of carrying this act into effect."
It is in tpis section that we find the power to. employ and
pay counsel for the purposes above mentioned.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DUTY UPON SHELLAC VARNISH.
Reconsideration of former opinion (see ante, p. 43) in regard to the duty
upon certain shellac varnish imported from Canada; and advised that
the warehouse value in Canada is to be taken as a basis for computing
the duty thereon.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 4, 1885.
SIR: Referring to your communication of 12th of .Aug-ust
last about duty upon shellac varnish imported from Canada,
the reply thereto of .August 18, and the subsequent communications upon tho same subject, including your note of October
151ast, I have to say that at his convenience, as was agreed,
Edwin B. Smith, as attorney for the importers, submitted a
a brief upon the question upon the 20th of last month.
I have considered this brief, and have reconsidered the
general question presented by you, as above, last August.
Whilst I am entirely satisfied with the general views
expressed in the reply of August 18, above mentioned, the
reargument has directetl my attention more particularly to
the matter of the pertinency of those principles to the very
question by youJirst as above put.
It ·is argued that the "construction" given in Birming-
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ham's case in connection with the administrative "acquiescence" therein operates, under the statute of March 3, 1875,
so as to prevent you from subsequently questioning that decision in the course of another suit. I do not agree to this
proposition. Whilst it would no doubt be inadmissible to
.act capriciously in enforcing any statute, especially one
which concerns the interests of many, I arn of opinion that
if, upon consideration, a Secretary should conclude that a
circuit court decision had been unadvisedly acquiesced in
by himself and the Attorney General, it would be not so
much merely competent as his duty to raise the question before the courts again. This certainly might become his duty
even as to a decision of the Supreme Court itself, much
more than in the case supposed.
However, after reviewing your letter of August 12, I find
that the reply was inadvertent in concluding you to be disposed to raise again, whether directly or indirectly, the
question underlying Birmingham's case. This may be due
to the circumstance that that case was founded upon statutory provisions since superseded, so that it might be better to
forbear further litigation than to disturb the small remnant
of transactions to which that decision applies.
This being so, I advise that if the composition of the varnish can not be inquired · into (see Birmingham's case) at
one stage of the question as to the rate of duty, neither
can it be at another; if not directly, so neither indirectly.
If the article was nothing but " varnish" at the point of
importation, so also for tariff purposes it was nothing else in
the Canadian warehouse. And, in conclusion, inasmuch as
you state that there was no market for this" varnish" in
Canada except so far as there was such inside of the warehouse, I see no reason. why your former decisions upon
"tea" and "malt" are not applicable~ viz: that the warehouse value is to be taken as a basis for calculating duties.
Very respectfully,
S. F. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor- General.
I concur.
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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FOREIGN-BUILT VESSELS.
Foreign-built vessels owned by citizens of the United States are not
exempted by the act Of J nne 26, 1884, chapter 121, from the payment of
fees for services of consuls.
DEPA.RTMEHT OF JUSTICE,

Febru.ary 5, 1885.
SIR: In reply to yours of the 2d instant, let me say that by
turning to the "dispatch" transmitted in yours of the 30th
ultimo, to which I was then referred fvr the question upon
which an opinion was asked, you will find that the question
was by its words confined to'' foreign-built registered American vessels." It was upon that account that the reply was
limited to that class.
A like question is now asked as to foreign-built vessels
purchased and owned by citizens of the United States, viz,
whether the act of 1884, chapter 121 (June 26, 1884 ), ineludes
·these amongst those vessels for services to which consuls are
not to charge fees.
Inasmuch as in the sa~e connection in which that statute
provides for the fees in question it expressly refers to and
operates upon the" consular regulations" issued by the President, and as th.e term "American vessels" is one employed
passim in such regulations, I am of opinion that it has the
same meaning in the statute (sec. 1~) as in the regulations.
Upon a perusal of these regulations I do not find that the
term in question is applied by them to designate foreign built
vessels purchased and owned by citizens of the United
States. It seems rather, so far as I can determine, to be
employed synonymously with that other term so usual with
us in both statutes and regulations, viz, "vessels of the
United States ".(see ex. gr., Reg. 111, 128, and 219). I do not
know whether there has been in your Department any long~ontinued practical administration of these regulations to
the effect that the term ''American vessel" therein contained
includes in any case as well foreign-built vessels owned by
citizens of the United States. Such practice would of course
be entitled to great respect. Otherwise, however, I conclude
as above, and consequently that the act of 1884 does not.
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exempt such foreign-built ships owned by citizens from the.
fees in question.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.

The

SECRETARY OF STATE.

CONTRACTS FOR CARRYING THE MAIL.
Contracts entered into by the Post-Office Department for carrying the
mail should be in the name of the United States as directed by statute.
(See sec. 3949, Revised Stat.; also sec. 403, ibi d.)
The express condition mentioned in section 3741, Revised Statutes, need not be inserted in those contracts made with railroad corporations.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 10, 1885.
SIR : In your letter of the 3d instant my attention is called
to section 3942, Revised Statutes, and you inquire" whether
a contract entered into under said section is legal, so far
as the naming of the parties thereto is concerned, if made
as follows: Between the Post-Office Department of the
United States of .America {acting in this behalf by the Postmaster-General) and the Connecticut and East Valley Railroad Company," etc. You also inquire" whether, in contracting with railroad companies for carrying the mails, it is ·
essential that such contracts contain a reference to the subject-matter of sections 3739, 3740, and 3741 of the Revised
Statutes."
In reply to your first inquiry I have the honor to state that
by express provision of statute all contracts entered into
by the Post-Office Department for carrying the mail are to
be in the name of the United States (see sec. 3949, Rev.
Stat.; also sec. 403, ibid.), and that the .contract mentioned, in "so far as the naming of the parties thereto is concerned," does not appear to conform strictly to such provision. Yet the provision itself is, I think, to be regarded as
directory only to the officer authorized to contract; it deals
wit.h matter of form rather than of substance. Formerly _
mail contracts were made in the name of the Postmaster-General, and suits thereon brought in his name. But by the

TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

113

Case of General Swaim.

thirteenth section of the act of July 3, 1836, chapter 276,
bonds and contracts of mail contractors were directed thereafter to be made to and with the United States of America,
and suits thereon instituted-in the name of the United States
of America. This direction has been in force ever since, and
its observance is obligatory upon the Post-Office Department
as a duty. In the absence, however, of any declaration in
_the statute to the contrary, the non-observance thereof
would not, in my opinion. invalidate an agreement made for
and in behalf of the United States which is otherwise unobjectionable.
Assuming your second inquiry to refer to mail contracts
made with incorporate companies for the general benefit
thereof, and to have especial regard to the requirements of
section 3741, I answer that the express condition mentioned
in that section need not be inserted in these contracts. By
section 37 40 such contracts are excepted from the operation
of the law (sec. 3739) forbidding members of Congress to be
admitted to any share in or benefit arising upon contracts
vith the Government; and the insertion of the said condition in a contract thus excepted is obviously not contemplated by section 3741.
I am, sir~ very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER ..
Bon. FRANK HATTON,
Postmaster- General.
CASE OF GENERAL SWAIM.
Review of the finding of the court-martial in the case of Judge-Advocate-General David G. Swaim.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF ,JUSTICE,

February 10, 1885.
SIR : Section 923 of the Regulations of the Army of the
United States, under the title '~Courts-Martial,'' provides
that" When a court-martial appears to have erred in any respect, the reviewing authority may reconvene the court fora
reconsideration of its action, with suggestions for its guidance.
The court may thereupon, shouhl it concur in the views sub273-VOL XVIII--8
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mitted, proceed to remedy the errors pointed out, and may
modify or completely change its finclings. The object of
reconvening the court in such a case is to afford it an opportunity to reconsider the record, for the purpose of correcting
or modifying any conclusions thereupon, and also to make
any amendments of the record necessary to perfect it."
The record of the court-martial, including the finding and
sentence of the court, in the case of Brig. Gen. David G.
Swaim, Judge-Advocate-General, U. S. Army., has been
transmitted to the President for his action thereon, as pro·
vided by law.
•
General Swaim was tried upon two charges:
(1) "Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in
violation of the sixty-first article of war."
(2) "Neglect Qf duty, in viohttion of the sixty-second article of war."
Of the second charge the court has found the accused not
guilty.
The first charge is accompanied by four specifications.
The second of these specifications was ruled out by demurrer, and of the offences set out in the fourth specification the
court has found the accused not guilty. Of the offenses set
out in the first and third specifications the court has (omitting certain phrases in the third, which were ruled out on
demurrer) found the accused guilty except as to certain words,
phrases, and paragraphs, which are stricken out, and with
the substitution of other words and phrases intended
to restrict and qualify the finding; and, in lieu of the charge
"'Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of the sixty-first article of war," which these specifications were intended to support, the court has inserted the
following : "Conduct to the pr~judice of good order and
military discipline, in violation of the sixty-second article of
war."
That the court had the legal right to make such a finding
is, I think, not open to doubt. (13 Opin., 460; Digest Opinions Judge-Advocate-General, 264, 266; De Hart's CourtsMartial, 180, 185; Ives' Military Law, 155; Benet's Military
Law and Courts-Martial, 1~0, 132; Harwood's Naval CourtsMartial, 123, 124.)
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But whether, in view of the specific facts actually found by
·the court, it acted advisedly in thus refusing to find the defendant guilty of" conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemant and in substituting therefor the words ''conduct to
the prejudice of good order and military discipline," seems
to admit of very serious doubt.
The first specification of charge 1 contains a substantial
:allegation of an attempted fraud by the accused upon the
banking firm of Bateman & Co., in the transfer by Swaim to
a third party, for the purpose of a suit, of a certain memorandum of deposit given by Bateman & Co. to Swaim on the
15th of July, 1882, said transfer being made after Swaim had,
in the course of his business, withdrawn nearly the entire
sum covered by the memorandum of deposit from the said
banking bouse, ''thus attempting to committ a fraud upon
said Bateman & Co." The court has found all the material
facts as alleged in this specification, but in the clause last
quoted bas substituted the word "wrong" for ''fraud," so
that in the findings of the court the clause reads: ''thus
.attempting to commit a wrong upon said Bateman & Co.";
and the finding further states in substance that -what the
accused did in this respect he did" knowingly."
If, as the court thus finds, the defendant did deliberately
and with a knowledge of the facts seek in the manner described to perpetrate a "wrong" upon Bateman & Co., the
line of distinction between the "'wrong" which the court
finds he sought to commit, and the "fraud" which he was
charged with seeking to commit, is an exceedingly narrow
one. Such a" wrong," deliberately planned and perpetrated,
would involve the same moral turpitude wh-ether it were designated as a fraud or as a wrong, and in either event the
offense would seem to fall much more naturally and appropriately under the classification of "conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman" than in the category of" conduct to
the pr~judice of good order and military discipline." The
·evidence adduced upon this point may or may not satisfy the
court of the immorality or dishonest intent of the accused in
the particular acts described in this specification. If the
-court has reached the latter conclusion, then the accused is
,entitled to such a finding or a verdict upon the specification
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as will indicate the absence of immoral or dishonest purposes, which the present finding does not. But, on the other
hand, if the court is satisfied of such immoral or dishonest
purpose, .then it is difficult to understand why the facts
should be glossed over by the use of the ambiguous word
''wrong," or why the original charge of ''conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" should not be sustained.
The third specification charges the accused in substance
with having prepared and forwarded to his official superior,
the Secretary of War, a written statement relative to the
transactions referred to in the first specification in regard t(}
certain facts set out in two letters from A. E. Ba,teman to the
Secretary of War, which statement by the sa~d Swaim is
charged to have been "evasive, uncandid, and false, and
calculated and intended to deceive the Secretary of War.''
Then follows an enumeration of seven particulars wherein the
said statement was false, evasive, and intended to deceive.
Of the substance of this specification the court has als(}
found the accused guilty. After reciting at length the letters of Bateman, their reference by the Secretary of War to
Swaim, and the official indorsement thereon of the latter, the
finding further proceeds: "Which said indorsement by the
said Swaim was evasive, uncandid, and calculated and intended to deceive the Secretary of War especially in the following particulars."
In the succeeding enumeration of those particulars one
has been found by the court exactly as charged, three having
been found substantially as charged, and as to the remainder
the accused has been found not guilty.
In the first branch of the finding upon the third specification above quoted, it will be observ:ed that the words "and
false," as contained in the original specifications, are stricken
out. In the enumeration of particulars, however, certain of
the statements made by the accused in the indorsemen.t in
controversy are expressly found to have been false, as he,
Swaim, "well knew·;" so that there is apparently no ground
to assume that in striking out the words "and false" the
court intended to acquit the accused of having made a false
indorsement. The only inference I can derive from this action is that by striking out these words as applied to the in-
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dorsement as a whole, and yet finding in terms certain specific falsehoods contained in said indorsement, the court simply meant to negative the implication that the indorsement
was false in every particular, while at the same time indicating that, being a mixture of truth and falsehood, it was as a
whole ''calculated and intended to deceive the Secretary of
War."
However this may be, the court has in fact found the ac-cused guilty of having presented to the Secretary of War a
written indorsement containing certain specific statements
which the accused knew to be false, .and having made such
statements for the purpose and with the· intention of deceiving the Secretary of War.
The finding of the court upon the specifications plainly
shows this. Yet, at the same time, taken as a whole, in connection with the finding upon the charge, it would seem to
indicate that in the opinion of the members of the court the
·offense thus established is not one which can properly be
classified as " unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."
I find it difficult to reconcile this conclusion with any rec·ognized standard of either officerlike or gentlemanlike conduct, and it can only be so reconciled by annexing to the
words " conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman " a
narrow and very limited significance, in my judgment
wholly incommensurate with the proper and reasonable imcport of those words.
It is not improbable that the argument upon this point of
the learned and able counsel for the accused may have pro·d uced more than an ordinary impression upon the minds of
the court. That argument was apparently intended to support the proposition that the charge of "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," under the sixty-first article
-of war, properly embraced only offenses of the grossest and
basest character, of such a nature as to render the guilty
party a moral and social outlaw. While it may be true that
the position of the learned counsel has not been without some
·countenance, I do not think it should receive the official sanction of the President of the United States. It should not be
necessary to prove that an individual is a moral monstrosity
in order to demonstrate his unfitness to be a trusted officer
·Of the Army.
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Undoubtedly charges of mere indecorum should not be
(and I believe they never are) made the basis of prosecutions
under the sixty-first article of war. The punishment annexed to a conviction under that article clearly indicates
that prosecutions under it should be limited to the more
serious class of offenses. Bnt between the grossest offenses of which an officer may be guilty and which are not
specially enumerated in the Articles of vYar, and those of
a character simply prejudicial to "good order and military
discipline," such as are apparently contemplated by the
sixty-second article of war, there are intervening grades of
offenses, many of which are in every proper sense of the words
"unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," and the commission of which by any person is a sure indication that he is
unfitted to hold an office of trust and honor in the military
sen·ice.
The objection to the finding of the court in General Swaim's
case is therefore based upon the obvious inconsistency between the findings of fact as contained in the modifications
and the gradation of the offense in the substituted charge.
The action of the court as a whole seems to involve a serious
lowering of -that high standard of honor which from theearliest days bas been the pride and the glory of mir military service, and which was expressed on a memorable occasion by the great Commander-in-chief of our Revolutionary
armies, when reluctlantly compelled to reprimand a brother
officer, in these words: ''Our profession is the chastest of all;
even the shadow of a fault tarnishes the luster of our finest
achievements."
The court in the present case has found the accused guilty
of making certain false statements to tbe Secretary of War
for the purpose of deceiving that officer. The President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, should not concede that
this ofl'ense is one either trivial in its nature or against good
order and military discipline alone, nor as (in any sense of
the words) other than an offense ''unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman." If the evidence before the court-martial does.
not establish the facts in question beyond a reasonable doubt
(upon which no opinion is here intended to be expressed)~
then General Swaim is clearly entitled to be acquitted upon
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this branch of the case. If, on the other hand, the evidence
does establish these facts, then he is clearly shown to have
committed an offense "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."
In 1881 Bvt. Brig. Gen. George Talcott, at the head of
the Ordnance Bureau in the War Department, was tried by
a court-martial upon three charges, the third being a charge
of" conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." Under
this charge the specifications set forth, inter alia, the fact that
the accused had made a written report and also verbal statements to the Secretary of War in regard to a certain transaction which "were false in fact and intent, and were made
with design to deceiv.e the said Secretary of War." This was
the burden of the charge. The accused was found guilty,
sentenced to be dismissed the service, and was dismissed. I
recall the case merely to indicate the fact that untruthful
statements made by a high military officer to the official head
of the War Department have not been regarded in the pastas I think they should not be regarded in the future-as any
less of an offense than one "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.''
I thin~ the record in the case of Bvt. Brig. Gen. David
G. Swaim, U. S. Army, may with propriety be referred back
to the court-martial, with suggestions in the line above indicated, for further consideration and revision.
I have not undertaken to criticise in detail the great mass
of testimony presented by the record in this case, nor the
propriety of the conclusions of the court as to the specifications established by it. Indeed it would be impracticable to
do so intelligently without devoting many weeks' time to the
examination of more than thirty volumes of the manuscript
record. Moreover, the court which heard the witnesses was
best qualified to scrutinize and balance their testimony, possessing, as it did, the advantage of personal contact and observation, so essential in reaching a just conclusion from
lengt,h y and conflict,ing statements. After the deliberate
consideration given to the case by the court it is not unreasonable to assume that the specific facts found represent the
truth of the case so far as it is ascertainable.
If the President should decide to approve the findings and
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sentence of the court as they now stand, I see no objection
to the mere form of the sentence. Article 101 of section
1;jl!l2 of the Revised Statutes refers in express terms to suspension of pay, and it is apparently well settled that such
suspension for a given period signifies its absolute forfeiture,
and not simply the temporary withholding thereof.
I am, sir, with great respect,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The PRESIDENT.
IMMEDIATE 'rRANSPORTATION OF DUTIABLE GOODS.
New legislation is not required by the proviso in section 7 of the act of
June 10, 1880, chapter 190, in order to give the privilege of immediate
transportation to any of the places named in that section which at the
time of the passage of that act was without the "necessary officers"
therein referred to, but which thereafter has such t>fficers ' assigned
thereto.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 13, 1885.
SIR: Yours of the 11th instant refers to the seventh section
of the act of 1880, chapter 190 (Rev. Stat., Supp., p. 546),
and asks in effect whether, in order to communicate the privilege thereby given, fresh legislation is required by the proviso
whenever any one of the places mentioned in the body ofthe
section, and which at the time of the passage of that act was
without the " necessary officers" therein spoken of, thereafter
bas such officers assigned to it.
I think not. For, in the first place, such construction would
render the body of the section so far superfluous, inasmuch
as the secondary legislation supposed would be quite as competent in its absence. Again, the careful na.m ing of the places
in the body of the section indicates that the general question
of the policy of communicating the intended privilege to each
had been decided by thB legislature. ':f.1he reference in the
proviso to a consideration merely practical is one that should
affect the operation of such policy. Such operation is to be determined by the Executive Department, as I think, toties
quoties such necessary officers are or are not at any of the
places named.
Very respectfully,
BE:ijJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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MILEAGE.
An officer of the Revenue Cutter Service is not entitled to rnileage for
travel on duty, but may be allowed actual traveling expenses.
DEPAR~MENT OF JUSTICE,

February 19, 1885.
SIR: I herewith submit a reply to the note of the Acting
Secretary of February 17, in regard to a claim by Philip
Littig, late second assistant engineer in the Revenue Cutter
Service, for mileage upon travel done in Jnly, 1872, and May,
187 4, betwixt Baltimore and San Francisco and Port Townsend. Littig has received his actual expenses, but claims
the balance betwixt that and the 10 cents a mile which formerly the Secretary assumed a right to allow by assimilation,
as I suppose. The claimant refers to Graham's case (110 U.
s., 219.)
As Littig is not a naval officer, it does not appear that Graham's case, or the act therein contained, bas any application
to his case. I am not referred to any statute, other than the
ordinary appropriation acts p~oviding for "traveling expenses" of officers of "the Revenue Cutter Service" (17 Stat.,
347 and 511), that concerns this claim; and as I know of none
such, I advise that Littig has no right to the mileage for which
he asks.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

FEES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS.
Certain fees claimed by a United States attorney for special services
held to be" compensation allowed by law" within the meaning of the
third section of the act of June 20, 1874, chapter 328, and therefore not
precluded by that section from being paid.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 19, 1885.
SIR : Yours of the 11th states a claim by the United States
.a ttorney for southern New York for two fees, and asks
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whether the act of 1874, chapter 328, section 3, has any and
what operation in preventing their payment.
1. The first fee is for $2,500, allowed by court for defending .t he Secretary of the Treasury in a suit brought in 1873
by one Lamar because of cotton seized by order of the Secretary, such Ruit being ended in November, 1884, by judgment in favor of the defendant.
This fee therefore comes within Revised Statutes, section
827 (the Secretary being an " officer of the revenue" within
that phrase there employed), and consequently it is excluded
from the operation of Revised Statutes, sections 770, 833,
(834) and 835. When duly allowed by the court it therefore
became strictly compensation allowed by law within the
meaning of those words in the body of section 3 first above
mentioned.
2. The second fee is one for defending Postmaster James
(of New York) in the Yale Lock suits.
I have considered this case with great care, having approached it with serious doubts as to the proper answer.
After scrutinizing the statutory provisions, however, I see no
reason to hold that compensation to district attorneys for
special services duly allowed. to them under a statute which
authorized their employment is not, as well as that in cases
under Revised Statutes, section 827, "compensation allowed
by law."
The act of 187 4 therefore does not apply at all, and the proviso herein was added ex abundanti cautela. I had at first
thought this might sub modo be otherwise; it is not necessary now to say why.
Upon the whole I see no reason why the fees should not
be paid.
Very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER
'
The SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

123

Emolument Returns of Marshals.

EMOLUMENT RETURNS OF MARSHALS.
Allowances for travel by United States marshals, provided by section 829,
Revised Statutes, are ''fees" within the meaning of section 833 Revised
Statutes, and should be included in the emolument returns required by
the latter section to be made by those officers.
DEPAR'l'l\IENT OF JUSTICE,

February 20, 1885.
SIR: By letter of the 14th instant, the then Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Coon, at the request of the Solicitor of the Treasury, submitted to me, for an opinion thereon,
the following question, which has arisen in a matter now before the latter officer : '• Does the mileage received by
United States marshals under section 829, Revised Statutes,.
form a part of the emoluments and fees, returns of which are·
required to be made to the Attorney-General by section 833,
Revised Statutes¥"
Having considered this question with much care, I am now
prepared to state my opinion thereon.
Tbe last-mentioned section requires the marshal to make,.
semi-annually, a written return of "all the fees and emoluments of his office, of every name and character," etc.
This language is very broad and comprehensive; it undoubtedly includes any and every allowance to which the marshal
is entitled, and which may properly be denominated a fee oremolument of his office.
Section 829 provides that the marshal shall re9eive certain
·allowances and among others the following: "For traveling
from his residence to the place of holding court, etc., 10 centsa mile for going only." ''For travel, in going only, to serve
any process, warrant, etc., six cents a mile, to be computed
from the place where the process is returned to the place of
service," etc. Allowances of this description to the officers of
courts are commonly called the traveling fees of such,officers;
and they have received this designation in the legislation of
Congress regulating the compensation of the marshal. Thus
in section 3 of the act of 1\-Iay 8, 1792, chapter 36, which prescribes the compensation of the marshal for the service of
process, it is declared that " the fee for travel," where only
one person is named in the writ, shall not exceed a certain
sum, etc. That section was repealed by the act of February
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29, 1799, chapter 19; yet it is in pari materia with all the
subsequent legislation regulating the compensation of ·marshals; and according to a familiar rule of interpretation, it
may be referred to for the purpose of explaining the scope
and import of terms employed in such subsequent legislation.
Regarding the allowances for travel provided by section
829, adverted to above, as fees within the meaning of section
833, there is no escape from the conclusion that all such allowances should be included in the written return which, by
the latter section, the marshal is required to make semiannually ; and I am of the opinion that they must be so regarded. This view is fortified by the practice which I
understand has hitherto uniformly prevailed from the passage of the fee-bill of 1853 (from which the above-mentioned
provision in section 833 is taken) down to the present time,
namely, to require marshals to include in their emolument
returns the amounts received by them for mileage. Such
practical construction of the statute for so long a period is
itself entitled to very great weight.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Hon. HuGH McCuLLOCH,
Secretary of the Treasury.

PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES.
An attorney was employed by the War Department in 1868 to defend
certain parties against whom suits were brought, in the result of
which the Government was interested. The suits were not determined
until some time after the passage of the act of June 22, 1870, chapter
150, up to which time the attorney was continued therein: Advised
that the authority under which the attorney was originally employed
was sufficient, and that the Secretary of War is authorized to pay for
his servibes out of any fund under his control which may be available
for that purpose.
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24:, 1885.
SIR: In your letter of the 12th instant, transmitting an aceount of George P. Strong, esq., for professional services rendered by him in the defense of certain suits brought by
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William G. Clark v. Robert and William Mitchell, and Same v.
Robert H. Franklin, you inquire "whether it is competent for
the Secretary of War to pay ·for the services, in view of section 365 of the Revised Statutes."
It appears by the paper accompanying the account that
both of these suits, and one other, were instituted in 1868 by
the plaintiff, Clark, to recover from the defendants certain
rents which they had paid over to the military authorities of
the United States during the rebellion under the compulsion
of an order issued by the latter; and that the War Department, deeming the United States to be interested in the
result of this legislation, Mr. Strong was then employed by
that Department to appear in behalf of the defendants.
Under the law in force at that time (act of February 26,
1853, chap. 80) the head of any Department was authorized,
in his discretion, to employ special counsel in behalf of the
Government where its interests were concerned, the compensation of counsel so employed being defrayed from funds
under the control of such Department. This authority was
taken away by section 17 of the act of June 22, 1870, chapter 150, which is embodied in sections 189, 365, .and 366, Revised Statutes; but the provisions of that act have been
construed to not apply to a case in which the employment of
counsel occurred prior to its passage, notwithstanding the
services were in part rendered subsequent thereto. (13
Opin., 580.)
In the suits mentioned, Mr. Strong was employed by competent authority before the said act of 1870, and, be having
· become thoroughly prepared for them, considerations of
economy, as well as of expediency, required his continuance
therein after the passage of that act, as his previous preparation enabled him to conduct the defense at less expense,
and perhaps with less hazard, than any one else. For the
purpose of such continuance, as also for the purpose of allowing compensation for his services, the authority under which
he was originally employed was sufficient, the provisions of
the act of 1870, according to the construction above adverted
to, not applying to the case.
The suits were ably and successfully defended ,by Mr.
~trong; the controversy, after having been tried in the in-

•

126

HON. BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER
Co m p en s a t i o n o f D is t r i c t A. t to r n e y s.

ferior court and heard in the supreme court of the State, and
thence brought before the Supreme Court of the United
States, being finally determined by the latter in favor of the
defendants. In my opinion you are authorized to pay for
his services out of any fund under your control which is
available for that purpose.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

COMPENSATION OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS.
Section 838 Revised Statutes does not authorize an allowance to be
made by the Secretary of the Treasury to a district attorney for services
in internal-revenue cases reported to the latter wherein no judicial
proceedings have been instituted.

DEPAR1'MENT

OF

JUS1'ICE,

March 2, 1885.

SIR : Your letter of the 28th ultimo, and accompanying
papers, relative to an account submitted by the United States
attorney for the eastern district of l\iissouri, under section
838, Revised Statutes, presents this inquiry: Whether that
section authorizes an allowance to be made to a district attorne~r for his services in _internal-revenue cases reported to·
him, wherein, upon inquiry and examination, he has decided
that the ends of justice do not require that judicial proceedings should be instituted and no such proceedings have
been instituted.
This, upon· inquiry, appears to be prompted by the circumstance that the district judge of the aforesaid district
has, in a recent case, placed a construction upon that section
which difl'ers from the one given it by your predecessors in
office. As construed by the latter, the section does not authorize compensation to be allowed in cases not "tried or disposed of" before a judge; while by the former it is held that
compensation may be allowed in such cases.
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that the construction
hitherto adopted and acted upon by your Departi:Qent is correct. Thit; conchtsion is reached after having taken into
view, in connection with section' 838, Revised Statutes, the
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seventh section of the act of July 18, 1866, chapter 201, the
act of March 3, 1873, chapter 244, and sections 3084, 3085,
and 3164, Revised Statutes.
By section 7 of the act of 1866 it was made the duty of
the rlistrict attorney, upon the report of the collector of customs thereby required, to" cause suit and prosecution to be
-commenced and prosecuted without delay for the fines and
personal penalties by law in such cases provided, unless
upon inquiry and examination he shall decide that a conviction cannot probably be obtained, or that the ends of public
justice do not require that a suit or prosecution should be
instituted, in which case he shall report the facts to the Secretary of the 'rreasury for hi~ direction; and for expenses
incurred and services rendered in prosecutions for such fines
.and personal penalties the Jistrict attorney shall receive
such allowance as the Secretary shall deem just and reasonable, upon the certificate of the judge before whom such
prosecution was had," etc. Here it is very clear that no
allowance is authorized for the services of the district attorney. excepting in cases in which suits or prosecutions have
been instituted. Nothing is allowed for the preliminary
"inquiry and examinination" and report of facts to the Secretary in cases not prosecuted.
That section was wholly superseded by the amendatory
act of 1873, which re-enacted the same provisions substantially, and extended them to internal-revenue cases. This
act made it the duty of the district attorney, on the report
of the collector of customs or of the collector of internal rev~mue, as the case may be, to •' cause the proper proceedings
to be commenced and prosecuted without delay for the fines,
penalties, and forfeitures by law in such cases provided, unless upon inquiry and examination he shall decide that such
proceedings cannot probably be sustained, or that the ends
of justice do not require that proceedings should be instituted, in which case he shall report the facts in customs cases
to the ~ecretary of the Treasury, and in internal-r~venue
cases to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for their direction; and for the expenses incurred and services rendered
in all such cases the district attorn~y shall receive and be
paid from the Treasury such sum as the Secretary of the
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Treasury shall deem just and reasonable, u_pon the certificateof the judge before whom such cases are tried or disposed of."'
The object of this enactment was to put internal-revenue
cases upon the same footing with customs cases (respecting.
fines, penalties, and forfeitures), both as regards the insti·
tution of judicial proceedings therein and the allowance of
compensation to district attorneys for their services, etc.,
therein. Under the act of 1866 such allowance was limited
to '' expenses incurred and services rendered " in customs
cases. The act of 1873 authorized a similar allowance to be
made in internal-revenue cases as well as customs cases.
The words " expenses incurred and services rendered in al~
s~wh cases," as used in the latter act, were meant to include
both customs cases and internal-revenue cases; and that they
were not meant to include cases (whether internal revenue or
customs) in which no judicial proceedings have been in~ti
tuted is shown by the context. Thus, the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized to make an allowance for such expenses and services only "upon the certificate of the judge
before whom such cases are tried or disposed of." This
language shows that, in enlarging the provisions of the act
of 1866 so as to cover internal-revenue cases, the act of
1873 intended to retain the restrictions theretofore existing
as to the cases in which allowances to the district attorney
should he made. The former act required a "certificate of
the judge before whom such prosecution was had;" the latter act calls for a ''certificate of the judge before whom such
cases are tried or disposed of." The phraseology thus employed, which also occurs in sections 838 and 3085, Revised
Statutes, is of the same import.
The sections of the Revised Statutes hereinbefore mentioned have made no change in the law as it stood under th~
act of 1873, respecting allowances by the Secretary of the
Treasury to district attorneys in customs and internal-revenue eases.
Accordingly, in answer to the inquiry presented, I have
the honor to reply that in my opinion section 838, Revised
Statutes, does not authorize an allowance to be made by the
Secretary of the Treasury to a district attorney for expenses
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incurred and services rendered in cases wherein no judicial
proceedings have been instituted.
Very respectfully,

BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. HUGH McCuLLocH,
Secretary of the Treasury.

CLAIM OF LAKE SUPERIOR AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD COMPANY.
Upon the facts presented in this case: Advised that it is not incumbent
upou the Postmaster-General to have an account for mail transportation performed in July, 1876, audited in favor of the Lake Superior
and Mississippi Railroad Company, until satisfactory evidence is presented that the company has maintained its existence and that there
are proper officers to receive and receipt for the money.
DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 2, 1885.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of the 20th of February ultimo and to reply as followt-3:
On the 12th of June, 1877, a decree of the circuit court of
the United States for the district of Minnesota, foreclosing
a mortgage dated January 1, 1869, transferred all the mortgaged premises to the St. Paul and Duluth Railroad Compauy. The mortgage had been given by the Lake Superior
and Mississippi Railroad Oompany, and included, witll the
real and personal property, all corporate franchises, including the franchise to be a corporation. At the time of the sale
and decree there was due from the United States to the LakfJ
cuperior and Mississippi Railroad Uornpany $3,G8J. 7G for
transportation of the mails from July, 1876. A suit instituted
by the St. Paul and Duluth Railroad Company to recover
this sum has been decided in favor of the United States by
the Supreme Court, it being held that no terms of description
sufficient to pass the interest of the original company therein
are to be found in the mortgage ur decree of sale, and, further,
that the transfer of such a claim is forbidden by section 3477,
Revised Statutes, which provides that every assignment of a •
claim against the United States made before issue of a warrant is absolutely void. (112 U. S, 733.)
273-VOL XVIII--9
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J. F. Farnsworth, claiming to be the attorney of the Lake
Superior and Mississippi Ra,ilroad Company and of the St.
Paul and Duluth Railroad Company, now asks that this claim
be audited, promising that when that is done he will present
satisfactory evidence of the rights of the party claiming the
warrant. You ask my advice as to whether it is your duty
to cause the claim in question to be audited by the proper
officers of the Department.
It does not seem to me incumbent upon you to have this
account audited until e\-ridence has been prfsented sufficient
to satisfy you that the Lake Superior and Mississippi Rail·
road Company has maintained its existence, and that there
are proper officers to receive and receipt for the money. The
Supreme Court having decided that the St. Paul and Duluth
Railroad Company is not entitled to the money, it follows that
the officers of that corporation have no right, and that no
assignee can make claim. You may, if you see fit, have the
account stated in favor of the Lake Superior and Mississippi
Hailroad Company, withholding the warrant until General
}""'arnsworth produces the evidence promised; but in view of
the mortgage and foreclosure of the franchise to be a corporation, and of the sale in 1877 of all and every right of the company,the presumption that the corporation still exists is overthrown, and 'the burden of proving its existence is upon the
claimant. It is for you to determine whether you will audit
without the promised evidence, or insist on the production of
the evidence before taking any steps. Without more facts I
cannot advise as to the preseut status of the Lake Superior
and Mississippi Railroad Company.
Very respectfully,

BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
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CANCELLATION OF POSTAGE-STAMPS.
'The Postmaster-General is authorized by the act of June 20, 1878, chapter 359, to substitute. for the black printing inks and writing fluids used
under section 721, Postal Regulations, any canceling ink which is uniform and which actual experiment and test have shown to his satisfaction to be best calculated to guard again&t fraud, and to order its
use in all post-offices where stamps are canceled.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 3, 1885.
SIR: Your letter of the 20th ultimo presents for my consideration the following case and question :
"Section 3921, Revised Statutes, 1878, requires that' postage-stamps affixed to all mail matter, or the stamped envelopes in which the same is inclosed, shall, when deposited
for mailing or delivery, be defaced by the postmaster at the
mailing office in such manner as the Postmaster-General shall
direct.'
"Under this statute the Postmaster-General, by regulation
(sec. 721, P. L. and R.), requires that,' the cancellation must
be effected by the use of black printing ink, whenever that
material can be obtained; where it cannot, the operation
shaH be performed by making several heavy crosses or parallel lines upon each stamp with a pen dipped in good black
writing ink.'
"In practice, however, it was found that the use of these
.canceling materials invited frauds upon the revenues of the
Department by the washing and reuse of stamps.
"Accordingly, on . April 29, 1875, the then PostmasterGeneral issued a circular invitation to the public to submit
methods (inks and appliances for the more effectual cancellation of stamps), under which many inks and appliances were
examined by the Department.
"In the sundry civil bill approved June ~o, 1878, appears
the following enactment :
" 'That the Postmaster-General be and he is hereby authorized to adopt a uniform canceling ink or other appliance
for canceling stamps which experiments and tests have
proved to be the most practicable and the best calculated to
protect the revenues of the Department from the frauds prac-
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ticed upon it, to be used in all the post-offices where stamps
are canceled, and he is hereby authorized to distribute said
canceling ink or other appliance in the same manner as other ,
supplies are now distributed in the different post-offices in the
United States, and to this end the Postmaster-General is
hereby authorized to use any funds of said Department·here·
tofore applicable: Provided, The same shall not increase the
expenditures of said Department for the purposes named in
this section.'
·
"In view of the laws above quoted, I have the honor to
request your opinion upon the question whether, assuming
the Postmaster-General is able to find a practically indelible
canceling ink, be will be authorized, under said laws, to substitute it for the black printing inks and writing fluids now
used under Postal Regulations, section 721, and to order its
use in all post-offices where stamps are canceled.''
Upon consideration, I am of the opinion that the question
propounded by you should be answered in tlle affirmative ..
Under the authority conferred by the act of June 20, 1878,
cited above, the Postmaster-General has power to adopt, and
to substitute for the inks now in use, any canceling ink which
is uniform and which actual experiment and test have shown
to his satisfaction to be best calculated to guard against
fraud npon the revenues of the post.:tl service, anu he has
power to require such canceling ink to be used in all postoffices where stamps are canceled; subject, however, to the
restriction that the e-x penses of the Department are not
thereby increased.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
BENJAMIN HARRIS BREWSTER.
Ron. FRANK HATTON,

Postmaster- General.

OPINIONS
OF

HON. AUGUSTUS H. GARLAND, OF ARKANSAS.
APPOINTED MARCH 6, 1885.

BRIDGE ACROSS THE MISSISSIPPI AT ST. PAUL.
'The provision in the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 215, fixing the width
of the water-way between the spans of the proposed bridge across the
Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minn., extends to the entire structure
over so much of the river as is ordinarily navigable at some seasons of
the year for either boats or rafts.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 20, 1885.

SIR: I have considered the question presented in your letter of the 17th instant, relative to the bridge which the City
of St. Paul proposes to construct across the Mississippi River
under the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 215, namely : "Whether
the provision in that act as to the length of spans should be
held to extend to the entire structure over the stream from
bank to bank, or confined to such portion of the river as is
navigable. "
The provision here referred to is in the second section of
tlrat act, and reads as follows : '' Provided, That if said
bridge or bridges shall be made with unbroken and continuous spans, it shall not be of less elevation in any case than
fifty-five and one-half feet above extreme high-water mark
.over the main channel of said river, as understood at the
point of location, to the bottom chord of the bridge, nor shall
the spans of said bridge or bridges give a clear width of
water-way of l~ss than two hundred and fifty feet, and the
piers of said bridge or bridges shall be parallel with the current of said river, and the main span shall be over the main
~hannel of the river, and give a clear width of water-way of
not less than three hundred feet."
133
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It appears by the drawings which accompanied your letter,
exhibiting the plan and location of the proposed bridge, that
the main span is to be over the main channel of the river and
will give a clear width of water-way of 34:8 feet, but that each
of the other spans (of which there are five) will give a width
of less than 250 feet, two of them, nearest the main span,.
giving but 200 feet, and the remainder still less.
In regard to these spans (other than the main one), MajorMackenzie, of the United States Engineer Corps, reports that
they are not over a navigable part of the river. The provision
prescribing the width of the water-way to be given by the
main and other spans is made in the interest of navigation,.
and if the river at this point were not, at any and all times,
navigable for" boats, vessels, rafts, and other water-craft,"
the requirements of such provision might well be deemed to
be inapplicable thereto. But the drawings indicate that between low and high water mark a very considerable depth of
water must exist there during certain seasons of the year,
which, it may reasonably be assumed, is available for the
navigation of rafts and like water-craft; and, in fixing the
width of the water-way between piers to be erected in that
part of the river which does not embrace the main channel,
Congress probably had in view more especially the needs of
such navigation. This is indicated by the second proviso in
said section, where it is provided that the spans there required to give a water-way of not less than 250 feet may benot less than 10 feet above extreme high-water mark.
Accordingly, in answer to your inquiry, I have the honor to
state that in my opinion the provision in question sxtends tothe entire structure over so much of the river as is ordinarily
navigable at some seasons of the year for either boats orrafts.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND..
Ron. WILLIAM C. ENDICOTT,
Secretary of War.
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HEAD TAX.
The duty imposed by the ~ct of 1882, chapter 376, upon passengers, other
than citizens, coming to any port within the United States, is to be exacted·of convicts, lunatics, etc., ~!!though by the terms of the statute
they are not to be permitted to land and are required to be returned to
whence they c~me.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 20, 1885.
SIR: Yours of the 18th instant refers to the duty of 50 cents
imposed bytheactof1882,chapter376, upon passengers, other
than citizens, who shall come, etc., to any port within the
U_n ited States; and asks whether such duty is to be exacted
of convicts, lunatics, etc., amongst such passengers that; by
the terms of the statute are not to be permitted to land, but
are to be returned to whence they came.
I advise you that it is to be so exacted. Amongst other
reasons for this opinion I observe that the statute is imperative as to the time within which (twenty-four hours after the
entry of the vessel) such duty is to be paid; whilst nothing is
said as to that within which the existence of convicts, lunatics, etc., is to be ascertained. This is a technical reason, it
is true, but it seems supported also by the policy of this
act-a matter which need not be developed here.
Very respectfully,
'
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL.
Special counsel may be employed by the Attorney-General, at the request
of the Secretary of the Navy, to assist th~ judge-advocate in a trial by
court-martial; the compensation of such counsel (in the absence of
other provision) to be paid from the appropriation for the contingent
expenses of the Navy.
Such counsel should be commissioned by the Attorney-General under section 366, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 21, 1885.
Yours of the 18th instant calls my attention to correspondence betwixt the Secretary of the Navy and the
Attorney-General in January and February last which reSJR:
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suited in an appointment of Mr. Cragin to assist a naval
judge-advocate in the court-martial called to try the_ late
Surgeon-General. Mr. Cragin was sel@cted, and his fee was
arranged by the Secretary with the assent of the AttorneyGeneral. He has taken an oath which has been forwarded
to this Department, but he has not been commissioned. The
trial will begin upon the 14th proximo.
After making a statement substantially as above, you ask:
(1) Whether special counsel can be employed to assist a
judge-advocate, i. e., "counsel" other than some officer of
the Department of Justice~
(2) If he can, should he not be commissioned under section
366, Revised Statutes; and also, can his compensation be
paid out of the appropriation for the contingent expenses of
the Nav.Y, which includes "expenses of courts-martial;"
such appropriation being (sec. 3676, Rev. Stat.) under the
direction of the Secretary of the Navy~
(3) Referring to sections 3676 and 3681, Revised Statutes,
can the Secretary of the Navy, in his discretion and without
applying to the Attorney-General, employ special counsel in
connection with cases before naval courts martial~
1. The only difficulty in the way of the employment by
the Attorney-General of special attorneys on behalf of the
United States seems to be involved iu the question of the existence of an appropriation for their payment.
The act of 1870, chapter 150, which created the Department
of Justice, seems to have intended that all lawyers who should
be employed, whether statedly or casually, upon behalf of the
United States should have connection with that Department.
They were not all to be '~officers" thereof, but there was to
be subordination betwixt them and the Attorney-General.
In particular it was provided (sec. 17) that such special
counsel as might be from time to time required by any Department should be appointed by the Attorney-General only,
and should formally and really be assimilated, in point of
office, oath, and commission, to the ordinary legal officers
of the G-overnment, the amount of their compensation to be
stipulated for by him. These provisions are to be found in
sections 189, 362, 365, and 366, Revised Statutes.
If, therefore, there be an appropricttion for the Navy De-
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partment that may be applied to the compensation of Mr.
Cragin upon his being duly qualified, I see no reason why he
may not entitle himself to be paid.
I do not know that you make objection to the manner in
which the Attorney-General informally delegated, as it were,
his functions as regards selection, etc., to the Secretary. In
.a proper case this might deserve consideration.
Upon the whole, as to your first question, I agree in the
{)pinion given to the Secretary of the Navy by AttorneyGeneral Akerman, under date of August 25, 1871 (13 Opin.,
.515). The cireumstance that in the mean time (June 19,
1878) the office of "naval solicitor" has heen abolished (20
Stat., 105), does not affect that conclusion.
2. I think that Mr. Cragin should be commissioned under
section 366, as you suggest.
When so commissioned, I see no reason why he may not
be compensated out of the fund for '"expenses of courts-martial," to which you refer.
3. A judge-ad vocate need not be a professional person.
His qualifications must of course be of the sort required by
members of the bar, but there is no law limiting choice of
judge-advocates, or of their assistants when needed, to that
.class. Although there is no statutory provision in regard to
naval judge-advocates, like that for those of the Army, to the
effect that they shall belong to the Navy, yet in fact I take it
that this is generally the case. So assistants for judge-advocates might be detailed ft·om the same branch of service, or
indeed specially intelligent persons might be selected from
'
.any line of civil life.
However, after considering the provisions in the Revised
Statutes taken from the act of 1870, I am of opinion that if
it be thought best in any case to employ regular counsel to
assist a naval judge-advocate, he should be selected and commissioned by the Attorney-General. Such service would substantially be professional "service," to which the AttorneyGeneral might under section 367 assign any lawyer in the
Department of Justice; and therefore it is probable that Congress intended the statutory provisions tor compensating
persons employed in lieu of these "offi~ers" (sec. 365) to
.cover like service ; and so such profe::;sional persons as are
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required to perform it should be selected etc., by the Attorney -General alone. If such service be professional in the one
point of view, so also in the other.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

JURISDICTION OVER TRIBAL INDIANS.
Where an Apache Indian, charged with murdering another Indian of
the same tribe on an Indian reservation in Arizona, was in custody of
the Territorial authorities: Advised that the accused should be delivered
up for trial and punishment to the authorities of his tribe.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
March 24, 1885.
SIR: I have considered the papers inclosed in yours of the
.20th instant~ stating the case of Eschilla, an Apache-Yuma
Indian, charged with murdering an .4-pache Indian scout
In August last within the White Mountain Indian Reservaiiion in Arizona.
The question~ ou ask is whether for trial and punishment
t.h is criminal is to be delivered up to the Territorial authorities or to the authorities of his tribe.
I gather from the papers in the case that Eschilla and his
victim are tribal Indians, belonging to the same tribe.
The case therefore comes within the rule of the Grow Dog
case (109 U. S., 556), i. e., whilst as between the Territory
and the United States the latter would have jurisdiction,
they have relinquished such jurisdiction to the tribe.
The case therefore is to be remitted to the authorities of
the tribe.
I herewith return the papers inclosed as above.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE lETERIOR.
OF
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ALASKA.
The fourteenth section of the act ofMay 17, 1884, chapter 53, which prohibits the importation of "intoxicating liquors" into the Territory of
Alaska, does not apply to wines imported for sacramental use.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

March 24, 1885.

SIR : Yours of the 21st instant refers to an application to
ship to Alaska wines for sacramental use in the various
Greeco-Russian churches there; and in effect asks whether
the fourteenth section of the act of 1884, chapter 53, which
prohibits the importation into that Territory of " intoxicating liquors," except for medicinal, mechanical, and scientific
purposes," operates upon such application.
Granting that, as appears probable from its context in Revised Statutes, section 1955, the word "importation" in the
above provision includes shipments from other portions of
the United States, and that wine is an" intoxicating liquor'"
within the words there employed, I am still of opinion that
-such provision does not apply to exclude wines intended for
sacramental uses. Such use of wines is a religious rite
equally solemn and venerable. Its "free exercise" is therefore protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.
In the light of that guaranty,...! am satisfied that, by the
provision referred to, Congress had no more intention than it
bad power to interfere with the shipment of the wines in
question.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
CUSTOMS LAWS.
Where meat of American production, cured with foreign salt, was exported to Europe (the duty upon the salt being refunded), and subsequently brought back to this country: Advised that, on the duties
upon the salt being re-refunded, the meat may be admitted duty free.
under the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

March 24:, 1885.

SIR : Yours of the 20th instant calls my attention to a.
case under the customs laws in which certain meats of Ameri- I
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can production, cured with foreign salt, were exported to
Europe, the duty upon the salt being thereupon refunded
(tariff act of March 3, 1883, Treasury ed., par. 483), and
have since been reimported. Thereupon a question was
raised before your predecessor, 25th ultimo, whether upon
such reimportation the meats after re-refunding duties on
the salt were not free; and he decided that under existing
law the meats could not be distinguished from meats of foreigu production, and therefore should be subjected to duty
accordingly.
Replying to the questions thereupon asked byyou,I advise(1) That under section 2 of the act of 1875, chapter 136
(March 3), you cannot of yourself alone reverse that decision for the purpose of holding the meats upon such rerefunding to be free; and,
(2) .A. proper construction of the free list in the tari~ act of
1883 (Treasury ed., par. 649) designates these meats as free,
at least upon such re-refunding of the duty upon the salt.
For customs purposes the salted meats at exportation were
regarded as "salt" and "meat." Upon their importation
it is consistent to keep up that treatment. The only serious
question thereabouts seems to be that which you mention as
having been raised by Judge Sawyer, viz: Whether the
words of paragraph 649 may not' avail to pass the whole
importation free, as being a "manufactured article of the
United States" returned in the same condition as exported.
I advise therefore that you accept the refunded duty upon
the salt, and thereupon admit the meats free.
Very respectfully,
A. H. G .A.RL.A.ND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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OLD WINNEBAGO AND CROW CREEK RESERVATION.
The contiguous tracts of land lying on the east bank of the Missouri
River in the Territory of Dakota, known as the Old Winnebago and Crow
Creek Reservations, are protected by the provisions of the treaty of
April 29, 1868, with the Sioux Indians; and the executive order of
February 27, 1885, restoring portions of such tracts to the public domain, is in violation of that treaty, and consequently inoperative and
void.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 29, 1885.
SIR: Your communication of the 17th March instant re-

quests my opinion as to whether those contiguous tracts of
land lying on the east bank of the Missouri River, m the
Territory of Dakota, and designated the Old Winnebago and
Crow Creek Reservation-and sometimes going by the last
name only-are embraced by "the treaty concluded with
various" bands of the Sioux Indians on the 29th April, 1868
(15 Stat., 635), and whether the executive order of the 27th
February, 1885, restored the lands in question to the public
domain.
In replying to the first question, as to whether the lands
referred to come within thP- treaty of 1868, it will be necessary to give particular attention to their condition prior to
and at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.
By an act passed on the 21st February, 1863 (12 Stat.,
858), tbe President was authorized to remove the Winnebago
Indians from the State of Minnesota and settle them upon
such unoccupied lands, beyond the limit of any State, as he
might assign and set apart for them in conformity to the law.
On the 3d March 1863 (12 Stat., 819), a similar law was
passed, authorizing and directing the President to assign
and set apart for the Sisseton, Wahpeton, Medawakanton,
and Walpakoota bands of Sioux Indians a tract of unoccupied land outside the limits of any State, in tbe manner required by the law.
In furtherance of these acts Clark W. Thompson, a superintt...;.dant of the Indian service, proceeded, by direction of
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to lay oft' two adjoining
tracts or reservations of the public domain on the east bank
of tbe Missouri River, in the Territory of Dakota, and on the
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1st July, 1863, be reported to the Commissioner that he had
completed the surveys, and tr~nsmitted the plats and field
notes with his report.
The Winnebagoes were settled on the upper tract or reservation and the Sioux on the lower, but no executive order
was made setting the lands apart for the use and occupation
of these Indians.
The Winnebagoes remained on their reservation until1865,
when by a treaty dated the 8th March of that year (14 Stat.,
671) they ceded, sold, and conveyed to the United States" all
their right, title, and interest in and to their present reservation in the Territory of Dakota, at Usher's Landing, on the
Missouri River, the metes and bounds thereof being on file
in the Indian Department." After this treaty the Winnebagoes removed to their new reservation in Nebraska.
In 1866 the Sioux were also removed to their new reservation in Nebraska set apart for them by an executive order
dated the 27th February, 1866, and founded on the act of 3d
March, 1863 (supra), but without any cession or formal relinquishment.
After the removal of the Winnebagoes and Sioux, wandering bands of Sioux belonging to the Yanctonias, Two Kettle,
and Brule tribes entered and took. possession of the abandoned reservations and have remained on them up to the
present time, although their original entry was without the
sanction of Government. Nevertbeless, the two reservations
have not to this day, as matter of fact, become merged in
the public domain, but have been continuously known, since
the removal of the Indians for whom they were set apart, as
the Old \Vinnebago and Crow Creek Reservations, or simply
as the Crow Creek Reservation. This will be at once apparent by reference to the maps prepared from time to time under the direction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and
by the reports of that officer. They are so laid down on the
map accompanying the Commissioner's report for the year
1884, entitled" Map showing the location of the Indian reservations within the limits of the United States and Territories,
compiled from official and other authentic sources under the
direction of the Hon. Hiram Price, Commissioner of Indian

,
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Affairs." Indee(i this is conceded in all the discussions of
the subject that have been brought to my attention.
In this condition of things the United States and various
tribes of the Sioux Nation came together and concluded a
treaty on the 29th April, 1868. By the second article of this
treaty "the United States agrees that the following district
of country, to wit, viz, commencing on the east bank of the
Missouri River where the forty-sixth parallel of north latitude
crosses the same, thence along low-water mark down said
east bank to a point opposite where the northern line of the
State of Nebraska strikes the river, thence west across said
river and along the northern line of Nebraska to the one
hundred and fourth degree of longitude west from Greenwich, thence north on said meridian to a point where the
forty-sixth parallel of north latitude intercepts the same,
thence due east along said parallel to the place of beginning;
and, in addition thereto, all existing reservations on ·the east
bank of said river shall be, and the same is (sic) hereby, set apart
for the absol~tte and undisturbed use and occupation of the India.ns herein named and for .~uch other friendly tribes or indi·vidual Indians as from time to time they may be willing, with
the consent of the United States, to admit amongst them."
-* * * (15 Stat., 635.)
A reference to the treaty will show that the tribes or bands
to which the Indians belonged or bad belonged who entered
and occupied the abandoned reservations were parties to the
treaty, and it may have been, and v~ry probably was, the
case that the occupants of these reservations were repre ~
sented in the negotiations, if they were not parties to th&
treaty, otherwise than by the chiefs of the tribes from which
they bad wandered. But whether that be the case or not,
they have certainly remained where they are with the consent of the United States and the tribes of the Sioux with
whom the treaty was made.
The questions submitted for opinion turn upon the interpretation of these words of the second article of treaty, that
is to say, "and in addition thereto all exisflng reservations .
on the east ba:nk of the river shall be, and the same is [sic],
set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use of the Indians herein named. " • • •
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If the lands known as the Old Winnebago and Crow Creek
answered to the de8cription of "existing reservations on the east bank of the river" at the time the treaty
was entered into, they are protected by it, and the executive
order of the 27th February, 1885, restoring certain portions
thereof to the public domain, is wholly inoperative and void~
being in violation of the treaty.
But it is urged in support of the order restoring the lands
in question to the public domain, that they were not originally set apart and dedicated as reservations by an executive order in the customary way, and, therefore, that at the
time the treaty of 1868 was made they did not answer to the
description of reservations in the legal technical sense, and
consequently did not come under the protection of the treaty.
I shall not stop to consider whether the laying off of these
two bodies of land by direction of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the removal of the Indians to them were
equivalent to a formal executive order, because I find that by
the third and fourth articles of the treaty between the United
States ~nd the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the Sioux
Indians of the 19th February·, 1867 (15 Stat., 505), reser.vations are set apart for certain members of the said bands "whowere not sent to the Grow Greek Reservation." In proclaiming
this treaty, thus excepting from its operation members of
the tribes who were parties to it, on the ground that they had
been already provided with a settlement on the Grow Greek Reservation, the Executive necessarily recognized and adopted
all that has been done towards establishing the reservations
now in question, which it may be proper to say are, since the
removal from them of the Indians for whom they were originally laid off, sometimes regarded as one reservation, and
called simply the Crow Creek Reservation, there being no
longer any reason for keeping up the old division. Whatever, therefore, was needed to complete the dedication at-·
tempted under the acts of 1863 would seem to have been supplied by the Executive in concluding and proclaiming this
treaty.
It will be observed that this action of the .Executive was
subsequent to the removal of the Winnebagoes and Sioux,
and the ce·ssion of the former, by treaty, of their interest in
Rese~vations
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the lands, which, it is argued, had the effect of restoring them
to the national domain.
At the time of the treaty, then, the lands in question had
been validly appropriated as Indian reservations, and being
on the east bank of the Missouri River fell within the treaty
and were protected by it from the power of the Executive to
throw open lands to entry.
But supposing I am wrong in this view, and that the lands
had never been legally appropriated as reservations at the
time of the treaty of 1868, I am still of opinion that they are
cover~d by the treaty. It must be regarded as a well-settled
principle in interpreting statutes that, if possible, ''no clause,
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant,''
and I see no reason why this principle is not as applicable to
treaties as statutes.
Now, ~fthe argument in support of the executive order of
February, 1885, is sound, the treaty of 1868, in so far as it
professes to secure lands to. the Sioux on the east bank of
the Missouri, is made to have no eflect or operation whatevt>r,
because there is no land so situated which answers to the description used in t,h e treaty, and the eminent and intelligent.
gentlemen who represented the Government in concluding
the treaty are placed in the somewhat embarrassing position
of having offered to the Indians reservations on tpe east bank
of the river when there were none there; for it is a fact that
if the lands in question were not reservations, there was no
reservation on the east bank of the river except the Yankton
Reservation, which, however, c6uld not possibly have been in
contemplation, because it was established by a previous treaty
made in 1859 with the Yanktons, who were not parties to
the treaty of 1868, and could not therefore be affected by it.
lf, then, it be true that these lands were not teclmical reservations at the time of the treaty of 1868, it is obvious the
contracting parties must have used the term reservation in
some secondary sense, and when we see that there has been
an uninterrupted practical appropriation of the lands as
Indian reservations from 1863 down to the promulgation of
the executive order of February, 1885, and that, as already
said, they are so described in the map of Indian reservations
accompanying the Indian Commissioner's Report submitted
273-VOL xvn--10
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to the last Congress by the Secretary of the Interior, we cannot for a moment be at a loss as to what that sense was.
Nothing would seem to be better established in reason or
authority than that when the expounder of a statute or other
instrument is satisfied that a term occurring in it is not to be
taken in its normal or technical acceptation, but in some
other, it becomes his duty to give it the sense in which it appears to have been used. So, here, if the lands in question
are found not to be reservations in a strict •legal sense, but
to have been understood to be such generally, and even by
the Government itself, surely the grant, which would otherwise fail in this particular, must be held to refer to such lands
as were reputed to be reservations.
'rhe words of description used in the treaty are, when so
interpreted, amply sufficient to point out the portion of the
public domain intended to be ceded, and the competency of
the treaty making power to make the cession is not open to
discussion; so that we have all the conditions necessary to
a public grant.
To these considerations may be added that Indian treaties
are not construed strictly, but liberally in favor of the Indians. (2 Opin., 465; The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall., 737.)
In conclusion, I am of opinion that the lands in question
are covered by the treaty of the 29th April, 1868, and, consequently, that the executive order of the 27th February,
1885, is inoperative.
I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
WORLD'S INDUSTRIAL AND COTTON CENTENNIAL EXPOSITION.
The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 360, in aid
of the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition, held in
New Orleans, La., is not applicable to any objects other than those
specifically enumerated in the act.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,
April 2, 1885.

SIR : Your communication of the 30th of March, 1885, requests my opinion as to whether the appropriation in the
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smH.lry civil appropriation act of 3d March, 1885, for ''final
aid to the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition, now being held in New Orleans," will be available for
the payment of debts due by the Exposition to persons, firms,
or corporations residing or having their places of business
in Louisiana, as to any surplus which may exist after all the
disbursements specifically provided for in the act have been
made.
I do not think such residuum would be available for the
purpose mentioned.
The enumeration of the objects to which the appropriation
is to be applied must, I think, be regarded as manifesting
a purpose to exclude all other objects, according to a wellknown canon of interpretation.
That such was the intention of Congress would seem to
follow, also, from the requirement of the act that the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe the modA of proving
"'such indebtedness," that is to say, the previously mentioned
indebtedness'' to persons, firms, or corporations living and
d.oing business outside of the State of Louisiana." The use
of the adjective '' such," in restriction of the meaning of the
\YOrd "indebtedness," would hardly have occurred if the
legislature had had in view the possibility of a use of the
appropriation to pay debts not specified. Again, the law
provides that no part of the ''foregoing sums" shall be paid
until the Secretary of the Treasury shall be satisfied as to
.all expenditures under the act of 21st May, 1884, and it cannot
ue doubted that Congress intended to embrace every disbnrsement under the act by the words ''foregoing sums,"
which, however, could refer only to the sums previously mentiO'J~ed.

This view would seem to be strengthened by the consideration that Congress in appropriating a sum H not to exceed the
sum of three hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars,"
which is the language of the provision, appears to evince a
purpose to appropriate only so much of the sum named as
may be required for the demands specified, after the payment of which, if this reading is correct, there can be no surplus, for the appropriation will then have been exhausted,
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although the amount disbursed fall short of the sum named
in the law.
Furthermore, the particularity of Congress in this provision is hardly consistent with the probability that it has
left to implication the application of any part of this appropriation.
·
I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DUTY ON SILVER ORE.

Silver ore, ground, is not dutiable under the tariff act of March 3, 1883.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 11, 1885.
SIR: Replying to yours of the 9th instant, which presents

a question as to the duty upon silver ore somewhat advanced
from a state of nature, as regards extraction of the bullion,
by grinding, etc., you state that on the 30th of September
last the Treasury Department decided that this article is
subject to a duty of 10 per cent., as being a non-dutiable crude
mineral refined, etc., in value by grinding, etc. (See tariff act.
of 1883, par. 95, Treasury edition.)
The soundness of this decision is questioned by the collector at San Francisco in a letter addressed to the Secretary,
dated February 12, mainly for the reason that paragraph 95
cannot mean to include gold and silver ores so refined, etc.,
inasmuch as " bullion," which is a product from such ores,
still further refined, etc., is free. (Par. 666.)
For that and other reasons I entirely agree in the conclusion which the collector suggests, viz, that the silver ore in
question is free.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
~he SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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PARDON-LAWTON'S CASE.
L., having been commissioned a lieutenant in the United States Army,
and taken an oath as such officer to support the Constitution of the
United States, afterwards bore arms against the United States in the
war of the rebellion, but on the 6th of February, 1867, received a full
pardon from the President for the part he had taken therein: Held,
that the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution (section 3), which
did not take effect until more than a year after such pardon was
granted, does not operate to exclude L. from holding office under the
United States.
DEPARTMEN1.' OF JUSTICE,

April14-, 1885.
SIR : My opinion is requested on the following case : Alexander R. Lawton, who had been a cadet at West Point and
held a commission as lieutenant in the United States Army,
and, in one or both of those characters, had taken an oath
which, it is contended, and which I am to assume, as a part
of the case submitted, bound him to support the Constitution,
afterwards bore arms against the United States in the war of
the rebellion.
On the 6th of February, 1867, he received a full pardon
and amnesty for the part he had taken in the rebellion, and
the question is whether he can hold a civil office under the
ur:ited States notwithstru ding the third section of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, which took effect on
the 20th of July, 1868, and is in the following words:
"HEc. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the United States or under
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as any officer of the United States, or as
a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. · But Oongress may, by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability."
The question presented will be disposed of upon the legal
intent and meaning of this amendment.
Prior to the adoption of the amendment, the Executive, in
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the exercise of an unquestionable power, had granted pardons to tlle person whose case is now under consideration
and others standing in the same predicament of guilt.
The power to pardon vested in the Executive by the Constitution was not given to be exercised capriciously, but
when resorted to in cases like the present it should be in
furtherance of the peace of society and in the interest of the
Government.
Such being the theory, it must be presumed that every
exertion of that power in such cases by the Executive Department of the Government was in furtherance of the objects
for which the power was granted; for nothing is better established than that a want of fidelity to its constitutional duties
is never to be imputed to any one of the three great coordinate Departments of the Government if it be possible to
avoid it.
At the time the fourteenth amendment went into operation, Mr. Lawton and the other persons referred to had been
restored, by the pardons previously granted, to all thdr
rights as citizens, and had become, by virtue of those pardons, as innocent as if they had never committed the offenses
forgiven. (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 380; United States v.
Padelford, 9 Wall., 531 ; United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128;
Armstrong v. United States, ib., 154;-Pargoud v. United States,
156; Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall., 148.)
The question, then, for my opinion is whether it was the
intention of the fourteenth amendment to take away rights
which previous pardons had restored; or, in other words,.
whether it was the purpose of that amendment to cast a
reproach upon the Executive Department of the Government
by repudiating, as unworthy of credit, its acts of unquestionable validity, by destroying rights which had undoubtedly
vested under those acts, and by violating the national faith,
solemnly pledged.
It can not be denied that the amendment is as comprehensive as language could make it, but, at the same time, it
must be rememhered that the words of every law are to be
taken in subordination to its intent, and that where they are
general their sense will be restricted if necessary to prevent.
an unjust and absurd consequence, which it must be pre-
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sumed the legislature could not have contemplated. It was
upon this principle that the Supreme Court of the United
States held that an individual pardoned for taking part in
the rebellion was not debarred from suing in the Court of
Claims by a law providing that in order to recover the proceeds of captured or abandoned property the claimant must
prove "that he has never given any aid or comfort to the
present rebellion." The court say: ''It is not to be supposed
that Congress intended by the general language of the act
to encroach upon. any of the prerogatives of the President,
and especially that benign prerogative of mercy which lies
in the pardoning power. It is more reasonable to conclude
that claimants restored to their rights of property, by the
power of the President, were not in contemplation of Congress in passing the act and were not intended to be embraced by the requirement in question. All general terms
in statutes should be limited in their application, so as not
to lead to injustice, oppression, or any uncons~itutional
operation, if that b~ possible. It will be presumed that
ex~eptions were intended which would avoid results of that
nature." (Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall., 153.) In a very
important case recently decided the same court restricted
the general language of a statute in order to avoid giving it
a sense that would have involved Congress in a violation of
a treaty obligation. (Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S.,
555.) The same doctrine is forcibly presented in United
States v. Kirby (7 Wall., 483).
That this principle is appli~able to the interpretation of
constitutions as to statute~ was conclusively established
by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter House Oases (16
Wall., 77), where the court refused to adopt the full meaning
of certain general words in the first section of the fourteenth
amendment in order to avoid an interpretation that would
have involved "so great a departure from the structure and
spirit of our institutions" as, in the absence of explicit language, could not be presumed to have been intended.
Applying, then, this sound rule of interpretation to the
third section of the fourteenth amendment, I am of opinion
that the consequences of allowing its general words of exclusion to operate without a limitation in favor of persons in
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the situation of Mr. Lawton would be productive of an injustice and a disregard of the public faith whlch nothing
short of the most explicit and controlling language should
authorize.
If the conclusion I have reached is not well founded, then
it follows that if the people of the United States should
amend the third section of the fourteenth amendment in the
single particular of requiring a unanimous instead of a twothirds vote of both Houses 'to remove the disability imposed,
all persons whose disabilities had been th~retofore removed
by a two-thirds vote would find themselves again under the
necessity of applying to Congress, a result which would not
be a whit less at war with justice than what would occur if Mr.
Lawton and others in his situation were held to have been
degraded by the amendment to the condition of disability
from which their pardons bad raised them. '
I am also of opinion that Mr. Lawton is not affected by the
amendment, because at the time it was ordained the offenses
on which the disability imposed is based could not have been
imputed to him, for the reason that he had by virtue of his
pardon become " a new man," endowed with "a new credit
and capacity," his guilt had been "blotted out," and he had
become "as innocent as if he bad never committed the
offense." Whatever was his connection with the rebellion
the effect of the pardon was to close the eyes of th~ law to a
perception of it.
These positions have been laid down upon the greatest
~onsiderations by the Supreme Court of the United States
in cases already cited, which make it entirely clear that to
have accused Mr. Lawton of any of the above named offenses
at the time the amendment was adopted would have been a
defamation for which an action might have lain.
Two years before the amendment became law the Supreme
Court laid down, in a case already cited, that a pardon had
the cleansing, renovating effect I have described, and it
almost seems like imputing to the framers of the third section of the amendment either ignorance of the law or the
purpose to set a snare to say that they intended to include
persons already pardoned without specially referring to them.
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I am of opinion, therefore, that Mr. ·Lawton is qualified to
hold a civil office under the Government of the United States.
I have the honor to be, yours, very respectfulJy,
A. H. GARLAND.

The

PRESIDENT.

WORLD'S INDUSTRIAL AND COTTON CENTENNIAL EXPOSITION.
Opinion of April2 1 1885 (ante, p. 146), relative to the appropriation for the
World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition at New Orleans,
La., reaffirmed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 16, 1885.
SIR: On the 13th instant I addressed you a letter, stating that I had examined the matter of the appropriation for
the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition
agafn, upon brief and docum~nts furnished by Mr. Merrick,
" -counsel for the Exposition," and that I saw no cause to
change the opinion that I had rendered you in the same matter on the 2d of this month. .After my letter of the 13th had
been sent, Mr. Merrick appeared in person, and requested
the privilege of being heard on the matter orally, in addition
to the brief that he had filed before you. I acceded to his
request~ and at the same time asked for a return of the
papers by you, which you accordingly sent me.
On last Tuesday Mr. Merrick appeared as H counsel for
the Exposition," and argued the matter before me, with the
brief already alluded to. I have given the matter close and
careful c,onsideration, and I am still of the opinion that I
expressed in my communication to you of the 2d instant, and
see no reason to change the same.
I herewith return the brief, with the documents, and also
my letter of .A.pril13.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
Hon. C. S. FAIRCHILD,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
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EXTIRPATION OF PLEURO-PNEUMONIA.
The provision in the act of May 29, 1884, chapter 60, giving the Commissioner of Agriculture power to expend money in such disinfection and
quarantine measures as may be necessary to prevent the spread of
pleuro-pneumonia from one State or Territory into another, does not
authorize him to purchase animals infected with that disease for the
purpose of slaughter.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 21, 1885.
Yours of the 18th instant caUs attention to the act
of 1884, chapter 60, entitled " to prot'ide means for the supp'(eSsion and extirpation of pleuro-pneumonia," and, referring particularly to words giving you power to expend money "in
such disinfection and quarantine measures as may be necessary to prevent the spread of disease from one State or Ter·
ritory into another," asks whether by these words you are
not " authorized to purchase diseased and infected animals
for the purpose of slaughter, i. e., disi~fection."
At the same time you state that the destruction of animals
infected with pleuro-pneumonia is recognized by experts as
the only way of putting a stop to the spread of that disease.
Conceding that this opinion exists, and is well-founded, I
nevertheless think that the statute in question does not confer power to purchase and slaughter such animals.
You will observe that the statute makes distinction betwixt the District of Columbia and other parts of the country, as regards the duties which it assigns to United States
officials. In the former case only are such officials expressly
directed "to require the destruction of infected animals.'~
The officials so empowered are not, even in that case, such
as belong to the Department of Agriculture. They are Commissioners of the District, or in other words the local authorities such as answer here to the executive authorities of the
States. For the destruction of infected animals within this
District therefore a co-operation is provided between its leg.
islature (viz, Congress, the statute in question affording
such co-operation) and the lvcal executive. My understanding is, that the same co-operation is intended also where such
animals are to be destroyed elsewhere. And I add that
inasmuch as Congress has not provided for "purchase" of
SIR :
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these animals within the District, I presume the more that
it does not intend the appropriation contained in the act so
to be applied anywhere. The diseased animal, as in ordinary
cases, perit suo domino; the hasten·ing of such event upon
public grounds being, to all appearance, supposed by Congress to afford no ground for setting up a market for such
animal, wherein the public is to be purchaser.
The act in question being, as probably was anticipated,
the first of a series upon that subject, is consequently somewhat general and merely tentative in its provi~ions; as, for
instance, was fhe case in analogous recent legislation establishing a National Board of Health. As the results of experience and observation are accumulated upon the topic of
which you speak, no doubt more definite legisiation is intended.
Section 3, to which you refer, authorizes regulations by the
Commissioner of Agriculture, and supposes that these may
be adopted by State executive authorities, or, as an alternative, supposes regulations by State executive authorities
which in turn it empowers the Commissioner to adopt. In
either case, of course, such State executive action is to be
authorized by competent State legisl2Jtion. The section
then proceeds to suppose a time for action to arrive, and to
he notified by some proper State authority to the Commisioner. And thereupon the Commissioner is authorized, as
you quot~?, to spend money for the quarantine action required
by the particular exigency.
There is, however, as I repeat, no provision for purchasing
the diseased animals. The question, at whose loss any nece~sary destruction of these may be, is not a question of quarantine, and the powers of the Commissioner are incident to
quarantine only; it being important, of course, that for the
purpose of executing these he shall have acquired information and come to conclusions in the way indicated by section 2.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE.

156

HON. A. H. GARLAND
Paymaster of the Fleet.

PAYMASTER OF THE FLEET.
No designatiori. otherthan that made by the President entitles a naval
paymaster to the place and perquisites of paymaster of the fleet.
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

April 21, 1885.
S:m : I have considered yours of the 18th instant, relating
to the case of Naval Paymaster Whitehouse, who, in October,
1'883, being on duty upon the Asiatic Station, was designated
"paymaster of the fleet" by Admiral Crosby, then in command
there, such designation being made expressly ''subject to the
approval of the President; " such approval (virtually, at
least) having been given on the 14th of November, 1884.
The question is whether he became entitled from the date of
his designation to pay as " paymaster of the fleet, " or remained entitled as" paymaster" only.
In that connection I have considered sections 1378, 1381,
1382, 1475, and 1556 (fifth and seventh paragraphs from top
of page 266), Revised Statutes.
I am of opinion that no designation other than that by the
President entitles a paymaster to the place and perquisites
in q uestwn. The powers conferred by sections 1381 and 1382,
respectively, are quite distinct. I am not referred to any legislation which changes the state of the case as constituted by
these sections.
Nor do I think that there is any relation by the subsequent
approval to the time of the designation by the Admiral. The
latter act has no significance in point of law, no more than
has any other recommendation made to an appointing power.
I notice that there is nothing in your communication to .explain to me the bearing upon this question of the date "June
5, 1884, " therein mentioned. I· take for granted, however,
that this reply, which ignores that date, will meet your purposes.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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COMPENSATION OF CONSULAR OFFICERS.
W. was appointed minister resident and consul-general to Hayti, and
took the oath of office, but failing to execute a bond as required by
section 1697, Revised Statutes, his commission was not delivered to
him : Held that by the provisions of that section he never became
qualified to receive the commission or to enter upon the duties of the
office, and that he is not entitled to pay as an incumbent of such office.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 22, 1885.
Sm: Your communication of the 20th April instant asks
my opinion upon this case: Mr. George W. Williams was appointed by President Arthur minister resident and consulgeneral to Hayti, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
On tlie 4th of March, US85, Mr. Williams took the oath of
office at the Department of State, and was there furnished
with a blank form of the official bond, which consuls-general
are required by law to execute. .Mr. Williams has not executed any bond, and the President has determined not to
deliver his commission to him.
The question submitted is whether Mr. Williams is entitled
to any pay.
I am of opinion that be is not entitled to pay as an incumbent of the office mentioned.
The commission of Mr. Williams has been held by the Secretary of State in escrow, and its delivery depended upon the
condition prescribed by section 1697 of the Revised Statutes,
which provides that'' every consul-general, consul, and commercial agent before he receives his commission or enters upon
the duties of his· office, shall give a bond to the United States
with sureties."
It will be observed that Congress manifests a plain intention that no right of any kind shall accrue from appointment
to the offices named until the bond shall have been given;
so that if ;Mr. Williams had been permitted to enter upon the
duties of the office in question he could not have received
compensation for his services. This exceptional stringency
was no doubt employed for the better protection of the vublic interests in foreign countries.
As Mr. Williams had not given the required bond, it follows that he has never become entitled even to demand his
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commission, let alone to enter upon the duties of the office,
from which it follows, necessarily, that he cannot claim any of
its emoluments.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
LIEUT.E NANT ROBERTSON'S CASE.
Leave of absence was grantefl Lieutenant R., of the Army, for one yea1
from August 1, 1881, during part of which period, namely, from August
1 to November 1, 1881, he was entitled to cumylative leave with full
pay. On March 16, 1882, the order granting said leave of absence was
revoked, and a new order was issued by direction of the Secretary of
War placing Lieutenant, R. "on a status of waiting orders for one year
from August 1, 1881.'' He has drawn full pay (notonly from August 1
to November 1, 1881, to wh1ch he was entitled, but) from November 1,
1881, to March 16, 1882, when, for this period, he was only entitled to
half pay: Held, that the difference between full pay and half pay for
the last-mentioned period can'n ot be withheld in the adjustment of
another and subsequent pay account presented by Lieutenant R.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 22, 1885.

SIR: The letter of the Second Comptroller, accompanying
your communication of the 14th instant, presents the following case:
Lieut. S. C. Robertson, of the Army, was granted leave of
absence for one year from 1st August, 1881, with permission
to go beyond sea. He proceeded at once to Saumur in
France, tor the purpose of obtaining military instruction.
On the 16th March~ 1882, the orders granting the leave of
absence were revoked, and on the same day an order was
issued by the Adjutant-General, by direction of the Secretary
of War, placing Lieutenant Robertson '' on a status of waiting orders for one year, from August 1, 1881," the date he
left his post on leave. This order, which is in the form of a
letter to Robertson, refers in complimentary terms to his
"conduct and progress at the cavalry school at Saumur,"
and was no doubt induced by the Secretary's des-ire that this
officer should be mad~ thereby better able to meet his expenses while abroad.
It seems that at the time the leave of absence was granted
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Lieutenant Robertson was entitled to cumulative leave with
full pay until the 1st of November, 1881, and the question as
presented by the Comptroller is whether he "was entitled" to
full pay from the 1st of November,1881, to the 16th of March,
1882, or "is to be regarded as on leave and entitled to half
pay during that period."
I do not understand that Lieutenant Robertson has not
drawn his pay for the period mentioned, for the question sub·
mitted is whether he H was entitled" to full pay for that time.
It is moreover stated by the Comptroller that the question
•~ is now pending in this office in an acco:1nt presented by
Lieutenant Robertson." It being hardly supposable that this
officer failed to draw his pay between November 1, 1881, and
March 16, 1882, it would have been better, perhaps, if there
l1ad been a full statement as to how the case arises upon the
account. Still, I am inclined to think there is enough stated
to justify me in giving an opinion.
Besides, as the pay of officers of the Army is fixed by law
for every status (Rev. Stat., sec. 1265), it was doubtless not
the intention of the Comptroller to ask my opinion upon the
point whether the Secretary of War could by any retroactive
order make what bad been the status of leave of absence one
()f waiting orders, that is to say, whether the Secretary could
by an order dated the 16th of March, 1882, completely change
the status of Lieutenant Robertson from that time back to
the 1st of November, 1881. I have no hesitation in saying
that the Secretary had no such power.
But this officer bas evidently received waiting orders pay
for the period named when he was only entitled to half pay,
and consequently the question arising upon the presentation
of his account against the Government must be whether the
latter is entitled to withhold from the amount due on the account the difference between waiting orders and leave of absence pay for the period mentioned; in other words, whether
the Government can in that way compel this officer to refund
the excess.
In my opinion this cannot be done. The case in hand falls
directly within the principle laid down in the case of Col. Wager Swayne by Attorney-General Brewster: Colonel Swayne
-was entitled to a certain percentage increase on his retired
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pay. It happened that on the 28th July, 1866, he, being a
major-general of volunteers, was appointed colonel of the
Forty-fifth United States Infantry, and on the lOth of September, 1866, accepted the appointment and took the oath of
office. From the time of his appointment as colonel until he
was mustered out of the service as major-general of volunteers, he continued to draw the pay of a major-general, and
it was contended at the Treasury that the Government was
entitled for percentage increase an amount representing the
difference between the pay of major-general and colonel
from ·the time be was appointed colonel until he was mustered out of the service as major-general. It is not necessary to do more than quote what is laid down in the opinion
referred to.
''I am of opinion that upon principles of administrative
policy which ought to be considered firmly established, the
settlements between Colonel Swayne and the accounting officers in the matter of his pay as a major-general of volunteers
are conclusive upon the executive department of the Government, and cannot be re-opened in the way indicated.
"In Hedrick's case (16 C. Cis. R., 88), it was held that settlements with a supervisor of internal revenue, crediting him
with clerk hire paid to a person who was at the same time a
gauger, and who therefore could not legally receive compensation as ~lerk, were conclusive on the judicial department
of the Government, and that the Government could no more
recover back money paid under a mistake of law than an individual. That case and Colonel Swayne's seem to be identical in principle, assuming, argumenti gratia, that the allowance of a major-general's pay to Colonel Swayne after his
appointment as colonel was mistaken. But in disposing of
this case it is not necessary that I should go farther than to
bold that the settlements with Colonel Swayne are conclusive
upon the executive department of the Government." (August
29, 1882.)
As the Supreme Court say, in McKnight v. United States (98
ti. S., 186), there is not in such cases one law for the Government and another for the citizen.
I have the honor to be, sir, sour obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Sentble that an assistant attorney of the District of Columbia is not
within the prohibitions of sections 1782 and 5498, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 24:, 1885.
SIR: Yours of the 16th (received on the 22d) asks whether
an assistant attorney for the District of Columbia is within the
prohibitions of sections 1782 and 54:98, Revised Statutes, or
ei1;her of them.
Section 1782 prohibits and renders highly penal the reception, or agreeing to receive, by officers or clerks in the employ of the Government, compensation for services to any
person in relation to any matter or thing before any Department, court-martial, bureau officer, or any civil, military, or
naval commission whatever.
Section 5498 prohibits under like penalty "every officer of
the United States or person holding any place of trust or
profit or discharging any official function under or in connection with any Executive Department of the Government of the
United States or under the Senate or House of Representatives" from acting as an agent or attorney for prosecuting
any claim against the United States, etc.
In these statements I have used only so much of the language of the sections as is pertinent to the question now presented.
The District of Columbia is a corporate agent, through
which the United States administer certain executive functions over the locality which includes the national capital.
The chief executive authority is vested in three commissioners,
and the assistant attorney in question is an officer under and
appointed by them.
It is plain, then, that under Germaine's case (99 U. S., 508)
such attorney is excluded from the description '~officer of the
United States" in section 54:98; and inasmuch as the other
words of that section which describe parties prohibited refers
to places and offices under Executive Departments or the two
Houses of Congress, it follows that this section in no part
affects an assistant attorney of the District of Columbia.
273-VOL XVIII--11

162

HON. A. H. GARLAND
Claims Against the United States.

The same is true of section 1782, unless a substantial distinction can be drawn betwixt the expressions ''officer of the
United States" and" officer in the employment of the Government," which is at least doubtful, especially in a highly
penal statute.
Whilst I am much inclined to advise that the present case
is not in terms provided for by statute, I concur in the view
which I find intimated here and there in the papers which
you have transmitted, viz, that the principle which underlies
such legislation makes employments like that here under
consideration, viz, by Indians [or of course others] to prosecute a claim against the United States before their courts
or Departments at this place inconsistent with those relations of ready confidence, entire unreserve, and liberty in
coming and going, which ought to exist betwixt officials of
the United States in every Department and attorneys whose
engagements with the Government at this locality are marked
by "tenure, duration, emoluments, and duties," no matter
what technical name may designate that engagement. I
need not enlarge upon this suggestion. It is one pertinent
apparently to the "approvals" required by the Revised Statute's, section 2103, paragraph "Second."
I may add that the gentleman whose interests are here involved seems to have acted with candor, and, as I have said,
probably also in accordance with law. Pursuing a suggestion offered by him (amongst the papers sent by you), I add
that no doubt his resignation as assistant attorney for the
District of Columbia will place his right, in every sense, to
.be employed by the Six Nations, beyond" all question.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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CUSTOMS DUTIES-WORKS OJ<' ART.
An artist of foreign birth, but who has resided in the United States for
fourteen years and has declared his intention to become a citizen
thereof, may properly be treated as an American artist within the
meaning of the provision in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, declaring free of duty "works of art, painting, etc., the production of
American artists."
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 25, 1885.
SIR: Yours of the 23d instant asks whether certain watercolor sketches by an artist who is by birth a British subject,
but who bas resided in the United States for the last fourteen
:years (making occasional visits abroad), and who has declared (June 13, 1883) an intention to become a citizen,
are free from duty under paragraph 819 (Treasury edition)
of the tariff act of 1883, which declares free "Works of
arts, painting, statuary, fountains, and other ·works of art,
the production of American artists."
Such a person is of course not a citizen, but he is nevertheless recognized as having inchoate qualities as such which
entitle him when abroad to protection by the United States.
American art, as I apprehend, is not confined to such art
only as is produced by native or naturalized artists. The
clause quoted above might easily have ended with the word
"citizen," if the notion of citizenship had been as prominent
before Congress there as it is for instance in sections 2505
and 2506 of the same statute. I suppose that the language
of paragraph 819, like that of sections 2508 and 2509, was
dictated by interest in the progress of art in this country.
It is more easy than satisfactory to define the term " an
American artist" by limiting it to citizens, and upon the whole,
without attempting a definition, lad vise that it will be proper
to treat artists of the class now in question as being American artists within the scope of the above tariff provision.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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RAILROAD BRIDGE AT ST. PAUL, MINN.
The power of Congress to regulate bridges over navigable waters is paramount, and where it comes in conflict with that of a State the latter
necessarily becomes ine:ffecti ve.
Yet, until Congress acts, and by appropriate legislation assumes control
of the subject, the power of a State over bridges across navigable
streams within its limits is plenary.
•
Accordingly, wb.ere a railroad company was authorized by the laws of
Minnesota to construct a bridge across the Mississippi River within the
limits of that State: Held that, if such authority is unatl'ected by any
law of Congress, the company may act thereunder, though in so doing
it will subject itself to the risk of future Congressional interference.

•

DEPARTMENT OF . JUSTICE,

May I, 1885.
SIR : Your communication of April 15, 1885, with accompanying papers, relative to the matter of the railroad bridge
across the Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minn., bas been received, and I beg leave to reply as follows:
It seems a railroad bridge is being constructed by the Minnesota and Northwestern Railroad Company across the Mississippi River at St. ·Paul, with a pivot draw over the main
channel, under the authority of an act of the Territory of Minnesota, entitled" An act to incorporate the Minnesota and
Northwestern Railroad Company," and acts amendatory
thereof, and also under the alleged authority of the general
laws of the State of Minnesota.
By the act of Congress of July 5, 1884, chapter 215, power
is given to the common council of St. Paul to erect or to authorize the erection of'' one or more foot and carriage or railroad bridge or bridges across the Mississippi River, extending from such point or points to be selected as lie between
the easterly and westerly boundaries of said city to a point
or points on the opposite side of said river, now known as the
Sixth ward of said city," etc. The act further provides that
any bridge or bridges built thereunder may, by direction of
said common council, be built as a draw-bridge, with a pivot
or other form of draw, and, if built as a draw-bridge, that the
draw shall be over the main channel of the river at an accessible a_n d the best navigable point, with spans giving a clear
width of water-way of not less than 160 feet on each side of
the central or pivot pier of the draw, etc.
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The bridge in course of construction by said company is
located within the limits described in the last-mentioned act,
and while the spans of its draw give a narrower water-way
than is required by that act (it being but 150 feet on each
side of the pivot pier) tllis bridge in otller respects fails to
meet the requirements of the same act.
Such is substantially the case presented by the papers,
and you snbmit for my determination the question" as to what
.action shall be taken to enforce the rights of the Government
and give efl'ect to the duty resting upon it to protect the
navigation of the Mississippi River."
As the Mississippi River above, at, and for some distance
below the city of St. Paul, is wholly within the State of Minnesota, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of tile
United States in Wilson v. Tke Blackbird Greek JJiarsh Company (2 Pet., 250), Gilman v. Philadelphia (3 Wall., 713),Pound
v. Turck (95 U. S., 459), and Escanaba Company v. Chicago
(107 U. S., 678) applies to this case, namely, that until Congress acts, and by appropriate legislation assumes control
of the subject, the power of a State over bridges actos~navigable
streams within its limits is plenary; lmt that when this power
is exercised so M to unnecessarily obstruct navigation, Congress may interfere and remove the obstruction. The power
of Congress to regulate bridges over navigable waters is paramount, and where it comes in conflict with that of the State
the latter necessarily becomes ineffective. Yet in the case
last above cited, the court obser,es that a to render the
action of the State invalid in constructing or authorizing the
construction of bridges over one of its navigable streams, the
General Government must directly interfere so as to supersede its authority and annul what it has done in the matter;"
and this doctrine is announced and. recognized in Bridge
Company v. United States (105 U. S., 470) and JJiiller v. The
:Mayor, etc. (109 U. S., 385), and especially by a decision
rendered at the present term of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Gloucest~r Fer1·y Company v. Pennsylvania
(114 u. s., 196).
Assuming, then, that the construction of the railroad bridge
referred to is authorized by the laws of the State of Minnesota,
this would seem to be sufficient for the purpose, unless the
/
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authority imparted by those laws is in conflict with, or has
been superseded or invalidated by, Congressional legislation.
If such authority is unaffected by any existing l_aw of Congress, the railroad company above named may undoubtedly
act thereunder; and, in so doing, it will only subject itself to
the risk of future Congressional interference.
Congress has passed no general law regulating the erection
of bridges across the Mississippi. Numerous acts have been
passed by it authorizing the erection of such bridges at particular localities, the provisions whereof are similar to tho~e
contained in the aforesaid act of July 5, 1884:. That act does
not expressly prohibit the building of any bridge at the locality therein describetl, other than such as is authorized thereby,
and whether it does so by implication is a question of construction. It declares that" any bridge or bridges constructed
under this act, and according to its provisions and conditions,.
shall be a lawful structure or structures." If this affirmative
declaration may be construed to include the negative one, viz,.
that " any bridge not constructed under this act, etc., shall
be an unl~wful structure," which is, at least, doubtful, it would
in efl'ect annul any authority derived under the State to erect
a bridge of any sort in that locality.
But suppose the act bas that effect, and the bridge now
being erected by the railroad company is not a lawful structure, what action, if any, are the officers of the General Government authorized to take in the premises~ There is no law of
Congress under which criminal proceedings can be instituted
by them; and without the authority of Congress it is questionable whether of their own motion, and simply in vindication of the general public right of navigation, they can institute any civil proceedings on behalf of the U_nited Statessuch as an information to enjoin the erection of the bridge,
or to abate it as a nuisance. (See 15 Opin., 526.) Where,
however, the interests of the United States are directly concerned-as, for example, if the structure should threaten
injury to or interfere with any work of the General Government for the improvement of the river~a civil proceeding to
protect such work may be instituted in its behalf in the
proper circuit court. (United States v. Duluth, 1 Dill., 469.)
But as regards the right of nadgation, the public law of the
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United States appears to leave the vindication of this right
wholly to those who sustain injury thereto from unlawful
obstructions or otherwise, through the institution by them of
appropriate civil proceedings for relief.
I am accordingly inclined to the conclusion that in the existing state of the law, the facts of the present case (as they
appear in the accompanying papers) aft'ord no ground for a
judicial proceeding on behalf of the rJnited States against the
railroad company ; and that until Congress makes some adequate provision upon the subject the officers of the United
States can in this case take no action '' to enforce the rights
of the Government and give effect to the duty resting upon
it to protect the navigation of the Mississippi River."
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R.
SALE OF INDIAN TRUST LANDS.
The claims of Ely Moore, J. W. Whitfield, and Daniel Woodson, as special
agents and receivers, for additional compensation for the sale of the
trust lauds ~f the Delaware, Kaskaskia, Piankeshaw, Peoria, and Wea
Indians, considered.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 5,1885.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your
communication of the 2d instant, inclosing papers in the
matter of the claims of Ely Moore and others, late special
agents and receivers, for amounts claimed for compensation
for sale of the trust lands of the Delaware, Wea, etc., Indian
tribes.
The general nature of your communication compels me
to resort to the inclosures, and as I may not form correct
conclusions as to the weight and effect of those papers, I beg
you to regard this opinion as based upon the case stated by
me and not upon the actual facts.
The claims presented to you are those of the administrator
of Ely Moore deceased, of J. W. Whitfield, and of Daniel
Woodson; and consist of a demand for 1 per cent. commission, together with a per diem compensation. On both of
these items interest is claimed at 6 per cent. per annum.
Ely Moore was not duly appointed special receiver· and
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superintendrmt to assist the special commissioner to dispose
of the trust lands of the Delaware, Kaskaskia, Piankeshaw,
Peoria, and Wea Indians, but as special register and superintendent aided William Brindle, who was so appointed.
Daniel Woodson as such special receiver and superintendent
sold some Delaware lands which were not sold by Brindle,
and was aided by J. W. Whitfield, special register and superintendent.
I am not clear as to the precise relation of Moore to Brindle
and of Whitfield to Woodson, but I shall assume tbat all
rendered valuable services in the sale at public auction of
the lands ceded in the treaties of May 6, 1854 (10 Stat., 1048),
and May 30, 1854 (10 Stat., 1082).
These treaties simply provided (art. 3, p. 1049; art. 4, p.
1083) that the United States shall pay to the Indians all the
moneys arising from the sale of such lands as were offered
for sale after deducting therefroll) the actual cost of surveying, managing, and selling the same. The Supreme Court
(110 U. S., 693) says: "This clearly implied the payment of
a reasonable compensation for the services of those employed
in carrying the trust into effect."
I fail to find anything in the treaties fixing or suggesting
what shall be a reasonable compensation for either surveying, managing, or selling; and between private parties, in the
absence of an agreement as to what that compensation should
be, or an acceptance without protest of a sum fixed, it would
become a question of quantum meruit for the courts.
Your letter of the 2d instant says:
"At the time the sales of these lands were made the claims
for services, etc., of the parties were allowed by this Department at rates considered fair and reasonable."
Whether the rates thus considered by the Departq~.ent fair
and reasonable were paid, and, if so, were accepted ·without
objection, I am not informed, except as the expression in your
letter, '• that the other claimants whose accounts had been
closed at the Treasury should seek their remedy in the
proper courts or before Congress," leads me to infer that they
received without protest the amounts so fixed. If this be so,
I am of opinion that the powers of your Department in the
premises have been fully exercised aud are exhausted.
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It is urged by the agent fOrtbeclaimantstbattbeSupreme
'Court bas decide(l what is a fair and reasonable compensa·
tion for the services of Mr. Brindle in the sale of these lands,
and that the rate fixed by the court must be adopted as to
similar officers engaged in said sale.
I do not so read the opinion. I find in it nothing on the
subject except that fair and reasonable compensation should
be paid. It appears, however, that the jury sitting 1n Philadelphia did find that a fair and reasonable compensation
to Brindle for his labor and risk in making sales of Indian
trust lands was 1 per cent. commission, together with some
per diem compensation. There is a vast difference between
the annunciation by the court of last resort of legal principles of general application or applicable to a class of cases
and a verdict rendered by a jury on a question of fact at issue
lJetween the United States and an individual. The former,
if not absolutely binding upon an officer of the executive department, is of such authority that nothing short of conscientious objections would warrant such officer in disregarding it. From the latter the officer may differ at his
pleasure; indeed, to make it of any weight the person invoking it should show that the circumstances of the two
-eases were identical, that the witnesses were credible, and
that the verdict was not unreasonable; in short, he should
substantially prove his case de novo. The officer must exercise his own discretion on such a subject and he is at liberty
to attach as much or as little importance to the verdict as
seems to him proper.
In conclusion, I will confine my opinion to four propositions.
(1) The claims now presented apparently differ from that
of Brindle in that the claimants receiveu their pay at the
time and acquiesced in the allowance of what was fair and
reasonable.
(2) Such acquiescence as much precludes them as the
United States from requesting a re-opening of the matter.
(3) The case is not affected in principle by the decision of
the Supreme Court in the Brindle case.
(4) That the conclusion of the jury in Philadelphia as to
what was fair and reasonable compensation for Brindle differs from that previously fixed by the Interior Department
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as fair and reasonable for Moore and others is not a matter
requiring special consideration at your hands.
Should you decide to re-open the cases and desire my
opinion on the question of interest and other questions suggested, I will be glad to comply with a request to that effect.
As the case is now presented to me, they do not seem to me
matters of importance.
I return all inclosures.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE IN1'ERIOR.

CASH INDEMNITY FOR SWAMP LANDS SOLD.
The Secretary of tht- Interior is warranted in approving certain state~
ments of account between the United States and the State of Ohio.
made by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, for cash indemnity for swamp lands sold during the period intervening between the
passage of the swamp-land act of September 28, 1850, and March 3, 1857.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
May 6, 1885.
SIR: I retur-n herewith the two statembnts of account between the United States and the State of Ohio, which accompanied your letter of the 21st ultimo, showing amounts found
due that State by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office as cash indemnity for swamp lands sold during the
period intervening between the passage of the swamp-land
act of September 28, 1850, and March 3, 1857; and in reply
to your iuquiry whether the case presented in these statements authorizes your approval of the accounts, I have the
honor to state that in my opinion such approval is fully warranted thereby.
Two points only seem to call for consideration in connection with these accounts, one of which relates to the period
of the sales, the other to the proof relied upon to determine
the character of the lands sold.
In regard to the latter point, it appears that the field notes
of the public surveys on file in the General Land Office were
resorted to and deemed sufficient. The evidence afforded by
such notes, in this class of cases, was early regarded and
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accepted by the Land Department as satisfactory, and it is,
perhaps, the most satisfactory of any now obtainable for the
purpose of determining whether lands were swampy at the
passage of the swamp-land act of 1850 and covered by the
grant thereby made.
The former point involves the question whether, in view
of section 2482, Revised Statutes, sales of swamp lands made
subsequent to March 2, 1856, and prior to March 3,1857, are
{as they were under the law in force previous to the revision)
authorized to be included in the account. Respecting this
question, I beg to refer to an opinion of om~ of my predecessors, dated July 25, 1~77 (15 Opin., 34:0), which covers the
same subject, and in the conclusions of which I concur.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
Hon. L. Q. C. LAMAR,
Secretary of the Interior.
INVENTIONS INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITION.
The President can not appoint an honorary commissioner to the "Inventions InternatJOnal Exposition" at London, such office not existing by
virtue of any law of the United States.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 6, 1885.
SIR: Your commun~cation asking my opinion as to the

the power of the President to appoint honorary commissioners to the "Inventions International Exposition" at London
has received my consideration.
By the Constitution the President is empowered to" commission all the officers of tbe United States." An officer of
the United States presupposes an office duly created by law;
and the offices to which the President is authorized under the
Constitution to appoint are onJy those established or recognized by the Constitution or by act of Congress (United
States v. Maurice,2Brock., 104; 5 Opin., 88, 754; 7 ib., 249),
but there is no office of the description referred to existing
by virtue of any law. As the President cannot create an
office, I am of opinion he cannot appoint honorary commissioners to the'~ Inventions International Exposition" at London.
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As the matter of sending commissioners to this exposition
was somewhat urgently brought to the notice of the last
Congress by the Executive witho11t effect, it may almost be
inferred that it was the sense of Congress that there was no
sufficient reason for this Government's being represented
there.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
.A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
SPECIAL EXAMINERS OF THE PENSION BUREAU.
Special examiners of the Pension Bureau authorized to be appointed by
the act of July 7, 11•84, chapter 331, and by the act of MaFch 3, 1885,
chapter 343, come within the purview of the civil service act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27; and in appointing such officers the latt·er act
and rules thereunder should be observed.
The office of special examiner is newly created by the said act of 1885, as
it was by the said act of 1884 ; the term under each act being for one
year only.
DEPARTMENT OF JUS'l'ICE,

May 7,1885.
SIR: The communication of the Commissioner of Pensions
to you and by you referred to me for an opinion has received
my careful consideration.
The twelfth section of the act of July 14, 1862, creating
the office .of special agent for the detection and prosecution
of frauds against the pension laws(12 Stat., 569) was repealed
by the act of July 4, 1864 (13 Stat., 387), which authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to detail clerks in his office from
time to time for the discharge of the same duty, and this
.statute has been followed by several others, the effect of
which has heen to continue the act of July, 1864, until the
present time, with various modifications touching allowances
to clerks detailed in addition to their regular salaries.
In this state of legislation Congress, by the act of July 7,
1884, making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June
.SO, 1885, enacted, inter alia,
"For an additi.onal force of one hundred and fifty special
examiners,for one year, at a salary of one thousand six hundred dollars each, two hundred and forty thousand dollars;
and no person so appointed shall be employed in the State
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from which he is appointed : Provided, That all of said appointments shall be temporary and on probation.
"For per diem in lieu of subsistence for one hundred and
fifty additional special examiners above provided for, while
traveling on duty, at a rate to be fixed by the Secretary of
the Interior, not exceeding three dollars per day, and for actual necessary expenses for transportation and assistance,
two hundred and twenty thousand dollars."
And by the act of March 3, 1885, making appropriations for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1886, it was enacted inter alia.
''},or an additional force of one hundred and fifty special
examiners, for one year, at a salary of one thousand four
hundred dollars each, two hundred and ten thousand dollars;
and no person so appointed shall be employed in the State
from which he is appointed; and any of those now employed
in the Pension Office or as special examiners may be reappointed if they are found to be qualified.
" For per diem in lieu of subsistence for one hundred and
fifty additional special examiners above provided for, while
traveling on duty, at a rate to be fixed by the Secretary of
the Interior, not exceeding three dollars per day, and for
actual necessary expenses for transportation and subsistance, two hundred and twenty thousand dollars."
The first question submitted, as arising upon this legislation, is whether special examiners of the Pension Bureau
must be appointed ''from the working force and the Civil
Service Commission eligibles, or whether they may be appointed from outsiders, at the risk of the Secretary."
The second question submitted is, whether special examiners must be reappointed after 30th June, 1885.
It seems clear that no detail from the clerical force of the
bureau can be made to fill the place of special examiner,
which is a new office, with a fixed salary attached.
It seems equally clear that the office of special examiner
comes within the purview of the act of 16th January, 1883,
entitled '' An act to regulate and improve the civil service
of the United States" (22 Stat., 403}, and is not within any
of the exceptions in Rule XIX of the amended Civil Service
Rules. It might indeed be thought that the office of special
examiner came within the exception in favor of persons em·
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ployed exclusively in the secret service of the Government;
but it must be remembered that to constitute secret service
the employment as 1.1.-'ell as the service must be concealed.
(Totten v. United States, 92 U.S., 106.)
'nhe third clause of the sixth section of the act in question
made it the dut.v of the Secretary of the Interior to throw
into classification the officers designated special examiners,
and Special Civil Service Rule No.3, approved 22d July,
1884, shows that the President thought the officers in question would fall within the civil service legislation.
I am of opinion, therefore, that in appointing special examiners the civil service law and rules must be observed.
In answer to the second question, I am of opinion that the
term of service to which a special examiner is appointed is
one year. The office is as new a creation by the act of 3d
March, 1885, as it was by the act of 7th July, 1884.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
SITE FOR PUBLIC BUILDING .AT L.A. CROSSE, WIS.
The provision in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 14::S, authorizing the
Secretary of the Treasury "to acquire by private purchase or condemnation the necessary lands for public buildings and light-houses to be
constructed, and for which money is appropriated, including all public
building sites authorized to be acquired under any of the acts of the
first session of the Forty-seventh Congress," does not empower him to
acquire by condemnation the site for the proposed public building
authorized to be erected at La Crosse, Wis., by the act of February
28, 1885, chapter 260.
That provision is limited to lands for public buildings for which money
is then (i. e., by said act of March 3, 1883) appropriated, including
building sites authorized to be acquired under acts of th.e previous
session, and does not extend to other cases.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 9,1885.
By your letter of the -29th ultimo, respecting the site
selected for a public building authorized to be erected at La
Crosse, Wis., by the act of February 28, 1885, it appears
that a proposal for the sale of part of the premises, made by
Gertrude A. and E. W. Hayden, was accepted by your De·
partment on the 25th of same month, and that on the 27th
SIR:
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a letter was received at the Department from their attorneys
inclosing a notice of the withdrawal of the proposal.
In connection with these facts you call attention to a provision in the sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1883,
chapter 143, and inquire whether, "if the Department cannot enforce the performance of the contract of sale," title to
the premises may be acquired, under that provision, by condemnation.
This inquiry presents two questions. One is as to enforcing a specific performance of the " contract of sale," and
hereupon I remark that, without fuller and more definite
information, I am unable to form a satisfactory opinion upon
the subject. To enable me to do this it would require, among
other things proper to be taken into view, an examination of
the terms of the contract as expressed in the proposal and
acceptance, neither of which is before me. The other question is whether the provision in the act · of 1883, above
referred to, extends to building sites for which money is at
.any time thereafter appropriated.
By that provision the Secretary of the Treasury ''is authorized to acquire by private purchase or condemnation
the necessary lands for public buildings and light-houses to
be constructed, and for which money is appropriated, including all public building sites authorized to be acquired
under any of the acts of the first session of the Forty-seventh
Congress," etc. To make it applicable to sites for which
appropriations are thereafter made, the words "for which
money is appropriated," as employed therein, must be taken
to import the same as if they read" whensoever an appropriation exists therefor ;" and, if they are to be understood
in this sense, the provision would, simply by force of those
terms, embrace not only sites for which appropriatiOns are
thereafter made, but those for which appropriations were
made theretofore and still remain ~. vailable. But the express
i uclusion, by a separate clause, of sites authorized to be acquired under the legislation of the preceding session, shows
pretty clearly that tbe words adverted to are not used in so
broad ·a sense as that above indicated; otherwiRe such clause
would be needless. I think the discretionary authority
either to purchase or condemn, with which the provision in-
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vests the Secretary, must be deemed to be limited to ''lands
for public buildings and light-houses'' for which money is
then (i. e., by said act of March 3, 1883) appropriated, including building sites authorized to be acquired under the acts
of the previous session, and not to extend to other cases.
The fact that a similar provision is found in the sundry civil
appropriation act of March 3, 1885, though applicable to a
particular site, is a circumstance which strongly favors this
construction.
Besides this, it i~ a well-settled rule-in view of the constitutional provision, ''No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law''
(art. I, sec. 9, par. 7)-that astatute should not be construed as
making an appropriation, or authorizing the expenditure of
money, unless the language is sufficiently explicit to clearly
justify it; authority for the use of the public money cannot
arise by inference without very clear terms requiring it.
I am accordingly of opinion that the above-mentioned provision in the act of 1883 confers upon the Secretary of the
Treasury no authority to acquire, by condemnation, the building site in question.
I may add that, upon receipt of your letter aforesaid, the
United States attorney for the western district of Wisconsin
was requested to take no steps in the matter of the examination of the title to the premises until further instructed.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
Hon. D. MANNING,
Secretary of the Treasury.
NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL.
The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in the Navy Department is amenable to the jurisdiction of a naval court-martial upon
charges and specifications preferred against him for acts done as such
chief.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 13, 1885.
SIR: Your communication of the 11th May instant, and
the inclosures therein referred to, have received my careful
~onsideration.

The question presented for opinion is whetller the court-
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martial, now assembled for the trial of Medical Director
Philip S. Wales, bas jurisdiction to entertain the charges and
specifications upon which that officer has been brought
before them, he having formally objected to the jurisdiction,
and the court, after hearing argument, having referred the
question of jurisdiction to you for your opinion.
The charges are brought under the articles for the better
government of the Navy, and the various offenses specified
are laid as having been committed by the accused as Chief
of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
The objection to the court's jurisdiction is founded on the
contention that the office of Chief of the Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery belongs to the civil branch of the executive
department of the Government, and that the incumbent of
it is for that reason not amenable to the articles for the government of the Navy touching an ofl:'ense which affects him
only as an officer belonging to the civil administration of the
Government, anu, as seems to be conceded, and therefore
may be assumed, cannot be said to reflect on him generally
as an officer of the Navy.
This brings me to the consideration of the law creating the
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, upon the meaning of which
the question submitted necessarily turns.
By Title X of the Revised Statutes (p. 70) it is provided
that there shall be "an Executive Department, to be known.
as the Department of the Navy, and a Secretary of the Navy,
who shall be the head thereof."
It is furthermore provided (sec. 419) that the business of
this Department shall be distributed in such wise as the
Secretary may deem proper, amongst eight bureaus, one of
which is the" Bureau of Medicine and Surgery," and that
the chiefs of all of these bureaus shall be appointed for the
term of four years by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, from certain classes of officers of
the Navy specially named, and, as to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, ''from the list of the surgeons of the Navy."
By section 1471, Revised Statutes, it is declared that the
chief of this bureau ''shall have the relative rank of commodore whilst holding said position, and shall have • * *'
the title of Surgeon-General."
273-VOL XVIII--12
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It is also provided (sec. 418) that the Secretary of
the Navy shall have the custody and charge of all the
books, records, and other property now remaining in and
appertaining to the Department of the Navy, or hereafter
acquired by it; and (sec. 420) that "the several bureaus
shaH retain the charge and custody of the books of records
and accounts pertaming to their respective duties; and all
of the duties of the bureaus shall be performed under the
authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and their orders shall
be considered as emanating from him, and shall have full
force and effect as such."
It is contended, as already mentioned, that the efl"ect of
this legislation is to make these chiefs of bureaux civil officers for the term of their appointment, without, however, impairing their rights, in any way, as officers of the Navy.
It is very cle~r that the office of Secretary of the Navy is
a civil office. Congress has not attempted to confine the
appointing power to any class or profession in choosing the
incumbent for that position. But this cannot be said of the
several bureaus of tLe Navy Department, the chiefs of which,
we have seen, must be appointed from certain classes of
officers of the Navy. When, therefore, it is said that these
officers are civil, it must be shown satisfactorily why it was
that Congress denied the appointing power the same range
of selection in filling them as in filling the office of Secretary of the Navy and civil offices generally. If it was the
purpose of Congress to make these offices purely civil, it was
not to be expected that the same restriction would be put on
the Executive in filling them as is usual in appointments
purely military and naval; a restriction w~ich, although in
derogation of the appointing power, is imposed b,y virtue of
the constitutional authority "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." (14 Opin.,
172.)

To me it is far from clear that Congress could, in creating
a purely civil office, constitutionally require that it should
l>e filled from a certain class of persons, when it is apparent,
as in the case now before me. that the restriction imposed
has much less relation to qualification than to military
economy; for it seems hardly to admit of question that it
would be easy to find in civil life any number of medical
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men entirely competent to take charge of the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery.
It is quite clear to me that if Congress had intended to
make the several bureaus of the Navy Department civil of.
fices it would have provided for the appointment of civilians
to fill them, and not frustrated its purpose to secure the benefits of a civil administration by declaring that these offices
should be filled by naval officers exclusively. It is difficult
to see what advantage it could be to the service to impress
its officers with a civil status when called to the performance
of duties purely naval and professional, as chiefs of bureaus,
.and before such an intention can be attributed to Congress
it must be shown that some practical end was to be answered
by the introduction of so eccentric and anomalous an innovation as a naval officer performing naval duties, a~d yet not
amenable to the articles for the government of the Navy.
The view I have taken is much strengthened in the case
in band by the consideration that the Chief of the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery, by the very fact of being so, enjoys
"the relative rank of commodore while holding that position,"
together with an increase of pay corresponding to that rank,
and the right to be retired as of that same rank if it should
fall to him to be transferred from the active list of the Navy
while chief of bureau. If, now, his office is civil, why this
accession of rank, with its attendant privileges and emoluments, which it would hardly strengthen the argument to
enumerate~

Would it not be deemed incongruous to give the Secretary
·ofthe Navy or the Secretary of War "relative rank" of any
kind, as incidental to a purely civil status?
So far, indeed, from there being any reason why the chief
of this bureau should have this additional rank if Congress
had intended him to be a civil officer, I should have supposed
that it would be more suitable to a civil status to deny him
all rank whatever in virtue of his position.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the court-martial has jurisdiction.
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
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CASE OF JAMES S. MORGAN.
Effect of the President's proclamations of amnesty of September 7, 1867,
and December 25, 1868, considered in connection with the case of
James S. Morgan as submitted.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 19, 1885.
SIR: In reply to your communication asking an opinion
as to the capacity of Mr. James S. Morgan to hold a civil
office under the Government of the United States, I have to
say that while Mr. Morgan represents (and his st;atement
alone is the evidence on which I am requested to act) that,
he took no oath to support the Constitution of the United
States on entering the Nava1 Academy, it may nevertheless .
be that he did then take an oath of some kind, and, therefore, that his statement is mere inference as to the legal
effect of such oath.
If he took no oath at all, or none binding him to support
'the Constitution, the President's proclamation of the 25th
December, 1868, which was unconditional and em braced all
cases not within the third section of the fourteenth amendment, necessarily restored him to his lost civil rights, it beingwell settled that a general pardon or amnesty is as efficacious for that purpose as one by deed (Armstrong v. United
States, 13 Wall., 155, and Knote v. United States, 95 U.S., 150) ;
and as to the effect of a pardon of the latter kind I need do
no more than refer to my opinion in the case of General
Lawton.
If, on the other hand, he did take an oath, in effect, although not in terms, to support the Constitution, he may
have been entirely rehabilitated by the President's proclamation of the 7th September, 1867; in which case the rights
thus restored would continue in full force noth withstanding
the fourteenth amendment, subsequently adopted, according
to my opinion in ·General Lawton's case.
·
It is true it does not appear in the somewhat imperfect
statement furnished you that Mr. Morgan was not within
the exceptions of this proclamation, or that he took the oath
prescribed therein, but the probabilities that he was not
within the excepted classes and that he took the required
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oath are so great that I hardly deem it necessary to go into the
question whether the oath and a year's services in the Naval
Academy, without being graduated, made Mr. Morgan an
officer of the United States, unless it should appear that he
did not embrace the offer of the proclamation in question,
and, as a conseq ueuce, comes under the ban of the fourteenth
amendment.
A fuller presentation of the facts of Mr. Morgan's case
than has been furnished you will ·show whether any other
questions require discussion.
I am, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

APPOINTMENT OF AN INDIAN AS POSTMASTER.
An Indian residing in the Indian Territory, who is a member of one of
the tribes there, and subject to tribal jurisdiction, is not eligible to
appointment as a postmaster; he being incompetent, in contemplation of law, to take the required oath of office.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
May 21, 1885.
SIR : Your letter of the 29th ultimo presents for my con·s ideration the following question :
"Whether an Indian in the Indian Territory, possessing
otherwise the requisite attainments, but a member of one
·o f the tribes there, and not a citizen of the United States,
can be lawfully appointed and qualify as postmaster of any
of t.he several classes.''
This question involves the inquiry whether an Indian, un·d er the circumstances therein stated, is eligible to the office
mentioned.
Excepting as regards the offices of President and VicePresident, and membership of either House of Congressfor which certain qualifications (embracing citizenship,
age, etc.) are required-the Constitution is silent on the
subject of eligibility to office under the General Government. Disqualification to hold office is declared in special
·cases (Art. I, sec. 6) and under particular circumstances
(14th amend., sec. 3); but, excepting as above, it contains
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no requirement in order to be eligible to office, other than
such as is implied in the provision for an oath to support
the Constitution (Art. VI), namely, that the individual possesses the legal capacity to take that oath. Beyond this
the Constitution appears t<> leave the whole subject to the
regulation of CongreRs ; and tlle only legislation of Congress,
applicable to the office of postmaster, which contains anything in the n-ature of a qualification for such office, is that
prescribing an oath of office and requiring an official bond.
Hence, whether an Indian is eligible to the said office depends upon whether his status, civil and political, is at the
time such that be can give the required bond and take the
prescribed O'i1th.
By the act of May 13, 1884, chapter 46, it is declared that
thereafter the oath to be taken by any person elected or ap·
pointed to any office of honor or profit. either in the civil,
military, or naval service, except the President of the United
States, shall l?e as prescribed in section 1757, Revised Statutes; and it is further declared that this "'shall not affect the
oaths prescribed by existing statutes in relation to the performance of duties in special or particular subordinate offices
and employments." Thus, while postmasters, in common
with all other officers of the United States except the President, are now required to take the oath of office prescribed
in section 1757, Revised Statutes, they are not exempted from
taking the oath prescribed by the act of March 5, 187 4, chapter 46, relative to the performance of duties in the postal
service, but must take this also. It is unnecessary, however,
to consider here any other oath than the one in section 1757,
which is as follows: "I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this
obligation freely, without any mentall'eservation or purpose
of evasion ; and tha·t I will well and faithfully discharge the
duties of the office on which I am about to enter: so help me
God."
There is nothing in this oath which precludes a foreign-born
resident of the United States, who has not yet been natural·
ized, from taking it. Want of citizenship is not of itself an
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obstacle. But the condition of an Indian who is a member
of a tribe, and especially one who dwells within the territory
and jurisdiction of his tribe, is peculiar. He is regarded and
treated by our Government asbeJonging toaseparate though
dependent political com]Ilunity, the members of which owe
immediate allegiance thereto, and are not ordinarily dealt
with by the Government individually, so long as their tribal
relation is preserved. The obligation imposed by the oath
does not seem to be consistent with the duty of obedience to
tribal authority which springs from such relation, and the
existence of which is distinctly recognized by our Government, and its effect would obviously be to greatly weaken if
not destroy that relation. Unless clearly warranted by the
provisions of some treaty or statute, an act whic.h thus i~ter
feres with the tribal relation, and is productive of conseduences so discordant and in such direct conflict with the
authority of the tribe over its members and their alJegiance
thereto, must be deemed to have no sanction in our laws. I
therefore think that an Indian, while a member of a tribe and
subject to tribal jurisdiction, is not in legal contemplation
competent to take the oath referred to.
As to the competency of an Indian in the Indian Territory,
under those circumstances, to give the required official bond
I entertain strong doubt. In general, contracts with Indians,
not citizens of the United States, can only be made under
certain ~:;tatutory restrictions and regulations (see sees. 2103
to 2106, Rev. Stat.), which, however, are designed for the
protection of such Indians in their dealings with other
persons, and appear to have no application to transactions
with the Government. Yet one against whom the bond can
not be enforced in the ordinary way (i.e., by snit in a United
States court), may well be considered as being, in contemplation of the statute requiring it to be given, incapable of
becoming a party thereto ; and such seems to be the condition of an Indian in the Indian Territory belonging to a tribe
there. Whilst in that Territory certainly he would not be
liable to suit on his bond in any court of the United States,
as the jurisdiction necessary to entertain the suit is not conferred by existing laws.
In an opinion of one of my predecessors, dated April12, 1869
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(13 Opin., ~7), it was held that General E. E. Parker, an Indian, was not disqualified from holding the office of chief of
a bureau in the Interior Department, and he was subsequently appointed to and filled the office of Commissioner of
Indian Affairs. The opinion is very brief and does not state
the facts in the case. But on examining the files of this Department I find that the faets presented were these: General
Parker was a Seneca Indian, born in the United States, and
had been separated from his tribe twenty-four years, living
<luring that time among the whites. He had been an engineer
upon the New York State canals; was subsequently chief
assistant engineer of the Chesapeake and Albemarle Ship
Canal in Virginia, and also constructing engineer of light·houses under General W. F. Smith, on the upper lakes. He
had · been appoint~d superintendent of con:struction, under
the Treasury DP.partment, of the custom-house and marine
llospital at Galena, Ill., and. afterwards of the custom-house
at Dubuque, Iowa. In 1863 he was appointed by President
Lincoln a captain and assistant adjutant-general, and served
on General Grant's staff, and at the date of the opinion was
still holding a commission in the Army. He had paid taxes
on real estate for over twelve years and been a voter in New
York.
It may be added that General -Parker was, perhaps, regarded as having already become clothed with citizenship by
force of the first section of the act of .April 9, 1866, chapter
31. But aside from that, the circumstances of his ca8e differ
very materially from the one under consideration, in this:
t.hat in the latter case the Indian (being a resident of and
member of a tribe in the Indian Territory) still sustains the
tribal relation and is 8till subject to tribal jurisdiction, while
in the other such relation and jurisdictiOn had long before
. ceased to exist. The circumstances of the present case to
which I have just adverted are those which, in my view,
render the Indian incompetent to take the prescribed official
oath and give the required official bond, and therefore ineligible to the office.
It is true the statutes touching the diplomatic and consular
officers in several instances provide for certain officers althmtgh
not citizens. Thus, in section 1678, Revised Statutes, the Ian-
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guage employed is, ''notwithstanding he may not be a citizen." But there is no statute regulating in any respect
this matter as far as Indians are concerned, and the very
mentioning of these cases in this particular service would,
by implication, exclude the idea as appllcable to Indians.
(Sedgwick Con st., 2d ed., p. 31, note.)
Therefore, in answer to the question proposed by you, I
have the honor to reply that, in my opinion, an Indian, under
the circumstances stated, cannot lawfally be appointed and
qualify as postmaster of any of the several classes.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
Hon. W. F. VILAS,
Postmaster- General.
HEAD-MONEY TAX.
'The tax of 50 cents imposed by the act of Angnst 3, 1882, chapter 376, is
applicable to all passengers, not citizens of the United States, who shall
come by steamer or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within
the United States, whether as immigrants or merely as tonriste.
DEPARTMENT OF .JUSTICE,

May 22, 1885.
SIR: Your communication of the 18th of 1\fay, instant,
with the inclosures therein referred to, has received my careful consideration.
The question presented•for opinion is, whether the head
money tax of 50 cents, levied by the act of the 3d August,
1882 (22 Stat. 214), entitled'' An act to regulate immigration,"
is demandable for passengers coming int.o our ports not as
immigrants but transiently as toru.rists.
The first section provides "that there shall be levied~ collected, and paid a duty of fifty cents for each and every passenger not a citizen of the United States who shall come by
.steam or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within
the United States."
Was it the intention of Congress that the term "passengers," as thus used, should be taken in its most extended
acceptation, or in the restricted sense of immigrants, or per.sons coming into the country for the purpose of permanent
abode'
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This is a question that must be resolved by a careful examination of the act itself.
The object of the duty imposed is, as the act declares
(sec. I), to raise a. fund to be called the immigrant fund, which
it enacts shall be paid into the United States Treasury and
be used under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury
" to defray the ~xpenses of regulating immigratton under
this act, and for the care ofimmig'i'ants Brriving in the United
States, for the relief of such as are in distress, and for the
general purposes and expenses of carrying this act into effect.''
That Congress had power to lay an impost of this kind for
the purposes mentioned has been recently decided by the Supreme Court in a case that arose under this very act (Beau
Money cases, 112 U; S., 580). But this case in_volved only the
constitutionality and not the interpretation of the act.
As we have seen, the statute sets out with imposing a duty
of "fifty cents for each and every passenger." The samt~
section contains the provision already quoted, that the money
thus collected shall be used for the care and relief of" immigrants," · and to meet the expenses of enforcing the law. It
then goes on to declare that the duty shall be a lien on the
vessels bringing" such passengers" into the country.
The second section directs what measures the Secretary of
the Treasury shall take ''to provide for the support and relief of such immigrants therein landing as may fall into distress or need public aid." It theft goes on to make provision
for examination "into the condition of passengers arriving,"
etc., and if there shall be found ''among such passengers any
convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of
himself," such person shall not be permitted to land.
The third section authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury,
inter alia, to make rules and regulations "to protect the
United States and immigrants into the United States from
fraud."
It will be observed, on this survey of the statute, that
whenever Congress refers to the persons entitled to its benefit, whether as partakers of its bounty or objects of its protection, it invariably describes them as "immigrants" and
not as "passengm·s." On the other band, when the statute
would provide a protection against the introduction of con-
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victs, lunatics, idiots, and paupers, it declares that there
shall be an examination into the condition of "passengers"
arriving at the ports, etc., thus plainly manifesting a purpose to use a term em bracing immigrants and all other itineran.t persons. So when the act declares (sec. 1) that the
duty laid shall be a lien on the vesBels bringing ''such passengers," it can hardly mean immigrants, for in that case the
most natural expression would have been "such immigrants," as the term immigrants occurs in the sentence next
preceding, and would, in all probability, have been present
to the draughtsman's mind as the antecedent to which he
wa~ referring.
The first duty of the expounder of a writing is to give each
word its ordinary sense unless there be some satisfactory indication that it was employed in some other sense; but as I
am far from seeing anything in this statute that leads me to
suppose that the word "passengers" was intended to be
taken in the restricted sense of" immigrants," I am of opinion it should have its ordinary sense of comprehending all
itinerent persons, not citizens of the United States, coming to
our ports in steam or sail vessels.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CIVIL SERVICE.
The officers in the Pension Bureau described as medical referee, assistant
medical referee, medical examiners, and law clerk, being "exclusively
professional," do not fall within the operation of the civil service la"·;
they are excepted therefrom by Rule XIX.
Those described as principal examiners for review board are not excepted
and in appointing them the civil service law and regulations should
be observed.
DEPARTMENT OF . JUSTICE,

]J1ay 28, 1885.

Your communication asking my opinion upon the
question submitted to you in the letter of the Commissioner
of Pensions, which you inclose to me, has received my consideration.
The ques_tion is whether officers in the Pension Office,
SIR:
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answering the description of medical referee, assistant medical
referee, medical examiners, qualified surgeons, law clerk, and
principal examiners for review board, fall within the civil
service law and the rules made pursuant thereto.
It seems to me that as the duties of the medical officers and
the law clerk 'are "exclusively professional," those officers
are expressly excepted from the law by Rule XIX. There is
hardly room for question, therefore, that these o;fficers do not
fall within the operation of the civil service law as restricted
by the rule just mentioned.
As to the" principal e:xaminers for review board," I do not
understand that they come within any of the exceptions of
Rule XIX, and therefore I am of opinion that ih appointing
them the civil service law and regulations must be observed.
It is proper to add that I have carefully reconsidered my
opinion of the 7th of May, 1885, in the light of some additional views submitted for the purpose of influencing my
judgment, but I see no reason for receding from any position
taken in that opinion, which is herewith returned.
I have the honor to be, sir, ~'our obedient servant,
.
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

WORKS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGATION.
The indefinite appropriation made by the fourth section of the act of
July 5, 1884, chapter 229, is not applicable to river and harbor improvements generally, but only to a particular class of public works, such
as canals, locks, etc., in the use of which both operating expenses and
expenses for repairs are necessarily incurred.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE~

May 28, 1885.
Your letter of the 12th instant, inclosing a communication from the Chief of Engineers of the 8th, and other
papers, relative to the indefinite appropriation provided in
section 4 of the river and harbor act of July 5, 1884, chapter 229, calls attention to the points presented in these papers
and requests my opinion as to the construction which should
be placed on the provision referred to.
SIR:
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The section above-mentioned reads as follows: H That no
tolls or operating charges whatsoever shall be levied or collected upon any vessel or vessels, dredges, or other passing
water craft through any canal or other work for the improvement of navigation bP-longing to the United States; and for
the purpose of preserving and continuing the use and navigation of said canals, rivers, and other public works without
interruption, the Secretary of War, upon application of the
chief engineer in charge of said works, is hereby authorized
to draw his warrant or requisition from time to time upon the
Secretary of the Treasury to pay the actual expenses of operating and keeping said works in repair, which warrants or
requisitions shall be paid .by the Secretary of the Treasury
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated:
Provided, however, That an itemized statement of said expenses shall accompany the annual report of the Chief of
Engineers."
Soon after the enactment of this provision it appears to
have become a questi_on whether the indefinite appropriation
thereby made, besides being (as it was deemed by the War
Departm~nt to be) applicable to defray the expenses of operating and keeping in repair the locks, dams, canals, etc., of
certain public works, is available for "restoring any improved
harbor channel to its previous condition when such channel
has been obstructed by the action of storms, freshets, or other
causes, repairing or rebuilding harbor piers or revetments
which have been injured by ice, storms, freshets, or natural
decay, refilling piers with stone or other material when such
material has settled or has been displaced by the action of
the elements," and, more recently, whether it is also available
for removing snags and scraping bars in certain rivers, etc.
By the terms ot the section the appropriation is to meet
" the actual expenses of operating and keeping said works in
repair," and the difficulty seems to be in determining whether
"said u:orks," as used therein, refers to the v-arious public
works for the improvement of navigation mentioned in the
preceding parts of the act, including harbors and rivers
generally, or only to a particular class of works, such as
canals, locks, etc., the operation and use of which ordinarily
involve the incurring of certain expenses by the Govern-

190

HON. A. H. GARLAND
Works for Improvement of Navigation.

ment. An examination of previous legislation may throw
some light on this point.
The act of May 18, 1880, chapter 96, which abolished all
tolls on the Louisville and Portland Canal after July 1, 1880,
authorized the Seeretary of War "to draw his warrant from
time to time upon the Sec,retary of the Treasur;y to pay the
actual expenses of operating and keeping said canal in repair." Before the passage of that act this canai was, by section 3 of the act of May 11, 1874, chapter 165, made ''free
of all tolls and charges except such as are necessary to pay
the current expenses of said canal and to keep the same in
repair."
The ri\er and harbor act of June 14, 1880, chap. 211,
in providing for an acceptance of a transfer of the St. Mary's
Falls Canal from the State of Michigan, declared that after
such transfer said canal should be free for public use, and
authorized the Secretary of War "to draw from time to time
his wa'rrant on the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the
actual expenses of operating and keeping said canal in
repair."
By a clause in the river and harbor act of March 3, 1881,
chapter 136, it was provided that thereafter, "for the purpose
of operating and keeping in repair the Des Moines Rapi-ds
Canal, and St. Mary's Falls Canal, and St. Clair Flats Canal,
and the J..~ouisville and Portland Canal, the Secretary of War
is authorized to draw his requisition on the Secretary of the
Treasury from time to time, which requisition shall be paid
out of any rnoneJ: in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated." The expense of operating and repairing the Des
Moines Rapids Canal and the St. Clair Flats Canal h:1d
theretofore been met by definite appropriations for those
objects (see as to the former work 20 Stat., 159, 367; 21
Stat.• 188; and as to the latter 20 Stat., 269; 21 Stat., 189),
and on neither of these canals had tolls been collected by
the Government.
Lastly, by a provision in the river and harbor act of August 2, 1882, chapter 375, it was declared "that no tolls or
operating charges whatsoever shall be levied or collected
upon any vessels, boats, dredges; craft, or other water craft
passing through any canal or other work for the improve-
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ment of navigation belonging to the United States." The
effect ofthis enactment was to abolish the tolls theretofore
levied by the Government upon vessels passing through the
works of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers improvement from
which the current expenses of operating and keeping these
works in repair were paid (see sec. 4, act of July 7, 1870,
chap. 210; section 5249, Rev. Stat.) No other proYision was
then made for defraying those expenses; they were left to
be provided for by future legislation.
Recurring now to section 4 of the act of July 5, 1884,
quoted above, it will be observed that the first clause of this
-section re-enacts the provision in the act of August 2, 1882,
just adverted to, and that in immediate juxtaposition therewith follows the clause containing the indefinite appropriation under consideration. The latter clause is" and for the
purpose of preserving and continuing the use and na·vigation
of said canals, rivers, and other public works without interruption, the Secretary of War * :t * is hereby authorized
to draw his warrant or requisition from time to time upon the
Secretary of the Treasury, to pay the actual expenses of operating and keeping said works in repair," etc. This language is broad, but I do not think the words '' said canals,
rivers, and other public works," and" said works" were meant
to include all those public works which are described in the
preceding parts of the same act. The language employed in
that clause must be viewed in connection, not only with the
first clause in the same section, but with the previous legislation to which reference is above made, and which contains
provisions of the same character. Regarded from this point
of view, the more reasonable construction is that it embraces
only public works of the kind described in that legislation,
and obviously referred to in said first clause.
Such, indeed, seems to be the meaning given it by the
Committee on Rivers and Harbors of the House, in their report which accompanied the bill. Referring to the provision
.vherein it occurs, the committee say, "Anothe provision
prohibits tolls or operating charges from being levied or collected upon vessels passing through any canal or other work
for the improvement of navigation belonging to the United
States. Operating charges, under proper restrictions, are to
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be paid by reqlJisition upon the Secretary of the Treasury.
This is the existing law as to Des Moines, Portland, and St.
Mary's Canals, and there seems to be no good reason for not
putting all similar Government works upon the same footing."
A necessity existed for making Rome provision to meet the
current expenses of operating and keeping in repah· the
works of the Fox and Wisconsin Rivers improvemeni, since
the abolishment of tolls thereon; and while there can be no
doubt that the inrlefinite appropriation provided by section 4
of the act of 1884 was meant to apply to those works, there
is also strong ground for the inference that it was intended
to be limited to works of that class, in whose use both operating expenses and expenses for repairs are necessarily incurred
(the object being, as the statute itself declares, to prevent
interruption to their use and to the navigation thereof for
want of funds to pay such expenses), and not to extend to
river and harbor improvements generally.
In my opinion the provision in question should be construed to cover only works of the class above referred to.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
Hon. WILLIAM C. ENDICOTT,
Secretary of War.

DISTRICT ATTORNEY AT NEW YORK.
Compensation of the United States attorney for the southern distnct
of New York, under sections 770, 836, and 827, Revised Statutes,
considered.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

tlune 5, 1885.
SIR: Your letter of the 2d instant contains two inquiries~
bearing upon the corrtpensation of Elihu Root, United States
attorney for the southern district of New York, under sections 770, 836, and 827, Revised Statutes.
(a) Section 770, fixing the salary of the attorney, and section 836, providing for the expenses of his office, do not conflict
with each other. Section 770, which provides a '' salary for
\ll his services," has been practically interpreted to mean all
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official services required directly by statute, and his accounts
have been adjusted under this view.
The statutes which fix the salary and fees for official services required by law do not regulate in any way the payment for unofficial services rendered. Of this character are
the se.rvices rendered by virtue of section 827, which allows
to the attorney a sum in addition to his salary.
(b) The employment of clerks in the district attorney's
office for services not directed by the judiciary act, as far as
the amount of payment is concerned, is a matter within the
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. Whether, in
addition to the salary mentioned, the Secretary of the Treasury approves an account taxed in favor of the attorney by
the court in the sum of $4 or $6, is not a question of legality.
Under section 824 he bas a legal right to increase the pay by
$4,000, and again by $2,000, and the extent to which he shall
exercise that right is a matter of discretion alone.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
Ron. DANIEL MANNING,
Secretary of the Treasury.

TERRITORIAL OFFICERS IN UTAH.
The superintendent of dist,rict schools, auditor of public accounts,
and treasurer of Utah Territory should, in conformity to the organic
law of the Territory, be appointed by the governor, with the advice
and consent of the legislative council. The Territorial statutes, in so
far as they require such officers to be elected, are in conflict with the
organic law and void.
The commissioners to locate university lands, created by the Territorial
legislature under the powers given by the act of Congress of February
21, 1855, chap. 117, should be elected in the manner prescribed by the
Territorial statute.
DEPARTMENT OF. tTUSTICE,

June 5, 1885.
SIR: At the instance of the U tab ·Commission, the Hon.
H. L. Muldrow, Acting Secretary of the Interior, in a letter
dated the 22d ultimo, requested my opinion upon the following question: "Whether certain Territorial officers in Utah~
273-VOL XVIII--13
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namely, superintendent of district schools, auditor of public
accounts, treasurer, and commissioners to locate university
lands, should be appointed by the governor, with the assent
of the legislative council, or chosen by the people at their
general elections."
For convenience, so much of the question 'as relates to the
commissioners will be considered separately, as the appointment or election of those officers appears to be controlled by
a provision not applicable to the others.
Upon examination of the statutes enacted by the Territorial legislature, it appears that the superintendent, auditor,
and treasurer are thereby required to be elected biennially1
at the general election, by the qualified voters of the Territory (see Comp. Laws of Utah, 1876, p. 247; act of Feb. 22,
1878, chap. 11, Laws of twenty-third session, p. 27).
The organic law, however (see sec. 7 of the act of Congress
of Sept. 9, 1850, chap. 51), declares that "the governor shall
nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the
legislative council, appoint all officers not herein otherwise
provided for." And as the three Territorial officers last
mentioned are not therein '' otherwi~e provided for," a direct
conflict manifestly exists between the statute-s of the Territorial legislature above referred to and the organic law.
The organic law of a Territory takes the place of a constitution as the fundamental law of the local government. It is
obligatory on and binds the Territorial authorities (National
Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U. S., 129.) Any act of the
Territorial legislature inconsistent therewith must be held
void (Ferris v. Higley, 20 Wall., 375.) Congress may undoubtedly make a void act of the Territorial legislature valid
and a valid act void (101 U. S., supra.) But for the exercise
of this power some legislative act on its part, having that effect,
would be necessary. Certainly nothing can be implied in
favor of the validity of a Territorial statute which conflicts
with an express provision of the organic law of the Territory, from the mere fact that Congress has not disapproved
it. It follows that the statutes of Utah, in so far as they
require the ~uperintendent of district schools, auditor of public accounts, and treasurer of the Territory to be elected, being contrary to the provision of the organic law hereinbefore
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mentioned, are a nullity, and that those officers should be
appointed in conformity to that provision.
A similar conclusion was reached by the supreme court of
that Territory in regard to the Territorial marshal, who by
an act of the legislature of the Territory was required to be
elected by a joint vote of both houses thereof. The court
held the act to be inconsistent with the provision of the organic law above adverted to, and therefore void. (See Ex
parte Duncan, etc., 1 Utah Rep., 81.)
In regard to the commissioners, these officers are by the
Territorial statute required to be elected annually by the
qualified voters at the general election. (Comp. Laws of Utah,
1876, p. 241.) By the third section of the act of Congress of
February 21, 1855, chapter 117, a certain quantity of land
was reserved for the establishment of a unive~sity, ''to be
selected under the direction of the legislature," etc. The legis] ature of the Territory provided for the selection of this
land by creating a board of commissioners, to consist of three
men, elected as above, and devolving upon such board the
duty of selecting the land. I am of the opinion that the
Territorial legislature, by virtue of said act, was invested
with full power over the selection of the land, including the
establishment of the agency by which such selection was to be
accomplished. It was at liberty to devolve the duty of
electing on officers alreac.ly created, or authorize the appointment of persons for that purpose by such officers or by the
governor, or otherwise provide the instrumentality for carrying its will upon the subject into effect. The commissioners in question are not, therefore, to be regarded as within
the operation of the above-mentioned provision of the
organic law; and their election in the manner prescribed by
the Territorial statute is proper.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
Ron. L. Q. C. LAMAR,
Secretary of the Interior.
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HEAD-MONEY TAX.
The duty of 50 cents a passenger, imposed by the act of August 3, 1882,
chapter 376, should be exacted from itinerant persons, not citizens of
the United States, toties quoties any such person enters one of our ports
from a foreign port.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 9, 1885.
SIR: Your communication of the 6th J nne instant, referring to my opinion of the 21st May, holding that the duty of
50 cents a passenger imposed by the act of August 3, 1882, is
collectible on account of all itinerant persons, not citizens of
the United States, coming to our ports in steam or sail vessels from ·foreign ports, asks whether such duty ''should be
collected on each successive return of any such person to the
United States."
In my opinion the duty is demandable as often as any such
person enters one of our ports. The statute makes no express provision for exemption from the duty, and I see no
ground for implying one.
It is hardly to be supposed that Congress could have in·
tRnded such' au exemption and yet have failed to provide for it.
When Congress, by the act of J nne 26, 1884 (Sess. Acts 1883-'8~,
p. 57), was imposing a tonnage tax on foreign vessels entering our ports, it remembered that the tax would fall heavily
on such of them as were constantly plying between the United
States and the ports of other nations, and therefore especially
provided that vessels hailing from some ports should not be
required to pay over 15 cents a ton in any one year, and that
vessels from other ports should not pay more than 30 cents a
ton per annum. The total omission of Congress to make any
such provisian in the head-money law to meet the case of a.
passenger, not a citizen of the United States, repeatedly
entering our ports from foreign ports, is, I think, conclusive
that no such indulgence was in the mind of the legislature.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
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TONNAGE DUTY.
The right to a reduction of tonnage duty under the first proviso of section
14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, takes effect from the proclamation of the President, and not before.
By virtue of the third section of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 221, the
decision of the Commissioner of Navigation on questions involving a
refund of the tonnage tax is final. That section supersedes or repeals
the previous law vesting the Secretary of the Treasury with appellate
power in such cases.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 12, 1885.
SIR: I have duly considered the questions submitted for

<>pinion in your communication of May 23, 1885, and will now
proceed to answer them in their order.
(1) The first question is in these words: "In the event of a
right to an exemption from the tax of 3 cents per ton, or to a
reduction thereof, attaching under the conditions specified
in the first proviso of said section 14, when did such right
inure to the owner of a vessel~ Did it inure to him on the
first tender of payment of tax after the passage of the act
and prior to the proclamation of the President suspending
its collection~ Or did it inure on the first tender of payment
·Of tax after the date of suspension of collection as fixed by
the proclamation ~"
I think the right to a reduction of tonnage duty under the
first proviso of the fourteenth section of the act of June 26,
1884, takes effect from the proclamation of the President, and
not before. Until the President has by proclamation suspended the operation of the statute, the rate of duty thereby
prescribed must be demanded. The action of foreign gov- .
·e rnments in respect of diminishing or abolishing tonnage, or
light-house, or other equivalent tax or taxes, can have no
effect in this country except by the dispensing power of the
Executive, as grallted by the statute; and until that power
is. exerted the statute, or the last proclamation under the
statute, as the case may be, must be the law as to whether
any tonnage duty is demandable in certain cases, and, if any,
how much.
If the right to exemption from or diminution of tonnage duty
resulted directly from the act of the foreign government in
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a given case, it is quite remarkable that Congress did not
require that the proclamation of the President should state
the time when the foreign law or regulation took effect. It
is not reasonable to suppose that Congress would have left
a matter so largely affecting the revenue to be determined
by the collector at each port of entry, according to the light
before him, with no small probability of occasional violations
of the constitutional injunction of uniformity in duties,
through conflicting decisions of the various collectors.
As, then, the ship Antillas was entered and the tonnage duty
demanded as to her paid before the proclamation under which
the refund is claimed went into operation, it follows that the
duty collected wal:) due and demandable.
(2) The second question is in these words: "Does the
right to an exemption or a reduction of the tax entail a right
to a refund thereof from the date when a partial or entire
exemption accrued~"
This question I have answered already, if I apprehend it
correctly.
(3) Tb,e third question is as follows: ''In view of the language of the last clause of section 3 of the act of July 5r
1884, constituting a Bureau of Navigation in the Treasury Department, and of section 26 of the shipping act, when rights
to exemption from tonnage tax accrue under treaty stipulations with foreign governments, or accrue under provisions
of foreign law operating jointly with the provisions of section
14 to carry such exemption, are interpretations and decisions
of the Commissioner of Navigation relating to the legal collection of tonnage tax in such sense final and conclusive as
to preclude an authoritative appeal to the Department of
State upon the interpretation of treaties or foreign law affecting the collection of said tax; or to preclude an appeal to the
Secretary of the Treasury for a refund of tonnage tax by
virtue of the provisions of section 26 of the act of June 26,
1884, when exemption from paying such tax may, in t"!le
Secretary's judgment, have accrued under the provisions of
foreign law or treaty stipulation~"
I am of opinion that the decision of the Commissioner of
Navigation is final by virtue of the third section of the act
of July 5, 1884, entitled "An act to constitute a Burearr of
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Navigation in the Treasury Department," as to all claims for
refunds of the tonnage tax. This section provides ''that the
Commissioner of Navigation shall be charged with the supervision of the laws relating to the admeasurement of vessels, and the assignment of signal letters thereto~ and of
designating their official number, and on all questions of interpretation growing out of the execution of the laws relating to these subjects and relating to the collection of tonnage
tax, and to the refund of such tax when collected erroneously
or illegally, his decision shall be final;" and being as to
questions involving the refund of the tonnage tax irreconcilable with section 2931 of the Revised Statutes authorizing
appeals to the Secretary of the Treasury in cases of controversies about tonnage and other duties, it has, in my opinion,
repealed that section in so far as appeals from the collector's
decisions as to tonnage duties are concerned. In like manner the provisions of any treaty inconsistent with the law·in
question mnst be held to be annulled in so far forth as a rule
of civil conduct in this country. (Head Money Oases, 112
U.S., 597, 598.) Indeed, I am persuaded that, in the absence of the explicit language of the statute, the mere fact of
confiding questions about tonnage duties to the judgment
and discretion of the Commissioner would, upon a settled
principle, have made his decisions final. (Freeman on Judg.
ments, 531; Allen v. Blunt, 3 Story C. C., 742; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106. U. S., 447.)
In my opinion section 26 of the act of June 26, 1884,
authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to refund, in certain cases, "any fine, penalty, forfeiture, exaction, or charge
arising under the laws relating to vessels or seamen," has
no application to tonnage duties. The words " exaction and
charge'' in this section, which might in some circumstances
be held to comprehend tonnage duties, must, from their
association with the terms "fine, penalty, forfeiture," be
taken in an acceptation akin to that of these latter words,
upon the well known principle of interpretation that words
associated together and admitting of a like sense take their
color from each other, the more general being restricted to a
sen~e analogous to the less general. (Maxwell Stat., p. 379,
2d ed., London, 1883.)
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Besides, there was no necessity to include tonnage duties
in this section, inasmuch as the Secretary of the Treasury
already had the powPr under section 2931 of the Revised
Statutes to refund such duties when illegally or improperly
exacted.
If, however. section 26 does include tonnage duties, the
power of the Secretary of the Treasur;y to refund such duties
has been abrogated by the third section of the subsequent
act of July 5, 1884, making final the decision of the Commissioner of Navigatiou as to "aU questions" relating to the
refund of the tonnage tax when erroneously or illegally collected. This provision seems repugnant to and to have supplanted the previous law investing the Secretary of the Treasury with appellate power in such cases.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE 'TREASURY.
OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION.
In the case of the bridges of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company
across the Southern and Easteru Branches of Elizabeth River, the facts
set forth are insufficient to authorize judicial proceedings against said
company in behalf of the United States on the ground that such bridges
are an obstruction to navigation
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 16, 1885.
I return herewith the papers which accompanied your
letter of the 11th ultimo in relation to the bridges of the N"orfolk and Western Railroad Company across the Southern and
Eastern Branches of Elizabeth River, at·Norfolk, Va.
It appears by these papers that, in view of officers of the
Engineer Department, those bridge~ are already an obstruction to navigation, and that the work of strengthening them
as proposed by said company will add to the obstruction.
This matter is thought to be of sufficient importance to warrant action by the United States authorities, if such action
can be legally taken.
Upon consideration, I am of opinion that the facts set forth
in the papers are not in themselves sufficient to authorize a
judicial proceeuing against said company in bPhalf of the
SrR :
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United States, and that for this purpose authority from Congress is needed. In connection with this point, I beg torefer to my opinion of May 1, 1885, in the matter of the construction of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi at St. Paul,
wherein the subject of authority of officers of the Government
to institute proceedings in its behalf in cases like the present
is fully examined.
I suggest that the proper course to take in the present case
is indicated by the following provision in section 2 of the
act of July 5, 1884, chapter 229. "He l the Secretary of War]
shall also report [to Congress] whether any bridges, causeways, or structures, now erected or in process of erection, do
Dr will interfere with free anu safe navigation, and if they
do or will ~o interfere, to report the best mode of altering or
~onstructing such bridges or causewayR so as to prevent any
.such obstruction."
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R.
EXTRA-DUTY PAY.
In the matter of the claims of Sergeant Robinson and Corporal Speddin,
of the Signal Corps, for extra-duty pay for services performed by them
from July 1, 1883, toDecember20, 1884, it appearing that Congress has
made no provision for extra-duty pay to signal service men in either of
the a11propriation acts of March 3~ Hl83, chapter 143, aud July 7, 1884,
chapter 332, for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1884, and June 30, 1885,
respectively, or in any other appropriation act for the same fiscal
years: Held that the claimants have no right to such pay for the period covered by their claims, unless the right is elsewhere conferred
by statute, which does not appear.
The claimants being non-commissioned officers, and not employed on
extra duty as overseers, their claims are not within section 1287, Revised Statutes.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,
J 1tne 26, 1885.

SIR: By letter of April 8, 1885~ the Ron. A. S. Fairchild
{then Acting Secretary of the Treasury), at the instance of
the Second Comptroller, submitteu to me for an opinion
thereon the following question, which · relates to certain
daims before the Comptroller made by Sergeant Jesse H.
Robmson and Corporal William C. Speddin, of the Signal
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Corps, for extra-duty pay for services performed by them
from July 1,1883, to December 20, 1884, viz," whether either
or both of these claimants have a legal claim against the
Government for extra-duty pay for services rendered within
the period. mentioned, notwithstanding no appropriation has
been made by Congress."
These claims appear to be based upon the following facts:.
The act of June 20, 1878, chapter 359, having proviueu ·
that "Signal Service men shall not receive extra-duty pay
unless specially directed by the Secretary of War," an order .
was subsequently issued from the War Department (Gen~
Order No. 54, dated July 23, 1878) in terms as follows:
"By direction of the Secretary of War extra-duty pay atthe rate of thirty-five cents a day will be allowed the followiug class of enlisted men in the Signal Service of the Army.
"(1) Corporals and privates in charge of stations or serving as operators and repair men in the United States telegraph lines carrying, or which may carry, commercial business.
"(2) Non-commissioned officers in charge of sections.
"(3) In such instances as they may be mustered by the
Chief Signal Officer for extra-duty pay in pursuance of the
special direction of the Secretary of W ~r."
(See also Army Regulations of 1881, par. 406, 407.)
Sergeant Robinson was mustered for extra-duty pay by special direction of the Secretary of War, dated June 20, 1881,
and served as a telegraph operator during the period above
specified, aud Corporal- Spedden was duly assigned to duty,
in pursuance of the first paragraph of said order, on September 1, 1881, as a telegraph operator on the United States
telegraph lines, and served as such during the same period.
The said order received no modification during that period
and was not revoked until February 5, 1885.
The question proposed calls for an examination .ofthe statutory provisions which relate to the ~ubject of extra-duty pay.
The earliest legislation upon the subject is the act of March
2, 1819, chapter 45, which provided ''that whenever it shall
be found expedient to employ the Army at work on fortifications, in surveys, in cut.ting roads, and other constant labor,
of not less than ten days, the non-commissioned officers,
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musicians, and privates so emploseu shan be allowed fifteen
cents and an extra gill of whisky or spirits each per day while
so employed."
Attorney-General Butler held that under this statute a
sergeant of the Army employed as an assistant clerk in one
of the bureaus of the War Department was entitled to the
additional compensation thereby allowed. He was of opinion that it included not only the particular kinds of duty
mentioned therein, but all "other constant labor," and that
in legal contemplation the service of a clerk in a bureau is
''labor," and, if it be continuously and regularly performed,
"constant labor." (2 Opin., 706.)
By the sixth section of the act of August 4, 1854, chapter
~47, "the allowance to soldiers employed at work on fortifications," etc., authorized by the said act of 1819, was ''increased to twenty-five cents per day for men employed as
laborers and teamsters, and forty cents per day when employed as mechanics, at all stations east of the Rocky Mountains, and to thirty-five cents and fifty cents per day when
the men are employed at stations west of those mountains.
Section 35 of the act of March 3, 1863, chapter 75, provided
that" enlisted men, now or hereafter detailed to special service, shall not receive any extra pay for such services beyond
that allowed to other enlisted men." But by section 2 of the
act of April1, 1864, chapter 45, it was declared that that section "shall not be deemed hereafter to prohibit the payment
to enlisted men employed at the Military Academy of the
extra-duty pay heretofore allowed by law to enlisted men
when employed at constant labor for not less than ten days
continuously."
The said section 35 was construed differently by AttorneyGeneral Bates and Attorney-General Devens. (See 10 Opin.,
472; 15 Opin., 362.) Its construction, however, is unimportant in connection with the present inquiry, as all legislation
of a permanent character on the subject of extra-duty pay in
the Army remaining in force was superseded by section 7 of
the act of July 13, 1866, chapter 176, which provided as follows:
"That when it is necessary to employ soldiers in the construction of permanent military works, public roads, or other
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constant labor of not less than ten days' duration in any case,
they shall receive, in addition to their regular pay, the following additional compensation therefor: enlisted men working as artificers and non-commissioned officers employed as
overseers of such work, not exceeding one overseer for every
twenty men, thirty-five cents per day, and enlisted men employed as laborers, twenty cents per day; but such working
parties shall only be authorized on the written order of a commanding officer. This allowance of extra pay is not to appiy
to the troops of the Engineer and Ordnance Departments."
Subsequently, by the act of February 1, 1873, chapter 88,
the enlisted men of the Engineer Department were "placed on
the same footing with respect to compensation for extra-duty
service as the other enlisted men of the Army," and all laws
in conflict therewith were repealed.
The above-mentioned provisions of the act of July 13, 1866,
as modified by the act of February 1, 1873, are em bodied (with
some further modification, w.hich will be hereinafter noticed)
in sections 1235 and 1287 of the Revised Statutes, of which
sections the latter only need be considered here.
Section 1287 reads : "When soldiers are detailed for employment as artificers or laborers in the construction of permanent military works, public roads, or other constant labor
of not less than ten days' duration, they shall receive in
addition to their regular pay the following compensation:
Privates working as artificers, and non-commissioned officers
employed as overseers of such work, not exceeding one overseer for twenty men, thirty-five cents per day, and privatelil
employed as laborers, twenty cents per day. This allowance
of extra pay shall not apply to the troops of the Ordnance
Department."
Where the word "privates" occurs in this section, the words
''enlisted men" were used in the corresponding provision of
the act of 1866. The former term, in our military service,
applies only to those soldiers who are below the grade of
non-commissioned officers, while the latter term comprehends
all soldiers who enter the service by enlistment, ~<,nd conse·
quently includes both non-commissioned officers and privates.
The provision of the act of 1866 is therefore modified by section 1287 to the extent thus indicated.
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The act of June 20, 1878, to which reference has already
been made, declares that "Signal Service men shall notreceive extra-duty pay unless specially directed by the Secretary of War."
i' may here add that the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 217,
provides that such extra-duty pay thereafter" shall be at the
rate of :fifty cents per day for mechanics, artil-mns, schoolteachers, and clerks at Army, division, and department headquarters, and thirty-five cents per day for other clerks, teamsters, laborers, and others."
It appears that prior to the :fiscal year beginning July 1,
1883, the claimants, along with other extra duty men in the
Signal Service, were allowed extra-duty pay out of the funds
provided by the Army appropriation acts for extra pay to
"soldiers employed on extra duty." But by a clause in the
act of August 7, 1882, chapter 433, the Secretary of War was
directed to submit to Congress for that fiscal year separate
and distinct estimates for the Signal Service, which estimates were accordingly submitted; and Congress, in the act
of March~, 1883, chapter 143, made a separate appropriation for the Signal Service for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1884, and declared that "there shall not be expended from
any moneys appropriated by the act entitled' An act making
appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year
ending J nne 30, 1884, and for other purposes,' approved
March 3, 1883, any money for the support of the Signal Serv- ice Corps, except the pay of such commissioned officers as
the Secretary of War may detail for service in that corps."
A separate appropriation for the Signal Service was also
made for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1885, with a similar
prohibition against expending any moneys for that service
out of the Army appropriations for the same fiscal year. (See
act of July 7, 1884, chapter 332.) And, as Congress has
made no provision for extra-duty pay to Signal Service men
in either of the separate appropriations above mentioned, or
in any ot.ber appropriation for the same fiscal years, it is very
clE'ar that the claimants have no right to such pay for the
period covered by their claims (from July 1, 1883, to December 20, 1884), unless the right thereto is elsewhere conferred
by statutes, which is the point now to be examined.
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As already intimated, the only legislation in force at that
period which relates to extra duty pay (exclusive of appropriations) is contained in section 1287, Revised Statutes, and
in the acts of June 20, 1878, and July 5, 1884, the provisions
whereof on that subject are hereinbefore se't forth. It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to consider any of this legislation, excepting that which is found in section 1287. By
that section it is declared that soldiers "shall receive, in addition to their regular pay," certain compensation when
detailed for employment as there provided; and where a
soldier is detailed for and performs extra-duty service in
conformity thereto, the question whether he thereby acquires
a legal right to such additional compensation, and the Government incurs a corresponding obligation to pay the same to
him, in the absence of any appropriation therefor, might well
arise. But in the view I take of the case under consideration it does not present that question.
Assuming that the provision of the act of July 20, ;1.878,
which requires the special direction of the Secretary of War,
has been complied with in respect to extra duty performed
by claimants, their claims, in order to come under section
1287, must be within its terms. The language thereby employed tn fixing the extra CQmpensation is "privates working
as artificers, and non-commissioned officers employed as overseers of such work, not exceeding one overseer for twenty
men, thirty-five cents per day, and privates· employed as
laborers, twenty cents per day." Both of the claimants
were non-commissioned officers, and neither of them was
employed as an overseer. In view of these facts, the section
must be deemed to be inapplicable to their claims.
However meritorious these claims may be in themselves
by reason of the nature of the service and the circumstances
under which the same was rendered, yet it is essential to
their legality that they be warranted by some statute. (See
sec. 1765, Rev. Stat.) Therefore, as they are without statutory authorization, in my opinion they are not legal claims
against the Government.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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DISPATCH BOAT DOLPHIN.
:Examination of the contract entered into between Mr. John Roach and
the Secretary of the Navy for the construction of the dispatch boat
Dolhpin, and consideration of the rights and duties of the United
States arising thereunder.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 30, 1885.
SIR: Your communication of the 17th June instant re-

quests my opinion as to the rights and duties of the United
States touching the dispatch boat Dolphin, recently constructed by Mr. John Roach under a written contract entered
into between him and your predecessor, the Bon. William .E .
Chandler.
This ve&sel, you inform me, has been found to be defective
in three particulars, two of which are fundamental, that is
to say: (1) she does not develop the power and speed which
the contract calls for; (2) she is not staunch and stiff enough
for the service expected of her; and (3) the general character
of her workmanship does not come up to the requirements of
t he contract.
.
As to the defect in the article of speed: The act of Congress under which the vessel was built (22 Stat., 477) makes
an appropriation for the construction of ''one dispatch boat,
as recommended by the Naval Advisory Board in its report
of December twentieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two."
Upon reference to tha.t report it will be found, as I am informed by you, that the board recommended the construction of "one dispatch vessel or clipper, to have a sea speed
of :fifteen knots," and I take it as very clear that the recommendation became, by force of this reference to it, as much a
part of the statute as though it had been recited therein
word for word.
The contract contains no express covenant as to the speed
of the vessel-unless one is necessarily involved in the stipulation for a "collective indicated horse-power" of two thousand three hundred--but its very first covenant is to construct a dispatch boat" in conformity with the aforesaid plans
and specifications hereto annexed, and in accordance with the
provisions of the a,cts of Congress approved August 5 and March
3,1883, respectively, before mentioned, and relating thereto,"
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and I am of opinion that this covenant bound the contractor
as effectively to make a ship "of the Eea-speed of fifteen
knots" as though he had agreed to do so in express words.
It may be said possibly that the covenant as to power and
speed is not absolute, but qualified by the provision that, if
upon the trial trip the engines should not develop the full
power called for by the contract and the failure should not
be due to "defective workmanship or materials," the ship
should be accepted by the Government nevertheless.
This attempt to bind the Government to take from the
contractor's hands a ship of less power and speed than what
the act of Congress peremptorily requires is, in my opinion,.
utterly null and without effect. It was to the quality of speed
more than any other that Congress w~s looking, a~ the terms
"dispatch ve~ sel or clipper," used in the report of the Advisory Board referred to in t.he law, plainly Rhow. Congress
deemed that the service required a swift vessel of a sea-speed
of 15 knots, and it directed such a vessel to be contracted
for and built.
The contractor cannot be ·heard to allege ignorance of the
very law under which the contract was made. He was bound
to know the source and extent of the authority of the official
with whom he contracted. "Individuals as well as courtst
say the Supreme Court, "must take notice of the extent of
authority conferred by law upon a person acting in an official
capacity, and the rule applies in such a case that ignorance of
the Jaw furnishes no excuse for any mistake or wrongful act."
(Whiteside et al. v. The United States, 93 U.S., 257; Hawkins
v. United States, 96 U.S ., 691; The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall.,
666.)
With a full knowledge of the statute authorizing the construction of a dispatch boat of a designated speed and no
other, and with the plans and specifications under which the
work was to be done laid before him that he might bid with
intelligence and safety, the contractor, if he had misgivings
whether a vessel planned like the Dolphin would make the
required speed, should have abstained from sending in proposals, knowing as he did, or ought to have done, that a ship
defective in point of speed could not be accepted under the
statute, whatever her merits might be in other respects.
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Under any other view the most imperative requirements
of Congress would be liable at all times to be evaded upon
one pretext or another. I can not conceive how it could be
seriously urged that the United States is bound under the
law in question to accept from the contractor any other sort
of vessel than the one ordered by Congress to be built,
namely, a dispatch boat or clipper of a sea speed of 15 knots;
and the Dolphin having been found not to be a vessel of that
description, as I must assume, it wonld seem to follow that
nothing short of an act of Congress could authorize her acceptance.
I come now to consider the next objection : that the vessel
is wanting in the necessary strength and stiffness. If this
defect exists, as I must assume, it is fatal, whether due to
the plans upon which the vessel was built or not, because,
by the ninth clause of the contract, the contractor and his
sureties stipulate "that the vessel constructed under tllis
contract shall be sufficiently strong to carry the armament,
equiprf!;ent, coal, stores, and machinery prescribed by the Naval
Advisory Board, and indicated in the annexed drawings and
specifications. * * *
Now, it is too plain for serious discussion that the contractor has, by this covenant, undertaken to make a ship for
a specific purpose in accordance with given drawings andl
specifications, and·has, to all intents and purposes, warranted
that the ship so agreed to be built shall be H sufficiently
strong" for that purpose. In a word, the contractor by this
covenant makes the plans of the Advisory Board his own,
and agrees to construct a vessel of sufficient strength according to those plans.
Manifestly, then, the Dolphin, which I am bound to assume,
in view of the report accompanying your communication, is
anything but ''sufficiently strong," can not for this reason
alone be accepted by you under the contract, the defect mentioned being fundamental in character.
The third objection, as to the general character of the
workmanship of the vessel, I need not stop to consider, in
view of your representation that, if the vessel is otherwise
in accordance with the contract, this objection can be readily
273-VOL XVIII--14
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dealt with by you, the oontractor being ready and willing to
make the vessel satisfactory in this respect also.
As to whether the Government has been in any wise estopped or compromitted by acts of acquiescence, approval, or
acceptance by the Advisory Board or others, I am of opinion
that the G~vernment stands unaffected by any such acts.
This must be the case necessarily if the law authorizing the
building of a dispatch boat is to have effect. Its language is
that ''no such vessel shall be accepted unless completed in
strict conformity with the contract, with the advice and assistance of the Naval Advisory Board • * * ,"and consequently no acceptance of a vessel not built "in strict conformity u:ith the contract" could bind the Government. Neither
the Secretary of the Navy nor any officer under him had any
dispensing power over this statute, the words of which,
appearing as they do in a context displaying great solicitude
for the protection of the public interests, can not be taken
in any other sense than as mandatory, without a plain disregard of the legislative intention.
The power to accept a ship built under this law cannot be
exercised unless the fact be that the ship was constructed in
strict conformity with the contract, and the mere enunciation
from any official quarter that the ship was so constructed,
when in truth it was not, lends no validity whatever to a
pretended act of acceptance. It was not the intention of
Congress that the United States should be foreclosed or concluded in any such way, or that any departure from the contract, except as expressly provided for, should be condoned
by the act or judgment of any official, and that it should be
open at all times to show that a vessel alleged to have been
built and accepted under the law was not so built and accepted. It was competent for Congress to create an extraordinary barrier of this kind against fraud and inefficiency,
and it is the duty of those called upon to apply their language
to do so in such a way as to make it effective.
The case of the Floyd acceptances, already referred to,
shows how difficult it is to bind the Government by the acts
·o f its officers in the matter of contracting for and disbursing
its moneys, and before that case was decided an opinion by
one of my predecessors was given sustaining the view that
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was afterward adopted in that case (10 Opin., 288). After
.all, this is but an application of the general doctrine, that
the Government of the United States, in transactions of this
character, is not ordinarily bound by an estoppel. (Fenemore
'T· United States, 3 Dallas, 363; Johnson v. United States, 5
1\Iason, C. C., 425; United States v. Oollier, 3 Blatch., C. C.,
-325; Cook v. United States, 12 lb. 43, 61; Herman on Estoppel,
sec. 219; 10 Opin. 231; 12 ib., 43.) These references show
the application of this doctrine in almost every conceivable shape; and also that in dealings with the Government,
upon contracts, there is always a safeguard until the final
acceptance by the proper ·officer and a disbursement of the
money.
But, aside from this consideration, suppose it was a case
:ts between individuals or private parties, I (lo not think that
the party occupying the place of the Government would be
·e stopped by the action of the Advisory Board, or any intermediate agent, by whatever name such agent might be known.
In Glacius v. Black (50 N. Y., 145) the court of appeals of
:i'TewYork considered this question very elaborately, after very
exhaustive argument, analyzing and applying many cases
that were cited in argument, and by a unanimous opinion
Uburch, chief-justice, speaking for the court, ruled as follows:
"Where by the terms of a contract for the :repair of a
building it is stipulated that the material shall be of the best
quality and the work performed in the best manner, subject
to the acceptance or rejection of an architect, all to be done
iu strict accordance with the plans and specifications, and to
be paid for when done cqmpletely and accepted, the acceptance by the architect of a different class of work or of inferior materials will not binq the owner, and does not relieve
the contractor from the agreement to perform according to
the plans and specifications. The provision for acceptance
is an additional safeguard against defects not discernible by
.an unskil1ful person."
This case, it is conceived, goes the full length to relieve
the Government in this instance as against anything in the
nature of an estoppel; and ;n this opinion (50 N. Y.) the
.court says: ''Fraud or mistake vitia.tes the certificate in tho-se
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cases where a certificate is otherwise conclusive." So that, as
upon a final inspection and trial of this vessel, it has been
found that a certificate has been given, or an acceptance
made, of work that did not comply with the requirements,
and whether this was through fraud or mistake matters not,
that action is not conclusive, and the Government is not
bound thereby, as an individual would not be in a similar
case.
In Bird v. Smith (64 E. C. L. R., 7S5) the contract was fpr
the sale and delivery to the plaintiff of a quantity of iron
rails, of certain weights, shapes, and dimensions. and -to be
inspected and certified as then agreed upon, and in quality
equal to any rails made in Staffordshire. A plea that the
rails were inspected, certified, and approved by an agent of
the plaintiff, as provided in the contract, was held bad on de
murrer, on the ground, among others, that each stipulation
is in its terms distinct, and in its nature, as an absolute warranty for quality, may well be required in addition to a provision for inspection aud approval, to guard against defects
which inspection cannot discover.
It is not deemed necessary to say more upon this feature
of the case.
All that has been said thus far is based upon the idea that
there is a valid, subsisting contract; but it is proper at this
point to say that the provisions of the contract binding the
United States to accept the vessel on the approval of the
Naval Advisory Board are in my opinion void and inoperative, as shifting a high trust and duty from the Secretary of
the Nav~ to the board, in violation of tlie act under which
the contrac~ was made, which directs the Secretary of the
Navy to invite proposals, which authorizes the Secretary of
the Navy "to construct said vessels and procure their armament," which requires proposals for the work to be "subject to an such rules, regulations, superintendence, and provisions as to bonds and security for the due completion of the
work as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe," and which
authorizes the SecrMary of the Navy to use for the purposes
of the act the bJ,lance of an appropriation made for another
object. In the face of these explicit provisions it seems to
me impossible to reach any other conclusion than that Con-
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gress, after providing the Secretary of the Navy with abundant facilities for forming an intelligent judgment, intended
that the full and ultimate responsibility of carrying out the
law should be on him.
This, however, while proper 1:o be mentioned, is perhaps
not of much practical consequence, in view of the contractor's
express covenant, already referred to, to do the work in accor·dance with the law authorizing it.
But beyond these questions there lies another of very great
importance not referred to in your communication or the report accompanying it, and that is, whether there was any
val·id contract at all between Mr. Roach and the United
States.
As we have seen, the Secretary of the Navy had no power
to contract for a dispatch boat that would not make 15 knots
at sea, or to accept any boat not built " in strict conformity
with the contract" he was authorized to enter into.
But the ninth clause of the contract provides that, should
the engines of the vessel contracted for fail to maintain successfully on the trial trip for six consecutive hours a power of
two thqusand three hundred horses, the v~ssel shall be accepted nevertheless, if it appear satisfactorily that the short·c oming was not owing either to defective workmanship or
materials. In other words, it was to make no difference how
much the engines should be wanting in power, and consequently how far short they should fall of propelling the ship
at the speed required by the law-it being impossible to dissociate power from speed-if there was no defect in the workmanship or materials. The obvious 'intention of this was to
relieve the contractor of all duty and responsibility as to the
.speed and power of the ship, and make it possible to force
upon the United States a ship wanting in the prime quality
of speed and fundamentally different from what Congress
authorized and was desirous to secure. It needs no further
discussioh to show tllat what was thus attempted was
wholly out of the question.
But the contract, is an entirety and does not admit of being
broken up into fragments, so as that what is good may be enforced and what is bad rejected. The stipulation which was
intended to relieve the contractor of responsibility for the

f
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power of the engines, and as a necessary conRequence for the
speed of the ship, forms a large and most important part of
the consideration moving to him from the Government. It
is impossible to say what was its bearing on the whole contract, nor is it material to do so, inasmuch as it and the other
covenants of the Government constitute one entire and indivisible consiueration, the invalidity or illegality of any element of which must necessarily vitiate the whole and abrogate the contract.
This is very well illustrated by the case of Ohater v. Becket
(7 T. R.,. 201), which is often referred to in illustration of
the principle on which I rely. In that case a parol, and
therefore invalid promise to 'answer for the debt of another, and a promise entirely valid and meritorious formed
the consideration of the contract sued on, and in view of the·
defendant's contention that the consideration was void in toto,
it ~as insisted on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant
should be held an"werable for so much of his contract as was
valid; but it was said by the court in reply that the agreement was entire, and that there could be no recovery on one
part the other part being illegal. As was said by Chief-Justice·
Gibson, "if any part of an indivisible promise or any part of an
indivisible consideration for a promise is illegal, the whole is
void." (Filson v. Himes, 5 Pa. St., 456.) In the latter case
the consideration was, like that in the case before me, made
up of several particulars, one of which was illegal, and the
learned judge, referring to the illegal part, says " Who can
say from this how far the office entered into the defendant's.
computation of what he was to get for his $500." I would
refer also to the cases of De Beerski v. Paiue (36 N. Y., 537);
Pettit v. Pettit (32 Ala., 289); and Doty v. Knox County Bank
(16 Ohio St., 134), as directly in point:
It follows then that no contract exists between Mr. Roach
and the United States, and that the large sums of money
which have been paid Mr. Roach have passed into his hands
without authority of law, and are held by him as so much
money had and received to the use of the United States, and
may be recovered from him. And not only so, but the
money thus paid him by officials holding a fiduciary relation
to the Government having gone into the ship Dolphin, a
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court of equity will follow it there, and for that purpose entertain a proceeding against the ship itself. In support of
this position I need do no more than cite the .recent decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the
Nat-ional Bank v. Insurance Co., (104 U. S., 55).
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, ·
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
POST-OFFICE LEASES.
Certain leases of post-offices, made by the Postmaster-General prior to
the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 342, for terms of twenty years, held
not to be obligatory upon the Government.
Where the tenancy of the Government is from year to year, it may be terminated by giving such notice as is required by the law of the State
in which the property is situated.

DEP.A.R'l'MENT

JUSTICE,
July l, 1885.
SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of 29th of
June, inclosing leases of three post-offices, viz, at La Fayette,
Ind., at Augusta, Me., and at Quincy, 111., and requesting an
opinion upon the question "whether a lease of a post-office
by the Postmaster-General on behalf of the United States
executed prior to the act of the Forty-eighth Congress, approved March 3, 1885, specially authorizing leases of postoffice~ for a term not·exceeding five yP,ars, is of any binding
obligat.ion upon the Government; and whether, if of binding
obligation only from year to year, it may be terminated upon
notice by the Postmaster-General to the lessor, and .if so,
upon what notice."
The lease for post-office premises at La Fayette, Ind., was
executed February 4, 1870, for a term of twenty years, commencing May 1, 1870.
The lease at Augusta, Me., was for a term of twenty years,
commencing July 1, 1870, executed July 1, 1870.
The lease at Quincy, Ill., was for a term of twenty years,
commencing April!, 1873, executed May 2, 1873.
These leases were executed on the part of the Government
by the Postmaster-General.
OF
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At the time of the execution of these leases the following
provision of the act of Congress, approved March 2, 1861
(Rev. Stat., sec. 3732), was in force: "No contract or purchase
on behalf of the United States shall be made unless the same
is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate
to its fulfillment, exeept in the War and Navy Departments,
for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of
the current year.''
And at the time of the execution of the lease for premises
at Quincy, Ill., this further provision (see act of Congress,
approved July 12,1872; sec. 3679, Rev. Stat.) was in force:
"No Department of the Government shall expend in any one
·fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the Government in any
contract for the future payment of money in excess of such
appropriations."
Independent of these inhibitory provisions, the authority
of the Postmaster-General to make these leases must be derived from an act of Congress. ( 'l'he Floyd Acceptances, 7
Wall, 666; .United States v. Alexander, 110U. S., 325; Moffatt
v. United States, 112 ib., 24.)
There was no such express authorization at the time of
their execution, and they are therefore valid only so far as
they are under appropriations adequate to their fulfillment
and not in excess of such appropriations. (McCollum v.
United States, 17 C. Cls. R., 92.)
The act of Congress approved March 3, 1868, appropriated
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1869, miscellaneous payments, including allowances to postmasters for rent, light,
and fuel, etc., $37•3,000. (15 Stat., 55.)
Tbe act of Congress approved March 3, 1869, making appropriations for 'miscellaneous payments for the year ending June
30, 1870, made no reference to rent, etc. (15 Stat., 323.)
The act of Congress approved July 11, 1870, for appropriations for the year ending June 30, 1871, provided for payments for rent, etc. (16 Stat., 228.)
The act of Congress approved June 1, 1872, for appropriations for year ending June 30, 1873, provided for payments
fo:r; rent. (17 Stat., 200.)
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The act of Congress making appropriations for the year
ending June 30, 1874, made provision for payments for rent.
(17 Stat., 556.)
In none of these acts, nor in any acts, was authority given
to the Postmaster-General to make leases for a term of years
for premises to be occupied as post-offices until the act approved March 3, 1885, which authorized the Postmaster-Gen·e ral to make leases for a term not exceeding five years. This
.act also made appropriation for rent.
In the absence of express authority,_ the leases under con-sideration, as leases for terms of years, are invalid.
But it would appedr from your communication that these
several premises have been occupied by the Government for
the purposes and under the tm·ms expressed in the leases,
and, presumably, that the rents have been paid therefor
under appropriations available for t.bat purpose, and that
for the current year there is a proper appropriation. The
Court of Claims, under a similar state of circumstances,
decided that the effect of such a contract was ''to give the
Postmaster-General each fiscal year thereafter, when a new
appropriation should be made, the option to adopt and ratify
the contract for another year. This he might do by express
notice to that effect, or by entry and occupation of the premises after the commencement of the year. If he should occupy
the premises after the beginning of the new year, be might
be held to have renewed the obligation on the part of the
defendants for that one year. In other words, a lease for a
term of years founded on an annual appropriation is binding
on the Government only until the end of that year, with a
future option from year to year till the end of the lease. Such
is the effect of the contract and statutes taken together, to
which the contracting parties must be held to have agreed."
{McCollum vs. U.S., ut supra.)
It appears that there is for the ensuing year an appropriation available for the payment of these rents.
The statutes and decisions of the courts in each of the
States where these leases were to take efl'ect determine the
-c haracter of the tenancies.
In Indiana a holding over beyond the term creates a tenancy from year to year. (Stat. Ind., 1881, sec. 5508.) .A ten-
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ant by holding over after expiration of lease for one year
without any new contract or agreement becomes tenant for
another year upon same terms. (Burbank v. Dyer, 54 Ind.t
392.)
In Illinois the tenant holding over may, at the election of
the landlord, be treated as a trespasser or as a tenant for
another year upon the same terms as in the original leaset
and this tpough the tenant has no intention of holding over
for a year or of paying the same rent. (Clinton Wire Olotk
Go. v. Gardner, 99 Ill., 151.)
In Maine the rule appears to be somewhat different. By
statute (Maine Rev. Stat.~ 1883, sec. 10, p. 604), it is provided: "No estate in lands greater than tenancy at will can
be created without writing signed by grantor, maker, or his.
attorney."
The statutory provisions as to the notice requisite to terminate these tenancies are as follows :
In Illinois sixty days' notice in writing within the last four
months of the year terminates a tenancy from year to year.
(Dig. Stat. Ill., sec. 5, p. 1492.)
In Indiana a tenancy from year to year created by holding
over is terminated by landlord by three months' notice before
termination of the year. (Rev. Stat. Ind., 1881, sec. 5209.)
In Maine thirty days' notice in writing by either party terminates a tenancy at will. (Maine Rev. Stat., 1883, sec. 2, p.
286.) But the expiration of the thirty days' notice to terminate
the lease at will must be coincident in point of time with a
pay day. ( Wilson v. Prescott, 62 Me., 115.)
All questions of the · regulation of the tenure of real
property within the limits of a State are to be determined by
the laws of that State. The title and modes of disposition of
real property within the State~ whether inter vivos or testa- .
mentary, are not matters placed under the control of Federal
authority." (United States v. Fox, 94 U. S., 315.)
By the laws of Indiana and Illinois the tenancies of the
United States of the post·office premises at La Fayette and
Quincy are from year to year. By the laws of Maine the
tenancy at Augusta is at will.
At Quincy, sixty days' notice in writing within the last four
months of the year will terminate the tenancy.
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At La Fayette, by the Indiana statute, the landlord can
determine the tenancy by giving notice three months before
the termination of the year. The obligation to give this
notice should be reciprocal by a holding-over tenant .
.At Augusta, thirty days' notice in writing before a usual
pay day by the tenant will terminate the lease.
The original leases for a, term of years being· invalid, and
no special agreement having been entered into between the
lessors and the lessees relating to the tenancies for the ensuing year, the notice to terminate the leases will be such
as the law of the State in which the property leased is situated
requires.
Very truly, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

CONSULAR JURISDICTION.
Where a citizen of the United States, trading in the island of Gnap, a
barbarous or semi-civilized country, was charged with cruelly and inhumanly punishing .a boy ou said island: A.dt1ised that the case is cognizable by a consul cr commercial agent under the provisions of section
4088, Revised Statutes, and that a special commercial agent might be
sent to the island for the trial of the accused.

DEP A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,
July 6, 1885.
SIR: The communication of Dr. Wharton (the examiner of
claims in the Department of State), addres8ed to me, at your
request, on the 3d instant, is received and has been carefnlly
read. It contains a statement as to the conduct of C. P. Holcomb, a citizen of the United States, trading in the islanrl of
Gnap, a barbarous or semi-civilized country, in arresting a boy
for stealing some of his goods, and 'punising him arbitrarily
by the most cruel . and inhuman tortures without any legal
proceedings whatever; and I am asked. what remedy there is
for this; or, in other words, how can Holcomb be reached for
1
his illegal and unjust acts in this regard ~
Section 4088, Revised Statutes, gives jurisdiction to the
· ~onsuls and commercial agents of the United States at islands
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or iu countries not inhabited by any civilized people, or recognized by any treaty with the United States, to hear and
determine certain matters of civil rights and contentions, and
then gives them jurisdiction over offenses or misdemeanors,
as is conferred by sections 4086 and 4087. These two sections
simply give consuls jurisdiction, civil and criminal, to be
exercised in conformity with the laws of the United States,
which are extended over all citizens of the United States in
those countries (certain countries with which there are
treaties), * * * and provided the way and manner of proceeding by these consuls; and in the two sections immediately
following punishment for offenses is provided. The iRland of
Gnap, from the statement before me, comes within the class
of countries referred to in section 4088; and it would seem,
under the several sections already named, considered together, that full power exists to arrest, try, and punish Holcomb.
·
The jurisdiction thus conferred is based upon the wellreceived doctrine of international law, that consuls in
barbarous or semi-barbarous states are to be regarded as
investing with extraterritoriality the place where their flag
is planted, and if justice is to be administered at all, so far
as concerns civilized foreigners visiting such states, it must
be by tribunals such as are named in section 4088, Revised
Statutes. Civilized powers will not surrender the control of
the business relations or of the persons of their subjects to the
sovereigns of uncivilized or semi-civilized states (Lawrence's
Wheaton, 215, et seq.; The lVilliarn Harris, 1 Ware's Reports,
367; 7 Opin., 342; 8 ib., 380); and such doctrine is clearly inferable in Oonsequa v. Fanning, ~Johns. Chancery, Rep. 587;
Daineses v. Hale, 91 U. S., 13; and JJ[ahoney v. United States,
10 Wallace, 62.
This being the case, there is no reason why a special commercial agent may not be sent to the island of Gnap, for the
trial of Holcomb, and I see no other remedy, under the law,
than this, which I think will be quite adequate.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.
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NEW ORLEANS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY.
Under the circumstances and for the reasons stated: AdviBed that the
suspension of the issue of land patents to the New Orleans and Pacific
Railway Company, heretofore made, be continued until the proper
tribunals, courts or Congress, definitely settle the rights of the parties
in the premises.
. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 6, 1885.
SIR: I am in receipt of a statement of facts submitted to
you by E. B. Wheelock, esq., president of the New Orleans
and Pacific Rail way Company (which you have designated as
a memorial), touching the claim of such company to certain
lands therein referred to. There is no prayer or request in
this statement for any definite action by you; indeed, no
action is asked for, except that serious consideration be given
to the matters therein contained; but I presume the ultimate
object of the statement ''(memorial)" was to have recalled
your order of the 1Oth of March last, suspending the issuing
of patents for such lands.
This statement, or memorial, is referred by you to me for
my opinion. The matter as now presented I do not consider
raises the question of strict right of the company to these
lands, for I have nothing before me to enlighten me upon that
subject, except this statement and some briefs and documents
submitted by Mr. Wheelock and his counsel. I take it, that
instead of a legal question upon the force and effect of the
grant, as well as upon the claim set up by the railway company as having complied with the terms of the grant, and
therefore being entitled to all of these lands-that, instead
of this, a mere question of administrative practice, or of ad·
ministrative policy, is submitted to me, and that more for an
advisory opinion than for a judicial one, properly speaking.
It seems that this matter has been before Congress, and
there have been various reports by .majorities of committees
and by minorities of committees upon the legal questions and
the rights arising upon this grant, and it seems that the subject is one which is in great doubt in the Congressional mind.
From the papers before me it would appear that the question
is susceptible of much debate, and in view of this fact :t
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might not be proper for me to give an opinion affecting the
rights of the parties interested before some final and definite
action is taken by Congress or by the courts, as the case may
be. I therefore refrain from expressing any view in the
premises, except that in reference to the duties of your Department, as a branch of the executive power of the Government.
Courts, upon questions properly before them, and Congress,
in the exercise of its legitimate power, may do certain things,
for reasons which would not or could not influence the executive branch of the Government, and reasons might prompt
the executive branch of the Government to a certain course,
which might not operate, on the other hand, upon Congress
or the courts. But in disposing of the public domain of the
Government, and especially under a grant, or a ~upposed
grant, by Congress, in case of doubt the Department should
not part with the fee of the Government, but should withhold its action until the proper tribunal, whether courts or
Congress, has disposed of the matter. (3 Opin., 102; 13 ib.,
430.)
So great is the doubt in this case that your Department,
on the lOth of March last, arrested the proceedings under
which patents were being issued and suspended all further
action in that direction. No new light or information has
been had upon this subject, so far as I am advised, since that
time. The same doubt that existed then still exists, as I am
assured by the very fact, if by nothing else, that, p~nding the
suspension of proceedings, you ask my ad vice upon this proposition. That advice is, as I have already indicated, that you
continue that suspension and do not isssue any more patents
until the proper tribunals, courts or Congress, shall definitely
settle the rights of parties in the premises.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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CLAIMS OF ELY MOORE AND OTHERS.
Where an account has once been duly adjusted, settled, and closed by
the proper officers, upon a full knowledge of all the facts, anct no errors
of calculation have been made, it cannot be re-opened in the absence
of statutory authority.
1.'he prov~sions of the act of August 7,1882, entitled "An act to authorize the auditing of certain unpaid claims against the Indian Bureau
by the accoun~ing officers of the Treasury," do not extend to the
opening of settled account.s.
Upon the facts stated: Advised that no action whatever should be
taken by the Executive Departments on the claim of Ely Moore and
others for additional compensatiou for selling certain Indian trust
lands, without legislation by Congress providing therefor.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 7, 1885.
SIR: In a letter received from the Ron. H. L. Muldrow,
Acting Secretary of the Interior, dated the 20th ultimo, relative to the matter of the claims of Ely Moore and others, as
special registers and receivers, for additional compensation
lor selling certain Indian trust lands, my opinion is asked
upon the following questions: "Whether these claims ought
to be allowed by the Indian Office and passed to the accounting officers of the Treasury under the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States on March 3, 1884, together with
interest on the amounts in dispute; whether they should be
referred to the Court of Claims for decision; or whether any
action whatever should be taken by the Executive Departments on these claims without further legislation by CoMgress
providing therefor."
The Acting Secretary's letter was accompanied by a communication from the Commissioner of Indian .A:fl'airs (at
whoso request the above questions were submitted to me),
dated the 19th ultimo, giving the history and facts of the
~ases as they are understood by his office, and also a number of other papers relating to the claims, all of which are
returned herewith.
From these papers I gather the following facts in regard
to the origin of the claims, the action hitherto had thereon,
and their present condition.
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By the treaty with the Delaware Indians of May 6, 1854t
and also by the treaty with the Kaskaskia and Peoria, Piankeshaw and Wea Indians of May 30, 1854 (10 Stat., 1048t
1082), certain lands were ceded to the United States in trust,
to survey, manage, and sell the same for the benefit of the
Indians. The sale of these trust lands was to be conducted
in the same manner as the sale of public lands, and the proceeds were to be paid to or invested for the Indians, after
deducting therefrom the " cost of surveying, managing, and
selling the same."
It appears that in October, 1856, Ely Moore was appointed
by the Secretary of the Interior a special register and superintendent, and William Brindle a special receiver and superintendent, to assist in the sale of the eastern portion of the
trust lands of the Delaware Indians under their said treaty;
and that in May, 1857, the Secretary of the Interior appointed
John W. Whitefield a special register and superintendent, and
Daniel Woodson a special receiver and superintendent, to
assist in the disposal of the western portion of the same trust
lands under the same treaty. In May, 1857, the said Moore
was also appointed by the Secretary of the Interior a special
register and the said Brindle a special receiver and superintendent, to assist in the sale of the trust lands of the Kaskaskia and Peoria, Piankeshaw and Wea Indians under their
treaty aforesaid.
Each of these special registers, at the time of his appointment, already held the office of register, and each of the
special receivers, the office of receiver, in different land districts.
Whit,field, Woodson, and Brindle having claimed compensation for their services (the first as special register and the
others as special receivers) in selling the trust lands aforesaid,
the question arose, whether they were entitled to compensation for selling those lands in addition to the compensation
received by them for the sale of public lands. This question.
along with the accounts of 'VLHfield and Woodson, was submitted by the Commjssioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for his determination, and in a letter to
the Commissioner dated May 8, 18G1, the Secretary (citing
Converse v. United States, 21 How., 464) decided that they
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were entitled to additional compensation for the services
mentioned; that, as no specific compensation was provided
in the treaty, they were entitled to a reasonable one; and that
the rate of compensation adopted by the Government for
similar services furnished a fair rule to determine the amount
which should be paid. He concluded by saying:
"I think the claimants should be allowed 1 per cent.
commission upon the sales of the lands of each tribe, the
maximum in any one year not to exceed $2,500, being the
amount allowed by the United States. Their accounts will
be adjusted accordingly, and the amount found to be due
will be paid out of the respective Indian funds in proportion
to the amount of the sales of each."
Subsequently the Commissioner of Indian .Affairs submitted to the Secretary of the Interior the account of Ely
Moore, then deceased, for compensation for his services as
special regi~ter in selling the said trust lands. In a letter to
the Commissioner dated June 6, 1862, the Secretary referred
to his decision of May 8, 1861, in the cases of Whitfield and
Woodson, and remarked that" if the account of Mr. Moore,
now presented, involv('s the same principles as were settled
by that decision, I see no objection to its allowance, and it
is herewith returned to be paid accordingly."
The accounts of Moore, Whitfield, Woodson, and Brindle
were adjusted and settled by the proper officers in conformity to the decision of the Secretary of the Interior
above mentioned. In adjusting those of Moore, Whitfield,
and Woodson, balances were found in favor of each of these
persons, which were paid. In adjusting Brindle's account a
balance was found to be due from him to the United States.
In each account, it seems, a commission was claimed of 1 per
centum upon the entire proceeds .of the sale, and in the ad ~
justment thereof the same commission was allowed, but not
to exceed the sum of $2,500 in any one year, the excess being
disallowed.
I understand that it is the excess thus disallowed, with interest thereon, which constitutes the subject-matter of the
claims of Ely Moore and others, referred to in the questions
proposed. And as the allowance of these claims would involve the reopening of accounts long since settled and closed,
273-VOL XVIII--15
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the ~nswer to those questions must necessarily depend upon
whether sufficient ground exists to warrant such action.
The only ground relied upon is the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of United States v. Brindle (110 U. S. Rep.,
688), the defendant in that case being one of the special
receivers above named.
In May, 1877, suit was brought by the United States
against Brindle in the United States district court for the
eastern district of Pennsylvania, to recover certain balances
(amounting in the aggregate to $9,251.68) claimed to be due
from him as receiver of public moneys. Whilst this suit was
pending in that court, Congress passed an act (dated June
10, 1878, chapter 179) providing that "in the trial of said
cause the said court shall hear and determine all disputes
and differences between the United States and the said
· William Brindle in reference to his various accounts as receiver and acting disbursing agent of public money in the
Pawnee land district in Kansas, and also . in relation to his
accounts as special receiver of Indian trust moneys received
and expended under the Indian treaties of May 6 and May
30, 1854, as well under said Indian treaties as under the laws
of the United States; and the said William Brindle, in the
trial of said cause, shall be permitted and be entitied to make
.defense and· claim setoff in his favor in said court, if said
·court shall determine him to be entitled thereto, with the
same effect as if said suit were commenced by an individual
against the said William Brindle, and said set-off shall not
be barred by any statute of limitations. And should the
said court, in the said trial, determine that there is a balance
due to the said William Brindle upon said accounts, the court
shall certify the amount so found to be due to him to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, for payment, out
()f any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
reserving, nevertehless, the right of appeal to either party
from the judgment of the said court."
The defendant, among other defenses, pleaded set-off, under
which plea he claimed that a large sum was due to him from
the United States as receiver of public moneys, and also that
a further sum was due to him as special receiver of Indian
trust moneys as aforesaid. At .the trial the jury found a
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special verdict, upon which the court entered judgment pro
forma in favor of the defendant. The cause was then brought
by writ of error before the United States circuit court for the
district aforesaid, which affirmed the said judgment; whereupon it was carried by writ of error before the Supreme
Court.
The judgment of the court below was for the largest sum
awarded by the jury in their alternative findings, and embraced an allowance of" military land-warrant fees exceeding
$2,500 per year, including commissions on cash sales of public lands," and also an allowaQce of ''commissions on sales of
Indian trust lands exceeding the sum of $2,500, for each sale
·of said lands."
The Supreme Court held tha,t the defendant, as receiver of
public moneys, was not entitled to the military bounty land
fees received by him during his term of office, over and above
the amount required, with his commissions on cash sales of
public lands, to make up his annual salary of $2,500 per
year; but that he was entitled to commissions on sales of
Indian trust lands in addition to his compensation as such
receiver of public moneys, that by express provisions in the
treaties the expenses incurred by the United States in making the sales were to be paid from the proceeds, which clearly
· implied the payment of a reasonable compensation for the
services of those employed to carry the trust into effect.
Among other facts found in the special verdict was the following : "That for the labor and risk of making sales of
Indian trust lands 1 per cent. commissions on the amount
of such sales is a fair compensation." Adopting this as the
sole basis for computing defendant's compensation, the jury
(in an alternative finding different from the one on which the
judgment below was rendered) found a certain balance due
him for that service.
The judgment of the court below was reversed, and the
cause remanded with directions to enter another judgment in
favor of the defendant for the balance so found.
In so far as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of United States v. Brindle relates to the matter of compensation for making sales of Indian trust lands, thePe is no conllict whatever between it and the decision of the Secretary
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of the Interior hereinbefore mentioned on any question of
law. On a question of fact which was directly involved,
namely, what is a fair compensation for such service, there
is a di:ffe!'ence between the determination of the Secretary
and the finding of the jury. Yet, as it was not for the court
to find the facts (nor did it assume to do so), but only to declare the law on the facts found by the jury, so its decision,
being of necessity confined to the facts thus found, cannot
properly be regarded as in itself conflicting with the determination of the Secretary just referred to. Therefore, if any
ground exists in that case for re·opening the accounts of
claimants, it is to be found in the special verdict of the jury,
not in the decision of the court.
It h~s been held that when an account has once been duly
adjusted, settled, and closed by the proper officers, upon a
:flull knowledge of all the facts, and no errors of calculation
have been made, such account can not be reopened in the ab·
sence of statutory authority (12 Opin., 386; see also 3 Opin.,
148, 461), and administrative practice has accorded with that
view. On this subject Attorney-General Grundy observed:
"It is undoubtedly a good general principle of law, as well as
of expediency, not to say absolute necessity, that the accounting officers, as well as all other responsible executive officers,
shoultl, as far as possible, refrain from disturbing, unsettling, ·
or reversing any of the official determinations of their predecessors; and if in the observance and preservation of this
wholesome general rule, injustice shall be done to any person,
it will be far better for the aggrieved individual to seek redress at the hands of Congress, than to place the whole past
transactions of the accounting ·officers in an unsettled condition. By which means, not only would great, and perhaps
inextricable, confusion be introduced into the transactions of
these officers, but in the resettlement of accounts might
great injustice be done in many cases, to individuals as wen
as to the Government." (3 Opin., 462.) Indeed there is no
rule more firmly and thoroughly settled in the administration
of the Government than this. (Ex parte Randolph, 2 Brock.,
473; United State8 v. Bank, etc., 15 Peters, 401; 9 Opin., 412;
Swift Company v. United States, 105 U. S. 694, 6H5.)
From these considerations, it must follow that the mere
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that the finding of the jury difl'ers from the
previous determination of the Secretary of the Interior, upon
the question of what was a fair compensation for the service
of selling the Indian trust lands, is not sufficient ground to
authorize the reopening of an account settled in accordance
with such determination, with a view to a readjustment of it
in accordance with such finding; and no other ground is
presented by the special verdict.
In this connection, I remark that there is no statute from
which such authority can be derived. The provisions of the
act of August 7, 1882, entitled "an act to authorize the auditing of certain unpaid claims against the Indian Bureau
by the accounting officers of the '.rreasury ," do not extend to
the opening of settled accounts.
The result at which I arrive is that no valid ground exists
for reopening the accounts of the claimants; in view of which
I am of the opinion that no action whatever should be taken
on their claims by the Executive Departments without legislation by Congress providing therefor. Agreeably to this
opinion, the first and second of the questions submitted must
be answered in the negative.
And I beg leave to say, that although there are additional
papers before me touching this case, since I considered it on
5th May last, yet they do not in the least change the legal
.aspect of the matter, but they do rivet the conclusion I then
reached, somewhat doubtingly, on the imperfect record
presented.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
CASE OF LIEUT. S. C. ROBERTSON.
This case reconsidered in the light of new and material facts; and it
appearing that there has been no such settlement of his account as
was heretofore supposed: Held, that Lieutenant R. is bound to refund
the sum which has been paid him without authority of law.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 7, 1885.
I have reconsidered the case of Lieut. S.C. Robertson
in the light of the new facts appearing in the letter to you
SIR:
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from the Second Comptroller of the 27th April, ultimo, and
by your reference now before me.
My opinion of the 22d April, ultimo, proceeded on what
turns out to have been a mistaken inference from the·
Second Comptroller's letter of the lOth .April, ultimo, then
before me, by your reference, that there had been a settlement between Lieutenant Robertson and the accounting
officers of the Government, touching the alleged unauthorized
payment to him of waiting-orders pay for a period when he
was only entitled to leave-of-absence pay. It appearing that
there has been no such settlement, the whole matter is at
large, and Lieutenant Robertson is bound to refund the sum
of $281.25, which has been paid him without authority of
law.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF 1'HE TREASURY.

SHEYENNE ISLAND, MISSOURI RIVER.
I

At the date of the Sioux treaty of April 29, 1868, Sheyenne ll'lland was.
within the reservation thereby established, the east line of which was
the east bank of the Missouri River at low-water mark. The island
having since gradually become attached to the mainland on the east
bank of the river, so that it is wholly surrounded by water only in
seasons when the water is high, t.h e low-water mark is now on the
west side of the island instead of the east side as formerly: Held that
the island is still a part of the reservation, notwithstanding the abandonment of its former channel on the east side of the same; whether
the island now belongs to the reservation being determinable by the line
of low-water mark on the east bank of the Missouri, not according to
the present course of that river, but according to its course at the date
of the treaty.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 14, 1885.
SIR: I have considered the question proposed by the Hon.
H. L. Muldrow, Acting Secretary of the Interior, in a letterto me dated the 27th ultimo, which bas arisen upon the following case stated by the Commissioner of ~ndian Affairs in
a communication dated tbe 25th ultimo:
''It appears that at the date of the Sioux treaty of April29,
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1868 (15 Stat. 635), a certain island in the Missouri River,

situate about 3 miles south of the mouth of Sheyenne River,
and known as Sheyenne Island, was within the boundary
lines of the reservation thereby set apart for the absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians, parties to
said treaty, and for such other Indians as they might be
willing to admit amongst them. The east bank of the Missouri River at low-water mark, from the forty-sixth parallel
of north latitude to~ point opposite where the north line of
Nebraska strikes the river, was, by the terms of the treaty,
to constitute the east line of the reservation. At the date of
the treaty, Sheyenne Island was, at all stages of the river,
entirely surrounded by water, the low-water mark of the
river being east of the island, and until quite recently it has
never been disputed that the island belonged to the reservation. But it appears that the island has gradually become
attached to the mainland on the east bank of the river, so
that it is wholly surrounded by water only in seasons when the
river is high. The low-water mark is now found to be on the
west side of the island instead of the east side, as formerly."
The question proposed is, "whether the island is still a
part of the reservation or whether it has become a part of
the public domain."
·
·
In reply thereto I now have the honor to submit, that, as
the island formed a part of the reservation at the time the
boundaries of the latter were established, it must still be
deemed to be a part thereof, notwithstanding the· fact that
subsequently the river has so far abandoned the channel on
the east side of the island that its waters flow there " only
in seasons when the river is high." In other words, whether
the island now belongs to the reservation is determinable by
the line of low-water mark on the east bank of the Missouri,
not according to the present course of that river, but according to its course at the date of the treaty. The principle applicable here is the same that applies where a river, which
has been made the boundary between two nations, afterwards
abandons its bed and forms a new one in a different direction ; in such case the old bed continues to serve as the
boundary. . (Bluntschli, Droit International, sec. ~99; Heft:
ter, sec. 66.) This principle was adopted and applied by the
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Suvreme Court in the case of Missouri v. Kentucky(ll Wall.,
395, 401), in deciding as to which of those States Wolf lsland
belonged.
If, instead of being included in the reservation, the island
had been embraced by a grant to an individual, the bounda·
ries whereof extended to low-water mark on the east bank
of the Missouri, it would hardly be contended that his ownership of the island became extinguished, and that it became
reunited to the public domain on the s bsequent abandonment by the river of the channel between the island and said
. bank. Such a proposition is countenanced by no rule of law.
Obviously the hypothetical case of the grant, as above, does
not differ essentially from the actual case of the reservation.
Therefore, in my opinion, the island in question is still a
part ofthe Sioux Reservation.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

SPECIAL AGENTS-INDEPENDENT TREASURY.
The appropriation for "contingent expenses, independent treasury," is
not applicable to the payment of expenses of special agents of the
Treasury employed to investigate the affairs of sub-treasurers.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 14, 1885.
SIR: Your communication of the lOth instant, with a statement~ has been received, and the matter has been duly considered. The question that you desire my opinion upon arises
upon the following state of facts:
The Secretary of the Treasury found it necessary, in May
and June, 1885, to send a party of experts to New Orleans to
make an examination or investigation of the affairs of the
sub treasury in that city. The. examination was made necessary on account of the absconding of the redemption clerk
of that office, and the default of a considerable amount. On
their way back from New Orleans the experts stopped at St.
Louis, Chicago, and Cincinnati and examined the sub-treasuries in those cities.
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The expenses incurred in making these examinations
amounted to several hundred dollars more than the balance
remaining to the credit of the appropriation, "Salaries of
special agents, independent treasury, 188.5," from which such
expenses are properly and usually paid. The only other
available appropriation at all applicable, it would seem, is
"Contingent expenses, independent treasury, 1885."
Question: Can the expenses be paid from the latter-named
appropriation~ The First Comptrol~er holds that they cannot.
The first appropriation is: "Salaries of special agents, independent treasury. Compensation of special agents to examine the books, accounts, and money on hand at the several
sub-treasuries anu depositaries, including national banks
acting as depositaries, under the act of August 6, 1846."
The second appropriation is: "Contingent Expenses Independent Treasury. Contingent expenses under the act of
August 6, 1846, for the collection, safe-keeping, transfer, and
disbursement of the public money, and for transportation
of notes, bonds, and other securities of the United States."
The expenses incurred about which inquiry is made were
for examining books, accountA, etc., of "several sub-treasuries;" and not for "collection, safe-keeping, transfer, and
disbursement of the public money," nor for transportation of
national securities.
The " salary" appropri.ation is for the examination of subtreasuries, and the sum appropriated is all that Congress
.s aw fit to give for that specific purpose, and this expression
of their will excludes the inclusion of all other expenses.
It is not seen how the contingent appl'opriation is at all
applicable or available.
The conclusion is that if services have been rendered under
the salary appropriation beyond the amount appropriated
for, unintent.i onally, it is a deficiency for which Congress
may be asked to appropriate, and I do not see how otherwise, under the law, its payment can be provided for.
Very respectfully,
.A.. H. G ARL.A.ND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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AMERICAN SHIPPING.
Foreign-built vessels owned by citizens of the United States are not
within the provisions of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, forbidding the collection of fees by consular officers from American vessels.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 20, 1885.
SIR : In answer to your letter of July 16, 1885, asking my
attention to letters from the Department of State dated December 30, 1884, February 2 and 28, 1885, relative to the
question of the collection of consular fees from foreign-built
vessels owned by citizens of the United States, I beg leave
to refer to the opinion of my predecessor, dated February 5,
1885.
Vessels not built in the United States owned by citizens
of the United States are recognized by the statutes of the
United States as a class of sea going vessels. They are the
property of American citizens, entitled to bear the flag and
receive the protection of the Government. (6 Opin., 638; 16
ib., 533; Consular Reg. (1881), sec. 344.) But with the exceptions made in the statute they are not "vessels of the United
States." (Rev. Stat., sees. 4132-4133.) Are they "American
vessels" within the meaning of the twelfth section of the act1
chapter 121, approved June 26, 1884 ¥
A careful examination of the statutes convinces me that
the expressions" vessel or ship of the United States,"" American vessel of the United States," and "American vessels" are
used synonymously and apply only to regularly documented
vessels. And in the Revised Consula.r Regulations (1881),
section 200, for the purpose of those regulations the terms
"American vessel" and "vessel of the United States" are
declared synonymous. In both statutes and regulations are
many provisions relative to foreign-built ships owned by
American citizens and the designation is in that distinctive
language. In the statute, the twelfth section of which is
under consideration, both terms," vessel of the United States"
and ''American vessel" are used, and in view of the previous
statutes and regulations must be considered, I think, as used
interchangeably.
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I conclude, therefore, that foreign- built vessels owned by
citizens of the United States are not embraced in the provisions of the act of 1884, forbidding the collection of fees by
consular officers from American vessels.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

LEASE OF INDIAN LANDS FOR GRAZING PURPOSES.
There is no law empowering the Interior Department to authorize Indians to lease their lands for grazing purposes.
Neither the President nor the Secretary of the Iut,erior has authority to
make a lease, for such purposes, of any part of an Indian reservation ;
nor would their approval of any such lease made by Indians render it
lawful and valid.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 21, 1885.
By your letter of the 8th instant, inclosing a communication fr~m the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 7th,
the following questions are at his suggestion submitted to me
with request for an opinion thereon:
"Whether there is any law empowering the Interior Department to authorize Indians to enter into contract with
any parties for the lease of Indian lands for grazing purposes;
and also whet,her the President or the Interior Department
has any authority to mal\e a lease for grazing purposes of
any part of any Indian reservation, or whether the approval
by the President or the Secretary of the Interior would render any such lease made by Indians with other parties lawful and valid."
These questions are propounded with reference to certain
Indian reservations, namely :
(1) The Cherokee lands in the Indian Territory west of the
ninety-sixth degree of longitude, except such parts thereof
as have heretofore been appropriated for and conveyed to
friendly tribes of Indians.
(2) The Cheyenne and Arapahoe reservation in the Indian
Territory.
SIR:
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(3) The Kiowa and Comanche reservation in the Indian
Territory.
Our Government has ever claimed the right, and from a
very early period its settled policy has been, to regulate and
control the alienation or other disposition by Indians, and
especially by Indiau nations or tribes, of their lands. This
policy was originally adopted in view of their peculiar character and habits, which rendered them incapable of sustaining any other relation with the whites than that of dependence and pupilage. There was no other way of dealing with
them than that of keeping them separate, subordinate, and
dependent, with a guanlian care thrown around them for
their protection. · (3Kent Com., 381; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95
U.S., 517, where most of the cases on this subject are cited
and discussed.)
Thus in 1783 the Congress of the Confederation, by a proclamation, prohib~ted '' all persons from making settlements
on lands inhabited or claimed by Indians, without the limits
or jurisdiction of any particular State, and from purchasing
or receiving any gift or cession of such lands or claims without the express authority and directions of the United States
in Congress assembled," and declared "that every such purchase or settlement, gift, or cession, not having the authority
aforesaid, is null and void, and that no right or title will accrue in consequence of any such purchase, gift, cession, or
settlement." By section 4 of the act of July 22, 1790, chapter 33, the Congress of the United States enacted "that no
sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of
Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any State, whether having the right of
pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be
made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under
the authority of the United States." A similar provision was
again enacted in section 8 of the act of March 1, 1793, chapter 19, which by its tc:Lms included "any purchase or grant
of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indians, or
nation or tribe of Indians within the bounds of the United
States." The pro·dsion was farther extended by section 12
of the act of May 19, 1796, chapter 30, so as to embrace any
"purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of
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any title or claim thereto." As thus extended, it was reenacted by the act of March 3, 1799, chapter 46, section 12,
and also by the act of March 30~ :1802, chapter 30, section 12.
In the above legislation, the provision in terms appliC3d to
purchases, grants, leases, etc., from individual Indians as well
as from Indian tribes or nations; but by the twelfth section
of the act of June 30, 1834, chapter 161, it was limited to such
as emanate ''from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians."
And the provision of the. act of 1834, just referred to, has
been reproduced in section 2116, l~evised Statutes, w_hich is
now in force.
The last· named section declares : "No purchase, grant,
lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Inqian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be
of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by
treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution."
This statutory provision is very general and comprehensive. Its operation does not depend upon the nature or
extent of the title to the land which the tribe or nation may
hold. Whether such title be a fee simple, or a right of occupancy merely, is not material ; in either case the statute
applies. It is not therefore deemed necessary or important,
in connection with the subject under consideration, to inquire
into the particular right or title to the above-mentioned
reservations held by the Indian tribes or nations respectively
which claim them. Whatever the right or title may be, each
of these tribes or nations is precluded~ by the force and
effect of the statute, from either alienating or leasing any
part of its reservation, or imparting any interest or claim in
or to the same, without the consent of the Government of the
United States. A lease of the land for grazing purposes is
as clearly within the statute as a lease for any other or for
general purposes, and the duration of the term is immaterial.
One who enters with cattle or other live stock upon an Indian
reservation under a lease of that description, made in violation of the statute, is an intn1der, and may be removed therefrom as such, notwithstanding his entry is with consent of
the tribe. Such consent may t~xempt him from the penalty
imposed by section 2117, Revised Statutes, for taking his stock
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there, but it can not. validate the lease, or confer upon him
any legal right whatsoever to remain upon the land; and
to this extent and no further was the decision of Judge
Brewer in United States v. Hunter, 21 Fed. Rep., 615.
But the present inquiry in substance is, (1) whether the Department of the Inter~or can authorize these Indians to make
leases of their lands for grazing purposes, or whether the approval of such leases by the President or the Secretary of the
Interior would make them lawful and valid; (2) whether the
President or the Department of the Interior has auth<?rity to
lease for such purposes any part of an Indian reservation.
I submit that the power of the Department to authorize
such leases to be made, or that of the President or Secretary
to approve or to make the same, if it exists at all, must rest
upon some law, and therefore be derived from either a treaty
or a statutory provision. I am not aware of any treaty provision applicable to the particular reservations in question
that confers such powers. The Revised Statutes contain
provisions regulating contracts or agreements with Indians
and prescribing how they shall be executed and approved
(see sec. 2103) ; bu.t those provisions do not include contracts
of the character described in section 2116, hereinbefore mentioned. No general power appears to be conferred by statute
upon either the President or Secretary, or any other officer
of the Government, to make, authorize, or approve leases of
lands held by Indian tribes; and the absence of such power
was doubtless one of the main considerations which led to
tbe adoption of the act of February 19, 1875, chapter 90," to
authorize the Seneca Nation of New York Indians to lease
lands within the Cattaraugus and Allegany Reservations
and to confirm existing leases." The act just cited is moreover significant as showing that in the view of Congress
Indian tribes cannot lease their reservations without the
authority of some law of the United States.
In my opinion, therefore, each of the questions proposed in
your letter should be answered in the negative, and I so answer them.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRE1'ARY OF THE INTERIOR.

,.
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IMMIGRANT ACT.
Where it appeared. th:1t an immigrant from a foreign State was convicted
of an offense there, sentenced to imprisonment, and after having served
a portion of his sentence was given an unconditional pardon: Held
that section 4'of the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, and section 5
of the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 141, do not forbid his landing in
the United States.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 23, 1885.
SIR: Your letter of the 20th instant bas been received, in
which you inquire whether section 4 of the act approved Au~
gust 3, 1882, and section5 of the act approved March 3, 1875,
relating to foreign immigration, forbids the landing in the ·
United States of the immigrant .F. A. H. Behncke, the circumstances attending whose arrival at New York City are
detailed in the papers forwarded by you and which are herewith returned.
The facts disclose that he was guilty of embezzlement,
sentenced to imprisonment, served a portion of the sentence,
.and was pardoned.
The turning point in the case is whether or not Behncke
was pardoned upon condition of emigration. A doubt may
arrise from his own statement. The officials at New York
apparently do not ~ntertain this doubt, but agree in the
statement that his case does not fall within the clauses prohibiting immigration.
If his papers were examined and passed upon officially by
the United States consul at Bremen, it is presumptive evidence that his pardon was unconditional, as he asserts, as
the fact would be notorious. Such presumption is borne
out by the additional supposition that the Government would
not pardon a man whose offense was simply embezzlement in
order to get him out of the country, such conditional pardons being usually granted in cases of a higher grade of
crimmals, whose presence in the country would be a menace
to the constituted authorities.
The pardon for an offense committed here would relieve
him of the act and its consequences-in fact, would, in legal
contemplation, blot out the ofi'ense (Knote v. United States,
95 U.S., 153; United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 542; Ex-
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parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333); and like effect must be gi\en
to the pardon by a foreign State of an qffense within its jurisdiction. (Wharton Conti. Laws, sec. 831; Bar International Law, 684, 692-693.)
The recognition of a pardon pronounced abroad is founded
upon consideration of the general security of intercourset
and would lead to a liberal application of the statute in this
case. This view, if not in conflict with other evidence not
yet presented, indicates that Mr. Behncke should be permitted to land.
The desirA expressed by you to have a rule stated in
this case which shall be a standard for application to similar cases is, perhaps, onA that can not be met by general
statement. Similar cases must be governed to a large extent by the circumstances attending them, and are matters
for your official discretion.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE rREASURY.

CONTRACT WITH JOHN ROACH.
Opinion of June 30, 1885, touching the contract with Mr. John Roach for
building the Dolphin (ante, p. 207), reaffirmed.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July ~8, 1885.
SIR: I have c<1nsidered with much care the law and the
contracts in reference to the building of certain vessels undertaken by Mr. John Roach, which you were kind enough
to send me on last Saturday for my examination. Considering these matters in connection with the conversation we had
respecting some settlement with Mr. Roach, I have this to
say: that in the opinion I have already gi\en you touching
the Dolphin the principle is laid down that the law providing
for the building of that and the other vessels is the basis, and
the only basis, upon which the contract to build them could
be rested. That is the chart by which these matters are to
be examined and finally determined, both as to the Government and as to the contractor. If the contract is a bad one,
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or an improvident one, or amounts to no contract in law, it
is to be regretted, of course; but the consequences are not
for this Department nor for the Navy Department to consider,
unless, possibly, in interpreting a doubtful statute.
There was no doubt in my mind, nor is there now, as to the
exposition I gave you in that opinion of the law and the supposed contract under it. With the consequences of that decision, of course, I was not concerned, and could not be, as a
public official. There is nothing left, in my judgment, but a
following of that law and a strict enforcement of it. Gener-ally there is no power in a Department to compromise differences arising in the execution of contracts, and in the absence
of a clear conferring of such power the Department could not
exercise it. The law in this case leaves no margin, as I view
it, for the exercise of any such power, or for the adjustment
of these matters upon "business principles" as between individuals. Individuals, dealing with their own afl'airs, of
course, can change their contrac~s and make them more or
less elastic, to suit their convenience. In these particular
matters Mr. Roach might yield certain advantages, but I do
not see how the Navy Department, acting under a law for a
spedfic purpose, can do anything of the sort to bind the Government. It would be a responsibility that your Department
would assume which Congress might approve, but Congress.
failing to approve it would leave the Department in a very
awkward attitude regarding these subjects.
Therefore I do not see that there is any room for a conference between yourself and :Mr. Roach (or his assignees) looking to any adjustment of these matters, only as indicated by
the opinion I have already given in the case of the Dolphin.
The only remedy is the enforcement of .the law as therein
indicated. You might yourself see every propriety and
every advantage to the Government, in recognizing any and
all of these contracts, and in yielding certain things in them,
if you had the power; but not having the power, whatever
the advantage might be to the Government, you cannot well
enter into an adjustment with Mr. Roach, or his assignees,
outside of the course indicated by the opinion referred to.
Of course that opinion is broad and far-reaching; but not
more so than the inquiry and the subject matters of it justi273-VOL XVIII--16
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fied; and if that be the state of tile law, as I am persuaded
it is, it is not your fault nor mine that Mr. Roach is injured,
or that the Government is injured or embarrassed.
In this view of the subject, a conference between yourself,
as Secretary of the Navy, and myself, as Attorney-General,
and the assignees of Mr. Roach, would be unnecessary, as I
could not give any opinion looking in the least to any deviation or relaxation of the law upon which these contracts are
supposed to be based. Of course, if upon any point or points
arising upon this law, or the supposed contracts under it,
the Navy Department should desire an opinion from me, it
would be most cheerfully and readily given; but it occurs
to me that in the opinion I have heretofore rendered to you
the question is pretty well settled, so far as the Dolphin is
concerned, and also in regard to the other vessels, as far as
the facts respecting them are the same with those in the
Dolphin case.
I retutn with this the two books that you sent me.
Very respectfully, ·
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

INDIAN CONTRACT.
Upon the facts of the case as presented: Advised, that the contract relating to certain coal mines at Savanna, Choctaw Nation, between
Mrs. A. G. Ream and her husband and the Atoka Coal Mining Company,
dated Novem her 3, lti~3, be considered as in full force for the period
for which it was executed and approved by the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs and Secretary of the Interior.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
July 29, 1885.
SIR: Your communication to me of the 9th instant, through
the Acting Secretary of the Interior, Hon. H. L. Muldrow,
touching the matter of certain coal mines at Savanna, Choctaw Nation, Indian Territory, has been received and duly
considered. The question propounded to me by such communication is: Ought the contract, execntPd Novemher 8,
1883, between Mrs. A. G. Ream and Robert L. Ream, jr.,
/
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her husband, and the Atoka Coal and :Mining Company, to
be considered as in full force for the period for which it was
executed, and approved by the office of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, notwithstanding the decision of the
supreme court of the Choctaw Nation~
From the record before me it appears that a suit was pending between certain parties in reference to these coal mines,
in the courts of the Choctaw Nation, through the years of
1881-'84, inclusive. During this time the contract referred
to, in fa\or of Mrs. Ream (that is, the one dated November
8, 1883), was executed, and it was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior
in due form of law. It does not appear that this agreement
was before the court of the Choctaw Nation in any manner;
in fact, the papers which I have are silent as to this fact.
It is a presumption universally indulged til at the Executive
Departments, in the transaction of business, act according to
law; and this presumption is particularly strong when one
Department is passing upon and considering the action of
another Department. It is therefore to be concluded that
the Department of the Interior, in ratifying and approving
this contract of November 8, 1883, did what the law authorized to be done ; and I have nothing before me to rebut that
conclusion.
This contract was either before the court of the Choctaw
Nation or it was not. If it was before that court, very strong
and cogent reasons should be furnished why that court ignored or set it aside; and no reasons of any kind appear in
the papers submitted to me. If it was not before that court,
any action by that court, nullifying or avoiding it, would
amount to nothing. So, in either view of the case, I find
nothing to justify the Department in rejecting or canceling
that agreement; and therefore the question propounded to
me is answered in the affirmative.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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CONSTRUCTION OF VESSELS FOR THE NAVY.
Whue a statute authorizes the building of vessels by the Navy Department, but makes no provision for procuring the necessary plans and
specifications therefor, it is to be construed as impliedly authorizing
the head of the Department to procure such plans and specifications
in the mode and manner which he shall deem best.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 30, 1885.
SIR: Touching the question which you submitted to the

Cabinet the other day, aml more particularly to myself, as to
your power or authority to provide for and procure plan~
and specifications, in your own way, for the building of certain vessels by the Navy Department, I wish to say, that
after full examination of it I am not able to find, in any of
the laws as to these vessels, any provision for procuring
plans and specifications, nor do I find in any of the laws prescribing the duties of different officers of your Department
anything providing for the procuring of these plans and
specifications.
Usually, as a general rule, such provision is made in the
laws providing for the building of cruisers or vessels. In the
absence of any provisions of this sort, the power delegated
to you to build vessels would take with it the right to execute that power in the mode and manner you should deem
best. Judge Curtis states the general proposition in these
words: "When it comes to a.question whether a power exists,
the parti<mlar mode in which it may be exercised must be left
to the will of the body (or person) that possesses it;" and he
quotes from Chief-Justice Marshall to sustain this position.
(2 Life and Writings of B. R. Curtis, 374.) Similar views,
conveying the same idea, are to be found in 1 Story on the
Constitution, by Cooley, pp. 430, 431; 2 ib., 1211.
As plans and specifications are necessary to insure the
building of vessels, to accomplish the purpose for which they
are to be used, it would follow as a matter of course that the
power to build these vessels, given you by the law, would
carry, without any expressions to that effect, the authority
to procure the plans and specifications, as you see proper.
The proposition could be stated in different ways, and
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could be illustrated by many citations, but I deem it unnecessary; and conclude, that you have this authority, beyond
any doubt.
Very respectfully,
\
...£\.. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

CIVIL SERVICE.
The act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, to regulate and improve the
civil service of the United States, repeals by implication section 164,
Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
August 1, 1885.

SIR: Your communication of yesterday submits to me this
question : Is section 164 of the Revised Statutes repealed or
abrogated by the provisions of the act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States, approved January 16, 1883 (chap. 27, Stat. L., vol. 22, p. 403.).
Section-164 of the Revised Statutes provides a certain manner for the examination and the appointment of clerks specified in section 163, which says that clerks in the Departments
shall be arranged in four classes, distinguished as the first,
.second, third, and fourth classes. Hence it seems that section 164 has reference entirely to the clerks named in section
163. The act to regulate and improve the ci vii s·ervice of the
United States, famiiiarly called "the civil service act," seems
to deal w!th the entire subject that section 164 referred to. It
is true there is no repeal, in so many words, of section 164, by
the" civil service act;" but under that rule which recognizes
that a statute that undertakes to provide for an entire subject-matter repeals all former laws or statutes upon that subject, it would seem that section 164 is repealed by the "civil
service act." It was certainly the intention of Congress to
make a new law upon this subject to embrace all that was in-tended under section 164, and to repeal all other laws on the
subject. (Murdock v. Oity of Memphis, 20 Wallace, 617.)
Then another rule somewhat similar, but of a little wider
.scope, is this: When there are two acts of Congress on the
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same subject, and the later embraces what is contained in
the first, and also new provisions, the later act operates, without any repealing clause, as a repeal of the first. ( Un-itt1d
States v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 88, et seq.)
It can not be supposed that Congress intended these two
different modes of procedure to be pursued, when it undertook, in the later act, to regulate this very subject as a part
of the civil service. The two are entirely inconsistent, and
both can not stand; and the later must prevail.
I must conclude, therefore, that section 164 is as completely
repealed as if repealing words had been incorporated in theact of January 16, 1883.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

INTERNAl~

REVENUE.

Where the holders of distilled spirits, bonded for exportation, shall have,
failed within the seven months specified in the bond (given under the
regulations of internal revenue circular No. 282) to withdraw such
spirits in fact from the distillery warehouse, a forfeiture of the bond
follows, and the spirits are not protected from the domestic tax,
Upon application of the principal and sureties on such bond, and forgood cause shown, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, under
existing regulations, extend the time named in the bond beyond seven.
months.
·
The spirits covered by an exportation bond, after the failure to withdraw them and after the forfeiture of the bond, are liable to distraint.
under the act of May 28, 1880, chapter 108.
The condition of the bond having been broken by the failure to withdraw the spirits, the Government may also proceed upon the bond.

DEP.A.R'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

•

August 5, 1885•
Sm : I make the following extract from your letter of the
28th ultimo :
"Under the provisions of section 3330, Revised Statutes,
the act of June 9,1874, amendatory thereof (l8 Stat., 64), the·
holders of distilled spirits on which the tax has not been
paid are allowed to export them in bond or transport them
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in hond to a port of export for exportation;" and then you
ask for an opinion on three questions.
Answer to the first quebtion: In the event that holders or
owners of such spirits shall have failed within the seven
months specified in the bond (given under the regulations of
the internal revenue cJrcular No. 282) to withdraw them in
fact from the distillery warehouse, a forfeiture of the bond
follows, 'and the spirits are not protected thereafter from an
obligation for a domestic tax. The effect of the bond while
in force and before forfeiture is to free the spirits from such
obligation, but this effect ceases upon the forfeiture of the
bond. Any other construction, it is respectfully submitted,
would be an evasion of the statute. (Meredith v. United
States, 13 Peters, 486.)
The Commissioner Qf Internal Revenue, with the assent of
the Secretary of the Treasury, by circular No. 282, above referred to, has already provided for the assessment of spirits,
covered by transportation or exportation bond, when they
have not been withdrawn from the warehouse within the
time named in the bond for the delivery at the port from
which they are to be exported, and I see no sufficient reason
for disturbing this regulation.
Upon the application of the principal and sureties on such
bond and for good cause shown, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue may, under existing regulations, extend the time
named in the bond beyond seven months. If the bond should
become forfeited, and the time should not be extended as
above indicated, the presumption would arise that the intention to export had been abandoned, and the Government
should assess the taxes due upon the spirits and take 1:?teps
to eollect the same with interest as provided by circular 282.
Second. I am of opinion that the spirits covered by exportation bond after the failure to withdraw them, and after the
forfeiture of the bond, are liable to distraint, up.der provisions
of section 4 of the act of May 28, 1880. (21 Stat., 145, 146.)
Third. I answer that the condition of the bond having
been broken by the failure to withdraw the spirits from the
warehouse, the right of the Government to proceed upon the
bond is unquestioned. At the same time, of course, the tax
can be collected by distraint, and as the latter mode is most
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expeditious, it would be advisable to resort to it first. (16
Opin., 634, 635.)
It is to be said, as a general rule in matters of this kind,
that the construction of these statutes must be such as is
most favorable to their enforcement. There is no liberal
interpretation in favor of the individual to be indulged in;
but, as statutes for the accomplishment of great public purposes, they must be construed in a manner to reach those
purposes, and to carry out the intention of the legislature in
passing them. (Taylor v. United States, 3 Howard, 210; Oli·
quot's Champagne, 3 Wall., 114; United States v. Hodson,
10 Wall., 406; Smythe v. Fiske, 21 Wall., 380.) As a rule deducible from these decisions, the Government loses none of
its remedies to collect its revenue or debt unless there is
an express repeal or abrogation of some existing remedy.
This is discussed in the opinion of my predecessor already referred to. (16 Opin., supra. See also United States v. Herron, 20 Wall., 251; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19
ib., 227 ; 13 Peters, supra.)
In view of these authorities, I feel that there is no doubt
as to the correctness of the answers given above to your letter of the 28th ultimo.
Very respectfully,

A. H. GAHLAND.
The SECRETARY

OF

THE TREASURY.

MAIL TRANSPORTATION.
The authority to make contracts for carryi~g the mail between ports of
the United States and foreign ports, given by section 4007, Revised
Statutes, is limited by section 4009, Revised Statutes, with respect to
the amount of compensation; so that in such contracts under the
former section no greater compensation can be allowed to American
steam-ship lines than the sea and inland postage npon the mail transported.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
A ug·ust 7, 1885.
SIR : By your letter of the 1st instant my attention is
called to sections 4007 and 4009, Revised Statutes, with a
request for an opinion upon the question whether the authorOF
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ity to make contracts under the former section is limited by
the latter upon the point of compensation; in other words,
whether in making contracts, after advertisement, under section 4007, you are at liberty to award to American steam ship
lines a greater compensation than the sea and inland postage
upon the mail transported.
In response to this request, I have the honor to state that,
upon examination of those sections, I reach the conclusion
that section 4009 was intended to limit, "upon the point of
.compensation," the authority conferred by section 4007. This
view appears to me to be not only in harmony with the language employed in those sections, but to be greatly strength~ned by a reference to the statutes on the subject of foreign
mail transportation which were the subjects of revision.
Those sections embody provisions which originated with
the acts of March 3, 1845, chapter 69, and June 14, 1858,
chapter 164. The act of 1845 gave the Postmaster-General
.authority " to contract for the transportation of the United
States mail between any of the ports of the United States
and a port or ports of any foreign power whenever, in his
opinion, the public interest will thereby be promoted." It
prescribed no limitation in regard to the amount of compensation to be allowed for such transportation. The act of
1858, however, restricted the authority of the PostmasterGeneral in that regard (see sections 4 and 5). The fifth section of the last-mentioned act authorized him to allow for
~uch transportation, if by an American vessel, the sea and
United States inland postage? and if by a foreign vessel, the
sea postage only on the mails conveyed. The provisions of
this section were re-enacted by section 4 of the act of June 15,
1860, chapter 131, and extended so as to include transportation between ports of the 0 nited States, touching at a foreigu
port. By section 9 of the act of March 3, 1865, chapter 89,
the fourth section of the act of 1860, just mentioned, was so
modified that the compensation for transporting the mails
between the United States and any foreign port, or between
ports of the United States, touching at a foreign port, was
limited to " any sum not exceeding the sea and United States
inland postage," or" any sum not exceeding the sea postage,"
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on the mails conveyed, according as the serfice should be
performed by an American or by a foreign vessel.
This legislation, including the provision in the act of 1845t
above referred to, was subsequently embodied without material alteration in sections 267 and 269 of the act of June 8t
1872, entitled "An act to revise, consolidate, and amend the
statutes relating to the Post-Office Department;" and as the
law now stood it is very clear that the Postmaster-General,.
in contracting with American steam-ship lines for the transportation of the mail between the United States and foreign
ports, could not allow a greater compensation for such service than the sea and inland postage upon the mail transported.
Sections 267 and 269 of the act of 1872 were adopted without change in the Revised Statutes, becoming sections 4007
and 4009 thereof; so that no modification of the law was
effected by the· revision touching the subject of compensation
for foreign mail transportation. On examining section 5 of
the act of May 17, 1878, chapter 107, to which my attention
is also called in connection with that subject, I ~erceive nothing therein which alters the law as contained in the sections
of the Revised Statutes above mentioned upon that point"
I am therefore of the opinion that the authority to contract
for such transportation, given the Postmaster-General by
section 4007, is limited by section 4009 with respect to the
matter of compensation, just as if section 4009 were a part
of section 4007, and followed as such in immediate connection
after the word promoted, as it might very well have done.
I add that, as the s~ope of your inquiry seems to be limited
to the construction of those sections, I have in the foregoing
confined myself to them, and not considered the effect of
recent legislation upon the authority of the Postmaster-General to contract for the transportation of foreign mails. I
refer here to a clause in the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 342.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
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l<'EES OF PENSION AGENTS.

The provision of section 4769 Revised Statutes authorizing pension agents
to deduct from the fees of attorneys in each pension case 30 cents, in
payment of the services of the former for forwarding the same, is repealed by the act of June 14, 1878, chapter 188.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

A 1tgust 10, 1885.
SIR : In compliance with your request of August 4, 1885,
for an opinion in reference to the deduction of 30 cents by
pension agents from the fees of attorneys in pension cases, I
have the honor to submit the following:
By section 4769, Revised Statutes, the sum of 30 cents wat\
deducted from the fees of the attorneys or agents prosecuting each pension case, by the pension agent, in payment of
his services in forwarding the same.
By the . act approved June 14, 1878, it is provided that
from and after July 1, 1878, agents for the payment of pensions shall, in lieu of the pereentage, fees, pay, and allowances
now allowed by law, be allowed compensation for their services, postage, vouchers and checks sent the pensioners, and
aU the expense of their offices: first, a salary at the rate of
$4,000 per annum; second, $15 for each hundred vouchers,
or at that rate for a fraction of one hundred, prepared and
paid by the agent in excess of 4,000 vouchers per annum;
third, actual and necessary expenses for rent, fuel, and lights,
and for postage on official matter directed to the Departments and Bureaus at Washington, to be approved by the
Secretary of the Interior; and it is further provided that all
acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act are here by
repealed.
It will be remarked that in the latter quoted statute no reference is made to the fees allowed to attorneys or agents of
pension claimants. The question presented to me is simplified by remembering that the portions of the Revised Statutes providing for the deduction of the 30 cents from the
fees of the attorney is repealed as an allowance to the pension agent, the amount and the manner of the payment of the
fees of the attorney or agent remaining the same. The whole
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subject matter of the compensation of the pension agents
was determined by this statute.
It is claimed, however, that by an act approved June 20,
1878, section 4769, Revised Statutes, is recognized as being
in full force. It is only necessary to observe that this act of
June 20, 1878, has no reference to the allowances to claim
agents, which were fixed lJy the statute approved only six
days previously, and which expressly repeals all provisiQns
relating to that matter.
It is further claimed that section 4769, Revised Statutes,
is recognized as being in force by the act approved July 4,
1884.
The provisions of the Revised Statutes giving the 30 cents
in payment for services named were expressly repealed by
the act of 1878. They could not be revived by the implied
repeal of this latter act (Rev. Stat., sec. 12), nor can it be
reasonably said that there was intended to be a,p. express
recognition of the right to this allowance or payment, because,
as claimed in the two acts subsequent to the repealing act,
section 4769 is referred to in express words; else there is no
force in the words "in lieu of the percentage, fees, pay, and
allowances now allowed by law."
There is no repugnancy in the provisions of these three
statutes which would operate as a repeal or preveut them
from being construed together. Effect can be given to all
of them. (United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 92; Henderson
Tobacco, 11 Wall., 65~; Wood v. United States, 16 Peters,
342; Daviess v. Fairbairn, 3 Howard, 636.)
I am of the opinion that the conclusions arrived at by the
Secretary of the Interior are correct, and that the pension
agents can not deduct 30 cents from the attorneys' fees for
the services named in the act, section 4769.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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ADVANCE WAGES TO SEAMEN.
The provisions of section 10 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, prohibiting the payment of advance wages to seamen hired in our ports,
in so far as those provisions apply to foreign shipping, are not in conflict with the stipulations of article 8 of the consular convention with
France of February 23, lt353.
Nor do such provisions come in conflict with any rights which, upon
principles of international law, other natiDns are entitled to exercise
within our ports as regards their merchant vessels.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 19, 1885.
SIR: Agreeably to the request contained in your letter of

the 6th instant, inclosing a copy of a note from the French
minister in relation to a supposed conflict between certain
provisions of the shipping act of June 26, 1884, and certain
stipulations of the American-French consular convention of
February 23, 1853, I have with much care and reflection
considered the points suggested in that note touching those
provisions and stipulations, and now have the honor to present to you my opinion thereon.
The provisions of said act and the stipulations of said convention specially in.....-olved are those contained in section 10
of the former and in article 8 of the latter, each of which,
for convenience of reference, I here quote in full:
By section 10 it is provided : "That it shall be, and is
hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages
before leaving the port at which such seaman may b.e engaged in advance of the time when he had actually earned
the same, or to pay such ad vance wages to any other person,
or to pay any person, other than an officer authorized by act
of Congress to collect fees for such service, any remuneration for such shipment of seamen. Any person paying such
advance wages or such remuneration shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and,.upon conviction, shall be punished
by a fine not less than four times the amount of the wages
so advanced or remuneration so paid, and may be also imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or
remuneration shall in no case, except as herein provided, absolve the vessel, or the master or owner thereof, from full
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payment of wages afler the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel, suit, or action
for the recovery of such wages : Provided, That this section
shall not apply to whaling vesseLs : And provided further,
That it shall be lawful for any seaman to stipulate iu his
shipping agreement for an allotment of any portion of the
wages which he may earn to his wife, mother, or other relath.. e, but to no other person or corporation. And any person
who shall falsely claim such relationship to any seaman in
order to obtain wages so allotted, shall~ for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not exceeding five hundred
· dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, at the
discretion of the court. This section shall apply as well to
foreign vessels as to vessels of the United States; and any
foreign vessel, the master, owner, consignee, or agent of
which bas violated this section, or induced or connived at
its violation, shall be refused a clearance from any port of
the United States."
By article 8 it is stipulated: ''The respective consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls, or consular agents, shall have exclusive charge of the internal order of the merchant vessels
of their nation, and shall alone take cognizance of differences
which may arise, either at sea or in port, between the captain,
officers, and crew, without exception, particularly in reference to the adjustment of wages and the execution of contracts. The local authorities shall not, on any pretext, interfere in these differences, but shall lend forcible aid to the
consuls, when they may ask it, to arrest and imprison all
persons composing the crew whom they may deem it necessary to confine. Those persons shlitll be arrested at the sole
request of the consuls, addressed in writing to the local au·
thority, and supported by an official extract from the register
of the ship or the list of the crew, and shaH be held, during
the whole time of their stay in the port, at the disposal of
the consuls. Their release shall be granted at the mere request of the consuls made in writing. The expenses of the
arrest and detention of those persons shall be paid by the
consuls."
In his note, the French minister, after referring to the provision in said section prohibiting the payment of advance

1'0 THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

255

Advance Wages to Sea men.

wages to seamen, under penalty of fine and imprisonment,
suggests that this provision cannot be reconciled with the
stipulations in said article. He further suggests that such
provision "infringes upon the rights of the different nations to
determine, according to their own legislation, the duties and
<>bligations of their merchant captains towards their crews
on the merchant vessels of their own nation." And while
~onceding the right of this Government to forbid American
-captains in home or foreign ports to make payment of advance wages to their crews, be asks whether such right can
he "legally extended to French captains, who enlist French
.sailors in the ports of the United States." He views the subject as presenting a "question of the rights of French captains over French sailors, rights concerning which the very
general terms of the final provision of section 10 might raise
difficulties between the Federal authorities and the consuls."
Not only does the French minister apparently entertain too
narrow a conception of the power of this Government to affect
by its legislation foreign merchant ships when within its ter·
ritorial jurisdiction, but I apprehend he has misconceived
th6 scope and operation of the statutory provision prohibiting the payment of ad vance wages to seamen to which he
.refers.
That provision is, from its subject-matter, of the nature of
a commercial regulation. Commerce in its simplest signification means an exchange of goods, but in the advancement of
society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care, and various
mediums of exchange, become commodities, and enter into
-commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the a.gent, and their
various operations, become the objects of commercial regulation. (9 Wheat., 229.) The officers and crew of a merchant
vessel are as much the instruments of commerce. as the ship.
{7 How., 408.)
The immediate purpose of. tke provision is to protect the
interests and promote the welfare of merchant seamen while
sojotuning at our ports, persons whose occupation is indispensable to maritime commerce, and who are objects of great
.solicitude and care in the codes of all commercial nations.
They are characterized as usually a heedless and ignorant,
but most useful claAs of men, exposed to constant hardships,
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perils, and oppression, and in port the ready victims of temptation and fraud (3 Kent Com., 176)-as notoriously and
proverbially reckless and improvident, and on all accounts
requiring protection, even against themselves (The Minerva, 1
Hagg., 355)-as credulous, complying, and easily overreached,
and requiring to be treated, in reference to their bargains, as
courts of equity treat young heirs in dealing with their expectancies, wards with their guardians, cestuis que trusts with
their trustees (Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason, 556). Legislation
for their security and protection, when employed in our merchant service, was early adopted by Congress (act of July 20,.
1790, chap. 29), and has been enacted from time to time down
to the present, containing many wise and wholesome provisions directed to that end. (See Rev. Stat., Title LIII.)
The provision now under consideration deals with the subject of wages of those seamen who are hired in our ports, and
those only. It is thereby made unlawful to pay" advance
wages" to the seaman himself before he leaves the port
which he is engaged, or to pay the same (i.e., advance wages of
such seaman) to any other person; and this, by the express
terms of the statute, applies to foreign as well as to American
vessels. The power of Congress to regulate the employment
or hire of merchant seamen within the ports of the United
States cannot be questioned. There is no principle of international law which forbids the application of such legislation
to foreign ships.
''The jurisdiction of the nation" (obser 8S :Marshall, C. J.,
in The Exchange, 7 Cr., 136) "within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution
of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an
investment of that sovereignty tp the same extent in that
power which could impose .such restriction. All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within·
its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source."
Hence a foreign merchant vessel going into the port of a
foreign state subjects herself to the laws of that state, and is
~onnd to conform to its commercial as well as its police and
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other regulations during the period of her stay there. " She
is as much a subditus temporaneus" (remarks Sir R. Phillimore with reference to such a case in The Queen v. Keyn, 2
Ex. D., 82) "as th~ individual who visits the interior of the
country for the purposes of pleasure or business."
From this doctrine it follows that in extending the provision adv~rted to, so as to make it applicable as well to foreign
merchant ships within our ports as to American vessels, Con~ess has not assumed to deal with any rights of such ships
with which, on principles of international law, it is not entitled to interfere, nor has it exceeded the proper limits of its
jurisdiction, having regard to the rights of other nations.
Therefore, unless exempted from the operation of the provision by virtue of some treaty or statute having that effect,
no nation has any valid ground to claim for its merchant
shipping, in any case or under any circumstances, immunity
from the observance thereof. Whether the seaman hired or
engaged in one of our ports by a foreign ship is or is not of
the same nationality as the vessel is wholly immaterial, the
language of the provision being general and including (as it
may properly do) all merchant seamen who are there hired
or engaged by such ship, irrespective of their nationality.
In regard to the supposed conflict between the statutory
provision and article 8, quoted above, I submit that the subject-matter of the one is entirely distinct from that of the
other, and that no collision necessarily arises.
By tlre said article the respective consuls, etc., ''shall
have exclusive charge of the internal order of the merchant
vessels of their nation, and shall alone take cognizance of
differences which may arise, either at sea or in port, between
the captain, officers, and crew, without exception, particularly
in reference to the adjustment of wages and the execution of
co ;ttracts.'' The word ''execution" is obviously used here in
the sense of performance.
This provision accords to the consular officer: (1) A limited police jurisdiction over the merchant ves~els of his nation, embracing only those acts which relate to the interior
discipline of the vessel, and which do not disturb the peace
and good order of the port. With respect to that jurisdiction,
the scope of the provision is precisely determined by the'
273-VOL XIII--17
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word "internal." (2) A limited cognizance of civil controversies between the officers and crews of such vessels, particularly those relating to the performance of contracts of
service and the adjustment of wages thereunder.
It is very plain that a public law of the port, which prohibits thf' payment of advance wages to seamen hired
thereat before the vessel sails, does not concern the "internal or(~er" of such vessels, in contemplation of the above
provision; and it is difficult to see wherein the law coul
become a subject of "difference" between the officers and
crew of the vessel. In hiring a seaman at one of our ports,
the master of a ship can make no valid agreement to pay
advance wages before leaving the port, for the reason that
such payment is prohibited by the public law of the place.
Should he do so, and fail to pay the advances~ this might
give rise to a ''difference" between him and the seaman,
but it would be a difference manifestly involving no conflict between the law and the treaty. On the other hand,
should the master pay the advance wages to the Ewaman,
the enforcement of the law against the former could not in
any point of view be deemed an interference in a ''difference" between the two individuals.
As already intimated, the provisions of section 10 of the
act of 1884 are designed to regulate dealings with seamen who
are -commorant itt" the ports of the United States, and with
whom shipping agreements are there entered into. They do
not apply to dealiugs with the seamen of a vessel under such
agreements made elsewhere. Obligations arising out of the
latter agreem~nts are unaffected by the statute; the former
can give rise to no obligation the performance of which involves an infraction of its provisions.
On the whole, I reach the following conclusions upon the
points suggested as above:
(1) That the provisions of the said act respecting the payment of advance wages, in so far as they apply to foreign
shipping, are not in conflict with the stipulations of article
8 of the said convention with France.
(2) That they infringe upon no rights which, upon principles
of international law, other nations are entitled to exercise
within our ports, as regards their merchant vessels.
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(3) That therefore they can ' 1 legally extend t.o French
captains who hire French sailors in the ports of the United
States," and that, in extending (as they do) to them, they
violate or prejudice no right of such captains in the premises.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRE'rARY oF STATE.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.
Qpinion of Attorney-General Devens, of October 4, 1878 (16 Opin., 158),
that imported merchandise entered upon pro jotma invoices. in the
absence of regular invoices authenticated by United States consular
officers, when advanced in value on appraisement more than 10 per
cent., is not liable to the 20 per cent. ad valorem additional duty
under section 2900, Revised Statutes, concurred in.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 27, 1885.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
·communication of the 25th instant, in reference to the opinion of Attorney-General Devens, forwarded to your Department on the 4th day of October, 1878, in which he took the
ground that imported merchandise entered at the .customhouse upon p"ro forma invoices, in t,he absence of regular
invoices authenticated by United States consular officers,
when advanced in value on appraisement more than 10 per
cent., was not liable to the additional duty of 20 per cent.
ad valorem prescribed by section 2900 of the Revised Statutes.·
It is very much to be regretted that the abuses referred to
bave arisen, and that certain shippers and importers have
used the opinion of a former Attorney-General as a loop-hole
for the purpose of entering their goods at prices much below
the proper dutiable values. This Department would cheerfully co-operate in applying the needed remedy, but after a
careful examination of the opinion in question I am not prepared to say that it is erroneous. On the contrary, I think
that section 2900 has been correctly interpreted. It is the
well-settled practice of this Department not to disturb former
rulings upon legal questions submitted to it unless they
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appear to be plainly erroneous, and if the question were ·an
original one I would feel constrained to hold that section
.:.moo, Revised Statutes, does not apply to an entry made in
the absence of a certified invoice! upon affidavit, under the
provisions of sections 9 and 10 of the act of June 22, 1874,
chapter 391.
In my opinion the words " original invoice" found in section 2900 were intended to refer only to the consular invoice.
Under existing legislation, it seems to me that the only
remedy for the abuses complained of is to be found in a more
rigid enforcement of the provisions of the twelfth section of
the act of 1874 and section 2864 of the Revised Statutes.
The report of the board of United States appraisers is
herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
JOHN GOODE,
Acting Attorney- General.
Hon. C. S. FAIRCHILD,
Acting l'Jecretary of the Treasury.
)

TONNAGE DUTY.
The discrimination as to tonnage duty in favor of vessels sailing from the
regions mentioned in the act of J nne 26, 1884, chapter 121, and entered in
our ports, is purely geographical in character, inuring to the advantage
of any vessel of any power that may choose to transport between this
country and any port embraced by the fourteenth section of that act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 19, 1885.
SIR: Your _c ommunication of the 8th September, instant,.
with the inclosures therein referred to, has received my deliberate consideration, and I have the honor to submit, in
reply, that I agree with you entirely in the interpretation you
place on the fourteenth section of the act of Congress of the
26th June, 1884, entitled "An act to .remove certain burdens
on the American merchant mnrine and encourage the American foreign carrying trade, and for other purposes," and in
your conclusion that the claims set up by the several powers
mentioned by you are not founded.
The discrimination as to tonnage duty in favor of vessels

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

261

Customs Laws-Collector's Certificate.

sailing from the regions mentioned in the act 'and entered in
our ports is, I think, purely geographical in character, inuring to the advantage of any vessel of any power that may
choose to fetch and carry between this country and any port
embraced by the fourteenth section of the act.
I see no warrant, therefore, to claim that there is anything
in "the most favored nation" clause of the treaty between
this country and the powers mentioned that entitles them to
have the privileges of the fourteenth section extended to
their vessels sailing to this country from ports outside the
limitation of the act.
Your able and comprehensive discussion of the subject
renders it quite unnecessary for me to treat it at large.
I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,
W. A. MAURY,
Act,ing Attorney- General.

The

SECRETARY OF STATE.

CUSTOMS LAWS-COLLECTOR'S CERTIFICATE.
In the case of merchandise of domestic production shipped at ports on
the Great Lakes to other ports in the United States, by routes through
Canadian terrritory, the issue of a certificate by the collector of customs
showing that the merchandise so shipped is of domestic production is
not authorized by law.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 3, 1885.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
-communication bearing date September 30, 1885,requesting
an opinion from this Department upon the question therein
submitted.
The joint resolution of Congress approved March 3, 1883,
providing for the termination of articles numbered 18 to 25,
inclusive, and article numbered 30, of the treaty between the
United States of America and her Britannic Majesty, conduded at Washington May 8, 1871, directs the President to
give notfce to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty that
the provisions of each and every of the articles aforesaid will
terminate and be of no force on the expiration of two years
SIR:
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next after the time of giving such notice. .Article 30 of said
treaty is as follows :
"It is agreed that, for the term of years mentioned in article 33 of this treaty, subjects of Her Britannic Majesty may
carry in British vessels, without payment of duty, goods,
wares, or merchandise from one port or place within the territory of the United States upon the St. Lawrence, the GreatI
Lakes, and the rh·ers connecting the same, to another port or
place within the territory of the United States, as aforesaid:
PYovideil, That a portion of such transportation is made
through the Dominion of Canada by land carriage, and in
bond, under such rules or regulations as may be agreed upon
between the Government of Her Britannic Majesty and the
Government of the United States. Citizens of the United
States may, for a like period, carry in United States vessels,
without payment of duty, goods, wares, or merchandise from
one port or place within the possessipn of Her Britannic Majesty in North America to another port or place within the
said possessions: Provided, That a portion of such transportation is made through the territory of the United States by
land carriage, and in bond, under such rules and regulations
as may be agreed upon between the Government of the United
States and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty. The
Government of the United States further engages not to impose any export duties on goods, wares, or merchandise car.
ried under this article through ·t he territory of the United
States, and Her Majesty's Government engages to urge the
parliament of the Dominion of Canada and the legislatures of
the other colonies not to impose any export duties on goodsr
wares, or merchandise carried under this article; and the·
Governrnt:,nt of the United States may, in case such export
duties arA imposed by the Dominion of Canada, suspend
during the period that such duties are imposed, the right of
carrying granted under this article in favor of the subjects
of Her Britanic 1\iajesty."
It appears that notice was given, by proclamation of the
President, of the abrogation of said article 30 of the treaty of
Washington, and that it ceased to be in force from and after
July 1, 1H85.
Section3006 of Revised Statutes provides that" imported
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merchandise in bond or duty paid, and products or manufactures of the United States may, with the consent of the
proper authorities of the British provinces, or Republic of
)Iexico, be transported from one port in the United States to
any other port therein over the territory of such provinces
or republic, by such routes, and under such rules, regulations, and conditions as the Secretary of the Treasury may
prescribe; and the merchandise so transported shall, upon
arrival in the United States from such provinces or republic, be treated in regard to the liability to or exemption
from duty, or tax, as if the transportation had taken place
entirely within the limits of the United States."
It appears from your communication that a practice obtains at certain ports on the great lakes of shipping merchandise of domestic production to other ports in the United
States by routes, partly by water ahd partly by rail, through
Canadian territory, and that foreign vessels are used in such
transportation. It appears also that the goods are regularly
exported to Canada from American ports, and at the time of
shipment a certificate is obtained from the collector of customs showing that the merchandise so shipped is of domestic
production, and upon this certificate free entry is made at
the port in the United States when the goods arrive after
transit.
Under section 2503 of the tariff act approved March 3,
1883, articles "the growth, produce, and manufacture of the
United States, when returned in the same condition as exported," shall be exempt from duty. The object of that paragraph, as I understand it, is to enable the exporter of domestic products and manufactures to bring back the same to
the United States free of cost, if from any cause he may desire to do so; but in order to entitle him to the benefit of that
provision, the articles must be the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, and must be returned in the
same condition as exported. It appears, however, in the
cases referred to by you, that merchandise of domestic production is shipped from certain ports on the great lakes to
other ports in the United States. The transportation is partly
through Canadian territory, but the port of destination is in
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the United States. In other words, it is not a bona fide exportation.
In view ofthe provisions of the joint resolution referred to,
I am of opinion that the practice of issuing the certificates
mentioned at the time of shipping the articles described in
your letter is illegal.
Very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

GRANT TO GARLAND COUNTY, ARKANSAS.
Under the circumstances existing in this case, and for reasons stated, the •
institution of proceedings on behalf of the United States to recover
the title and possession of certain land (part of the Hot Springs 'Reservation) granted to the county of Garland, Arkansas, for the site of a
public building, would not be warranted.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 7, 1885.
By your letter of the 26th of August last my attention is called to the act of March 3, 1877, chapter 108, granting a piece of land (part of the Hot Springs Reservation)
"to the county of Garland in the State of Arkansas as a
site for the public building of said county," and also to the
report of the Committee on Expenditures in the Interior
Department, first session, Forty-eight Congress, and other
documents, from which it appears that, after the location of
the grant, the county authorities leased the land so granted
for a period of ninety-nine years to private parties, by whom
the same has been subdivided into lots and sublet to numerous persons, and that the land has never been devoted to
the purpose for which it was donated by Congress.
In directin~· my attention to this subject, you request that
"legal proceedings be instituted, with a view to recover to
the Government the title and possession of the land," should
the failure of the county authorities to carry out the purpose
of Congress be regarded as operating to nullify the grant.
While it is very plain, from the language of the gr~nt,
that Congress intended to donate the land for the specific
SIR:
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purpose designated therein, namely, to be used'' as a site for
the public building of said county," yet, whether this annexes
acondition to the grant, or creates a mere trust, is not so clear.
If a condition, upon breach thereof the grant would be liable
to forfeiture; if a trust, the same result would not follow
upon a breach, but the aid of a court of equity might be invoked by proper parties to effectuate the trust. (See Stanley
v. Colt, 5 Wall., 119.)
In the former case, I submit that, in the absence of any
law of Congress declaring the forfeiture or directing the institution of proceedings to that end, no authority exists to
bring a suit in behalf of the United States to recover the land
on the ground of failur~ to perform the condition. In the
latter case, it would seem to be unnecessary to consider the
subject of proceedings to enforce the trust, as it appears by the
accompanying letter of the superintendent of the Hot Springs
Reservation, addressed to you, dated the 14th of August
last, that a suit bas recently been brought by the proper
county authorities to annul the aforesaid lease and recover
~ontrol of the property, that it may be devoted to the purpose for which it was donated.
These considerations lead me to think that, under the existing circumstances, I would not be warranted in instituting
proceedings of any kind in behalf of the United States touching the premises.
I return herewith the documents which accompanied your
letter.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SE.C RETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

....
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HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARKANSAS.
The Secretary of the Interior bas power, under the act of December 16~
1878, chapter 5, to lease sites upou the Hot Springs Reservation in
Arkansas for the term of five years, and to relet the premises for the
same term, from time to time, as the leases expire.
Upon the facts stated: Advised that the Secretary may accept a surrender
of a lease of a bath-bouse site heretofore made to S., and cancel the
same, and then enter into a new lease of the premises with the same
party for the term of five years.
During the term of the lease, and while the tenant is in possession under
the same, be may remove from the premises whatever improvements.
be bas erected thereon for the purposes of trade, whether machinery or
buildings; but if be leaves the premises without removing such improvements, and the Govern1:nent should take possession, they would
become the property of the latter.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 12, 1885.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 5th instant, forwarding the letter dated
the 29th ultimo (with inclosures) from Ron. D. W. Voorhees~
John Paul Jones, and J. L. Smithmeyer, requesting your Department ''to surrender a lease of a bath-house site upon the
Hot Springs Reservation, Arkansas, granted to Mr. Smithmeyer by the Secretary oftbe Interior January 15,1884, and
that a new lease may be entered into to run for five years
from September 1, 1885."
Reference is made in your letter to the original lease, which
is also forwarded, and the act of December 16, 1878 (20 Stat.
258).
You state that ''the facts in relation to the granting of the
lease and the extension of the time of the commencement of
payment of water rent thereunder are set forth" in said letter of Hon. D. W. Voorhees and others, and that "there is no
reason to doubt the statement that d nring a great portion of
the time since the lease was made it has been entirely im·
practicable for the lessee to carry out the purposes for which
the site was leased."
You further sta.te that "the five years' term of lease to Mr.
Smithmeyer commenced from the date of the lease, January
15, 1884, and consequently a renewal of the lease, as he desires, would extend the period beyond the whole term specified in the statute."
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.An opinion is requested, as follows, viz :
First. ".As to whether there is any authority of law for
complying with the request of Mr. Smithmeyer, as above set
forth."
Second. "Generally, whether there is authority for renewing any of the leases which have expired."
Third. "And also, whether at the expiration of a lease the
permanent improvements upon the site belong to the lessee
or to the Government."
The clause of the act of December 16, 1878, authorizing the
Secretary of the Interior to lease sites for the building of
bath-houses at the Hot Springs Reservation, .Arkansas, is a~
follows, viz :
''And he is further directed to lease the bath-houses of a
permanent nature, now upon the Hot Springs Reservation, to
the owners of the same, and lease to any person or persons,.
upon such terms as may be agreed on, sites for the building
of other bath-houses for the term of five years, unless otherwise provided by law, under such rules and regulations as
he may prescribe; and the tax imposed shall not exceed fif.
teen dollars per tub per annum, including 'ground rent.'"
The main question presented by the inquiries is, as to
whether the authority of the Secretary of the Interior is limited to the granting of leases for only one term of five years,
or as to whether he is directed to make leases of a term
neither greater nor less than five years V In other ""ords,
does the limitation of five years apply to the period in which
leasing is authorized, or as a limit to the length of the leases or
If it is the true intent and meaning of the law that all leasehold estates, acquired under and by virtue of the said act,
shall expire at the end of their respective terms of five years
without any autlwrity being vested in the Secretary of the
Interior to renew the leases or relet the said sites for bathhouses, the obvious duty rests upon the Secretary at the end
of such terms to repossess himself for the Government of the
leasehold premises, and to hold them unused and unoccupied
against all intruders. He has no authority, under such interpretation of the act, either to create vr permit a tenancy at
will or by sufferance.
Snch an interpretation of the Jaw would have the effect of
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depriving the public of the use of such bath-houses where the
leases have expired; to foster a monopoly such as it is the
declared purpose of the said act of December 16, 1878, to
avoid; to depreciate the value of the lots sold or leased by
the Government on the '' rese!'vation" for hotel and building
purposes; to interfere with the price and sale of other lots
for such purposes by the Government, and, awaiting the ac·
tion of Congress, defeat the purposes for which the" reservation " was established.
As such interpretation would be against public policy and
should not be adopted unless it is required by either the
words, the context, the effect, or the spirit and reason of the
law, is such interpretation required~ The Secretary of the
Interior is directed by the act to lease two kinds of property,
viz, first, bath houses of a permanent nature, at the time of
the passage of the act, to the owners of the same; second,
"sites for the building of bath-houses" to any person or
llersons. The maximum rental of $15 per tub is fixed; the
l'Ules and regulations are to be prescribed by the Secretary;
the t.erm of each lease is to be a period of five years "unless
otherwise provided by law." There is no prohibition as to
reletting. So long as the conditions precedent to leasing
exist, the Secretary is directed to lease, and this without any
limitation except in the words " unless otherwise provided
by law."
By act of March 3, 1877 (Stat. 19, 377), when Congress
first undertook to dispose of the "reservation" after the
decision of the Hot Springs cases (92 U. S. 698,) such portion
of the "reservation" as includes the hot or warm springs is
reserved from sale. By that act the Secretary of the Interior
is permitted to fix a special tax on water taken from said
springs (sec. 4 of said act), but no authority is given him
therein to either lease bath-houses or sites for bath-houses.
The words'' unless otherwise provided by law" in the statute of 1878 bad, therefore, no present meaning at the time of
the passage of the act, and must either be regarded as surplusage, or the obvious interpretation be given, that so long
as the conditions precedent to leasing exist, the authority to
let or relet, in accordance with the terms of the act, is vested
in the Secretary of the Interior, unless at the time of such
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leasing it is otherwise provided by law. This interpretation
is not only in accord with public policy and the presumed
object of the ''reservation," but a contrary interpretation,
confining~' the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to
the granting of such leases for one term only of .five years,"
is warranted neither by the said act of 1878, its words and
context, nor by the general intent and meaning and declared
object of the several acts of Congress relating to said ''reservation."
This view as to interpretation of the act is in accord with
an opinion of the Supreme Court delivered in an al)alogous
case (United States v. Gratiot, 14 Peters, 537). In that case,
referring to a clause in act of March 3, 1807 (2 Stat., 449), viz:
"The President of the United States shall be and is hereby
authorized to lease any lead mine which has been or may
hereafter be discovered in Indiana Territory for a term not
exceeding :five years," Thompson, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The authority given to the President
to lease the lead mines is limited to a term not exceeding five
years; this limitation, however, is not to be construed as a
prohibition to renew the leases from time to time, if he shall
think proper so to do. The authority is limited to a short
period so as not to interfere with the power of Congress
to make other disposition of the mines, should they think
proper so to do."
•
The site for bath houses leased to Mr. Smithmeyer, jt is
alleged, remains in the same condition as to imprlwements
as it was at the time the original lease was made, in December, 1883. There bas been no possession taken by the lessee
by virtue of the lease. If the lease is annulled by the
joint consent of lessor and les8ee, the premises will still remain such a site for the building of a bath-hquse as the Secretary of the Interior is authorized by the act of 1878 ,to
lease for a period of five years. By the terms of the lease
to Mr. Smitbmeyer be was entitled to the possession and
enjoyment of the lea~ehold premises for the period of five
years.
He has been ready at all times, if permitted the free use
and enjoyment of his grant, to fulfill his contract. The
Government in the making of improvements on the "reser-
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vation" has interfered with him, for the time being, in the
use and enjoyment of his grant. As up to this time he bas
been practically dispossessed by the Government, if he desires to surrender his lease the Secretary of the Interior bas
the authority to cancel it. The Government is not injured
thereby. If the lease is surrendered and canceled a new
lease may be made to Mr. Smith meyer, or any person or persons, in accordance with the provisions of the act.
In reply to the inquiry as to the ownership of permanent
improvements upon the bath-house site at the expiration of
the lease, if the tenant should leave the premises without
removing such permanent fixtures, and the Go ernment
should take possession, such improvements would become
the property of the Government. During the term of the
leasP, however, or whilst the tenant is in the peaceable enjoyment of the leasehold premises, he may take away what-ever he has erected for the purposes of trade, whether machinery or buildings. As to whether a building is erected
for the purposes of trade does not depend upon the form or
size of the building, or whether it is or is not attached to the
realty by a permanent foundation. The sole question is
whether the building was erected and was designed for the
purposes of trade. The building may be used as a residence
for a family, if such residence be ~rely an accessory for the
more beneficial exercise of tire trade (Van Ness v. Pacard, 2
Peters 137); bath-tubs, fixtures, and buildings should be regarded as improvements for the purposes of trade.
" If the tenant does not exercise his privilege before his
interest expires be can not do it afterwards; because the
right to possess the land and fixtures as a part of the realty
vests immediately in the landlord." (Taylor's Lanulord and
Tenant, 433.)
The letter of Hon. D. W. Voorhees, John Paul Jones, and
J. L. Smith meyer to the Secretary of the Interior, dated September 29, 1885, with inclosures, and also the original lease to
Mr. Smithmeyer, dated the 12th day of December, 1885, are
herewith returned.
Respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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APPOINTMENT OF POSTMASTERS.
Where a post-office of either the first, second, or third class (all of which
classes are filled by appointment by the President) is reduced to a postoffice of the fourth class (which is filled _by appointment by the Postmaster-General), the commission of the then incumbent, though he
may not have served out the term for which he was appointed, expires,
~nd a new appointment (by the Postmaster-General) becomes necessary.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 14, 1885.
SIR: Yours of the 1st instant submits for answer the following question:
"When a post-office is reduced to a fourth-class office from
one of the higher classes, is it necessary or proper that the
Postmaster-General should make a new appointment, or does
the postmaster appointed for a term hold for the residue of
.the term for which he was appointed~"
The fifth section of the act of July 12, 1876 (Stat. L., 19,
80), provides "that the postmasters shall be divided into
four classes, as follows: The first class shall embrace all those
whose annual salaries are three thousand dollars, or more
than ~hree thousand dollars; the second class shall embrace
all those whose annual salaries are less than three thousand
dollars,- but not less than two thousand dollars; the third
class shall embrace all those whose annual salaries are less
than two thousand dollars, but not less than one thousand
dollars ; the fourth class shall em brace all postmasters whose
annual compensation, exclusive of their commissions on the
money-order business of their offices, amounts to less than
one thousand dollars."
The first section of the act of March 3, 1883 (Stat., 22, 600),
lays down the rules by which the Postmaster-General shall
" ascertain and fix" the salaries of postmasters of the first,
second, and third class.
The gross annual receipts of the office determine the compensation of the postmaster, and in that way the class to
which the office belongs. The first three classes include all
offices whose gross annual income amounts to or exceeds
$1,000. All offices with a less gross annual income belong to
the fourth class. Section 2 lays down the rules by which the
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compensation of the fourth-class postmasters are to be ascertained.
The act further provides :
Section 3. "That the Postmaster-General shall make aU
orders relative to the salaries of postmasters, and any change
made in such salaries shall not take effect until the first day
of the quarter next following the order." * * *
Section 4. ''That the salaries of the first, second, and third
classes shall be re-adjusted by the Postmaster-General; the'
first adjustment (under this act) to take effect simultaneously
with the reduction of the rates of postage, and thereafter at
the beginning of each fiscal year." * * •
These statutes are homogeneous parts of a system devised
for regulating the salaries and keeping the accounts of postmasters throughout the land.
The sixth section of the act of July 12, 1876, is as follows:
'' Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall
be appointed and may be removed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold
their offices for four years unless sooner removed or su&pended according to law ; and postmasters of the fourth class
shall be appointed, and may be removed, by the PostmasterGeneral, by whom all appointments shall be notified to the
Auditor for the Post-Office Department."
This section forms no part of the system for regulating the
salaries and adjusting the accounts of our postmasters. The
two classes into which it divides them are totally distinct.
The difference between a presidential office and a departmental office is the greatest that can exist between any offices
known to the Constitution.
For the purpose of distinguishing the postmasters who belong to either class this section adopts the classification of
section 5. As we have seen, this classification is made annually and based on the gross annual income of the respective
post-offices. As the gross annual income of each post-office
varies more or less, an office which one year is presidential
may the next year be departmental, and vice versa.
It was patent that each annual adjustment would result
in transferring some officers from one class to the other. In
full view of the fact that each annual adjustment would re-
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suit in such changes, the President is divested of and the
Postmaster-General is invested with all authority to appoint
and remove all fourth-class postmasters. There is no exception to this general and sweeping provision. At the beginning of the first quarter after the adjustment is made, each
post-office takes its place in the class to which by the adjustment it was found to belong. It is then as fully and firmly
established in the class to which it has been assigned as it
ever can be.
In making the assignment you are required to look alone
to the gross annual income of the office for the preceding
year. Whether or not the incumbent of the office at the
date of the adjustment has served out the term for which he
was appointed is of no moment, and is not a matter which
you have· to consider in making the a:::;signment. The effect
of the assignment of a first, second, or third class office to
the fourth class is to abolish a presidential office and create
a departmental office. The President and Senate can not
appoint, remove, or suspend the incumbent of a fourth-class.
post-office. An appointment by the President and Senate t()
a presidential office can not confer any title to a departmental office.
It is true that Congress might have enacted that the incumbent of a presidential post-office should continue to be post·
master until the expiration of his term, even though during
the term the office was assigned to the fourth class.
If such had been the intention of Congress, the presumption under all the circumstances is of the very strongest
character that an express provision to this effect would have
been inserted in the lawo
If, in a foreseen contingency, Congress intended that broad
and general provisions should be disregarded, authority for
such disregard would have been given in explicit terms and
not left to inference or conjecture.
This view is strengthened by the twelfth section of the act
of 1876, which is as follows: "* • • and no salary of
any postmaster where the appointment is now presidential
shall be reduced by the compensation herein established until the next re-adjustment below the sum of one thousand
dollars."
273-VOL XVIII--18
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Congress could have had but one purpose in thus enacting
that a presidential office should not be reduced to a departmental office until the then ''next re-adjustment." That purpose was to protect the tenure of office of presidential appointees until that date. An express provision to effect this was a
recognition by Congress that as the law stood such appointee
might lose his office before the date therein indicated; and
since the protection was temporary and bas never been extended, we must conclude that the legislative intent was,
that a presidential appointee after the date fixed should lose
his place if, under the law, his office should be assigned to
the fourth class.
The fact that a presidential postmaster is appointed for a
fixed term is not evidence of a legislative intent that such
officer shall hold a departmental office, should his office expire
before his term.
On the contrary, since the law provides that in a certain
contingency the office to which be is appointed shall expire,
without reference to the expiration of his term, such postmaster bas accepted the office with full notice that his term
was liable to be defeated by the abolition of the office.
From the foregoing Rtatement of the law it follows that the
first branch of your question should be answered in the affirmative and the last one in the negative.
Respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The PosTMASTER-GENERAL.

BONDS OF ASSISTANT UNITED STATES TREASURERS.
The form of the bond requil·ed to be given by assistant treasurers of the
United States under section 3600~ Revised Statutes-whether the parties thereto are to be jointly and severally, or may be only jointly
bound, and whether each surety is to bind himself for the fullamount
of the penalty, or may restrict his liability to a less amount-is not
made the subject of statutory regulation, but is left to the determination of the officers by whom the bond is to be approved.
But the form ordinarily made use of in practice is that wherein the principal and sureties are jointly and severally bound for the full amouut
of the penalty.
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This form being preferable to any other, and its use sanctioned by long
practice, the adoption of a different form (though it might not be inconsistent with the terms of the statute so to do) would not be warranted unless the circumstances of the particular case were such that
the public interests could not otherwise be served.

DEPARTMENT OF

JU~TICE,

October 17, 1885.
SIR: Your letter of the 6th instant inquires: "Whether
the bonds required to be given by assistant treasurers of
the United States, under section 3600 of the Revised Statutes,
should in all cases be joint and several, so that each surety
is iiable for the full amount of the bond; or whether a several
bond can be lawfully given, in which each surety is made
liable for a limited amount therein specified, and less than
the amount of the penalty of the bond." To this inquiry I
have now the honor to reply:
The section above mentioned . provides that those officers
"shall give bonds to the United States for the faithful discharge of the duties of their respective. offices as assistant
treasurers according to law, and for such amounts as shall
be directed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with sureties
to the satisfaction of the Solicitor of the Treasury;" and it
further provides that they "shall, from time to time, renew,
strengthen, and increase their official bonds as the Secretary
of the Treasury may direct."
But the form of the bond to be given by them, whether
the parties thereto are to be jointly and severally or may be
only jointly bound, and whether each surety is to bind himself for the full amount of the penalty or may restrict his
Uability to a less amount, is not made the subject of statutory regulation. This appears to be left to the determination of the officers by whom the bond is to be approved.
I observe that in the case of collectors, naval officers, and
surveyors, the form of the bond to be given by these officers
is prescribed by statute (see sec. 2619, Rev. Stat., as amended
by the act of February 27, 1877, chap. 69); the form thus prescribed being that of a joint and several bond in which the
sureties bind themse1ves each for the full amount of the
penalty. Also, by express statutory provision, the bond of
a marshal is required to be given, "jointly and severally with
two good and sufficient sureties," for a certain sum.
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In the case of some other officers the form of the bond, by
the express terms of the statute requiring it, is to be prescribed by or to be subiect to the approval of the President,
head of Department, or other officer named therein (see sees.
1697, 3144, as amended by the act of March 1, 1879, chaps.
125, 3153, 3tl14, 4459, and 4779, Rev. Stat).
In most cases, however, where official bonds are required
the form thereof is (as in section 3600, Revised Statutes) tacitly or impliedly left by Congress to be regulated or fixed by
the officers by whom the bonds are to be approved (see sees.
302, 479, 795, 1191, 1349, 1383, 1698, 2215, 3143, as amended
by the act of March 1, 1879, chaps. 125, 3151, 3156, 3551, 3759,
3834, 3870, 4113, and 4950, Rev. Stat.).
So far as I am informed, the form of bond ordinarily made
use of in practice, in all cases; corresponds with that prescribed by statute as above, i.
it is one wherein the principal and sureties are jo-intly and severally bound for the full
arnount of the penalty. This form is manifestly preferable to
any other; and where its use is sanctioned by long practice,
the adoption of a different form, though it might not, strictly
speaking, be inconsistent with the terms of the statute,
would not be warranted unless the circumstances of the particular case were such that the public interests could not
otherwise be served.
The same form is commonly used in the States, though in
some cases sureties are allowed, under statutory regulation,
to become severally liable for amounts less than the penalty
of the bond. Thus in California, while all o:ffici~l bonds are
there requited to be in form joint and several, when the penal
sum of any bond exceeds $1,000 the sureties may become
severally liable for port,i ons of not less than $500 thereof,
making in the aggregate at least two sureties for the whole
penal sum (see Political Code, sees. 956, 958). Here the bond
may contain a joint and several obligation, as regards the
principal and each surety for that portion of the penalty to
which the undertaking of the surety is limited; but as regards the sureties inter sese the obligation of each would be
several only. A bond in this form where several sureties
bind themselves each jointly and severally with the principal for a part of the penalty, making in the aggregate (say)

e.,
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double the amount thereof, may be equivalent in point of
security to a bond wherein two sureties with the principal
bind themselves jointly and severally for the whole penalty,
but this depends upon circumstances extrinsic to the bond,
namely, the sufficiency and responsibility ofindividual sureties.
While there is nothing in section 3600 that forbids the giving and accepting of an official bond thereunder in the form
just adverted to (which I understand is the one referred to
in the latter clause of your inquiry), and while the form of the
bond is thereby left to the determination of the approving
officer, yet I think the discretion of such officer, in that regard, should be governed by the established practice, and
that a departure from the latter would not be justified in any
case unless required by public considerations.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

COMPROMISE OF CLAIMS.
Claims in favor of the Government, founded on judgments entered upon
forfeited recognizances taken in the prosecution of offenses against the
postal laws, may be compromiseu by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions and upon the considerations imposed by section 3496,
Revised Statu.tes.
Such claims do not arise under the postal laws, within the meaning of
the exception in that section.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 22, 1885.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 15th instant, inclosing the petition of John Cobberg et al. for my consideration and such action as I may
deem proper.
It appears from the petition that each one of the petitioners forfeited a personal recognizance for his appearance as a
witness on behalf of the Government, before the district
court of the United States for the southern dist.rict of Illinois,
in a criminal cause or proceeding pending therein. On these

1
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forfeitures the court entered final judgments at the January
term, 1885.
The petitioners ask for the remission of these judgments.
I have no authority to take any action in the premises.
You ask that I will, in the event this conclusion is reached,
give an opinion as to " whether in view of the exception as
to cases (claims) arising under the postal laws, in section
3496, Revised Statutes, these judgments can be settled by
compromise thereunder."
Though these judgments were entered upon recognizances
taken in the prosecution of a " postal crime,'' they are not
within the exception. They are not claims arising under the
postal laws, but under the laws regulating procedure in criminal cases; claims within this exception are those over which
the Postmaster-General has jurisdiction by section 409, Revised Statutes.
I am therefore of opinion that balances due on these judgments belong to the class of claims which you have authority
to compromise under the provisions of and upon the conditions imposed by section 3496, Revised Statutes.
Respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

WITNESSES BEFORE A COURT-MARTIAL.
Where a civilian witness is brought before a court-martial but refuses
to testify, the court is not invested with any inherent power to punish the witness in such case, either summarily or otherwise, as for a.
contempt. Such power can only be exercised by it when given by the
positive terms of some statute.
Section 1202 Revised Statutes arms the court with authority to compel
the witness to appear and testify, so far as this can be done by process;
but in securing his testimony the court is restricted to the means
which it iA thus authorized to employ. It can not inflict any punishment where the power t.o impose it is not clearly conferred by Congress,

DEPAR1'MENT

JUSTICE,
October 23, 1885.
SIR: By your letter of the 16th instant and the papers
transmitted to me therewith, it appears that at a trial before
OF
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a general court-martial recently convened at Fort Clarke,
Tex., two civilians, who were summoned and appeared as
witnesses, refused to testify, and stood mute when their testimomy was sought to be elicited. The court adjuged one of
them to be in contempt, and dismissed him from further at• ten dance. The other the court was directed, by orders from
the commanding general of the military department of Texas,
to commit for contempt in case he persisted in his refusal to
testify. But the court upon consideration held that it had
no legal authority to imprison or otherwise punish a civilian
witness for obstinately standing mute when called upon to
give testimony.
Doubts being entertained by the judge-advocate of the
court, and also by the commanding general, as to the correctness of this decision, the following question (suggested
by the former) is proposed by you for my opinion thereon:
"What remedy has a court-martial in case a civilian witness is brought before it, and refuses positively to answer
questions which the court decides are proper for him to
answer~"

•

After careful examination of this question, I arrive at the
conclusion that the court has no remedy-that it is not in\ested with power to punish the witness in such case, either
summarily or otherwise, as for a contempt or other offense
committed by him.
The main purpose of the creation of courts-martial is the
maintenance of military discipline. Their jurisdiction and
powers are based wholly upon the Articles of War and other
statutory provisions constituting our military code, and, in
general, extend to those persons only who are subject to
military law. Formerly, a citizen not in the military service,
even when summoned only as a witness by such court, was
not bound to obey the summons (9 Opin., 311); and it would
seem that if he appeared, he was not bound to testify. In
the absence of any statute making him amenable to the
authority of the cpurt it was powerless to compel his appearance, and a fortiori to punish him for a refusal to testify.
But by the twenty-fifth section of the act of March 3, 1863,
chapter 79, the judge-advocate of a court-martial was
authorized to issue process " to compel witnesses to appear
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and testify." The same provision is reproduced in section
1202 Revised Statutes. This is the only statutory provision
now in force that imparts to a court-martial power to enforce
obedience to its summons by civilians when called as witnesses before it; and the inquiry here arises, whether a courtmartial derives any authority thereunder to punish a wit- •
ness who, after having appeared, refuses to testify.
In this connection I remark that such power has sometimes
been expressly conferred upon courts-martial. Thus, by the
Rules and Articles of War adopted by Congress September 20,
1776, for the government of the American armies, an article
contained therein provided that ''all persons called to give
evidence in any cause before a court-martial, who shall refuse
to give evidence, shall be punished for such refusal at the discretion of such court-martial." The terms of this article are
broad enough to include civilian witnesses, and it was doubtless meant to apply to them. It -was, however, along with
some other articles relating to courts-martial, repealed May
31, 1786.
Another ii_nstance of the express grant of such power to
courts-martial, applicable to civilian witnesses, is found in
section 4 of the act of April18, 1814, chaptPr 82, which act,
by its terms, expired at the end of the then existing war.
That section imposed a pecuniary forfeiture (to be recovered
by bill, plaint, or information, in any civil court of competent
jurisdiction) where the witne~s, after being duly summoned
to attend the court-martial to testify before the same, failed
to appear without reasonable excuse; and where he refused
to testify before the court-martial, or behaved with contempt
thereto, it empowered such court to punish him with imprisonment.
The inference to be drawn from these enactments is, that
the power to punish a recusant civilian witness, a8 for a contempt, is no~ inherent iB a court-martial, and that such power
can only be exercised when authorized by the positive terms
of some statute.
The same view has been adopted and acted upon in the
British service. Prior to 1800, it seems, no power existed •
there to secure the attendance before courts-mart-ial of civilians summoned as witnesses. To supply such power a clause
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was introduced into the mutiny act of that year, providing
"that all witnesses so duly summoned as aforesaid (i. e. by
the judge-advocate or person officiating as such), who shall
not attend such courts, shall be liable to be attached in the
court of king's bench, etc., in like manner as if such witness had neglected to attend on a trial in any criminal proceeding in that court." Notwithstanding this provision authorized the issue of compulsory process by the courts therein
designated to secure the attendance of witnesses before
courts-martial, yet where the witness attended the courtmartial and refused to be sworn or to testify, such court
could not commit.him for contempt or otherwise punish him
for the refusal. (See Clode. Mil. Law, 1st ed., p. 126).
This was remedied in 1830 by a further amendment of the
mutiny act, making the witness liable to attachment as
above, where, having attended, be refused to be sworn, or
being sworn, refused to give·e"Vidence or to answer·all such
questions as the court might legally demand of him.
Recurring now to section 1202 Revised Statutes, I am unable to discover in this section any grant of power to punish
a recusant witness. The judge-advocate is thereby given
"power to issue the like process to compel witnesses to appear and testify which courts of criminal jurisdiction * * *
may lawfully issue." This does not enlarge the power of the
court-martial to punish, or create or give it cognizance of any
new offense. It arms the court with authority to compel the
witness to appear and testify~ so far as this can be done by
process; but in securing his testimony the court is restricted
to the means which it is thus authorized to employ. It can
not, on grounds of supposed public expediency, or on the
supposition that the interests of justice will thereby be promoted, assume to exercise any jurisdiction beyond what is
plainly granted, or inflict any punishment where the power
to impose it is not clearly conferred by the laws of Congress.
I may add that the general conclusion reached upon the
question herein considered derives additional support from
the provisions of the sixty-eighth article of war (Rev. Stat.,
sec. 1342). By this article Congress has given a courtmartial power to punish for contempts; but the power is in
terms restricted to cases of acts of menace in its presence or
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of disorder by which its proceedings are disturbed. In thus
limiting the grant of power to certain cases designated in the
statute, by a familiar rule of interpretation it is to be implied
that all others were meant to be excluded therefrom.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. B. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

FINES, PENALTIES, FORFEITURES, ETC.
The power conterred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by section 26
of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121, to refund" a fine, penalty, forfeiture, exaction, or charge arising under the laws relating to vessels
or seamen," which has been paid to any collector of customs or consular officer, does not extend to the case of a fine, penalty, etc., exacted
and paid prior to the date of that act, and of which an application for
remission was made within a year from the date of payment.
Nor does the power of remitting fines, penalties, etc., so arising, given by
the same section to the Secretary of the Treasury, extend to cases
where a competent judicial tribunal shall have decided that such fines
penalties, etc., were legally imposed.

DEPART:.JIENT

OF

JUSTICE,

October 30, 1885.

SIR: Your letter of the 24th ultimo presents for my con·
sideration the following case and questions :
''In 1.\'Iay, 1882, the British steamer Glenelg arrived at
Astoria, Oregon, from Hong Kong, China, having on board
an excess of passengers in violation of section 4253, Revised
Statutes. The master was tried in the United States district
court for Oregon, and condemned to pay a fine of $5,200,
which sum was paid into the registry of the court, and has
been regularly accounted for by the collector of customs in
that port. Hing Kee & Co., owners or agents of the vessel,
by their attorney, applied for a remission of the fine within
a year from the date of its collection j but the money having
been already covered into the Treasury by warrant, this Department took no action on the merits of the case, as it had
no power to refund any part of the money, even should it
decide that the penalty could be remitted. After the passage
of the shipping act of June 26, 188J, chapter 121, the appli-
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cation was renewed under the twenty-sixth section of that
act."
Hereupon these questions are proposed:
"(1) Does the power to refund moneys, conferred on the
Secretary of the Treasury ·by section 26 of said act of June
26, 1884, extend to moneys accruing from fines and penalties
exacted and recovered prior to the passage of the act, when
the application for a refund was made within a year from the
date of payment thereof'
" (2) Is a power to remit vested in the Secretary by the
same section, in cases where a competent tribunal shall have
decided that such fines and penalties were legally imposed ~"
The answer to the first of these questions depends upon
whether the provisions of section 26 of the act therein mentioned have or have not a retrospective operation. It is a
well settled rule that statutes are to be construed as prospective only, as intended to apply to those facts and cases
only which come into existence after their enactment, unless the contrary very clearly appears either explicitly or
by necessary implication from the language employed. In a
recent case the Supreme Court of the United States quotes
what was said })y the same court in the case of the United
States v. Heth (3 Or., 413), namely, that ''words in a statute
ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are
so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can
be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature
cannot be otherwise satisfied;" and it declares that such is
the settled doctrine of that court (Chew Beong v. United
States, 112 U. S., 559.)
The doctrine in the case of Heth v. United States, supra,
was applied in construing a clause in the act of May 10, 1800,
chapter 54, which provided ''that in lieu of the commissions
heretofore allowed by law, there shall, from and after the 30th
of June next, be allowed to the collectors * * * two and
a half per centum on all moneys which shall be collected and
received by them * * * for and on account of the duties
arising on goods impM·ted into the United States." The point
was whether this provision included collections on account
of goods imported before as well as after the 30th of June,
or was restricted to collections on account of goods imported
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after that date. It was construed to embrace the latter only.
In commenting upon the terms of the provision, Patterson,
J., observed: ''The word 'arising' refers to the present time,
or time to come, but cannot, with any propriety, relate to
time past and embrace former transactions. As to the word
'imported,' it may comprehend the past, or future, or both,
according to the subject-matter, and the words with which
it is associated. Thus the word 'arising,' coupled with the
words 'on goods imported,' shows that the whole clause has
a future bearing and aspect, and will not justly admit of a
retroactive construction."
The terms of the section now under consideration are somewhat similar. They are: "That whenever a :fine, penalty,
forfeiture, exaction, or charge arising under the laws relating
to vessels or seamen has been paid to a:r1y collector of customs or consular officer, and application has been made
within one year from such payment for the refunding or remission of the same, " etc. Here the controlling words, descriptive of the cases contemplated, appear to be "whenever
a fine, etc., arising," etc., which seem to have a prospective
meaning, and to be significant of an intent to include only
such :fines, etc., as may thereafter arise. They cannot well be
taken to comprehend such as had already arisen. The subsequent words, "has been paid," are necessarily limited to
the payment of a fine, etc., so arising; and hence to a payment made after the date of the act. Agreeably to this construction, an application for refunding or remission, unless
presented within one year from a payment so made, is not
within the act. Furthermore, it cannot reasonably be inferred from the language emnloyed that Congress intended
to go back an indefinite period of time, and provide for refunding payments made during such period, where the application for remission happened to be filed within a year
from the date of the payment, but not until after the money
bad been covered into the Treasury.
To the first question, I therefore reply, that in my opinion
the power to refund, conferred upon the Secretary of the
Treasury by section 26 of the act of J nne 26, 1884:, does not
extend to payments of fines and penalties exacted and recovered prior to the date of the act, and of which an application
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for remission was made within a year from the date of payment.
The second question involves an examination of section 26
of the act of 1884 with reference to the circumstances under
which, in the case of a fine or penalty arising as above, the
power to refund may be exercised under its provisions. It
declares that where the fine, etc., has been paid to any collector of customs or consular officer, etc., "the Secretary of
theTreasury 7 if on investigation he finds that such fine, pen- .
alty, forfeiture, exaction or charge was illegally, improperly,
or excessively imposed, shall have the power, either before or
after the same has been covered into the Treasury, to refund
so much of such fine, penalty, forfeiture, exaction or charge
as he may think proper, from any moneys in the Treasury
nCft otherwise appropriated."
This provision, in respect of the circumstances above referred to, differs very materially from the provisions for the
remission of fines, penalties, and forfeitures contained in sections5292 and 5293 Revised Statutes, and in the act of June
22, 1884, chapter 391. Under the latter, the power of the
Secretary to remit may be exercised, when, in his opinion,
the fine or penalty was incurred" without willful negligence
or any intention of fraud in the person incurring the same."
Generally, in the cases of such fines and penalties as come
within the scope of these statutes, it is not necessary toestablish either negligence or fraud on the part of the defendants, in onler to recover in prosecutions therefor; and
hence, notwithstanding the liability to the fine or penalty is
judicially established, the question of negligence or fraud in
the party liable remains an open one, and (as the statute provides) may still be the subject of investigation with a view
to the exercise of the power of remission.
Where, however, a fine or penalty has been recovered by
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, the question whe.ther it was or was not "illegally, improperly or excessively imposed," is one tha!i goes to the very foundation
of the judgment itself, and cannot well be determined except upon a review of the proceedings wherein such judgment was rendered. It may reasonably be assumed, in the
absence of anything in the statute indicating the contrary,
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that Congress did not intend to devolve upon the Secretary
of the Treasury a duty of that character. The "in,Testigation" to be made by him, as contemplated by the statute, is,
I think, limited to cases of fines, penalties, etc., exacted by
and directly paid to the customs and consular officers themseh·es, without the intervention of a court. In such cases
fines and penalties may be and often are "illegally, improperly, or excessively imposed." But where the imposition of
the fine or penalty is by the judgment of a competent court,
the presumption is otherwise-one which, on general principles, must be regarded as conclusive of the question of the
legality of the fine, etc., so long as the judgment stands
unreversed.
Accordingly, in direct answer to the second question, Ireply, that in my opinion the section under consideration does
not give the Secr.e tary of the Treasury a power of remission
"in cases where a competent tribunal shall have decided that
such fines and penalties were legally imposed."
I am, sir, very respectfully,.
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS.
The provisions of sectiqns 3739, 3740, and 3741, ReYised Statutes, considered, and held that, upon a fair construction thereof, a member of
Congress may be lawfully accepted as a surety on the bond of a contractor with the United States.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE~

November 2, 1885.

SIR: In your communication of October 27, 1885, you submit for an opinion the following question:
"Whether a member of Congress can lawfully be accepted
as a bondsman on a contract with the Government~ "
This question must be determined by a construction of
sections 3739, 37 40, and 37 41 of the Revised Statutes.
Section 3739 provides that ''no Member of or Delegate to
Congress shall, directly or indirectly, himself, or by any other
person in trust for him, or for his use or benefit, or on his
own account, undertake, execute, hold, or enjoy, in whole or

J
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in part, any contract or agreement made or entered into in
behalf of the United States?"
The penalty for violation of this statute is $3,000, and the
contract rendered void.
Section 3740 construes the statute as to agreements with
incorporated companies.
Section 3741 provides for an express condition in the contract that" no Member of (or n·elegate to) Congress shall be
admitted to any share or part of such contract or agreement,
or to any benefit to arise thereupon."
Section 37 42 makes it a misdemeanor for any officer of the
United States to enter into any such contract or agreement
with any Member of or Delegate to Congress, under penalty
<>f $3,000.
An opinion was rendered upon substantially the same sections (2 U.S. Stat. JJ., 484) by Attorney-General Legare.
He says : " The act of 1808 is a singularly strict, searching,
and comprehensive enactment, and one of my distinguished
predecessors (Mr. Wirt) thought it ought to be so construed
as to make it as remedial and efficacious as possible. Yet it
is a highly penalla w ; and, besides, is in derogation of common right; on both accounts, therefore, if not to be interpreted strictly, at least not to be extended by any latitude
of inference and construction. * * * The interest to disqualify a member from taking, or an officer from offering a
contract, must, in my opinion, be an immediate (however indirect) personal interest in its benefits. That he may ultimately profit by the contract * * * is not enough." (4
Opin., 48, 49.)
The rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed is
well established. How, then, can the above statute be so construed as to extend its prohibitory provisions to bondsmen
and sureties~ Signing a contractor's bond would not give
the surety any immediate personal interest in its benefits.
He is not a contractor with the Government nor does he,
under any circumstances, become so under the statute.
The bondsman does not become an original contractor, nor
is there any statute which subrogates him to the right of
such original contractor, under any circumstances or contingencies whatever.

•
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If the original contractor fails to perform his agreement,
there is no statute that substitutes the bondsman or surety
to the right to fulfill the same. If such right or privilege
devolves on the bondsman, it is acquired by the terms of the
contract, and not by the provisions of the statute.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that, upon a fair construction
of the ~tatute 7 a :Member of or Delegate to Congress may
be lawfully accepted as a bondsman on a contract with the
Government in the case mentioned.
·
The inclosures are returned herewith as requested.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient
servant.
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

CUST0:\18 DTJTIES.
The expense of brokerage, auctioneer's commissions, and packing, incurred at the place of exportation, are, by the act of March 3, 1883,
chapter 121, not to be estimated in determining the dutiable value of
imported merchandise.

DEPART]f!ENT

OF JUSTICE,
November 3, 1885.
SIR: I have considered your communication of the lOth
ultimo, inclosing papers relating to the cases of Glanz v. Spalding, recently decided in the United States circuit court for
the northern district of Illinois.
These cases, as I gather from the papers submitted, involved the question whether, under the customs laws as modified by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121,
certain items of expense, hereinafter mentioned, formed part
of the dutiable value of a lot of seal-skins which had been imported into the United States.
On the trial it appeared that, in the usual course of trade,
the skins were bought undressed at auction in London by
plaintiff's agent, who afterwards had them dyed and dressed
there, and, when finished, packed and shipped to the place of
importation. Besides the price paid for the undressed skins at
auction, the cost of the goods to the plaintiff at the place of
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exportation included the expense of dyeing, dressing, packing, etc., together with the auctioneer's commissions and the
agent's brokerage, all of which items had been added by the
customs officer in determining their dutiable value.
The plaintiff sought to recover back so much of the duties
paid by him on the goods as covered the items of brokerage,
com1nissions, and packing. The court found in his favor for
the amount of these items, and judgments were rendered accordingly.
Upon examination of the statutes, I am unable to discover
any ground for contesting the correctness of the judgments
so rendered. Expenses such as those last above described
are plainly forbidden by the act of 1883 to be estimated in
determining the dutiable value of goods. Formerly, under
sections 2907 and 2908, Revised Statutes, those and other
like charges were rP-quired to be added to the actual wholesale price or general market value in the principal markets
of the country of exportation in order to ascertain dutiable
value. But that act expressly repealed these sections, and
declared that thereafter "none of the charges imposed by
said sections, or any other provisions of existing law, shall
be estimated in ascertaining the value of goods to be imported,'' etc. I think the judgments are in perfect harmonywith the customs laws as thus modified.
In my opinion, therefore, writs of error should not be prose~
cuted in the cases above referred to, and I hereby certifythat no writs of error will be taken by the United State&
therein. The papers which accompanied your communica . .
tion are herewith returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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TRAVELING EXPENSES OF UNITED STATES MARSHALS.
In the adjustment of a marshal's emolument account, he may be allowed
credit for expenses of travel incurred by himself while serving process.
So a deputy-marshal may be reimbursed for expenses incurred while
serving process, and also be allowed three-fourths of the profits arising from his services.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 3, 1885.
SIR : The communication to you from the First Comptroller,
and by you submitted to me for opinion, presents the folio'\\ing questions :
(1) Whether in the adjustment of a marshal's return of
fees and emoluments he can be allowed credit for expenses of
travel incurred by himself while serving process.
(2) Whether a deputy-marshal can be reimbursed for expenses incurred while serving process, and also be paid
three-fourths of the profits accruing from his services.
This subject is regulated by section 841, Revised Statutes,
which provides that "no marshal shall be allowed by the Attorney-General, except as provided in the next section, to
retain of the fees and emoluments which he is required to
include in his semi annual return, as aforesaid, for his pet.sonal compensation, over and above the necessary expenses
<>f his office, including necessars clerk hire, to be audited and
allowed by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury Department, and a proper allowance to his deputies, any sum exceeding Hix thousaud dollars a year, or exceeding that rate for
any time less than a year. The allowance to any deputy
shall in no case exceed three-fourths of the fees and emoluments received or payable for the services rendered by him,
and may be reduced below that rate by the Attorney-General
whenever the returns show such rate to be unreasonable.i'
The general question that arises upon tllis section is
whether it was the intention of congress that, in estimating
the personal compensation of marshals and deputy-marshals,
no credits representing traveling expenses necessarily incurred by them in the discharge of official duties should be
allowed; in short, whether it was the intention of Congress
that these officers should defray their own expenses of that
kind.
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If this question is answered in the affirmative, it must fol low that if the traveling expenses of a deputy marshal for ·a
year should amount to the maximum sum he may receive for
that period, as might well happen in some large judicial
districts, he must be contented to have served the Government for his actual expenses merely. And what bas been
supposed of a deputy-marshal might be the case with a marshal. .Manifestly such a reading of the law must be avoided
if possible.
In my opinion the statute does not call for any such construction. It plainly requires that before the personal compensation of the marshal shall be determined "the necessary
expenses of his office" together with "a proper allowance to
his deputies" shall be first deducted, and it would be a rigorous interpretation, indeed, which rejected the cost of traveling in exe~uting process from the category of " necessary
expenses" of the marshal's office, or which recognized such
items as proper credits for the marshal, but not for his
deputies. Both offices stand on the same footing in this respect. The allowance of the marshal's "personal compensation" presupposes a reduction of all "necessary expenses of
his office," as well those incurred by his deputies as by himself, and superadded to that the deduction of " a proper ailowance to his deputies," thus showing that the compensation
of both grades of officers was intended to come out of the
emoluments or net earnings of the office.
And such bas been the interpretation that the accounting
officers of the Treasury have for many years given the law
regulating not only tbe compensation of marshals and deputymarshals, but that governing the compensation of district
attorneys and the clerks of United States circuit and district
courts, all which are regulated in this particular in precisely
the same langu-age, so that one principle must necessarily
apply to al1.
And the files of this Department show that this construction of the law was recognized by Assistant Secretary of the
Interior Otto when the subject of marshals' compensation
was under the control of that Department, and afterwards,
more than once, by Mr. Attorney-General Devens.
Such being the case, it would violate a wise principle of
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administration to overturn a reading of the law so long
established and appealing so powerfully to the sense of
right, and which may well be presumed to have received
the acquiescence of Congress. ·
In a case where two constructions of a statute are admis·
sible tre Supreme Court has uniformly deferred to and generally treated as controlling that construction which has
· been adopted by the proper Department of the Government
in applying the statute, particularly where it has been longes·
tablished. (Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wh., 206; Atkins v. Disintegrating Company, 18 Wall., 301; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall.,
382; United States v-. Moore, 95 U. S., 763; United States v.
Pugh, 99 U. S., 269 ; Swift v. United States, 105 U. S., 695;
Hahn· v. United States, 107 U. S., 406; United States v. Graham, 110 U.S., 221; F·i ve Per Cent. Cases, 110 U.S. 485.)
It follows that the questions propounded must be answered
in the affirmative.
Very, respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
N.A. VAL ACADEMY -HAZING.

To constitute the offense of" hazing" at the Naval Academy, under the
act of June 23, 1874, chapter 453, it is essential that the victim should
be a new cadet of the fourth class. Hence, unless the charge against
the accused alleges that the victim was a new cadet of the fourth class,
a court-martial organized under the statute would have no jurisdiction over it. An allegation that the victim was a candidate for appomtment or admission to the Academy is insufficient.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 12, 1885.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the lOth instant, inclosing'' a copy of all
rules, regulations, and orders in force at the Naval Academy prior to and at the date of the act of June 23, 1874, defining prohibiting, or referring to the offense of hazing."
This copy was requested in view of your communication of
the 20th ultimo, in which you ask "my opinion as to the
proper construction of the act of June ~3, 1874, 'to prevent
hazing,' with special reference to the question of jurisdiction
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as affected by the fact that the person against whom the
offense is committed, being a candidate for appointment, is
not at the time a naval cadet."
This act provides: ''That in all cases when it shall come
to the knowledge of the Superintendent of the Naval Academy at Annapolis, that any cadet midshipman or cadet engineer has been guilty of the offense commonly known as
hazing, it shall be tile dut.y of said Superintendent to order
a court-martial, * * * and any cadet midshipman or
cadet engineer found guilty of said offense by said court
sball upon recommendation of said court be dismissed, and
such finding when approved by said Superintendent shall be
final." * * *
The act does not define the offense against which the penalty is denounced. This is not unusual. Congress frequently affixes a penalty to a common law offense by name,
without defining it. In such cases we must look to the common law to ascertain the ingredients of the offense. The
statute under consideration is local to the Naval Academy at
Annapolis, and the offense named is unknown either to the
common or statutory law of tile land. Again, the statute
denounces an "offense," not a system or practice. Naval
cadets could not be guilty of an "offense," unless there was
some rule or regulation prescribed by competent authority
to be offended.
It is evident, therefore, that we must go to the rules and
regulations in force at the Naval Academy of Annapolis at
the date of the passage of this act for a definition of the
"offense commonly known as hazing." An examination of
the copy of them which you have furnished shows that for
many years prior to the passage of this act there existed at the
Naval Academy a practice among the older naval cadets of
maltreating the new cadets of the fou~th class. This practice was forbidden by tbe orders of the Superintendent of
the institution, and in those orders denominated as "hazing." Many cadets were dropped from the roll for the offense
of hazing, and much official correspondence about the offense
and its punishment took place between the Superintendent
of the Academy and the Secretary of the Navy during the
period from October, 1865, to l\1ay, 1874.
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On O~tober 6, 1865, a board was appointed by order of
the Superintendent of the Academy "to investigate the late
disgraceful proceeding that took place on the dock near the
Santee and Oonstit·n tion," in which it appear~ that Midshipman Wheeler was molested for the purpose of " horsing"
(as they express it here). T~w term ''horsing" was e,-j.
dently used by mistake for '' hazing." This is the first time
in which the existeuce of any system or practice kn.own as
"horsing" or "hazing'' is recognized in any order or regulation promulgated by those in authority at the Academy.
Here the victim was a mid~hipman.
Referring to this order the Superintendent of the Academy
writes the Secretary of the Navy, October 18, 1865, No. 27,
that" the practice of teasing and tormenting new midshipmen, often to the endangering of life and limb, has been
practiced here rather too freely.'' The Secretary of the
Navy, in reply, says: "Your No. 27, reporting midshipmen
(naming them) of the third class for taking unwarrantable
liberties with members of the fourth class, who have just
entered the Academy, has been received," etc.
The Secretary continuing, says that such conduct will not
be tolerated.
October 20, 1868, order No. 44 was issued by the Superintendent of the Academy and read at the evening parade.
This order was directed at the practice of hazing, and was
evoked by some cruelties practiced by inembers of the senior
classes upon new members of the fourth class. It recites
that'' orders have been issued in regard to the disreputable
practice of hazing," and dismissed those midshipmen who
were leaders in the hazing or maltreatment of the fourth-class
midshipmen.
'
On September 28, 1871, order No. 105 was issued by the
Superintendent. It is as fqllows:
"Order No. 105.]

NAVAL ACADEMY,

"Annapolis, JJfd., September 28, 1871.
''The cruel and senseless practice which has prevailed to
a greater or less degree amongst the senior classes of the
cadet midshipmen in the Academy, of 'hazing' the members of the junior or fourth clas~, is hereby positively pro-
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hibiteu. The cadet midshipmen are warned that those who
persist in the violation of regulations, and of this orcler, and
who are detec~ed in this practice will be reported to the Navy
Department and their dismissal from the Academy earnestly
recommended by the Superintendent.
"JOHN L. WORDEN,
'" Commodore and Superintendent of Naval Academy.
On October 6, 1871, Order No.117 was issued. This order
recites that " in open defiance of the regulations of the
Academy and of the stringent order of the Superintendent of
28th September, some evil-disposed members of the second
and third classes have carried the senseless practice of 'hazing' many of the fourth class to such an extent as to require
the most stringent measures for its immediate suppression."
On September 28, 1872, Order No. 109, was issued, \w hich is
as follows:
"Order No. 109.)

UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY,
"Annapol,is, Md., September 28, 1872.
''While the Superintendent does not believe that any of
the cadet midshipmen wi11 be so blind to their own interests,
or so regardless of the reputation of the Academy, as to attempt to re·establish the exploded and senseless practice of
'hazing' junior classmen, he yet deems it advisable, in the
event of his being miRtakeu in the gentlemanly instincts of
the young gentleme-::1. to warn them, at the outset of the new
academic year, that any violation of the regulations in that
regard will meet with speedy punishment. For the information of all concerned, the following extracts from letters of
the honorable Secretary of the Navy, dated October 14 and
November 16, 1871, are publisl;led:

*

*

*

*

*

*

"Extract 1. 'The traditions and instincts of a naval o:ffi~
cer call upon him .to protect the weak, to be kind and courteous to strangers, to render the service of the country as acceptable to its members as its hardships and privations will
permit.
" 'The Department is determined to root out the recently
exhibited tendency to treat the incoming cadets with violence
and inhumanity, and will punish to the extent of its power
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------------------

------------------

condu~t

so unworthy of officers and gentlemen as that just
shown at Annapolis.'

•

*

*

. *

*

*

"Extract 2. 'The Secretary of the Navy learns with regret
that the order from the Department of the 14th of October,
visiting upon certain cadet midshipmen at the Academy the
proper punishment for their offenses against good order and
discipline, has failed to entirely remoYe the evil against
which the order was directed. The Superintendent of the
Academy reports that the barbarous and ungentlemanly-like
practice of 'hazing' bas been renewed by certain members
of the class which has just entered upon its second year at
the Academy, and that not only the constant annoyance,
but in some instances brutal treatment, to which certain of
the newly-entered cadets had been subjected, still continues.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*'

*

*

*

"Extract 3. 'Youug gentlemen selected to be educated for
the public service at the public expense ·must realize that
the continuance of· the national favor depends upon the
spirit with which it is received, and that misGonduct in their
position, like misconduct in any other office, deser"Ves and
will inevitably be followed by· removal.'

•

*

*

''Extract 4. 'In conclusion, let it be distinctly understoo<l
that the Academy will be purified of this disgraceful practice,
and the defiant spirit which now invokes its action, by the
dismissal, if necessary, of every cadet-to the "Very last-who
refuses the fullest obedience to the regulations on this subject.'

*

*

*

*

"The prompt action taken ~y the Navy Department last
year, in dismissing parties who were found guilty of" hazing,"
should be sufficient proof to others who may be tempted to
commit like offenses, of the certain conRequenee which must
result therefrom. !Jet this warning given in the interests of
yourselves and of the Academy be sufficient to sa,Te you and
your friends from the disgrace and mortification which a
disregard to it will surely bring.
''JOHN J.J. WORDEN,
"Commodore and Superintendent of Naval Academy."
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No order, rule, or regulation has been found in which the
maltreatment by a cadet of any one other than a new cadet
of the fourth class is denominated as hazing or made a spe·
cific offense.
The statute under consideration is highly penal and must
be strictly construed. The definition of the offense commonly
known as "hazing'' cannot be enlarged or its ingredients
varied for the purpose of carrying out any line of policy,
however wise, or effecting any purpose, however laudable.
The offense commonly known as hazing, at the date of the
passage of the act, was committed where an older cadet maltreated a new cadet of the iourth class.
I am confirmed in this opinion by the interpretation put
upon this statute by the authorities of the Naval Academy.
In an official copy of the regulations of the United States
Naval Academy, as approved by the Secretary of the Navy,
of date January 1, 1876, I find the following:
Section 170 (page 32), under general heaci " Internal discipline,'' provides: "The practice of molesting, annoying, ridiculing, maltreating, or assuming unauthorized authority over
the new cadets of the fourth class, known under the term
. hazing, running, etc., shall subject the older cadets to
prompt dismissal from the Naval Academy, as prescribed
by the act of Congress and the orders of the Secretary of
the Navy."
I am of opinion, therefore, that to constitute the offense of
hazing under the statute it is essential that the victim of the
maltreatment should be a new cadet of the fourth class.
Unless the charge on which the cadet is arraigned alleges
that the victim of the maltreatment or hazing was a new
cadet of the fourth class, a court-martial organized under the
statute would not have jurisdiction to try it. If the charge
makes the allegation and the proof fails to maintain it the
court-martial should acquit the accused. As a candidate for
admission to the Academy is in no sense proper or popular" a
new cadet midshipman or cadet engineer of the fourth
class," a charge alleging that the victim of a cadet's maltreatment was a candidate for admission would not come
within the jurisdiction of a court-martial organized under the
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statute. nor would proof that the victim wag a candidate authorize conviction on a charge properly drawn.
AU papers and documents sent me in connection with this
matter are herewith returned.
Very respectful1y,
A. H. GARLAND.
ThA SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

COMMISSIONERS OF ALABAMA CLAIMS.
The officers composing the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims,
re-established by the act of June 5, 188~, chapter 195, were appointed
in conformity to the provisions of that act, but were not commissioned
for any stated period. · That act limited the duration of the court to
two years ft·om the time of its organization thereunder; but, by the
act of June 3, 1884, chapter 62, its existence was extended to December
31, 188fi; and under the latter act tile officers of the court con tinned
to perform their duties aft,er the expiration of the two years referred
to, without any other appointment than that originally received: Held
that the limitation upon the duration of the court prescribed by the
act of 1882 was not a limitation upon the terms of the officers thereof,
and that the court remained after the expiration of the two years limited by that act, by virtue of the act of1884, a legally constituted body,
notwithstanding the officers composing it received no other commissions than those originally given.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 14, 1885.
Your letter of the 13th ultimo informs me that a question has arisen in the Treasury Department " as to the legality of the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims," upon
which you desire my opinion. Iu compliance with your re·
quest I have now the honor to state my views upon this subject.
The officers composing that court were appointed under
the act of June 5, 1882, chapter 195, re-establishing it. This
act limited the existence of the court to two years from the
time of its organization thereunder. By the act of June 3,
1884, chapter 62, its existence was continued and extended
to December 31, 1885. Under the latter act eaGh of the officers of the court has, from the expiration of the two years re·
ferred to down to the present time, continued to exercise the
duties of the office to whieh he was appointed as above,
SIR:
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without any other commission than the one originally received. This has given rise to the question alluded to by
you, which I understand to be: Whether the court has been
since the expiration of the two years mentioned, and is now,
a legally constituted body.
It is assumed that the doubt as to the legality of the court,
which the suggestion of this question implies, proceeds from
the view that the term of the incumbents, appointed as above,
was apparently for a definite period (namely two years), and,
if for a definite period, that Congress could not, by subsequently prolonging it, continue them in office after the expiration of the term fixed by the law in force when their appointments were made. Here, then, it becomes important in
the first place to inquire whether the aet of June 5, 1882,
under which the appointments were made, prescribed a definite term for the appointees.
By the first section of the act of 1882 the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, created by the act of June 23,
187 4-, chapter 459, was re-established in the manner and with
the obligations, duties, and powers imposed and conferred by
said chapter, except as changed and modifi~d by this act."
The second section of the same act provided "that the number of judges for said court, to be nominated and appointed
in the mode directed by section 2 of said chapter, shall be
three," etc. Section 3 provided "that the judges of the court
hereby re-established shall convene and organize in the city
of Washington as soon as practicable after their appointment,
and the court so organized shall exist two years," etc.
It w~ll be observed that the second section of the act of
1882 declares that the judges sliall be nominated and appointed in the mode directed by section 2 of the act of 1874.
The latter section contains nothing in regard to the appointment of the judges. Their appointment, unrler the last-mentioned act, is regurated by the first section thereof, and it is
probable that Congress had in mind the provisions of this
section when passing the act of 1882. The mode prescribed
by the first section of the act of 1874 is, nomination by the
President to the Senate and appointment by him with the
advice and consent of that body, which is the mode whereby
the judges were actually appointed under the act of 1882.
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Had the latter act been silent or made no valid and effective
provision on the subject, their appointment would have constitutionally devolved upon the President and Senate (6
Opin., 1; 11 Opin., 209; 15 Opin,. 3, 449); so that it is unimportant whether the clause in the second section thereof,
quoted above, be taken to refer to the first section of the act
of 187 4, or be regarded as wholly inoperative, the appointments of the judges under the act of 1882 as actually made
being in either case proper.
Neither the act of 1874, which originally created the court,
nor the act of 1882, by which it was re-established, expressly
limited or defined the terms of the officers thereby authorized
to be appointed.
The act of 187 4, in Recti on 8, provided that " the said court
shall exist for one year from the date of its first convening and
organizing, and should it be found impracticable to complete
the work of the said court before the expiration of the said
one year, the President may, by proclamation, extend the
time of the duration thereof to a period not more than six
months beyond the expiration of the said one year; and in
such case all the provisions of this act shall be taken and
held to be the same as though the continuance of the said
court had been originally fixed by this act at the limit to
which it may be thus extended." The duration of the court
was subsequently extended by proclamation of the President
for a period of six months from July 22, 1875 (19 Stat., 661.)
Afterwards, by act of December 24, 1875, chapter 1, its existence was continued and extended to July 22, 1876, when,
by an act of the latter date (chapter 225), it was again continued and extended to January 1, 1877.
In similar terms the act of 1882, in the third section thereof,
provided that " the cottrf, * * * shall exist two years."
This legislation limits the du~ation of t}J.e court, and, incidentally, the term of each officer constituting it; as, when
an office ceases to exist, the in cum bent is ipso facto out of
office. But it does not restrict such term otherwise than in
this incidental way. The judges, etc., are not thereby required to be appointed for any definite period, but only to
the office; and, in point of fact, they were not commissioned
for any stated time. It is manifestly intended by the statute
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that the term of the officer so appointed shall not be for a
fixed period, but be co-extensive with the existence of the
office itself, which depends solely on the will of Congress,
and may be prolonged or shortened at the pleasure of that
body. The effect of the limitation adverted to was nothing
more than that the court should exist for two years only,
unles~ Congress, in the meantime, should extend its duration
for a longer time. And when the appointments were made
to the office without any definite term being expressed therein
(which, as already intimated, was in conformity with tile
statute authorizing them) it must be presumed that they were
so made with the knowledge of the power of Congress to prolong the existence of the conrt, and also in contemplation of
the possibility of Congress exercising this power and thereby
continuing the appointees in office correspondingly.
Instances of this sort are found in earlier acts of Congress
and in the practice of the appointing power thereunder.
Thus, by the act of July 13, 1832, chapter 199, to carry into
effect the convention betwRen the United States and France
of July 4, 1831, the President, with the concurrence of the
Senate, was authorized to "appoint three commissioners,
who shall form a board," whose duty it was to receive and
examine all claims presented to them under that convention.
The act further provided ~'that the board * * * within
two years from the time of its meeting shall terminate its
duties." Subsequently, by act of June 19,1834, chapter 57,
the duration of the commission was extended to three years
from August 1, 1832, and again by act of March 3, 1835,
chapter 43, it was extended to January 1, 1836. The commissioners appointed under the act of 1832 were not (nor
did it require them to be) commissioned for a definite term,
and they continued in office under their original appointment
after the expiration of the two years limited by that act, and
during the whole period for which the existence of the commission was extended by the subsequent acts mentioned.
So, in the case of the commission created by the act of
March 2, 1833, chapter 96, to carry into effect the convention
between the United States and the Two Sicilies of October
14, 1833. That act limited the duration of the commission
to one year from the time of its first meeting. The act of
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J nne 19, 183-t-, chapter 58, extended the time six months.
The commissioners were not appointed for a definite term,
and they remained in office under their original commissions
during the extended period.
Very different, however, is the case where Congress prescribes a definite term for the appointment, and afterwards
extends the duration of the office. Thus the act of March 3,
1871, chapter 116, which created the Southern Claims Commission, provided that the commissioners should be ''commissioned for two years," and they were commissioned for
two years from March 10, 1871. The provjsions of that act,
establishing the commission, were subsequently by the act
of March 3, 1873, chapter 236, extended and continued in
force for four ~·ears from March 10, 1873.. But the commissioners, on the expiration of the term for which they were
commissioned under the act of 1871, were re-appointed and
thereafter served under new commissions. This case well
illustrates the difference between a law which limits the duration of an office and one which limits the term of an incumbent thereof.
In addition to the instances above mentioned, showing the
practice of the Government where offices, limited in duration,
have been created by statute, and afterwards continued in
existence by Congress, I may mention another, showing a
similar practice where the office was established by treaty
for a limited period and subsequently extended by treaty for
a further period. The Mexican Claims Commission, created
by the convention between the United States and Mexico,
of July 4, 1868 (one of the commissioners being appointed by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate),
was originally limited in d ura.tion to two years and six months,
but was subsequently extenJe<l from time to time by the conventions of Avril 19, 1871, .November 27, 1872, and November 20, 1874. The comillissioner who was appointed by the
_President under the convention of 1868 (and here the appointment was not for a definite term) continued to serve
under his original appointment during the period for which
the commission was subsequently extended as above.
The result arrived at is that the limitation upon the duration of the court prescribed by the law of 1882 is not to be
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understood as a limitation upon the term of the officers
thereof in such sense as to restrict the latter to a definite
period of time beyond which it can not extend, or the incumbents continue in office without new appointments.
In response, then, to the general question submitted, I
reply that in my opinion the Uourt of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, re-established by the act of J nne 5, 1882, has
been since the expiration of the two years limited by that
act, and is now, by virtue of the act of June 3, 1884, a legally
constituted body, notwithstanding the judges, etc., composing it were appointed under the former and before the passage of the latter act, and have received no other commissions than those originally given.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRE'f.A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

CASE OF DANIEL DONOVAN.
D., while a clerk in the office of the Auditor of the District of Columbia,
was appointed a referee by the Court of Claims under the provisions
of the act of June 16, 1880, chapt,er 243, and performed services as such;
and in consideration of such services the court issued certificates to him
fixing the amount ot compensation allowed therefor: Held that D. is
entitled to receive the amount thus allowed.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF .JUSTICE,

November 18, 1885.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of five
certificates of the Court of Claims allowing Daniel Donovan,
a clerk in the office of the auditor of the District of Columbia, ~930 for services as referee in certain suits against said
District with a request for my opinion upon the question presented.
Inclosed therewith is a communication addressed to "The
. President," dated November 2, 1885, from J. B. Edmonds,
president ofOommissioners of the District, referring to said
certificates of Court of Claims to said Donovan for services
as referee under appointment of said court in accordance
SIR:
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with the act of June 16,1880, and stating: "Inasmuch as
his right to receive these awards has been challenged on account of his employment as clerk in t,h e auditor's office, we
have the honor to request that this question be referred to
the honorable Attorney-General for his opinion."
By said act of June 1G, 1880, it is provided (inter alia) to
wit: "When the trial of any claim against the District of
Columbia, prosecuted under the provisions of this act, involves the taking and stating of a long account, or the making
of measurements or computations involving the services of
engineers, said court shall have the power to award a reference to a competent referee to take and state such account,
or .to the engineer commissioner of the District to make and
report such measurements and computations; and said
referee or engineer shall report to the court the evidence
taken by him for the information of said court, and any such
referee shall be allowed such compensation for his services
as the court may determine, not to exceed ten dollars per
day for time actually employed, to be paid on the order of
the court by the Secretary of the Treasury and charged to
tbe account of the District of Columbia."
If Daniel Donovan is otherwise competent there is nothing in said act to prevent his acting as referee in accordance
with its provisions and receiving proper compensation therefor whilst a clerk in the office of the auditor of the District.
Revised Statutes~ section 17G3, provides, viz: "No person
who holds an office the salary or annual compensation attached to which amounts to the sum of two thousand :five
hundred dollars, shall receive compensation for discharging
the duties of any other office unless expressly authorized by
law."
·
It does not appear from the papers presented whether or
no the salary of Donovan amounts to the sum of $2,500. The
offices referred to in said act are offices under the Government of the United States. It is questionable as to whether
a clerk in the auditor's office of the District is embraced in
its provisions. It is not necessary to consider that question,
however, as a referee appointed by the Court of Claims under
the provisions of said act of June 16, 1880, does not hold an
office under the Government embraced in the provisions of
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said section 1763 of the Revised Statutes. ''An office is a
public station or employment, conferred by the appointment
of Government. The term embraces the idea of tenure, dura·
tion, emolument, and duties." (United States v. Hctrtwell, 6
Wall., 393.) A referee is appointed to perform a specific
duty and as soon as that duty is performed the service ceases.
It is a duty attached to the person selected under the said
act of J nne 16, 1880. Should the referee die a new reference
would have to be awarded. The referee is paid by the Government, but the'District is charged with the amount. It is
his duty to be disinterested in his action and to represent
both ·claimant and defendant.
If the office of Douavan as clerk in the auditor's office of
the District be assumed as embraced in section 1763 of Revised Statutes, then the payment of the certificates to Donovan as referee could only be disputed on the ground of
their being for extra services. For such services, however,
a compensation is fixed by law, and they have no connection
with the duties of the office he holds, and should therefore
be paid (Converse v. United States, 21 Howard, 463). In
United States v. Brindle (110 U. S., 694) the case of Conversev. The United States, s~tpra, is affirmed. It is there decided
that when duties to be performed are of a different character
and at a different place, whilst "the exact amount of compensation for the service is not fixed, it is clearly to be in-·
ferred that such compensation as the law implies where labor is performed by one at the request of another, that is to
say, a reasonable compensation, would be paid.''
Converse v. The Un,ited States and The United States v.
Brindle, supra, relate to cases em braced within the provisions
of the act of August 31, 1852 (Stat. L., 10, 100, sec.18). Such
section is substantially the same as He vised Statutes, section
1763, except that it is iu terms absolutely prohibitory, whilst
said section of the Revised Statutes assumes that a double
office may be held and the salary of both paid, although the
compensation of one may amount to $2,500, if " expressly
provided by law."
My opinion is that Donovan is entitled to the compensation claimed, so far as the objection referred to is concerned.
273-VOL XVIII--20
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I inclose herewith the certificates above referred to, with
accompanying papers.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The PRESIDENT.

IN THE MATTER OF CLARK MILLS.

DEPAR1'MENT

OF

JUSTICE,

December 10, 1885.

SIR: The question presented to me by the papers transmitted by you is, whether in the execution of the trust
created by deed of Clark Mills under the provisions of the
act of Congress approved March 3, 1883, any further duty
in respect thereto devolved upon the President.
The complete condition of the trust appears in the accompanying letter of Ron. A. S. Worthington, United States
attorney, District of Columbia, to whom the matter was
referred last summer for information. Delay in this investigation has been inevitable on account of the long search
that was necessary to be made to get at the facts. The
money appropriated having been paid in accordance with
the provisions of the statute, and the $10,000 properly invested and secured under the supervision of the President,
as it appears, there is no other act which the President can or
ought to perform. The conservation of the rights of the
cestui que trust is now with the courts.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The PRESIDENT.
LOTTERIES-NON-MAILABLE MATTER.
Letters and circulars known (not merely supposed or suspected) to con.
cern lotteries are non-mailable, and may properly be excluded from
the mails.
But letters addressed to lottery associations or lottery agents cannot,
simply because they are thus addressed, be deemed to be letters concerning lotteries anu as such excluded.
Newspapers or periodicals containing lottery advertisements are not
thereby rendered non-mailable.
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A postmaster cannot lawfully refuse to receive and forward registered
packages addressed to lottery companies or persons described as agents,
officers, or managers thereof; nor can he lawfully refuse to issue moneyorders payable to such companies or to persons described in the orders
as agents, officers, or managers thereof.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 16, 1885.
SIR: The questions propounded for opinion in your communication of the 19th of November, ultimo, arise upon the
following provisions of law:
By section 3894, Revised Statutes, it is provided: "No letter or circular concerning (illegal) lotteries, so-called gift
concerts, or other similar enterprises, offering prizes, or concerning schemes devised and intended to deceive and defraud
the public for the purpose of obtaining money under false
pretenses, shall be carried in the mail. Any person who shall
knowingly deposit or send anything to be conveyed by mail
in violation of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not
more than five hundred dollars nor less than one hundred
dollars, with costs of prosecution." (Rev. Stat., 758.)
This was amended by act of July 12, 1876 (Stat., 90), by
striking out the word "illegal" where it occurs before the
word " lotteries."
By section 3929, Revised Statutes, it is provided "the Postmaster-General, may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that
any person is engaged in conducting any fraudulent lottery,
gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or of'
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of
any kind, or in conducting any other scheme or device for obtaining money through the mails by means of false or frauduient pretenses, representations, or promises, instruct postmasters at any post-offices at which registered letters arrive directed to any such person, to return all such registered letters
to the postmasters at the offices at which they were originally mailed, with the word 'fraudulent' plainly written or
stamped upon the outside of such letters; and all such letters
so returned to such postmasters shall be by them returned to
the writers thereof, under such regulations as the PostmasterGeneral may prescribe. But nothing contained in this title
shall be so construed as to authorize any postmaster or other
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person to open any letter not addressed to himself." (Rev.
Stat., 763.)
By section 4041, Revised Statutes, it is provided : "The
Postmaster-General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him
that any person is engaged in c·onducting any fraudulent lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money
or any real or personal property, by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind, or in conducting any otller scheme or device
for obtaining money tllrough the mails by means of false or
fraudulent pretences, representations, or promises, forbid the
payment, by any postmaster, to any such person of any
postal money order drawn to his order or in his favor, and
may provide oy regttlation for the return to the remitter of
the sums named in such money-orders. But this shall not
authorize any person to open any letter not addressed to
himself." (Rev. Stat., 778.)
By the act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 360, sec. 20), it is provided:
"That mailable matter of the fourth-class shall embrace
all matter not embraced in the first, second, or third class,
which is not in its form or nature liable to destroy, deface,
or otherwise damage the contents of the mail-bag, or harm
the person of any one engaged in the postal service, and is
not above the weight provided by law, which is hereby declared to be not exceeding four pounds for each package
thereof, except in case of single books weighing in excess of
that amount, and except for books and documents published
or circulated by order of Congress, or official matter emanating from any of the Departments of the Government, or from
the Smithsonian Institution, or which is not declared nonmailable under the provision of section thirty-eight hundred
and ninety-three of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the
act of July twelfth, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, or
matter appertaining to lotteries, gift concerts, or fraudulent
schemes or devices."
The first question is as follows: Whether these several
statutes render non-mailable letters and circulars concerning
lotteries.
As section 3894 (supra) prohibits the carrying in the mail
of any letter or circular concerning lotteries, and makes it
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penal to send anything in violation of the said prohibition, it
follows that letters and circulars known, and not merely supposed or suspected, to be concerning lotteries, are non-mailable.
The second question is as follows: Is it the duty of postmasters to withdraw from the mails such letters as they know
to be concerning lot<teries, and such circulars as they find
upon examina~ion to be concerning lotteries, etc. ~
Unsealed circulars may, by inspection, be knotrn to concern lotteries or not, and when they do may be properly withheld from the mails, as prohibited matter, and so may letters,
if known to concern lotteries. It must, however,' be in rare
instances that the contents of letters can be known, as they
are generally sealed and in\iolable.
The third question is in these words: When letters are addressed to lotteries, lottery associations, or persons described
in the addre~:<s as the agents of lotteries, or of lottery or similar schemes, can postmasters lawfully withdraw them from
the mails as letters concerning lotteries~
I think this must be answered in the negative The statute does not warrant any such action touching letters of the
kind mentioned. It does not follow that a letter addressed
to a lottery association concerns a lottery.
,
The fourth question is as follows: Are newspapers and
periodicals, otherwise entitled to pass in the mails as secondclass matter, rendered non-mailable when they publish, in
their regular columns, advertisements of lotteries, or similar
schemes for distribution of money or property by lot or
chance or offering prizes~
I do not think that a newspaper or periodical is rendered
non-mailable by containing a lottery advertisement. This
does not transform the newspaper into a ''circular" within
the purview of section 3894 (supra).
The fifth question is in the words following: Can postmasters lawfully refuse to receive and forward registered
packages addressed to lottery companies or to persons described as agents, officers, or managers of lotteries or other
similar enterprises offering prizes~
This should be answered in the negative. The law, section
3929 (supra), does not go so far. It authorizes the return of
regist,e red letters addressed to parties found and declared by
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the Postmaster-General, upon satisfactory evidence, to be
engaged in conducting a "fraudulent lottery." To reject such
matter as1 non-mailab-le would be to violate the statute, which
must be interpreted by its own words, and, furthermore,
would be to assume an identity between a lottery and a
fraudulent lottery, in the face of a seeming distinction between the two in t.he statute.
The sixth question is in these words: Can postmasters lawfullyrefuse to sell money-orders payable to lottery companies,
or to persons described in the orders as agents or officers of
such companies or concerns f
This question must be answered in the negative. Section
40!1, supra, cannot be so extended by implication. Its words,
which are plain, must have their ordinary sense and cannot
be understood to warrant the denial of an application for a
money-order to be made payable to a lottery dealer. The law
goes no further than to authorize 1;he Postmaster- General to
order the refusal of payment of any money-order payable to
a person who has been found, upon satisfactory evidence, by
him, the Postmaster-General, to be engaged in conducting a
"fraudulent lottery."
The seventh question is as follows: Has the PostmasterGeneral any legal authority, upon being satisfied that a concern or company is conducting a lottery, gift-enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind, to forbid postmasters generally from
registering packages or selling money-orders made payable
to such concerns, or to their known agents, on the ground that
it is unlawful to convey in the mails any matter-that is, concerning lotteries ~
If a letter is known to contain matter concerning a lottery
it may be withheld from the mail. But it does not follow,
necessarily, that a registered package addressed to a lottery
dealer, or a money-order made payable to him, appertains to
his business of lottery dealing. Such evidence certainly would
not sustain a prosecution for sending by mail a letter concerning lotteries. I think, therefore, this question must be answered in the negative.
In answering these questions, I have proceeded on the principle that the legislation in question should not be extended
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by construction. It is to some extent penal and very much
in derogation of the general right to use the mails, and, upon
a well-settled rule, nothing should be held to be within such
laws that is not embraced by the very words of the legislature, or, to borrow the language of the Supreme Court of the
United States, when speaking of the construction of penal
statutes," the words employed must be understood in the
sense they were obviously used." (United States v. Reese, 92
U.S., 219; Sedg. Stat. and Con. Law, 250,302, 329; Bishop
on Written Laws, sec. 119.)
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The POSTMASTER GENERAL.

CASE OF ASSISTANT SURGEON POPE.
A discharge of an officer from the military service, under the act of July
15, 1870, chapter 294, in order to be valid, must, like a resignation, be
founded on an offer on the one part and an acceptance on the other.
Accordingly, where Assistant Surgeon P., in September, 1870, offered to
taketh~ benefit of that act, and in November following his offer was
virtually rejected, an order subsequently (in December, 1870) issued
discharging him from service is held to be invalid and his status in the
service unaffected thereby.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

December 19, 1885.

SIR: Your communication of the 30th October, 1885, has
received my consideration.
The case presented by it is as follows: In September, 1870,
Benjamin F. Pope, then an assistant surgeon in the United
States Army, applied for a discharge, with a year's pay, under
section 3 of the act of 15th July, 1870 (16 Stat., 317), which
provides "that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized, at his discretion, honorably to discharge from the service
of the United States officers of the Army who may apply
therefor on or before the first of January next, and such officers so discharged under the provisions of this act shall be
entitled to receive, in a,ddition to the pay and allowances du~
them at the date of their discharge, one year's pay and allowances."
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On the 2d November, 1870, he was informed that staff officers would not be discharged with the pay and allowances
granted by the said act.
Afterwards it was decided to discharge staff officers at their
own request under the law, and, accordingly, on the 31st December, 1870, an order was issued discharging Assistant Surgeon Pope on his original application.
But upon receipt of this order Pope represented that he no
longer de~ired a discharge, and that on the rejection of his
application he bad made arrangements to continue in the
service, and that, under the circumstances, the order was unjust to him.
As a consequence of this representation the order of discharge was revoked on the 17th June, 1871, since which time
the officer has continued to render service and receive pay.
On the 16th September, 1885, a vacancy, with the rank of
major, occurred in the 1\fedical Department, and, as Assistant
Surgeon Pope was at the head of the list of his grade for promotion, he was appointed to fill the vacancy, subject to the
action of the Senate.
Upon this state of facts my opinion is asked as to the
status of Pope.
A discharge under the act of the 15th of July, 1870, to be
valid, must, like a resignation, be founded on an offer on the
one part and an acceptance on the other. (14 Opin., 261.)
There must, as in the case of an ordinary contract, be a meeting of the minds of the officer and the President upon the
same identical proposition, or no valid dischargt can be the
result.
Applying these principles, then, to the case in hand, it is
manifest tbat the order of the 31st December, 1870, discharging Assistant Surgeon Pope was inoperative and void for
the want of a subsisting offer or proposal on that officer's
part to take the benefit of the law. After the rejection of
the offer of September, 1870, it cannot be regarded as continuing to be accepted afterwards whenever the President
might see fit, but must be treated as at an end at the moment
of its rejection. As was said by the vice-chancellor in the
case of the Sheffield Canal Oo. v. Sheffield & Rother ham Railwa.y Go. (3 Rail way and Canal Cases, 132), the party who has
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rejected the offer cannot afterwards at his own option convert the same offer into an agreement by acceptance; for
that purpose he must have the renewed consent of the party
who made the offer. I am, therefore, of opinion that the
status of Surgeon Pope has not been affected by the order
made with a view to his discharge.
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
DEDUCTION FROM PAY OF MAIL CONTRACTORS.
The power conferred upon the Postmaster-General by section 3962 Revised Statutes to make deductions from the pay of mail contractors
in the cases therein mentioned is discretionary.
Where a deduction has been ordered by the Postmaster-General and he
afterwards becomes satisfied that the order was made under a misapprehension of the facts, it is within his power either to directly
rescind the order or to refer the matter to the Sixth Auditor under the
provisions of section 409 Revised Statutes.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Decmnber 21, 1885.
SIR: I have the J;tonor to acknowledge receipt of your
eommunication of the 14th instant (with inclosures) requesting my opinion upon the proper construction of section 3962,
Revised Statutes, which reads as follows:
'' The Postmaster-General may make deductions from the
pay of contractors for failure to perform service according to
contract; and impose tines upon them for other delinquencies; he may deduct the price of the trip in all cases where
the trip is not performed ; and not exceeding three times the
price if the failure be occasioned by the fault of the contractor or carrier."
The case presented by you is that of "a deduction of the
price of a trip recently made from the pay of the Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company for failure to perform a round trip August 24, 1885, on the route of the com- ·
pany from Creston to Hopkins, 1\lo., 27007."
You say: "The company has now shown by satisfactory
evidence that the failure was caused by the washing away
of a hridge on the line of their road, and that it was impossible to have run their trains through on that date. The
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mails thus delayed were carried by the company the next
day. They apply for the remission of the deduction, and if
such deduction were discretionary, in the first instance, or if
it can be remitted after having been ordered, there is mucl1
force in the application of the company for such remission.''
In construing the language of this statute the universal
rule, of course, must be applied in presuming the ordinary
meaning of words, unless that meaning would manifestly
defeat the objects of the statute. The word "may" in a
statute sometimes means "must" or "shall," but this is only
the case when in giving it its ordinary meaning the object of
• the statute would be destroyed. When power is given to
public officers, and when public or individual rights call for
its exercise, language used, permissive in form, is in fact peremptory, but this is only so where it is necessary to give
effect to the clear policy and intention of the legislature.
(Sedgwick on Construction, 375-377; Thompson v. Carroll, 22
How., 434; Bishop on Written Law, sec. 112.)
The words used in the statute under consideration in their
plain ordinary meaning permit the exercise of discretion on
the part of the Postmaster-General.
The question presented is not that of performance or nonperformance'' according to the contract." A case might arise
when both parties to the contract being innocent, the work
not being performed, it should not be paid for, but this is not
the only case which may occur under the statute. There
may be performance, although not performance '' according
to the contract," yet if the contractor l.s innocent of fault and
the public service does not suffer, a proper question arises for
the discretion of the Postmaster-General. The public interests, it seems, would not suffer by the exercise of such discretion on the part of the Postmaster-General in the matter
of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company,
presented in your letter. Where the contractor is in fault
there can be no question but that under the terms of the
statute the Postmaster-General has discretion. I fail to perceive that either the public interests or individual rights demand that language permissive in this statute should be regarded as in fact peremptory. A similar question was
presented to one, of my predecessors (14 Opin., 179), and I

TO THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

315

Customs Duties.

concur in his conclusion that it is within your discretion to
make de~uctions or not from the pay of contractors according to what may appear right and-proper under the circumstances in each case .
.A further question is presented. Can the deduction be
remitted, having been ordered '
No such power is expressly conferred by the statute. A
remission of a forfeiture under an act of Congress must be
supported by the terms of the act, and it is a familiar rule
that the acts of a public officer beyond the scope of his power
are void. The deduction provided for in the act under consideration, however, is not, where the contractor is innocent
of fault, in the technical sense either a forfeiture or penalty,
but it is the withholding of money not earned. If the Postmaster-General becomes convinced the order was made under
a misapprehension of the f~cts and the amount is in justice
due to the contractor under his contract it is within the scope
of the power of the Postmaster-General either to directly rescind his order or refer the matter to the Sixth Auditor under
the provisions of section 409, Revised Statutes.
It does not appear from your communication whether the
railroad company mentioned is an ordinary contractor, or
whether it is merely performing what is called "recognized
service." In either case, however, I think it is clear the
railroad company can be regarded as a contractor, and is
therefore within the terms of the statute. (Railroad Oompany v. United States, 101, U.' S. p. 549.)
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The POSTMASTER·GENERAL.
CUSTOMS DUTIES.
Periodical publications bound in stiff covers in regular book form (each
volume containing several numbers of any such publication) lose their
character as periodicals and become dutiable as books under the act of
March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 21, 1885.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
your letter bearing date 18th instant as to the 'm atter of
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the dutiable character of certain books. It appears that
there was recently imported atNewYorkanumberofbound
volumes, in stiff covers, of the Statesman's Year Book,
Portfolio Library of Art, Tour du Monde, Hugo Raconde,
and Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society, all of which
publications are issued in parts at regular stated periods,
but in the present instance having been bound in stiff covers
in regular book form, each volume containing several of the
periodical numbers, they were classified as books under the
provision of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, for ''books,
pamphlets," etc. (paragraph 384), and in accordance with the
decision of the Treasury Department of April3, 1884.
I am of opinion that the said publications, having been
bound in stiff covers in regular book form, lost their character as periodicals and became books in the sense of
the tariff act. Schedule M of the tariff act of 1883 imposes a duty of 25 per cent. ad valorem upon '~books,
pamphlets," etc. I concur with the Department that the
provisions of the free list relating to periodicals refer to
such as are forwarded in the usual manner, and not to
pamphlets which have been bound into books before their
importation into the United States. Therefore I am not
prepared to advise any reversal or modification of the decision of April3, 1884~ series 6288.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
STATE OF KANSAS-ACT FOR RELIEF OF.
In construing the act of August 15, 1876, chapter 305, the preamble thereto
may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the
enacting clause.
In compliance with the provisions of that act, the State is entitled to a
credit of $11,425 thereunder, and no more.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF

JUSTICE,
December 28, 1885.
Sm: Yours of December 23, instant, requesting an opinion
as to the proper construction of the act of Congress approved
August 15, 1876, entitled "An act relieving the State of K~n-
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sas from charges on account of ordnance stores furnished to
Kansas Territory" (19 Stat., chap. 305, p. 206), has been
received.
If the preamble and enacting clause of this statute are to
be construed together, the intention of Congress is easily ascertained. The preamble recites that" Whereas it appears from the books of the Ordnance Bureau of the War Department that the State of Kansas stands
charged with eleven thousand four hundred and twenty-:fiTe
dollars for arms issued to the Territory of Kansas." * • •
The enacting clause direct~ • • • "the State of
Kansas to be credited on its ordnance account with the
amounts now charged against it for arms and ordnance
stores." • * *
•
The preamble states in unequivocal language the amount
with which the State of Kansas was charged at the date of
the passage of the act, and the enacting clause directs a
credit for th~ amounts so charged. It is evident that it was
the intention ofCongress that the amount named should be
the extent of the credit, and that the provisions of the act
should be restrained to the recitals in the preamble.
What effect has the preamble upon the interpretation of
this statute~
''It becomes important in ascertaining the general intent
of the legislature."
It may explain an equivocal expression in the enacting
c]ause, seldom extends it, and in doubtful cases may restrain
it.
Lord Coke considered the rehearsal or preamble a key to
open the understanding of the statute.
"Recitations in the preamble must be accepted as at least
prinw facie and perhaps conclusively correct. * • •
When viewed as a key to the interpretation they should in
reason be deemed conclusive of the recited facts, because,
whether really true or not, they explain the legislative perspective in enacting the statute."
"And whether the words shall be restrained or not must
depend on a fair exposition of the particular stat~te in each
particular case, and not upon any universal rule of construction." (Bishop on the Written Law, secs.49,50,51, and notes.)
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"Parker, chief-justice, lays down the rule that it is right
and proper to consider the whole of a statute and p'reamble
and the probable intention of the legislature, in order to as:
certain the meaning of any particular section, and that this
mode of interpretation is justifiable, even where the words
of the section may be unambiguous." (Smith's Cpmmentaries, sec. 571, p. 707 ; 1 Pickering's Reports, 258.)
"But though the preamble can not control the enacting
part of a statute which is expressed in clear and unam bignous terms, yet, if any doubt arise on the words of the enacting part, the preamble may be resorted to to ex1Jlain it. In
truth, it then resolves itself into a question of intention; or,
in other words, recourse is had to the primary rules of interpretation." (Potter's Dwarris, p. 269.)
It is plain, therefore, from the above references that recourse may be had to the preamble in this case to ascertain
the intention of Congress in the passage of the act, and also
for a proper interpretation of the enacting clause.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the preamble in the act
under consideration should be resorted to for the purpose
of interpreting the enacting clause, and that the State of
Kansas, when it has complied with the provisions of such
act, is entitled to a credit of $11,425 thereunder, and no
more.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

SUSPENSION OF OFFICER.
Case of the suspension of Marshall B. Blake as collector of internal revenue for the second district of New York, and the designation of John
A. Sullivan to perform the duties of that officer, considered.
The suspension of an officer involves a suspension of his bond; the bond
required of the person designated to take the place of the former being substituted therefor while the person so designated is performing
the duties of the office.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

December 28, 1885.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the
letter of Ron. JosephS. Miller, Commissioner of Internal Rev-
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enue, relating to the appointment of John A. Sullh·an to
succeed Marshall B. Blake as collector of iuternal revenue for
the second district of New York, which has been referred by
yourself to this Department with the request that immediate
attention may be given to the same.
It appears from the st~tement of facts submitted that the
commission of Mr. Sullivan and the order of the President
suspending Mr. Blake from the office of collector, both being
dated December 2,1885, were sent by mail on the 3d day of
December, 1885. On the 15th of December the bond of John
A. Sullivan as collector of internal revenue for the second
district of New York, dated December 10, 1885, was received
and found to be correct.
On the same day Mr. Sullivan's commission was delivered
to him in the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
with a letter of instructions advising him that the office of
collector would be transferred to him December 31, 1885,
and inclosing a letter addressed to Mr. Blake, directing him
to turn over the office to his successor. A separate letter
was mailed to Mr. Blake directly on December 15, 1885, advising him of the date fixed for the transfer.
Under section 2, Article II, ofthe Constitution, the President has power to nominate and, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to appoint all officers of the United
States whose appointments are not therein otherwise provided
for and which shall be established by law.
The office of collector of internal revenue was created by
act of Congress, and belongs to a ~lass which requires the
concurrence of the Senate in the appointment of the incumbent. The tenure of the office is not fixed by law, and the
Constitution, while providing for appointments, is silent as to
the power of removal. On general principles it would seem
that the power of appointment carries with it the power to
remove as a necessary incident. (See 103 U. S~, 227.)
Before entering upon his office the President is required
to take an oath that he will faithfully e~ecute it, and one of
the obligations imposed upon him by section 3, Article II, of
the Constitution, is to" take care that the laws be faithfully
.executed." ·
The appointment and suspension of the incumbents of such
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offices as have been created to enable him to perform this
duty is his especial function. It is also his prerogative to
commission all the officers of the United States. The power
of the President to remove an officer, whose appointment requires the approval of the Senate, without t_h at approval,
has been much discussed. Until the enactment of the tenure
of office act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 430) it seems to have
been virtually conceded by Uongress (Story on the Constitution, sees. 1537, 1545), and the Supreme Court has accepted
the legislative action as amounting to a settled construction
of the Constitution in favor of the power. (Ex parte Hennen,.
13 Pet., 230.) In that case the co11rt say :
''All offices the tenure of which is not fixed by the Constitution, or limited by law, must be held either during
good behavior or (which is the same thing in contemplation
of law) during the life of the incumbent, or must be held at
the will and discretion of some Department of the Government and subject to removal at pleasure. It can not for a
moment be admitted that it was the intention of tl.Je Constitution that those offices which are denominated inferior
offices should be held during life. And if removable at
pleasure, by whom is such removal to be made¥ In the absence of all constitutional provision or statutory regulation
it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule to consiUer ,
the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment.
This power of removal from office was a subject of much
dispute, and upon which a great diversity of opinion was
entertained in the early history of this Government. This
related, however, to the power of the President to remove
officers appointed with the concurrence of the Senate; and
the great question was, whether the removal was to be by the
President alone or with the concurrence of the Senate, both
constituting the appointing power. No one denied the power
of the President and Senate jointly to remove where the
tenure of office was not fixed by the Constitution; which was
a full recognition of the principle that the power of removal
was incident to the power of appointment. But it was Yery
early adopted as tbe practical construction.of the Constitution
that this power was vested in the President alone, and such
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would appear to have been the legislative construction of the
Constitution." (See also 103 U. S., 227.)
But in the determination of the question now submitted
it is not necessary to discuss the power of the President to
remove from office. This is not a case of removal but of suspension. Secti0n 1768 of the Revised Statutes provides as
follows:
"During any recess of the Senate the President is authorized, in his discretion, to suspend any civil officer appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
except judges of the courts of the United States, until the
end of the next session of the Senate, and to designate some
suitable person, subject to be removed in his discretion by
the designation of another, to perform the duties of such
suspended office in the mean time; and the person so designated shall take the oath and give the bond required by law
to be taken and given by the suspended officer 1 and shall,
during the time he performs the duties of such officer be entitled to the salary and .emoluments of the office, no part of
which shall belong to the officer suspended. The President
shall, within thirty days after the commencement of each
session of the Senate, except for any office which in his
opinion ought not to be filled, nominate persons to fill an
vacancies in office which existed at the meeting of the Senate,.
whether temporarily filled or not, and also in the place of all
officers suspended ; and if the Senate during such session
shall refuse to ad·\ ise and consent to an appointment in the:
place of any suspended officer, then, and not otherwise, the
President shall nominate another person ~s soon as practicable to the same session of the Senate for the office."
The Senate was in recess on the 2d of December, 1885,
when the commission of Mr. Sullivan and the order suspending Mr. Blake were issued. When the President commissioned the one and suspended the other he exercised the discretionary authority which had been vested in him by an
act of Congress, and which he bad the undoubted right to
exercise with or without cause. It is fair to presume that
cause existed. At any rate the enactment of the law already
quoted furnishes conclusive evidence that in the judgment
of Congress the President can not properly perform his duty
273- VOL xvrn--21
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under the Constitution during the recess of the Senate without the power to suspend and thereby dispense with the services of such officers as in his opinion the public interests
may require.
Whatever effects might be considered to result from the
act of suspension, it can not be seriously contended, I think,
that the bond of the suspended officer remains in force after
his suspension and while the person designated to fill the office
in the mean time is performing its duties and receiving its emoluments. The suspension of the officer carries with it
necessarily the suspension of his bond. The bond required
of the person designated to take his place is substituted for
the bond of the suspended officer while the person so designated is performing the duties of the office.
It appears that the order suspending Mr. Blake was sent
to him on the 3d of December, 1885, and it is reasonable to
suppose that he received it in due course of mail. The Senate
was not in session until the 7th of December, 1885. The
-order of suspension took effect upon due notice thereof to
Mr. Blake, unless by its terms it was to take effect at a stated
time after notice. The receipt of the order by Mr. Blake
was due notice. (15 Opin. 62.) In my opinion he can not
,p roperly or legally resist the transfer of the office to lVlr. Sullivan.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DUTIABLE VALUE OF IMPORTS.
The values of foreigu coins, as annually estimated and proclaimed by
the Secretary of the Treasury under the provision of section 3564, Re-•
vised Statutes, constitute the only lawful basis for computing the invoiced value of importations, and duties on the latter are necessarily
required to be collected on the values of foreign coins so estimated and
proclaimed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Decembe-r 29, 1885.
SIR: In your letter of the 26th instant you direct my attention to. section 3564, Revised Statutes, which prescribes

•
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the rule for determining the value of foreign coin as expressed
in the money ofaccountofthe United States, and after observing that, in consequence of the decline in the price of silver,
the values of different foreign silver coins, as annually proclaimed by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions thereof, have greatly declined, and that this has had the
efl:'ect of reducing the duty exacted on merchandise invoiced
in such currency, you inquire whether that section necessarily requires the duties upon imported merchandise to be collected on the values of the standard foreign coins as thus
annually proclaimed. To this inquiry I have the honor to
reply:
By section 2838 all invoices of imported goods subject to
a duty ad valorem are required to be made out in the currency of the place or country whence imported, and in order
to determine the dutiable value of such goods it is necessary
to ascertain the value in United States money of the currency in which they are invoiced.
Prior to the passage of the act of March 3, 1873, chapter
268, a number of statutory provisions existed fixing the rates
at which foreign coins were to be estimated in computations
at the custom-house-some prescribing rates for estimating
the value of particular coins only, others rates for estimating
the value of the particular coins enumerated therein, and
also a mode for estimating the value of such as were not
therein enumerated. But in the case of The Collector v.
Richards (23 Wall., 246) the Supreme Court declared that
the provisions of that act abrogated all previous regulations
on the subject, and it accordingly held that the value of the
French franc, as estimated by the Director of the Mint and
proclaimed by the Secretary of the Treasury on January 1,
1874, pursuant to the first section of the act, were applicable
to goods invoiced in French francs and entered at the custom-house in March of that year, and that the invoiced value
of such goods must be computed according to the valuation
of the franc so proclaimed. This valuation exceeded by 7
mills the value of the franc as fixed by previous legislation,
and the effect was in that case to increase the duty upon the
goods.
In construing the first section of the act of 1873 (which was

324

HON. A. H. GARLAND

•

Dutiable Value of Imports.

the one involved in the case then under consideration) it was
observed by the court that that section and the second section of the same act had substantially the same objects in
view; that the object of the first section was to establish a
method of computing the value of other foreign coins, similar
to that employed in the second section in computing the value
of the sovereign, and to apply such computation in the same
cases and for the same purposes, amongst which is that of computing the value of invoices of imported goods. "Otherwise,"
remark the court, "there would exist two different methods of
computing the values of foreign coins and two different rules
for estimating the values of goods imported frbm different
countries, giving a different value to goods imported from one
country from that given to goods of the same cost imported
from another country.'' And this case has been on two different occasions cited with approbation by the Supreme Court.
(Cramer v. Arthur, 102 U.S., 612; Hadden v. Merritt, 115 U.

s., 25.)

The provisions of the first and second sections of the act of
1873 are reproduced witho~t change in sections 3564 and 3565,
Revised Statutes-section 3564 containing those of the first
section.
The construction put by the Supreme Court upon the first
section of that act applies with all its authoritative force to
section 3564. According to that construction the values of
foreign coins, annually estimated and proclaimed as required
by the latter section, must be regarded as being the only lawful basis for computing the invoiced value of importations.
In my opinion, therefore, that section necessarily requires
the duties upon importal merchandise to be collected on the
values of the standard foreign coins annually estimated and
proclaimed as above.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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LOTTERIES.
Until the Postmaster-General has found, upon evidence satisfactory to
himself, that any lottery,gift-enterprise, or scheme is a means of fraudulently obtaining money through the mails, he is not authorized to
instruct postmasters to return registered letters or to forbid them to
pay money-orders because the same are addressed or made payable to
an individual conducting such lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 7, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to submit, in reply to your commu-

nication of the 21st December, ultimo, that in my opinion
the Postmaster-General has no right to instruct postmasters
to return registered letters or forbid them to pay money·
orders because addressed or made payable to an individual
conducting a lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money or property by lot, chance, or drawing of any
kind, until be has found,'' upon evidence satisfactory to him,"
that such lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme is a means of
obtaining money through the mails by falsehood and false
pretense.
I think it beyond doubt that Congress, in section 3929,
Revised Statutes, intended to draw a distinction between lotteries, etc., fairly, and lotteries, etc., dishonestly conducted.
· I do not think that, because a lottery or gift-enterprise or
scheme for the distribution of property may be illegal by the
law of the State where it is carried on, it is, for that reason
alone, fraudulent under section 3929 (supra), it being clearly
the intention of Congress, as I have said already, that before
the above-mentioned mail facilities can be denied to persons
carrying on lotteries, etc., it must be shown that their business involves a use of those facilities for obtaining money
fraudulently.
I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfrllly,
A. H. GARLAND.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
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PERSONAL EFFECTS-FORFEITURE.
Where an importation of packages was entered at the custom-house as
containing personal effects only and not subject to duty, but it turned
out on examination that the packages contained dutiable merchandise
of considerable value: Held that the entire packages were not forfeitable but only the dutiable merchandise; the case being governed
by section 2802, Revised Statutes, which is unaffected by the provisions
of section 12 of the act of June 22, 1874, chapter 391.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 13, 1886.
SIR: Your communication of the 7th January, instant, has
received my consideration.
The case submitted for opinion is this: One F. Abbes has
entered in the custom-house at the port of San Francisco an
importation of nine ca~:;es as containing personal effects, and
therefore non-dutiable. It turns out, however, that only four
of the cases contained goods entitled to free entry, and that
the other five contained dutiable merchandise of considerable value. The questions presented on these facts are: Supposing the dutiable merchandise to be forfeitable, are the
personal effects also liable to seizure under t.he provisions of
section 12 of the act of the 22d June, 1874 (18 Stat., 186), or
by virtue of any other f:.ltatute, and ''does a forfeiture attach
to an entire package of imported merchandise when any portion of its contents is liable to forfeiture by a false entry or
false statement in an invoice, or by omission from such invoice for the purpose of evading payment of duties."
In my opinion the personal effects referred to are not confiscable with the dutiable merchandise, should that be held
liable to condemnation. Section 2802 of the Revised Statutes
provides that when an article subject to duty, and not disclosed at the time of making entry, is discovered in the baggage of any person, it shall be forfeited and such person shall
be liable to a penalty of treble the value of such article.
This section is still the law, and stands unaffected by the
twelfth section of the act of the 22d June, 1874 (supra),
which applies to frauds in connection with entries of merchandise acknowledged and avowed.
If Congress baa intended by that act to subject to forfeit-
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ure the personal effects found in the same case or package
with dutiable goods fraudujently entered as free, it is hardly
to be supposed· that such \ntention would have been indicated by declaring that the forfeiture denounced should apply to the " whole of the merchandise in the case or package
containing the particular article or articles of merchandise
to which such fraud or alleged fraud relates." The term
"merchandise" can not be by itself held to be convertible
with " baggage" and '~ personal effects," which are the terms
generally used by Congress in its revenue legislation when
dealing with the things to which those terms customarily
refer.
It is not at all probable either that if Congress bad intended
for the first time to make personal effects share the fate of
confiscable property mingled with them,it would have omitted
to refer specially to section 2802 and left its repeal or modi·
fication to implication merely.
The fact that the case presented is the first one of the kind
that. has arisen since the act of 1874 was passed, is perhaps
due to the prevalence until a very late day of an interpretation of the 12th section of the act of June, 1874, accordant
with this opmion.
In conclusion, it will be observed that I have answered the
questions submitted with exclusive reference to the facts contained in your communication.
I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

l!'ORT BROWN RESERVATION, TEX.
The act of March 3, 1885, chapter 360, appropriated a large sum of money
"to enable the Secretary of War to acquire good and valid title for
the United States to the Fort Brown Reservation, Tex., and to pay and
extinguish all claims for the use and occupation of said reservation by
the United States;" with a proviso that uo part of said sum shall be
paid·" unt.il a complete title is vested in the United States," and that
"the full amount of the price, including rent, shall be paid directly to
the owners of the property."
Claims of ownership of the property, or some portion thereof, having
been asserted by diffbrent parties, who propose to convey the same to
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the Government, their titles respectively, at the request of the Secretary of War, examined and considered by the Attorney-General,
who indicates in his opinion the persons by whom and points out the
mode by which a good and valid title to the whole of the reservation
can be conveyed to the United States and all claims for the use and
occupancy thereof extin~uished, as contemplated by the said act of
1885.
The provisions of that act do not authorize acquisition of title by condemnation under the eminent domain power of the United States.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 16, 1886.
SIR: I have considered the questions presented in your
letter of the 7th of November last relative to the property
known as the Fort Brown Reservation, and, in compliance
with your request, now have the honor to state my views
thereon.
The act of March 3, 1885, chapter 360, appropriated the
sum of $160,000 "to enable the Secretary of War to acquire
good and valid title for the United States to the Fort Brown
Reservation, Tex.~ and to pay and extinguish all claims for
the use and occupancy of said reservation by the United
States," with a pro-viso "that no part of this sum shall be
paid until a complete title is vested in the United States,
and the full amount of the price, including rent, shall be paid
directly to the owners of the property."
Since the passage of that act several parties who claim
ownership of the property, or some portion thereof, having
filed in the War Department papers setting forth their titles,
these papers were transmitted to me along with the abo-vementioned letter, in which you ask advice as to whether they
"'show in whom of the claimants, or in what porportions, if
any, a good and valid title to the property is vested, and
what steps are necessary to vest the same in the United
States, and whether, under the law, condemnation proceed- '
ings may be instituted in the courts of the United States
in Texas."
It appears by the papers that Pedro G. Cavazos, a resident of the city of 1\Iatamoros, Mexico, and James Stillman,
a resident of the city of New York, claim each the title to
an undivided one-half of the premises-the latter under a
deed dated ~{arch 25, 1875, from Mrs. Maria Josefa Cavazos
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to Oharlt?s Stillman (both since deceased), and the former
under her will dated April 21, 1877, which was probated in
the probate court of Cameron County, Tex., in January,
1879. James Stillman also claims to have acquired title to the
whole of the premises by virtue of certain tax deeds given
him by the pl'oper local authorities In 1878 at a sale of the
same for unpaid taxes assessed thereon for the years 1873,
1874, and 1875. Both of these parties propose to unite in a
deed of the entire property to the United States; and as
(apart from the tax deeds referred to) they each deduce their
respective interests in the premises from the before-mentioned deed aml will of l\frs. Cavazos, it becomes important
.at the outset to ascertain precisely the nature and extent of
her title.
The title held by Mrs. Maria J osefa Cavazos is deraigned
from a Spanish grant made to one Jose Salvador de la Garza in the year 1781, which embraced a very large tract of
land bordering on the Rio Grande, known as the Agostadero
del Espiritu Santo, and included within its limit.s the premises. . On the death of the grantee, which happened during
the same year, his title under the grant passed to his heirs,
consisting of two daughters and a son; in equal shares. No
partition of the tract appears to have ever been made between these three co-heirs; yet by mutual consent one of
them went into the exclusive occupancy of the upper or
western portion, another of the middle portion, and another
of the lower or eastern portion (these portions having equal
or nearly equal frontage on the Rio Grande,) with the understanding that on a future partition of the tract the share of
each should be assigned in conformity to that arrangement.
The premises are situated within the middle portion of the
tract, which was occupied by the son, Don Blas Maria de la
Garza, who died in 1802 without issue, but leaving a widow,
Senora Maria Francesca Cavazos, who under his will succeeded to all his estate except the fifth part thereof, which
was left to her niece, the sa1d Maria Josefa Cavazos. Senora
Maria Francesca Cavazos took possession of and retained
her husband's estate without division during her life-time.
She died in 1835, also without issue, and by the disposition
of her will all her right to the said tract became, with the
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other property belonging to her estate, vested in Maria Ignacia Cavazos and Maria Josefa Oa\azos. The interest thus
derived by Maria Ignacia in the same tract was afterwards,
on a partition of the whole property, relinquished to Maria
J~efu.
'
At or soon after the close of the Mexican war title to the
premises, and to other parts of the said tract lying within
the middle portion thereof, was claimed by Charles Stillman
and other parties, based upon labor grants issued by the
ayuntamiento of Matamoros, and upon locations and surveys
of head-right certificates, land warrants, donation warrants,
etc., issued lJy the Republic and State of Texas. In January,
1849, a suit was commenced in the United States district.
court for the district of Texas on behalf of Maria J ospfa
Cavazos and others against the said Stillman and the other
parties claiming title as above, the object of which was to
establish and quiet the title of the complainants to the lands
in controversy, which embraced the premises then and now
vccupied by the United States and land adjacent thereto.
ln that. suit all who claimed title under the Spanish grant of
1781, through the heirs or assigns of the two daughters of
the original grantee, were also made parties. In January,
1852, the court made a decree, declaring the title to the lands
in controversy to be vested in Maria J osefa Cavazos as tenant
in common with other persons named (parties to the suit) who
were heirs or assigns of the two daughters aforesaid or who
claimed thereunder, and also declaring void the adverse titles
set up by the defendants Stillman and others, derived from
the ayuntamiento of 1Uatamoros or based upon locations and
surveys made upon head-right certificates, land warrants,
etc., issut>d by the Republic or State of Texas, etc. As there
was no appeal from the judgment of the court in that suit,
its decree became C'onclusive upon all the parties tiliereto.
Subsequently a suit was brought against Maria Josefa
Cavazos and others by the city of Brownsville, which claimed
title to the premises and other land adjacent as part of the
former ejidos of Matamoros. This title, tv establish which
was the object of the suit, was asserted under an act of the
Texas legislature, passed in 1850, granting to the city of
Brownsville "all the right, title, and interest of the State of
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~rexas in and to all the land within the said tract (i.e., the
former ejidos of Matamoros) that was owned by the town of
~Iatamoros on the 19th day of December, 1836," etc. The
suit was tried in the United States circuit court for the
eastern district of Texas in 1876, resulting in a judgment in
favor of the defendants. This judgment was afterwards, on
a writ of error, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court
at its October term, 1879. (See Brownsville v. Cavazos, 100 U.
s., 138.)
In the two suits above mentioned the title derived under
the Spanish grant of 1781 prevailed over all ad verse claims
- to the land in controversy (which included the premises) derived from the ayuntamiento of .M:atamoros or from the Republic or State of Texas, and the validity of that title thereby
became fully and finally established. And since the abovementioned decree of the United States district court, made
in 1852, the right and interest of all those claiming as heirs
or assigns of the two daughters of the original grantee, or
under such heirs or assigns, in and to the land lying within
the middle portion of the large tract em braced by that grant,
appear to have been wholly extinguished, thus leaving the
title of Maria J osefa Cavazos to the premises, so far at least
as they are concerned, not that of a tenant in common, as
declared in said decree, but that of a bolder in severalty.
As already shown, Maria tl osefa Cavazos derived her title
partly under the will of Don Blas 1\tlaria de la Garza, who
died in 1802, but mainly under the will of his widow, Senora
Maria Francesca Cavazos, who died in 1835; and the title so
derived is claimed by those deraigningtitlefrom Maria Josefa
Cavazos to include the whole of the premises occupied by the
United States. But to parts of the same premises title
is asserted by other parties, based upon certain sales and
conYeyances alleged to have been made by Senora Maria
FrancescaCavazos during her lifA-time in 1817 and 1833.
In the will of the latter it is declared that she has sold to
Capt. Don Jose Miguel Paredes 10 sitios (square leagues) of
the portion of the Espiritu Santo tract which she derived
from her husband, and a copy of a conveyance is exhibited,
purporting to ba"\'"e been made by her November 24, 1817,
granting to Capt. Don Miguel Paredes 10 sitios of·said tract,
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which by the terms of the conveyance '' are bounded on the
east by the lands belonging to the heirs of her brother-in·
law, the Capt. Don Pedro Lopez Prieto, and on the west by
the remainder of the land already mentioned belonging to the
grantor, on the south by the Rio Grande, and on the north
by the Aroyo Colorado." This description locates the 10
leagues granted by such conveyance upon the eastern side of
the middle portion of the Espiritu Santo tract, that portion
being the one which was occupied by the husband of the
grantor, as hereinbefore stated.
It is alleged that t.h e grantee, Paredes, died in 1819, and
title to the 10 leagues granted to him, as above, is claimed
under two conveyances to James Grogan; one dated March
18, 1848, made by Clemencia Prieto, as devisee of the property under the will of the said Paredes, and the other dated
1\'Iarch 7, 1854, made by certain persons as his heirs. From
James Grogan, n~w deceased, there appears to be a regular
chain of title thereto by mesne conveyances and otherwise
down to the present claimants, namely, the heirs of Stephen
Pow~rs (for 6! leagues undivided) and the wife of C. S. Dana,
nee Marie Grogan (for 3i leagues undivided.)
Whilst the eastern boundary of these 10 leagues, according
to the terms of the grant to Paredes, is identical and co extensive with the eastern boundary of the middle portion of
the Espiritu Santo tract, the western boundary thereof does
not appear to be as yet definitely established, but remains a
subject of controversy. The parties asserting title to the 10
leagues, under the aforementioned conveyances to Grogan, ·
claim that the western boundary takes in a large part of the
Fort Brown property. On the other hand, those who claim
ownership of the Fort Brown property through Maria J osefa
Cavazos deny that the western boundary includes any part
of it; they say that such boundary begins at the rancho
Tomates, on the Rio Grande, some 200 or 300 yards below
the Fort Brown property, and runs thence northward a considerable distance to the east of that property.
In the conveyance from Clemencia Prieto to Grogan the
10 leagues are described as situated "between the Tomates
and Santa Rosalia, and extending back to the north for
quantity (entre los Tomates y Santa Rosalia con su fondo al
I
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norte)," both of which points are below the Fort Brown property on the Rio Grande. This description apparently favors
the claim of those who assert ownership through l\1aria Josefa
Cavazos. But the deed to Grogan from the heirs of Paredes
conveys simply their right and title to the 10 square leagues
of the Espiritu Santo tract formerly owned by Capt. Jose
1\Iiguel ·Paredes, without indicating the situation thereof.
And in an action to try title, brought jn the district court of
Cameron County, Tex., in 1875, by Charles S. Dan21. and wife
and Jacob Mussina, then holding the Grogan title to the 10
leagues, against Maria Josefa Cavazos and others, the plaintiffs in their declaration describe the land claimed by them as
follows: Bounded "on the north by the Arroyo Colorado;
on the east by lands lately held by Jose Antonio Prieto,
one of the heirs at law of Pedro Lopez Prieto and Margarita
de la Garza, his wife; and on the west by lands owned and
claimed by the said Maria Josefa Cavazos, one of the defendants herein, being the same 10 square leagues sold by Maria.
Francesca Cavazos, about the year 1817, to J.ose Miguel
Paredes." Judgment by default was rendered in favor of
plaintiffs for the recovery of the land, as above described;
yet there tbe description does not precisely locate and determine the western boundary of the 10 leagues, but leaves it
to be ascertained by lands "then owned and claimed" by
Maria Josefa Cavazos.
Upon the whole that boundary must be regarded as still
in dispute; and inasmuch as there is ~mcertainty whether it
may or may not when finally established be found to include
within the 10 le~gues some portion of the Fort Brown property, the existence of the claim of the heirs of Stephen Powers
and Mrs. C. S. Dana, as owners of the 10 leagues, to a part
of that property, constitutes an objection to the title offered
by those who assert ownership of the whole of the Fort
Brown property through Maria J osefa Cavazos.
Title to a part of the same property is also claimed by the
heirs of Stephen Powers and others, under a sale and conveyance alleged to ba ve been made~S by Maria Francesca
Cavazos to Maria de Jesus Escamilla, widow of Juan Estavan
Gutierrez, on the 20th of September, 1833. This conveyance
purports to grant the labor formerly rented by the said Gutier-
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rez, "which is of the property of the grantor, and which is
bounded by the lane of Luz Rendon to the principal watering place of the lake, it being understood that all now within
tbe present fence is included in the said sale.'' It is alleged
that this labor lies partly in Browns"Ville and partly within
the limits of the military reservation, including about 23 acres
of the latter, and that it was on the 30th of March, 1835, conveyed by the said Escamilla to Miguel Salinas, who by a deed
dated December 29, 1R49, con,eyed the same to his son,
Antonio Salinas. By deed dated March 18, 1862, Antonio
Salinas, since deceased, con,eyed an undivided one-half
thereof to Stephen Powers, which is now claimed by the
heirs of the latter. The remainder of the labor is now
claimed by other parties as the heirs of Antonio Salinas or
their assignees.
In 1851 a suit to try title was instituted in the United
States district court for the district of Texas by Maria J osefa Cavazos and her husband against William Patterson,
Antonio Salinas, and others, involving the ownership of
lands in and about the city of Browns·ville and the military
reservation, including tlwt labo'i'; and this suit appears to be
still pending. It is understood that all the defendants therein
except Antonio Salinas claimed title to the lauds in controversy under labor grants by the a~·untamiento of Matamoras,
which haYe since been declared invalid by the Supreme Court,
and must be so regarded. But the title of Salinas rests upon
the grant from Maria Francesca Ca\azos to Escamilla, mentioned above, and the question of its validity remains undetermined, and seems to be still a subject of controversy before
the United States district or circuit court.
Under these circumstances, the above-mentioned claim of
Powers's heirs and others to part of tbe Fort Brown property,
based on the title just adverted to, may well be deemed to
constitute an objection to the title offered by those claiming
under Maria Josefa Ca"Vazos.
Besides the claim of Powers's heirs and others, last referred
to, an· adverse title to the identical land covered by that
claim is asserted by Mrs. Charlotte l\'Iiller under a sheriff's
sale made April 6, 1856, on an exeeution issued upon a judgment rendered September 28, 1854, by the district court of
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Nueces County, Tex., in favor of Elisha Bass et al., and
against Antonio Salinas. It appears that the suit in which
the judgment was rendered was originally brought in 1851,
in the district court of Cameron County, by Antonio Salinas
against Bass and others, for the said labor of land, and was
removed to Nueces Uounty for trial. Judgment was given
defendants for the land and also for $3,000 damages. Writ
of error was subsequently sued out by plaintiff, but he gave
no supersedeas bond, and execution was issued on the judgment for the damages and .his interest in the land sold thereunder for the sum of $20. Afterwards the judgment was reversed by the supreme court of Texas on account of a fatal
irregularity in the rendition of the verdict. (See 25 Tex., 12.)
But where there has been a sale under execution, the title of
a bona .fide purchaser is not affected by the subsequent reversal of the judgment. (Ibid., 'i 40.) And as the sale in the
present case does not appear to have ever been set aside or
annulled, it may properly be considered to be a cloud upon
the title not only of Powers's heirs, etc., but also of those
.claiming the same land under Maria J osefa Cavazos. It
therefore constitutes an objection to the title offered by the
latter.
It may here be added that a valid title to that part of the
Fort Brown property which is used for a natim1al cemetery,
.containing about 25 acres, has already been acquired by the
United States, under a condemnatio11 proceeding instituted in
1872 in the United States district court for the western district
of Texas, pursuant to the actufCongress of Feburary 22,1867,
chapter 61. In this proceeding the amount of the appraised
value of the land taken ($5,000) was deposited in court subject to its order, and subsequently, in 1879, the court ordered
the same to be paid over to Pedro G. Cavazos, who claimed
it under the will of Maria Josefa Cavazos.
The result to which the foregoing facts lead is, that Maria
Josefa Ca vaJZos

hel~

at the date of her deed and wj)J here-

in before referred to, a good and valid title in fee to the whole
of the premises within the limits of the military reservation
of Fort Brown, excepting the portion thereof (25 acres) then
already acquired by the United States for the purpose of a
national cemetery, subject, however, to the above-mentioned
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claim_s of the heirs of Stephen Powers and other parties to
par~s of the same premises, which are controverted claims,
the validity or invalidity whereof (from their nature) can
only be satisfactorily determined in the courts.
Under the will of Maria Josefa Cavazos, her son, Pedro G.
Cavazos, claims title to an undivided one-half of the entire
premises, excepting only that portion already owned by the
United States (the other undivided one-half having been conveyed to Charles Stillman by her deed above adverted to).
The wil1 is dated April 21, 1877, and in it the testator, after
reciting that she was then negotiating for the sale of the
Fort Brown property to the United States through her attorney and agent James R. Cox, of Auburn, N. Y., devises to·
her son Pedro the whole of that property "as at present occupied by the Government of the United States," and authorizes him to deed and convey the same to said Government,.
upon any terms approved by her said agent and attorney.
The testator also bequeaths to her said son al1 of her right,.
claim, and demand for rent, use, and occupation of the said
premises from the year 1848 up to the date of her decease,.
and authorizes him to collect and receive and receipt for the
same, and the price of the sale aforesaid to be made, which
shall be in full discharge -of all her claims against said Government. After the above devise and bequest follows this
clause: " In trust, nevertheless, as to the whole of said receipts, both for the price and the rent or use, for the uses and
purposes which I may hereafter propose or provide by a
further testament, then such avails of said property are to
be by him accounted for and apportioned or divided among
my heirs, according to law; but the said Government of the
United States so purchasing or paying are not to be in any
wise accountable or responsible for the mvestment or distribution of the proceeds or avails."
It will be observed that by this instrument the testator's
interest in the Fort Brown property goes to the devisee, not
absolutely, but only upon certain trusts, with power to convey the same to the Government "upon any terms approved
by her said agent and attorney." The bequest of the claim·
for use and occupation is likewise made upon the same trusts,
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with authority to receive the proceeds thereof and also the
proceeds of the property.
On the petition of Pedro G. Cavazos the will was admitted
to probate by the county court of Cameron County at a regular term thereof, in January, 1879, and he was thereby appointed "executor and testamentary trustee of the said last
will and testament of the saidMariaJosefaCavazos,deceased,"
and directed to give a bond in the sum of $100,000, conditioned as by law required, and to take the oath as by law
provided. But at a subsequent term, in November, 1882, it
appearing that there had been a failure on his part to give
the bond and take the oath as above directed, the court
ordered and decreed" that the said Pedro G. Cavazos be,
and he now hereby is, in all things removed from his saiJ
trust as such executor and the same declared vacant." Thereupon Thomas Carson was appointed administrator with the
will annexed, and directed to give bond in the sum of $100,000,
and to take the oath required by law; and afterwards, at
another term of the court, held in January, 1883, the said
Carson :filed his bond and oath as such administrator, which
were approved by the court.
·'
At the August term, 1885, of said court Carson, as admin ·
istrator, etc., :filed an application therein, setting forth theappropriation made by Congress to acquire title to and pay
for the use and occupancy of the Fort Brown reservation,.
the existence of adverse claims by Powers's heirs and others·
to parts of the prennses, and asking that he be authorized
and empowered to compromise and settle the claims of the
estatA of ~1aria Josefa Cavazos with the United States and
the adverse claimants referred to, and upon payment by the
United States of the sum found due for the rents and property to give thereto proper acquittances and conveyances.
This application was made under a statute of the State of
Texas, which provides that "whenever an executor or administrator may deem it for the interest of the estate he represents * • * to make compromises or settlements in
relation to property or claims in dispute or litigation it shall
be his duty to present an application in writing to the county
court, at a regular term thereof, representing the facts; and
if the court upon the hearing of such application shall be
273-VOL XVIII--22
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satisfied that it will be for the interest of the estate to grant
the same an order to that effect shall be entered upon the
minutes, S'~tting forth fully the authority granted." (Rev.
Stat. of Texas, 1879, art. 1934.)
The abo"e application was granted during the same term,
and the administrator was by the court authorized as such
"for and in behalf of the estate of said Maria ,J osefa Ca\azos,
deceased, to unite with the other tenants in common and coowners of said middle third of said Espiritu Santo tract of
land, and the other claimants to said Fort Brown reser\ation,
in a sale of the land embraced in said Fort Brown resen·ation
to the United States, and to make, execute, and deli\er to the
said United States fullandcompleteacquittances,releases, and
conveyances of all and singular the right, title, and estate,
which he, the said Thomas Carson, now has and holds as administrator of the estate of Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased,
in and to the la:nd embraced within said Fort Brown reserva.
tion, and in and to all sums of money due by the United States
as rents for the use and occupancy of the same."
Thus conflicting claims to the premises and to the right to
(lispose of the same to the Government appear to exist between Pedro G. Cavazos, as devisee, etc., under the will of
Maria Josefa Cavazos, and Thomas Carson, as administrator
cum testamento a.n nexo of her estate, in view of which the more
prudent, and perhaps the only safe course would be, in acquiring title to the premises and extinguishing the cL.lims of
that estate for use and occupation, to require both these claimants to unite in a proper conveyance and acquittance thereof.
Upon the foregoing considerations it is submitted that a
good and valid title can be acquired by the United States to
the whole of the Fort Brown reservation (exclusin~. of the
National Cemetery, which alrea~dy belongs to the Go\ernment), and all claims for the use and occupancy thereof extinguished, by conveyance and relinquishment from tlte owners of the pr·operty in the following way :
(1) By a deed to tlte United t;tates granting the whole of
the premises, and acknowledging payment of and relinquislting all claims for the use and occupation thereof, executed, acknowledged, and delivered by the said James
Stillman, and Pedro G. Cavazos (under the power conferred
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upon him as devisee as aforesaid), and Thomas Carson, the
latter as administrator cum~ testamento annexo of the estate of
Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased.
(2) In addition to that deed, a quit-claim deed to the
United States, embracing the same premises, and containing
a release of all claims for the use and occupancy thereof,
executed, acknowlerlged, and delh·ered by the following
parties, namely: The heirs of Stephen Powers; C. S. Dana
and his wjfe, nee J\1:arie Grogan; the heirs of Antonio
Salinas; H. E. Woodhouse, Francisca Yturria, Mat. Gerhard, Juan Salinas, Vicente Salinas and R. D. Hinojosa, his
mortgagee, and Charlotte Miller. So far as the papers show,
these ~omprise all the parties who are interested in the adverse claims (as against those deriving title under J.\lfaria
Josefa Oavazos), to which reference is hereinbefore made.
In behalf of Pedro G. Cavazos and James Stillman, it is
urged that by virtue of a certain condemnation proceeding
originally instituted in the county court of Cameron County,
in 1853, under a statute of the State of Texas, and by virtue
of a deed executed by the said Cavazos and Stillman on the
20th of April, 18~5, which is offered for the acceptance of
the Government, a good and valid title to the wl'lole of the
Fort Brown re's ervation niay now be acquired by the United
States upon payment to them of the consideration named in
the deed ($160,000).
·
At the time of the institution of the said proceeding, the
United States had been in the actual occupation of the premises for several years, but no law of Congress then existed
authorizing the acquisition of the same for the Government
in that or any other mode. The proceeding was accordingly
initiated without lawful authority, andnothingwasdone thereunder at the period referred to beyond the rendition of a-verdict by a jury assessing the -value of the land, which was appraised at $50,000, and the approyal thereof by the court.
~iany years afterwards, in February, 1879, the said court, on
a motion made in behalf of certain parties below named claiming ownership of the premises (no one appearing in opposition
thereto), entered a judgment of condemnation, by which it
was decreed that upon the payment by the United States of
the said sum of $50,000, together with interest thereon from
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the 29th of No\ember, 1853, at ther ate of 8 per cent. per
annum, into the National Bank of the City of Galveston, to
be disposed of as thereinafter provided, the whole right, title,
and interest of the City of Brownsville, and of Maria J osefa
Cavazos, deceased, and also of the said Pedro G. Cavazos, her
successor in interest, in and to the premises, shall vest forever in the United States, etc.
The above-mentioned deed recites the institution of the
said proceeding and the rendition of the verdict therein in
1853, the subsequent entry of the judgment of condemnation
in 1879, etc., and in consideration of the payment of $160,000
to .the grantors, conveys the premises in fee simple to the
United States, covenanting "that all and every of the duties,
obligations, and conditions imposed by the said judgment of
the district court of Cameron County, Texas, hereinbefore
referred to, upon the said the United States of America, in
respect to the complete condemnation and lawful acquisition
of the said lands and premises, are now and hereby, in consideration of the above described payment of $160,000, fully
completed, discharged, dissolved, satisfied, and performed;
and the recording of this conveyance in the clerk's office of
said county of Cameron shall be conclusive evidence of the
full and complete satisfaction and discharge of said judgment
and of all the obligations thereof."
The aforesaid proceeding was instituted under the third
section of an act of the Texas legislature, passed December
19, 1849, by which it was provided that where the executive
officer or authorized agent employed by the United States to
purchase land for public purposes shall be unable to ascertain who the real owner or owners of the land desired to be
purchased may be, or where it is uncertain in whom the title
to such land may be, it shall be lawful for such officer or
agent to apply to the judge of the district court, giving a
full description of the land; and after eight weeks' notice of
such application shall have been given in some newspaper
published in the county where the land is situated, such
judge shall call a jury to assess the value of said land, etc.;
and the amount of the value of the land so ascertained is to
be paid into the treasury of the State, there to be
to
the order of the owner or owners when known, and t
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of the court is to make a conveyance of the land under the
orders of the court, which conveyance shall be as valid and
binding as if the same had been made by the real owner of
the land. ·
It will be observed that the judgment of the court, as entered in 1879, does not conform to the provisions of the statute. The latter requires the amount of the appraised value
of the ·property to be paid into the treasury of the State,
"there to be subject to the order of the owner or owners
when known," and makes it the duty of the clerk of the court
to execute a conveyance of the land. The judgment requires
the payment to be made elsewhere, namely, into the National
Bank of the City of Galveston, and declares that thereupon
·''the whole right, title, and interest of the city of Brownsville and of Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased, and also of
Pedro G. Cavazos, her successor in interest." in and to the
premises shall vest in the United States. Besides, the deed
does not even call for a compliance with the directions of the
judgment as regards payment, but requires this to be made
directly to the grantors therein.
Irrespective of the circumstance that the proceeding referred to was originally begun by persons acting in behalf of
the United States without lawful authority therefrom, and
subsequently promoted by other persons acting in behalf of
certain parties claiming ownership of the premises, it is
doubtful whether a valid title can be derived thereunder by
reason of the non-compliance with the pro\isions of the statute as above pointed out, and hence whether the deed would
operate to pass anything more than such interest in the
premises as the grantors themselves possess. Moreover, a
title acquired under the State statute would be a qualified
one-i. e., ''for the purposes aforesaid and none other;"
whereas the act of Congress of March 3, 1885, cited above,
requires that a " complete title," in other words, an absolute
one, shall be vested in the United States before any part of
the sum thereby appropriated is paid.
In reg~rd to the question whether, under the provisions of
that act, condemnation proc·eedings may be instituted in the
United States court in Texas, I am of the opinion that such
provisiOJlS do not authorize acquisition. of title through the
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exercise of the eminent domain power of the Government.
'l'he aim of the statute is, as well to extinguish claims for the
past use and occupation of the land ·as to secure title thereto;
but this could not be fully accomplished by proceedings of
that character. The statute seems to contemplate the attainment of its object solely through a voluntary conve,van~e of
the land and discharge of such claims by the owners of the
property.
I ha"Ve already indicated the parties by whom, and the
mode by which~ a good and valid title to the Fort Brown
reservation can be conveyed and all claims for the use and
occupancy thereof extinguished, as contemplated by the provisions of the aet of 1~85. Should these parties, or any of
them, fail or: decline to give the necessary deeds and acquittances for such compensation out of the appropriation made
by that act as you shall deem it reasonable and just to allow,
this may present such an obstacle as to render it expedient
for the Government . to have recourse to some other method
of settling the claims, both for the land and its use. In such
event, and in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case,
I suggest that application be made to Co~gTess for the passage of an act authorizing any person claiming ownership of
the land or any part thereof within the limits of the reservation to institute a suit against the United States in the Court
of Claims for the recovery of compensation therefor, including
also compensation for its use and occupation, with a provision requiring such suit to be brought within a certain time
after the passage of the act, and in default thereof that the
claim be forever barred; and also requiring, where two or
more parties bring separate suitR, based upon conflicting
claims to the same land, that such suits be consolidated and
tried together, etc., and also giving the court power to grant
all proper relief as between the respective claimants as well
as between each of them ami the United States. With the
aid of such legislation, in my judgment, all obstacles in the
way ot securing for the United States a good and valid title
to the land, and of extinguishing all claims for its w;e and
occupation, can be surmounted and those objects fairly and
just.Jy accomplished.
In addition to the papers which accompanied your letter
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of the 7th of November, other papers have since been forwarded to this Department by you with request that they
be considered in connection therewith.. Among the latter
are papers transmitted with your letter of the 9th instant,
relating to a claim of the h1'irs of Miguel Salinas for the rent
of certain houses and compensation for loss sustained by
their destruction, and also by the destruction of crops, fences,
etc., at Fort Bro\\n, during the :Mexican war. When the
American forces arrived at the Rio Grande, opposite Matamoros, in the spring of 1846, they found the said Salinas in
possession of part of the land upon which they en~mped
whether as tenant or proprietor does not appear. The land
was undf'r fence, and upon it were growing crops, and also
some small houses. Seven of the latter were, about the
middle of April, hired from .\Ir. Salinas, by the quartermaster,
at a stipulated rent, for the use of the . .<\rmy; but shortly
afterward (some two or three weeks only) they were destroyed by direction of the officer in command of the troops.
The fences were also in great part destroyed and the material used in the construction of the fort there erected and as
fuel.
It appears that while but a very small part of the claim of
the heirs (only $12.88) is for unpaid rent of the houses referred
to, the remainder (amounting to several thousand dollars) is
for compensation for the loss of property destroyed, etc.
This claim does not, I think, come within the scope of the
appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1885, herein before
mentioned. That appropriation is limited to the following
objects: payment of the purchase money for the land within
the limits of the reservation, and payment to the owner
thereof of compensation for its past use and occupation;
neither of which seems to touch the subject-matter of the
claim referred to.
I. return herewith the papers which accompanied your
letters, together with others relating to the m::J.tter which
have been received directly from parties interested therein.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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CUSTOMS DUTIES.
"Medicinal soap" is dutiable as soaps not otherwise provided for at !20
per centum ad valorem, or at 25 per centum as a medicinal preparation
or compound.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 16, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication, bearing date the 12th instant, relating to certain so-called ''medicinal soap" prepared by Messrs J. D.
Stiefel in Germany and imported by Messrs. W. H. Schieffelin
& Co., a\N ew York.
After a careful examination of the question submitted, I
concur with the appraiser that the " soaps" referred to are
n~t dutiable at the rate of 50 per centum ad ~alorem as
"proprietary medicines," but that they are dutiable as
"soaps" not otherwise provided for at 20 per centum ad valorem, or at 25 per centum as a medicinal preparation or compound. For the additional reasons suggested by you as to
the difficulty of making a successful defense of any suits
which might be brought in consequence of the presel!._t classification of such merchandise without the concurrence of the
appraiser at the port of importation, I deem it advisable that
the decisions in question be ~o modified as to conform to the
classification recommended by the appraiser at New York.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF 1.'HE TREASURY.

•

LIGHT-HOUSE KEEPERS.
Legislation of Congress in regard to the appointment of light-house
keepers considered.
Section 4669, Revised Statutes, confines the power of the Light-House
Board to the adoption and enforcement of such regulations as concern
the management and control of light-house keepers, inspectors, and employes for the purpose of properly administering the Light-House Establishment.
·
The statute does not authorize the Board to adopt and enforce regulations
·controlling in any manner the appointment of light-house keepers or
other inferior officers, or to designate the appointees.
DEP .A.RTMEN1.' OF JUSTIOE,

Jam wry 18, 1886.
SIR : The legislation of Congress in regard to the appointment of ligbt-honse keepers bas not been uniform. Some-
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times the appointing power has been vested in the President
and sometimes in the Secretary of the Treasury.
The power to appoint such keepers is, in many instances,
embodied in the act authorizing the erection of the lightbouse, and these acts, conferring the appointing power respectively upon the President and the Secretary of the Treasury, occur in about an equal number of statutes, and are not
inconsistent with subsequent acts and have not been repealed
either expressly or by implication, but remain in full force.
The power to appoint such keepers in such instances has not
therefore been disturbed, but remains where it was placed
by Congress, in the original statutes authorizing the erection,
equipment, and appointment of keepers of the respective
light-houses.
Previous to 1852 various powers were conferred upon the
Secretary of the Treasury of a general character and otherwise, such as authorizing him to erect light-houses, to furnish
them with supplies, to fix the salaries of keepers, and to appoint keepers, when directed to do so by the special provisions of any act.
The Secretary of the Treasury retains the absolute power
to regulate the salaries of the keepers under the provisions
of section 4673, Revised Statutes. But the general power to
superintend t.he Light-House Establishment and to fix salaries
does not embrace and carry with it the power to appoint such
keepers. It requires an act of Uongress to vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President, courts of law, or
heads of Departments (Cons., Art. II, sec. 2; Ex parte Hennen,
13 Pet., 230). This principle appears to have been well
understood and adopted in each instance in the legislation
upon the subject of light-houses prior to 1852. By consent
or acquiescence the power to appoint light-house keepers appears to have been exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury
prior to and since the approval of the appropriation act of
August 31, 1852, (10 Stat., 112, 119.) By this act Congress
constituted the Light- House Board oft he United States, and
authorized such Board to discharge certain designated and
well-defined administrative duties, under the superintendency and subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
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The same act, with slight and immaterial changes, so far
as it applies to the duties of the Light·House Board, is included in the codification of the statutes of the United States.
(Rev. Stat., 906.)
Under the provisions of the sections of the codification
arises the question in controversy, an<l which is presented for
.
consideration. (Rev. Stat., Title LV, 906.)
Various duties de\olve upon the Board under the several
sections of the statute, but the question presented may be
determined by a consideration of t.wo sections of the Revised
Statutes, the first of which defines the general administrative
duties of the Board, and reads as follows:
" SEc. 46 38. The Light-House Board shall be attached to
the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, and under his
superintendence shall discharge all administrative duties relating to the construction, illumination, inspection, and superintendence of light-houses, light-vessels, beacons, buoys,
sea-marks, and their appendages, and embracing the security
of foundations of works already existing, procuring illuminating and other apparatus, supplies, and materials of an
kinds for building and for rebuilding when necessary and
keeping in good repair the light-houses, light-vessels, beacons, and buoys of the United States; and shall have the
charge and custody of all the archives, books, documents,
drawings, models, returns, apparatus, and other things appertaining to the Light-House Establishment."
For the purpose of more efficiently discharging the duties .
defined in the section above q noted, or otherwise~ the Board,
with the approval of such secretary, is authorized to prescribe proper regulations, under a subsequent section, to wit:
"SEc. 4669. The Light-House Board, with the approval of
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prescribe, and from time
to time may alter or amend and cause to be distributed, such
regulations as they de€m proper for securing an efficient,
uniform, economical administration of the Light-House Establishment."
Under the latter section the Light-House Board claims and
has assumed the power to prescribe rules abridging the appointing power of the Secretary of the Treasury, or such
power in whatsoe\er officer it may· exist under the statute,

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURL

347

Llgbt-House Keepers.

so as in reality to bring such appointments within their absolute control and jurisdiction, thereby confining the function
of the proper appointing officer to a mere confirmation or rejection of nominations. Was it the intention of Congress to
empower the Light-House Board under section 4669 (supra)
to prescribe regulati.ons governing the manner of the appointment of light-house keepers~ Or was it the intention
to limit such regulations to the general duties of the Board,
to be exercised with the approbation of the Secretary, as
provided in section 4658 (S'ltpra) a,nd otherwise~
If the intention of Oongress is to be gathered from a consideration and comparison of the act of August 31, 1852 .
(10 Stat., 112-119) with the codification (Rev. Stat., 906), the
latter is undoubtedly the correct conclusion.
Section 4669 (supra) is are enactment of section 13 of the
act of August 31, 1852 (10 Stat., 112-119), and reference may
be bad to the latter in order to arrive at a proper construction of the former.
Section 13 (s~tpra) explains what is meant by regu1ations,
and provides that such regulations are to be distributed
among the light-keepers, inspectors, and employes of the
Light- House Establishment, for the purpose of securing an
efficient, uniform, and economical system of administering the
same, and to secure responsibility from such inferior officers.
The section reads as follows :
''SEC. 13. And be it f~trt7wr enacted, That the Light-House
Board, by and with the consent and approbation of the Secretary of the Treasury, be authorized and required to cause
to be prepared and distributed among the light-keepers, inspectors, and others employed in the Light-House Establishment, such rules, regulations, and instructions as shall be
~necessary for securing an efficient, uniform, and economical
system of administering the Light-House Establishment of the
United States, and to secure responsibility from them, which
rules, regulations, and instructions when approved shall be
respected and obeyed until altered and annulled by the same
authority."
It is true the commissioners in the revision have shorn
section 4669 of its explanatory provisions, but in doing so
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no new or extended powers were expressly conferred upon
the Board, and none can reasonably be 'implied.
Congress has not conferred power upon the Light-House
Board to designate such appointments as is expressly done
in the act of August 30, 1852 (10 Stat., 63), in relation to inspectors of hulls and boilers.
Reference is especially made to an opinion upon a similar
question by Attorney-General Bates and citations therein.
(10 Opin., 204.)
The President has long since ceased to exercise the appointing power that exists under the respective statutes,
and it has been for years the practice of the Secretary of the
Treasury to make such appointments. In a majority of cases
the law now in force does not vest the power to appoint lighthouse keepers in either the President, the courts of law, O]\
heads of Department, and from this anomalous condition of
the law has arisen the custom of the Secretary, in connection
with the discharge of his other duties, to appoint such
keepers.
The rule of practice followed by the Secretary of the Treasury i~ one of many years standing, and, by reason of a failure
to enact proper laws for the purpose of curing the defect of
omission herein mentioned, may be said to have acquired the
recognition or sanction of Congress. The Secretary will
undoubtedly, for the good of the service, be justified in continuing to act in accordance with such rule of practice until
Congress shall enact appropriate and definite laws upon the
subject. This is a proper matter for the consideration of
Congress, to which the attention of that branch of the Government should be called.
I am of the opinwn, therefore, upon a general review of
the authorities, that section 4669, Reviseg Statutes, confines
the power of the Light-House Board to the adoption and enforcement of such regulations as have reference to the management and control of light-keepers, inspectors, and employes, for the purpose of securing responsibility from them,
and for the further purpose of properly administering the
Light-House Establishment; but the statute does not authorize such Board to adopt and enforce regulations abridging or
controlling in any manner the appointment of light-house
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keepers or other inferior officers, nor does it authorize such
Board to designate such appointment.s. The authority to
appoint is vested elsewhere, as indicated in this opinion.
Respectfully,
.A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
PURCHASE OF ARMY SUPPLIES.
Purchases of supplies for the Army made in open market after advertisement, where no bi1s ha.ve been received in response to such advertisement, are emergency purchases within the meaning of the act of July
5, 188-t, chapter 217, and should be "at once reported to the Secretary
of War for his approval."
When parts of machinery, or of stoves or ranges or patented articles, are
needed, such articles are required by that act to be purchased in the
same way as other quartermaster's supplies-that is, by contract after
advertisement, except in cases of emergency, in which cases the purchases are to be reported to the Secretary of War for approval.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
J anua1·y 20, 1886.

SIR: Your letter of the 18th ultimo directs my attention to
certain provisions of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 217, relative to the purchase by the Quartermaster's Department of
supplies for the Army, and also to a circular letter of instructions issued by the Adjutant-General, dated January 19, 1885,
touching the same subject, and inquires: ~'Whether, when
purchases are made in open market after advertisement, and
no bids have been received in response thereto, such purchases are not really emergency purchases within the meaning of the law above referred to; and whether, when parts of
machinery, or parts of stoves or ranges, for repairR, or patented articles, are required, they can be purchased in open
market without advertisement; and, if so, whether such purchases should be regarded as emergency purchases."
To these inquiries I have now the honor to reply:
The act of 1884 provides that thereafter " all purchases of
regular and miscellaneous supplies for the army furnished by
the Quartermaster's Department and by the Commissary Department for immediate use shall be made by the officers of
such department, under direction of the Secretary ofWar,
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at the places nearest the points where they are needed, the
conditions of cost and quality being equal: Provided~ also,
That all purchases of said supplies except in cases of emergency, which must be at once reported to the Secretary of
War for his approval, shall be made by contract, after public
notice of not less than ten days for small amounts for immediate use, and of not less than from thirty to sixty days
whenever, in the opinion of the Secretary of War, the circumstances of the case and conditions of the service shall warrant such extension of time. The award in every case shall
be made to the lowest responsible bidder for the best and
most suitable article, the right being reserved to reject any
and all bids."
By the law in force at the date of thiS enactment it was
made the duty of the officers of the Quartermaster's Depart. ment, under the direction of the Secretary of War, to purchase such supplies (sec. 1133, Rev. Stat.), and all purchases
thereof were required to be made " by advertising a sufficient
time previously for proposals respecting the same," where immediate delivery of the article was not demanded bJ- the public exigencies; but where the public exigencies required immediate delivery, the articles were authorized to be procnred
"by open purchase or contract at the places and in the manner in which such articles are usually bought and sold between individuals" (sec. 3709, Rev. Stat.). These statutory
provisions were supp1Amented by other provisions in the nature of instructions thereunder, contained in the Army Regulations of 1881 (see paragraphs 1478, 1486-1490, and 1523).
The latter, among other things, required that where the exigencies of the. ser~ice demanded a purchase to be made in the
open market without advertisement, the fact should be reported to the proper bureau, with a detailed statement of the
quantity, quality, and price of each article so purchased, the
names of the sellers, and the circumstances which rendered
such a course necessar_y.
The second clause or proviso in the above-quoted extract
from the act of 1884 (to which the present inquiries appear
to have especial reference) requires as a rule that "all purchases" of quartermaster's supplies shall be made by contract
after public notice, as there prescribed, the oply exce'ption
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therefrom being purchases'' in cases of emergency." In these
cases purchases may be made, as before, without previous
public notice, in open market,. and in the manner in which
such articles are usually bought and sold between individuals (sec. 3709, Re\. Stat.), but they are ·now required to be
"at once reported to the Secretary of War for his approval."
The latter requirement is imposed as an additional check upon
the purchasing officer
The object of this legislation is to secure for the Government the benefit of competition in obtaining supplies and
to prevent favoritism in making purchases thereof. It contemplates one general mode of purchase, namely, by contract,
after advertisement, with "the lowest responsible bidder, for
the best and most suitable article," with but a single exception, and that is where an "emergency " exists requiring
the purchase to be otherwise made. Such emergency may
arise not only before the required public notice can be gi,en,
but after it has once been given, in consequence of the failure to receive any bids or proposals; in either case the purchase thereupon would be an emergency purchase, and comeunder the requirement of the statute for an ip1mediate report
to the Secretary of War for his approval. This requirement
is, I think, designed to extend to all purchases which are not
made agreeably to the general mode above indicated ; and
hence it applies to the purchase of parts of machinery, or
parts of stoves or ranges, for repairs, or of patented articles,
where the same is (as in cases of emergency, and those only,
it may be) made in open market.
I am therefore of opinion that purchases in open. market
under the circumstances stated in the first of your inquiries
are emergency purchases within the meaning of the statute,
and also that when parts of machinery, or of stoves or
Tanges, or patented articles, are needed, these supplies are
required by the statute to be purchased in the same way as
other quartermaster's supplies-i.e., by contract, after public
notice, except in cases of emergency, in which cases the purchase should be reported to the Secretary of War for his approval.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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CLERKS AND EMPLOY~S OF DEPARTMENTS.
Provisions of section 4 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, relating
to leave of absence of Department clerks and other employes, construed.

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,
January 24, 1886.
SIR: Your letter of the 16th instant has been received, in
which ·y on ask whether or not you are authorized to withhold the salary of a clerk who is absent on account of sickness over thirty days in a year.
The act approved March 3, 1883, section 4, provides that,
"All absence from the Departments on the part of said clerks
or other employe.s in excess of such leave of absence as may
be granted by the heads thereof, which shall not exceed
thirty days in any one year except in case of sickness, shall
be without pay."
The meaning is, that an absence from the Departments in
excess of thirty days shall be without pay except in case of
sickness; that in a case of sickness an absence in excess of
thirty days shall be with pay, so long as the Department
shall retain upon its roll the sick employe; tllat after thirty
days of absence in a case of sickness no leave of absence
for a different cause can be granted with pay; that when
thirty days' absence in any one year has been granted with
pay, additional absence can be granted to the same party
with pay in case of sickness.
Very respectfully,
.A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ACQUISITION OF SITES FOR PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
Under an act of the legislature of New York, passed April2, 1885, a valid
title to certain lands situated in the cities of Troy and Auburn, in that
State, which have heretofore been selected for the sites of Government
buildings authorized by Congress to be erected there, may be acquired
by the United States by condemnation proceedings instituted in the
State court pursuant to its provisions.
The acts of Congress of March 3, 1885, chapters 331 and 360, providing
for the purchase of such sites, may properly be taken to authorize the
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acquisition thereof in any :::node which is in conformity to the laws of
t.he State. Hence where, by a law of the State, the property may be·
condemned and title thereto acquired under the eminent domain power
of the State, recourse may be had as well to this mode of acquisition
as to any other under the authority conferreu by those acts.
DEPARTMENT 014' JUSTICE,

January 27, 1886.
SIR: Your. letter of the 11th ultimo, calling my attention
to the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 331, which authorizes the
purchase in the city of Auburn, N. Y., of a site for a public
building for the accommodation of the post·office, United
States courts, and for other Government uses, and to the act
of March 3, 1885, chapter 360, which makes provision for the
purchase of a site for a post-office and court-bouse building at
Troy,N. Y., and also to an act of the legislature of New York
passed April 2, 1885, entitled "An act granting the consent
of the State of New York to the acquisition by the United
States of certain lands for the purpose of the erection of
Government buildings at the cities of Troy and Auburn,"
etc., presents for my consideration the following question:
"Whether title to such lanfl.s as may be selected for the
purpose named can be acquired, under the laws above referred to, by proceedings in condemnation, should the Department be unable to acquire title to the same by purchase."
The sixth section of the act of the New York legislature,.
above mentioned, provides that if title to the land (which i&
not to exceed one acre in quantity in each place) or any portion
thereof can not be acquired by purchase, application in behalf
of the United States may be made to the supreme court for a
writ of inquiry of damages, and thereupon the damages shall
be ascertained, and the same be paid, in the manner prescribed
by certain other statutory provisions therein named. In proceedings under these provisions, where it appears that the
writ has been quly executed, the court is authorized to make
an order declaring that, upon paying into court the amount
of the damages ascertained, the United States shall be entitled to an absolute estate in the real property described in
the writ and in the appurtenances belonging thereto.
This legislation authorizes title to the property to be ac·
quired by the United States, in the contingency stated in
273-VOL XVIII--~3
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the question under consideration, through condemnation proceedings instituted in the State court under the eminent do·
main power of the State.
Two inquiries here arise: first, whether a title so acquired
would be valid and sufficient; second, whether authority thus
to acquire it is conferred by the provisions of the acts of
Congress of 1t;85 above referred to.
There is some diYersity of opinion upon the subject of the
power of a State to exercise its right of eminent domain for
the purposes of the General Government. In the casP of
T1·ombley v. Humphrey (23 Mich., 471) the supreme court of
Michigan denied the existence of such power, asserting the
doctrine that the right of eminent domain can only be exerted
by a State for its own purposes-that the State can not any
more exercise this right for purposes which appertain to the
United States, tlJough to be accomplished within the territorial limits of the former, than as if the two governments
were wholly foreign to each other. On tbe other hand, the
court of appeals of Maryland in Reddell v. Bryan, (14 l\Id.,
444); the supreme court of California in Gilmer v. Lime Point
~ 18 Cal., 229); t,h e supreme judicial court of l\iassachusetts in
Burt v. Merchants' Insurance Omnpa.~ny (106 Mass., 356); and
tile court of appeals of New York iu ~Matter of Petition of the
United States, etc. (96 N. Y., 227), lay down a different doctrine, and ha,·e affirmed the validity of State laws authorizing condemnations of land under the eminent domaiu of the
State for the uses of the United States. In each of these
last-mentioned cases the use of the United States for which
the land was taken (namely, for the construction of an
aqueduct in the first, the establishment of a fortification in
the second, the erection of a post-office building in the ~bird,
and the improvement of navigation in the fourth) was regarded as an object of public utility in which the State was
equally interested with the General Government, and there·
fore a publin use, in respect of which its right of eminent do·
main might properly be exercised. The court of appeals of
New York in the cases above cited remark : '' vvbile the
Federal Government, as an independent sovereignty, bas the ·
power of condemning land within the States for its own use,
we see no reason to doubt that it may lay aside its sovereignty,
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and, as a petitioner, enter the State courts and there accomplish the same end through proceedings authorized by the
State legislature. If the State may delegate its power to a
private corporation of another State for the benefit of a
canal located within its borders, as was held by this court in
the matter of Peter Townsend (39 N.Y., 171), so it may to an
independent political corpor. .ation where the use is public and
the convenience shared by its own citizens."
\
The decision of the court of appeals of New York' in the
case just adverted to, sustaining the validity of a law in that
State which authorized the acquisition of title to land by
virtue of the eminent domain power of the State, for the
purposes of the General Government, seems to me to relieve from an doubt as to its validity the legislation of
the same State hereinbefore referred to authorizing sites for
post-office buildings at Auburn and Troy to be acquired
through the exercise of the same power. The title so · acquired for those purposes pursuant to such legislation, embracing as it would an "absolute estate" in the premises,
would, I think, be both valid and sufficient.
As to the other point, namely, whether authority thus to
acquire title to the property is imparted by the acts of 1885
above mentioned, I think the direction in .. the one case "to
purchase or otherwise provide a suitable site" and the provision in the other ~'for purchase of a site'' may proyerly be
taken to authorize the acquisition in any mode which is in
conformity to the laws of the State wherein the property
is situated; and hence where, by a law of the State, the
property may be condemned and title thereto acquired under
its eminent domain power, recourse may be had as well to
this mode of acquisition as to any other' under the authority
conferred by those acts.
On examination, I find that such bas been the practical
construction heretofore given similar provisions. Thus,
under authority of the provision made by the act of March
3, 1857, chapter 97, "to purchase a site and construct additional defenses for San Francisco," condemnation proceedings were instituted in a court of the State of California,
pursuant to a law of that State, for the acquisition of Lime
Point (case of Gilmer v. Lime Point, supra). So, un~er au-
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thority of the joint resolution of March 12, 1868 (No. 20),
providing for the" purchase" of a site for a post-office building, etc., in Boston, similar proceedings were instituted, pursuant to a law of Massachusetts, in a court of that State, for
the acquisition of such site (case of Burt v. Merchctnts' lns~tr
ance Company, supra), and here Congress subsequently~ by
act of March 3, 1871 (chap. 115), made an appropriation
''to pay the award for the necessary land condemned under
authority of the ~tate of Massachusetts for the purposes of
said building;" thus recognizing the correctness of the construction practically given the joint resolution as above. So,
under authority of the provision in the act of June 8, 1872,
chapter 362, empowering the Secretary of the Treasury "to
purchase a lot of ground in the city of Philadelphia for a
post-office site," etc., similnr proceedings were resorted to in
order to acquire title to a part of the site, in pursuance of
statutes of the State of Pennsylvania passed March 6 and
April 10, 1873 (Laws of Pa., 1873, pp. 70, 72). Other instances might be mentioned, but the above are thought to
be sufficient to indicat(} the construction which has in prac- •
tice been given to provisions like those under consideration.
I may, however, add that Attorney-General Cushing, in an
opinion dated .April 24, 1855 (7 Opin., 114), deemed the acquisition of land by the United States, for the use of the
Wasbingt()n Aqueduct, through the means of condemnation
proceedings instituted in a Maryland court under a statute
of that State, to be a ''purchase" within the scope of the
joint resolution of September 11, 1841, and that the validity
of the title might be certified by the Attorney-General thereunder.
In this connection, I observe that while authority to "purchase" land for the uses of the General Government within
the States has thus been taken to authorize its acquisition
pursuant to State laws through the exercise of the eminent
domain power of the State, such authority bas been held to
be insufficient of itself to authorize the land to be acquired
by virtue of the eminent domain power of the United States.
Touching this point, I beg to refer to an opinion of Attorney
General Devens, dated May 16, 1879 (16 Opin., 329), and to
one of Attorney General Brewster, dated February 1, 1883

I

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

35 7

Fort Keogh Military Reservation.

(unpublished),* both addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury. The view there adopted is, that to warrant the eminent
domain power of the United States to be invoked, the terms
of the statute must plainly permit its exercise; that the word
purchase does not, as commonly used, impart authority to
exert that power; and that where Congress intends to confer the authority other terms clearly indicative of such intent are ordinarily made use of by that body, as in the acts
of March 9, 1882, chapter 28, and August 7, 1882~ chapter
433 (appropriation for custom-house site at Fall River).
But assuming that there is want of authority, in the terms
employed in the acts under consideration, to put in motion
the eminent domain power of the United States and acquire
the sites in question thereunder, this does not necessarily·
imply a want of authority to make use of similar means afforded by the laws of the State, in the exercise of its right
of eminent domain, for the purpose of obtaining title to the
property.
In answer to the question proposed, I have therefore the
honor to reply, that in my opinion title to the sites mentioned may, under the circumstances stated, lawfully be acquired by condemnation proceedings ins.tituted in the State
court pursuant to the statutes above referred to.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

FORT KEOGH MILITARY RESERVATION.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company has no interest in any of the
lands within the boundaries of the Fort Keogh military reservation,
excepting the right of way therein granted to that company by the
second section of the act of July 2, 1864, chapter 217, to the extent of
200 feet in width on each side of its road, including all necessary ground
for station buildings, workshops, depots, etc.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 1, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to return herewith the papers
which accompanied your letter of the 12th of Oc~ober last,
*Since published in 17 Opin., p. 509.
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in relation to an application made by citizens of 1\.'I.iles City,
Mont., in behalf of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
asking that that company be allowed to erect shipping pens
for cattle upon its right of way within the Fort Keogh military reservation, and also that permission be granted stockmen to drive their cattle across the reservation to such shipping pens.
The question proposed for my consideration is, "as to
what interest, if any, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company may have to any portion of the lands embraced within
the limits of the above-mentioned reservation."
This calls for an examination of the grant made to that
company by Congress in the act of July 2, 1864,chapter 217.
By the second section of that act a right o{ way through
the public lands "is granted to the company for the construction of a railroad and telegraph" to the extent of 200
feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may pass
through the public domain, including aU necessary ground
for station buildings, workshops, depots, machine-shops,
switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water stations," etc.
The third section grants to the company, for the purpose
of aiding in the construction of its railroad and telegraph
line, "every alternate section of public land, not mineral,
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty alternate sections per mile on each side of said railroatl line,"
etc., ''not reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated,
etc., at the time the line of said road is <lt>fi.nitel.v fixed and
a plat thereof filed in the office of the Commissioner of the
General Land Office."
It appears by the papers that the Fort Keogh military
reservation, which lies wholly within the 40-mile limits of the
. grant last mentioned, was established by an Executive order
dated March 14, 1878, but that the map of definite location
of the railroad through the reservation was not filed until
June 25, 1881; and as the lands within the reservation were
then already appropriated, they were by the terms of that
grant excepted therefrom, and the company consequently
acquired under the grant no interest or right in or to an;
portion thereof. (Kansc~;s Pacific Railway Company v. Dun·
nzyer, 113 U. S., sec. 629.)
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But it would seem that the grant of the right of way in the
second section of that act differs from the land grant above
referred to jn this, that it contains no reservations or exceptions. "It is a present, absolute grant, subject to no exeeptions, except those necessarily implied, such as that the
road shall be constructed ·and used for the purposes desig.nated." (Railroad Company v. Baldwin, 103 U. S., 426.) In
the case just cited, which involved the construction of a similar grant of right of way, the land was vaeant and unoccupied public domain at the date of the act making the grant.
After the passage of the act, but before the definite location
of the railroad line, it was sold by the United States, and
subsequently the line was definitely located thereon. The
point was, whether the grant of the right of way took effect
from the date of the definite location of the road or from the
date of the act making the grant. The Supreme Court
adopted the latter view, and accordingly held that the purchaser took the land subject to that right. Agreeably to the
doctrine of this case, the military reservation of Fort Keogh
having been established after the grant of right of way to
the railroad company, though before the definite location of
its line, it must be deemed to be subject to that right through
the same.
In answer, then, to the question proposed by you, I reply
that in my opinion the Northern Pacific Rai\road Company
has no interest whatever in any of the lands em braced within
the limits of the reservation, other than the easement granted
thereto by the second section of the act of 1864, namely, a
right of way for a railroad and telegraph-that it has such
right to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of its
road, "including all necessary ground for station buildings,
workshops," etc.
·
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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APPRAISEMENT OF DUTIABLE MERCHANDISE.
Statutory pit>visions relating to the appraisement and reappraisement
of imports subject to duty considered, and held that, in the absence of
any regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury to that effect, the law
does not permit importers to appear before the appraisers, with counsel
or otherwiEe, for the purpose of producing witnesses to be examined
in their own behalf, or to cross-examine witnesses called by such .
appraisers. The entire matter is under the control of the Secretary,
and subject to such rules and regulations as he may from time to time
establish in relation thereto.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

I

February 1, 1886.
SIR: Yours of recent date in regard to the appraisement
of imported merchandise has been received, and in it you
ask an opinion upon the following proposition, to wit:
~'The main differences between certain importers and the
customs' authorities are, that the importers insist on being
permitted to appear by counsel at such reappraisement and
to cross-examine witnesses, examine and criticise the confidential testimony and papers which may be submitted to the
general and merchant appraiser who may conduct the appraisement, and that they have the right to produce such
witnesses as they may deem proper for examination by the
reap praisers."
The question presented arises between importers and the
customs authorities at the city of New York.
Reference is had in this opinion to sections 2614, 2615,
2785, 2902, 2922, 2930 and ~949 of the Revised Statutes,
as containing the provisions of law governing the matter
presented for consideration. Upon examination of the foregoing sections it will be observed that the statute requires(!) That such appraisers, including the merchant appraisers, shall take and subscribe an oath to diligently examine
and inspect such merchandise, and report the true value
thereof to the best of their knowledge and helief.
(2) That the owner, consignee, or proper agent thereof
shall make an entry of such imported merchandise under
oath, in which shall be stated among other things the prime
cost. And the orig·inal invoices, or documents in lieu thereof,
with the bills of lading, must be produced to the collector.
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(3) That upon the filing of such entry, and the papers
required therewith, it shall be the duty of the customs officers,
by all reasonable ways and means in their power, to ascertain, estimate, and appraise the true and actual market value
and wholesale price of such merchandise at the time of its
exportation in the principal markets of the country from
whence it was imported, regardless of the in\-oice and affidavit of such importer.
(4) If the importer, owner, agent, or consignee of such
merchandise shall be dissatisfied with the appraisement aforesaid, he may, if he has complied with the law, give notice
thereof in writing to the collector.
(5) The collector shall then select one discreet and experienced merchant, to be associated with one of the general
appraisers wherever practicable, or two discreet and experienced merchants, citizens of the United States, familiar with
the character and value of the goods in question, to examine
and appraise the same, agreeably to the provisions of the
statute.
(6) The appraisers may can upon and examine upon oath
any owner, importer, consignee, or other person touching
any matter or thing which they may deem material in ascertaining the true market value or wholesale price of any merchandise imported.
(7) Such appraisers may require such importer on oath to
produce to the collector or to any permanent appraiser any
letters, accounts, or invoices in his possession relating to such
merchandise.
(8) The Secretary of the Treasury, from time to time, shall
establish such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with
law, as will secure a just, faithful, and impartial appraisal
of all merchandise imported into the United States, and just
and proper entries of the actual market value and wholesale
price thereof, as aforesaid.
It is plain that the appraisers may make and report such
appraisement upon knowledge obtained by examinatioD and
inspection of the imported goods, without resorting to other
sources or means of information.
The mode of appraisement from the time of the entry of ·
the importer until the final determination of the question is
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one continuous act of appraisement under the statute. The
use of such terms as "appeal" and "reappraisement" are
not warranted by the provisions of the law. Nor have the appraisers been invested by law with any of the powers of
a judicial tribunal. They are not authorized to make rules
and regulations for their own government in ascertaiumg
values and concluding appraisements, but are goverued by
the provisious of the statute and such rulr>s and regulations
as the Secretary of the Treasury may from time to time
establish.
The appraisers are selected for their supposed knowledge
and familiarity with the values of the goods imported, and
may act upon such knowl~dge, when they have examiued
aucl inspected the merchandise, without additional evidence;
or they may, in their discretion, call the owner, importer, consignee, or other person, and examine him upou oath in regard
to any material matter. Such examinations may or may not
be made according to the discretion of the appraisers. Such
examinations can not be demanded by tbe importer, but may
bt~ required by the appraisers. And as the letters, accounts,
or invoices in the possession of the importer may be produced,
by direction of the appraisers, under the law for the secret
inspection and custody of the collector or permanent appraiser,
no good reason can be assigned why the statements of owners,
importers, consignees, or other persons, taken as required by
law by such appraisers, may not be held as secret information by the customs officers, under a rule or regulation to
that effect established by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Such a rule is not inconsistent with any law of the United
States.
There is nothing in the law upon the subject under consideration vesting the customs officers with judicial powers at
any stage in the appraisement, nor has Congress fettered the
proceedings with statutory rules; but the establishment of
such rules has lJeen wisely delegated to the Secretary of the
Treasury. The law authorizes the appraisers to require
owners or importers to appear before them and make statements under oath, but the rules and regulations in relation to
· the manner of conducting such examinations are to be establisiled by tile Secretary of tile Treasury. He must report the
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rules and regulations adopted by him to Congress, with his
reasQDs therefor.
I am of the opinion therefore that the law, in the absence of
a rule of the Secretary of the Treasury to that efl'ect, does not
permit importers to appear before such customs officers, with
counsel or otherwise, for the purpose of producing witnesses
to be examined in their own behalf, or to cross-examine witnesses called by such appraisers, or to criticise confidential
papers therein, but the entire matter is under the control of
the Secretary of the Treasury, and subject to such rules and
regulations as he may establish in relation thereto from time
to time.
Respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF 'IRE TREASURY.

REFUND OF DUTY.
Cement barrels being deemed non-dutiable charges, it is recommended
that the instructions of the Treasury Department of July 20, 1885, be
so amended as to apply to cases of exaction of duties on such barrels
where the value thereof was added by the importer at the time of entry
under a requirement mac.le by the order of April 10, 1884, as contained
in the circular of that Department of April 12, 1884.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 5, 1886.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt ofyour
communication of the 3d instant, inclosing copy of a letter
dated New York, the 29th of July last, from Messrs. Hartley
& Coleman, in which they ask that your Department's instructions of the 20th of that month for the settlement of suits
and appeals covering the question of the exaction of duties
on barrels containing cement may be considered as applicable to cases of exaction of duties on such barrels where the
cost or value thereof was added at the time of entry by the
importers, under and in pursuance of an express requirement
of the order of April 10, 1884, as contained in Department's
circular of April 12, 1884.
My opinion is requested upon the claim made in said letter
that, as the cost of the barrels was added by the importers
· SrR:
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under such positive order of the Department and against
their written protests and appeals, the legal effect is the same
as if the addition had been made by the collector or appraiser
after entry.
It appears that the instructions of your Department of the
25th of July, 1885, as to settling suits for refund of duty on
cement barrels, limited the cases to "those where the entries did not include the cost of barrels, and where the cost
was added by tho appraiser or collector to the entered value
for the purpose of assessment of duty." Understanding the
meaning of said limitation to be that where the addition was
made on the entry by the importer, he was bound to pay duty
thereon, whether the item added was properly exempt from
duty or not, I am of opinion that said limitation should be
reconsidered and revoked. I can perceive no difference between the cases in which the cost of the barrels was added
by the importers under the positive order of the Department and against their written protests and appeals, and
the cases in which the addition has been made by the collector or appraiser after entry. Although in form the addition is the act of the importer, it is in reality the act of the
Department. In the case of Meyers v. Shurtleff (23 Fed.
Rep., 577) it was decided that, according to the true construc·
tion of section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, cement barrels
are non-dutiable charges. That decision seems to have been
acquiesced in by the Government as final. It is accordingly
recommended that the instructions of your Department bearing date the 20th of July, 1885, be so amended as to apply to
cases of exaction of duties on such barrels where the cost or
value thereof wa,s added at the time of entry by the importers under and in pursuance of a requirement made by the
order of AprillO, 1884, as contained in Department circular
of April12, 1884.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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STEAM REGISTERS.
Sections 4418, 4419, and 4491, Revised Statutes, concerning steam registers used on vessels propelled by steam, considered; and held that a
steam register, in order to be the subject of approval under section 4419,
must be of a description which satisfies the requirements of both section
4418 and section 4419.
•
The terms "persons engaged in navigating the vessel," as used in section
4419, comprehend the officers and crew, those who are in the service of
the vessel, and employed in its management, the working of its machinery, etc., during the voyage. The register is not only to be taken
from the control of all persons so employed, but to be secured from such
control by the inspectors.
DEP ARTi\1ENT OF JUSTlCE,

February 11, 1886.
SIR: Your letter of the 30th of December last informs me

that'' a controversy" has for a number of years existed between the board of supervising inspectors of steam-vessels
and the owners and proprietors of what is known as the" Edson recording steam-pressure gauge," touching the proper construction of certain statutory provisions contained in sections
4418, 4419, and 4491, Revised Statutes.
By the first of these sections it is provided that the local
inspectors of steamboats shall ''satisfy themselves * * *
that there is a sufficient number of gauge-cocks properly inserted, and, to indicate the pressure of steam, suitable steam
registers that will correctly record each excess of steam carried above the prescribed limit and the highest point attained," etc.
The next section provides that " the steam registers shall
be taken wholly from the control of all persons engaged in
navigating such vessel and secured by the inspectors."
The remaining section reads as follows : " No kind of instrument, machine, or equipment for the better security oflife,
provided for by this title, tihall be used on any steam-vessel
which shall not first be approved by the board of supervising
inspectors and also by the Secretary of the Treasury."
The view taken by the board of supervising inspectors appears to be that they have no discretionary power under section 4491 to approve any steam register that does not come
within the provisions of the other sections named (4418 and
4419), both in regard to its adaptability as an indicator and
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recorder of the pressure of steam and its capability of being
placed beyond the control of those who may be engaged in
navigating the vessel, and thus secured by the local inspectors. On the other. hand, the parties interested in the "Edson recording steam-pressure gauge" (as it seems from J·our
letJ;er) regard the board as in duty bound to approve any
steam register that satisfies the provisions of section 4418,
irrespective of the requirements of section 4419.
Referring to. these conflicting views, you, at the instance of
the board, request an opinion" upon the construction of the
statutes in controversy."
If what is here proposed for my consideration were nothing more than a subject of controversy between the board
and the parties above mentioned, it would not present a
question upon which the Attorney-General is authorized to
gi \·e an official opinion. It is made his duty to give opinions
at the call of the heads of Departments, but this is limited
to questions of law arising in the administration of their respective Departments (sec. 356, Rev. Stat.). Where the subject· matter is not of that character, and consequently not
within the scope of the duty thus marked out, he is without
authority to officially ad vise thereon.
Presuming the subject before me, however, to be one that
concerns not only the duties of the board but the exercise of
your own functions under section 4491, whatever other feature it possesses, I may well regard it as a matter arising in
the administration of your Department, and so not open to
that objection.
The point on which my opinion is desired, though not disstinctly stated in your letter, I understand to be this: Whether,
with respect to steam registers, tte approval called for by
section 4491 is limited to those instruments which come
within the terms of section 4418 and which are also capable
of being secured as required by section 4419.
The ~nswer to this is plain. The provisions of section 4491
extend only to such instruments, machines, or eq uipments
as are" provided for in Title LII; and since no steam registers are therein provided for other than those covered by
sections 4418 and 4419, the register, in order to be the subject of approval under 4!91, must be of a description which
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.satisfies both the sections mentioned. It is not enough that
the instrument meets all the requirements of section 4418.
Unless it can be taken wholly from the control of the persons engaged in navigating the vessel and secured by the
local inspectors, as required by section 4419, it does not properly fall within the provisions of section 4491.
There has been some discussion as to the meaning of the
terms "persons engaged in navigating" the vessel, as employed in section 4419. In a generaJ sense, those terms comprehend the officers and crew, all who are in the service
-of the vessel, and employed in its management and the working of its machinery, etc., during the voyage. I incline to
take the view that they are meant to be understood in that
broad sense. The register is not only to be taken from the
-control of "all" persons so employed, but to be secured from
such control by the inspectors. The aim of the statute thus
seems to be to place the register under the exclusive control
of the inspectors themselves. Whether this is practicable
with regard to the use of any steam register now constructed
can not properly be considered to govern the interpretation
of the statute, but the intent and meaning thereof mus~ be
gathered from its language.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. B. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.
Where certain merchandise, consisting of a fabric composed of silk, cotton, and worsted, met all the requirements of Schedule L of the act
of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, and also fulfilled all the conditions imposed by Schedule K of the same act for classification for duty there
under: Held that under section 2499, Revised Statutes, it should be
classified for duty under Schedule L, which imposes the higher rate
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

Febr'uary 18, 1886.
I have the honor to acknowledge the rec0,ipt of your
-communication of the 16th instant, requesting my npinion
upon a question involving the classification for duty of cerSIR:
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tain merchandise called silk seals, imported under the tariff
act of :March 3, 1883.
It appears from your statement that the merchandise in
question consists of a fabric composed of silk, cotton, and
worsted, silk being admittedly the component of chief value,
but worsted also forming a component of no inconsiderable
value. The question presented is whether the merchandise
is dutiable at the rate of 50 per centum ad valorem under
the provision in Schedule L, act pf March 3, 1883, or whether
it is dutiable under the provision of Schedule K, which imposes duties at the rate of 35 cents per pound and 40 per
centum ad valorem on all manuf~ctures composed in part of
the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other animal, when weighing
over 4 ounces per square yard. Inasmuch as these goods
fulfill the conditions imposed by Schedule K, and also meet
the requirements imposed by Schedule L, it seems to me that
the case is governed by section 2499 of the Revised Statutes,
incorporated in the act of March 3, 1883. That section provides as follows :
'' There shall be levied, collected, and paid, on each and
every non-enumerated article which bears a similitude either
in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be
applied to any article enumerated in this title as chargeable
with duty, the same rate of duty which is levied and charged
on the enumerated article which it most resembles in any of
the particulars before mentioned; and if any non-enumerated
article equally resembles two or more enumerated articles on
which different rates are chargeable, t,h ere shall be levied,
collected, and paid on such non-enumerated article the same
rate of duty as is chargeable on the article which it resembles paying the highest duty, and on all articles manufactured from two or more materials the duty shall be assessed
at the highest rates at which the component material of
chief value may be chargeable. If two or more rates of duty
should be applicable to any imported article, it shall be classified for duty under the highest of such rates: Provided,
That non-enumerated articles similar in material and quality
and texture and the use to which they may be applied to articles on the free-list, and in the manufacture of which no
dutiable materials are used, shall be free."
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It appearing that two rates of duty are applicable to the
merchandise referred to, I am of opinion that the action of the
collector, to the effect that of these rates the higher should be
selected, was correct.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CASE OF MOORE, WHITFIELD, ETC.
Opinions of May 5 and July 7, 1885 (see ante, pp. 167, 223), reaffirmed.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 2, 1886.
I have duly considered your communication of December 14, 1885, together with the papers accompanying it,
which asks for a further consideration of the accounts of
Moore, Whitfield, and Woodson, in connection with the sale
of certain Indian trust lands.
As you state in your communication, I have on two previous occasions (May 5 and July 7, 188fl) rendered your
Department opinions in this matter, and· now, after the third
examination of this case upon the papers presented, I see
no cause to change those opinions, or either of them.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND ..
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
SIR:

LOSS OF MONEY-ORDER FUNDS.
The act of March 17, 1882, chapter 41, which authorizes the Po~tmaster
General to grant relief to postmasters for the loss of money~order
funds in certain cases, does not annul the requirements of regulation
1099 of the" Postal Laws and Regulations," whereby the postmaster
is to make good the loss should he fail to comply with such regulation.
Nor is the Postmaster-General at liberty, so long as the regulation is in
force, to disregard it in a case where he is satistied that the postmaster
had in fact remitted the money lost, but did not have the remittance
witnessed as the regulation requires.
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The authority to credit postmasters with lost remittances being limited
by the act of 1882 to cases where the remittance is made ''in compliance with the instructions of the Postmaster-General," such compliance
forms a necessary element in each case to bring it within th~ statute.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 3, 1886.
SIR: I have considered the questions in the case of the

postmaster at Washington, Ark., which were submitted to
me in your letter of the 14th of December last. As stated
by you, the case is this:
" On the 29th of November, 1884, the postmaster there
(Miss Rosa Wallace) bad on hand $381 surplus money-order
funds, which by the· regulation she was required to deposit
in a depository office named, and was required to remit the
same in registered packages in the mail. In order to preserve evidence of such remittance of a character that admits
of no contradiction, special instructions are given as section
1099, Postal Laws and Regulations. (Here follows that section.)
"As will be seen, the above regulation requires that, in
every case of a remittance of money-order funds made by
means of paper money, the postmaster should be able to prove
by at least one disinterested witness that the money was actually inclosed in a properly registered package addressed to
the postmaster at the post-office designated to receive the deposit, and furthermore that said package, with the money
inclosed therein, was securely locked in the mail pouch, and
was taken from the post-office and out of the postmaster's
possession by the contractor, employe of the railway mail
service, mail carrier, or other person duly authorized to dispatch the same to its destination. The regulation also provides that should the remitting postmaster fail to comply
with the foregoing in~tructions, he will be required, if the
money is lost, to make good the amount.
"Miss Wallace (the . postmaster at Washington) states
that she scheduled the money for remittance, and inclosed it
in an envelope properly sealed and addressed on the night
of November 29, and placed it in a large iron safe during
the night, together with other packages, to be forwarded in
the mail train which passed at 8 o'clock the following morn-
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ing; that the next morning she went to the post-office, took
the registered packages and locked them in the mail pouch,
and. they were duly forwarded. At the Hope post-office the
bag was found to be cut, and the whole bundle of letter
packages, some t.welve in all, were reported missing, amongst
them the one in question, and have ne\er been found; and
there is much e-vidence justifying suspicion that the packages were stolen in the la~t-named office. She thereupon
duly presented Ler claim for credit under the act of 1\farch
17, 1882. chapter 41.
" The evidence in the case showed that she had no witness,
as required by regulation 1099, Postal Laws and ltegu.lations, of the several steps in preparing and forwarding the
remittance, although a credible witness happened to be present in the morning and casually saw her put in the mailpouch packages tied together and appearing to be regiHtered
matter, and remembers the fact, although not then called
upon to witness it.
" The regulation was adopted and promulgated before the
passage of the act of March 17, 1882, and has never been
modified or changed by the _act of the Postmaster-General.
but has been applied in many cases."
In connection with the foregoing you submit the following
questions:
"(1) \Vhether the act of March 17,1882, above cited, oper_
ated to annul the requirement of regulation 1099, so far as it
declares t.hat the postmaster shall make good the amount in
case the regulation is disregarded.
"(2) If the regulation be in force, has the Postmaster General the right to disregard it in a particular case, where he
is satisfied that the postmaster bas in fact made the remit·tance, but bas failed to have witnesses to the transaction as
the regulation requires."
The act of March 17, 1882, in so far as it relates to the loss
of money-order funds, confers upon the Postmaster-General
power to grant relief to postmasters in the following cases:
First, where the funds, while in the hands of the postmaster,
are lost by hurglary, fire, or other unavoidable accidents.
Second, where the funds; being remitted by the postmaster,
are lost or stolen while in transit. ·The present inquiry is
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confined to the provision of the statute and the regulations
of the Post-Office Department applicable to cases of the lat·
ter description only.
The statutory provisionjust adverted to authorizes the Post
master-General " to credit postmasters with the amount of
any remittances of money-order funds made by them in compliance with the instructions of the Postmaster-General which
shall have been lost or stolen while in transit by mail from
the office of the remitting postmaster to the office designated as his depository." This provision does not annul regulation 1099, which embodies ''special instructions about remittances," but rather recognizes it as a duty of postmasters
to comply therewith in making their remittances. And as
the authority to credit them with lost remittnnces is limited
to cases where the remittance is made'' in compliance with
the instructions of the Postmaster-General," such compliance
forms a necessary element in each case to bring it within the
statute.
The Postmaster-General may undoubtedly amend or modify
the existing regulation or instructions upon the subject of
these remittances, but the amendment or modification could
only be made to apply to cases of loss thereafter happening.
Cases of loss which have already occurred must be viewed
with reference to the instructions in force at the time of their
occurrence. The Postmaster-General has no dispensing
power as to them. For while in force and operating they are
as binding as if they were statutes, and if in any such case
there has been failure on the part of the postmaster in
making remittance to comply with the instructions, the
loss is not one for which, under the act of 1882, the Postmaster-General is authorized to give him credit.
Agreeably to the foregoing considerations I answer both
the questions submitted by you in the negative.
I am sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLA~D.
'rhe POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
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CADET ENGINEERS.
The cadet engineers in the Navy (graduates of the classes of 1881 and
1882) who were discharged unJer a misconstruction of the act of August 5, ltJ82, chapter 391, not having been legally removed, are still the
lawful incumbents of their respective offices, and should be recognized
as in the immediate line of promotion, in their proper order, to fill the
vacancies that may occur in the office of assistant engineers.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 6, 1886.
SIR: Yours of the 27th'ultimo in reference to cadet engineers, who are graduates of the classes of 1881 and 1882, has
been received. In view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of The United Sta,tes v. Redgrave,
and The United States v. Perkins, affirming the decisions of
the Court of Claims .(20 C. Cls. R., 226, 438) you ask an opinion upon the questions which are hereinafter considered in
the order in which they are presented.
(1} ''Whether the cadet engineers who, after being notified
of their discharge under the act, accepted the same with the
accompanying pay, or, after protesting, waived their objections and then accepted the pay, are or are not affected by
the decision; or, in other words, whether they are by their
own act debarred from participation in the benefit of the
decision."
The court held in Leopold v. United States (18 C. Cis. R.,
546) that the act of Augm;t 5, 1882 (22 Stat., 285), is prospective and not retroactive, and therefore not applicable to
the classes of 1881 and 1882. The subsequent decisions of
the Court of Claims and of the Supreme Court have settled
this as the law.
The cadet engineers of these classes became inferior officers
under the Constitution, and Congress by expres8 enactment
vested the power to appoint them in the Secretary of the
Navy, subject, however, to the restriction and limitation as
to removals which is found in section 1229, Revised Statutes,
to wit: "And no officer in the military or naval service shall
in time of peace be dismissed from service, except upon and
in pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that efl'ect
or in commutation thereof."
Inasmuch as it has been held by the Court of Claims in
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Perkins'v. United States (20 C. Cis. R., 438) and affirmed by
the Supreme Court, that " the discharge of a cadet engineer
by the Secretary of the Navy in 1883} under a mistaken construction of the act of 5th August, 1883 (22 Stat., 284), and
contrary to the Revised Statutes, section 12291 was void," it
is evident the cadet engineers, who have passed the requisite
examinat:ons, can only be relieved of their official obligations and duties by one of two methods, either by sentence of
a court-martial or by resignation. The former proposition
does not enter into the matter under consideration. The
honorable discharge of the cadet engineers having been held
void by the courts, can it be said that those who accepted
their pay without protest or that those who protested against
the legality of the discharge, and subsequently accepted
such pay, intended thereby to give to their acts the force
and effect of resignation~ This construction could not· reasonably be given to such acts. Such protests and acts could
not change the legal force of the statute either for or against
them.
''A resignation may he effected by the concurrence of the
officer and the appointing power; its essential elements
being an intent to resign on the one side and acceptance on
the other. The principle upon which it rests is agreement."
(14 Opin., 259; and JJ;Jirnmack's Case, 97 U.S., 436.)
One of these cadet engineers bas been discharged at his
own requet:;t. 'rhe other twenty-nine have not been legally
removed, have not resigned, and are still the proper and
legal incumbents of their respective offices, and have been
such notwithstanding the misconstruct,ion of the act of
August 5, 1882.
That act recognized the rank and office of cadet engineers
(graduates) and made an appropriation to pay them for their
services, and the courts have. held that such act did not make
cadet engineers (graduates) of the classes of 1881 and 1882
naval cadets.
"(2) What disposition shall be made of such cadet engineers after their restoration to the Navy Register~"
As the courts have declared the honorable discharges issued under the act of August 5, 1882, void, the cadet engi·
neers (graduates) retain their offices and rank without regard
to such discharges. The misconst.ruction of said act has
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placed them in an anomalous position, and embarrassed the
Department. These cadet engineers (graduates) were in the
-immediate line of promotion to assistant engineers, and, only
for the misconstruction of the act aforesaid, they would now
bold the commissions to the latter office erroneously h'eld by
others. It appears the office of cadet engineers (graduates)
was ignored in making promotions, under the misconstruction
of the act of August 5, 1882, and naval cadets who were inferior in rank were promoted to the vacancies in the office of
assistant engineer, which vacancies should have been filled
by promotions from the cadet engineers. The cadet engineers are, by the -decisions of the courts, in the direct and
immediate line of promotion to vacancies to the office of
assistant engineers.
Congress, by inadvertent legislation, caused a state of
affairs to exist not intended or contemplated. The persons
now erroneously holding the commissions as assistant engi·
neers can not well be disturbed. But the misconstruction of
the act of August 5, 1882, having been definitely pointed out
by the courts, the cadet engineers (graduates) who have so
long been deprived of their rights, are now entitled to have
them restored, and this can only be accomplished by recognizing them as in the immediate line of promotion, in their
proper order, to fill the first vacancies that may occur in the
office of assistant engineer.
As to the disposition of the naval cadets who are entitled
to promotion, I would suggest a reference of the matter to
Congress for immediate consideration.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that all of the twenty-nine
cadet engineers (graduates) are in the service as officers, and
entitled to participate without distinction in the benefit of
the decisions of the courts referred to in your communication; and that such cadet engineers (graduates) remain in
their proper order, in the immediate line of promotion to the
first vacancies that may occur in the office of assistant engineer, and have preference thereto over naval cadets of inferior
rank, and that Congress should he requested to enact a law
regulating the promotion of naval cadets, and providing for
the discharge of any surplus thereof.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
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HAZING A1' THE NAVAL ACADEMY.
Where the record of the proceedings o~ a court-martial in the case of a
nava~ cadet of the second class, who was tried under the act of June
23, 1874, chapter 453, for the offense of hazing, showed that the acts
complained of were pulling the nose, striking at, striking, and otherwise maltreating a naval cadet of the fourth class: Held, that these
facts, in conjunction with other circumstances, present a case containing all that is e~sential to constitute the offense of hazing within the
meaning of the statute, and that the court had jurisdiction of the complaint.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 12, 1886.
I have examined the question submitted in your letter of the 18th ultimo, transmitting the record of the proceedings of a court-martial in the case of Naval Cadet Glen
Waters, namely: " Whether the court had jurisdiction of the
case."
This is one of several cases recently tried before the courtmartial referred to for violation of the act of June 23, 1874, to
prevent hazing at the Naval Academy, in all of whieh the
charges had relation to or were based upon the same occurrences.
In the case under consideration the charge and specifications were these :
~' Charge : Violation of the act of Congress approved on
the 23d day of June, 1874, to prevent hazing at the Naval
Aeaclemy.
"Specification .first: In this that the said Naval Cadet Glen
·Waters~ while attached to and serving at the said Academy,
on or about the 31st day of December, 1~85, in the cadet
quarters of said Academy, did~ haze' Naval Cadet Louis L.
Driggs, a cadet of the fourth class, attached -to and serving
at the said Academy, by pulling the nose of the said Driggs,
and otherwise maltreating the said Driggs.
"Specification second: In this that the said Naval Cadet Glen
Waters, between October 1 and December 31, 1885, in the
cadetquarters,did haze Naval Cadet Louis L. Driggs, a cadet
of the fourth class, attached to and serving at the said
Academy, by striking at said Driggs and otherwise annoying the said Driggs."
SIR :
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Here the inquiry arises, do the allegations in the above
charge and specifications, assuming them to be true, amount
to the "offense commonly known as hazing," within the
meaning of the act of 1874 ~ If so, then undoubtedly the
court-martial not only had jurisdiction of the complaint, but
was bound to entertain it and to determine its truth or falsity
upon the testimony adduced.
In a former opinion addressed to you, dated November 12,
1885, I had occasion to examine the subject, what constitutes
the offense of hazing, mentioned in that act-the act itself
containing no definition of such offense, and it being unknown either to the common or statutory law of the land.
The result reached was, that for a definition of the offense recourse must be had to the rules and regulations in force at the
Naval Academy at the time of the passage of the act, and
that according to these the offense consists in the maltreatment of a new cadet of the fourth class by any of the cadets
of the senior classes. In paragraph 170 of the regulations
of the Academy of 1876, it is described as "molesting, annoying, ridiculing, maltreating, or assuming unauthorized
authority over the new cadets of the fourth class " by the
older cadets.
It is averred in the specifications that the person upon
whom the ofl'ense is alleged to have been committed was at
the time " a cadet of the fourth class, attached to and serving
at the said Academy;" and it elsewhere appears in the reqord
that the person charged with the offense was then a cadet of
the second class; while the acts of the latter which go to
form the gravamen of the complaint are (specification first),
"pulling the nose of the said Driggs, striking the said Driggs,
and otherwise maltreating the said Driggs," and (specification second) "striking at said Driggs, and otherwise annoying the said Driggs," be being a cadet of the fourth class.
These facts plainly exhibit a case of maltreatment, which, in
conjunction with the other circumstances mentioned, contains
all that is essential to constitute the offense of "hazing" in
the sense of the statute.
The cmut-martial, then, having jurisdiction of the case as
set forth in the complaint, it had power under the statute to
inquire into au·the facts and circumstances thereof and make
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a findiug thereon. Whether the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence did or did not establish the offense
charged was for the court to decide, and whether the dr·
cision rendered was correct or erroneous this could not affect
the validity or effect of its fiuding when approved by the
proper authority.
It is suggested that if the facts in evidence, as shown by
the record, make out a case of personal rencounter or fight
between the parties, the court was thereby ousted of its jurisdiction, and its finding was consequently a nullity. But
conceding, for the present purpose, that the facts do make
out a case of that sort, this would only go to show that the
decision of the court was wrong, not that it acted without
jurisdiction. If the court had cognizance of the offense charged
its jurisdiction to receive evidence and to determine from tue
testimony given whether the accused was guilty of that offense
could not be defeated by the state of facts developed on the
trial (Regina v. Bolton, 1 L. B., 66; Wilkinson v. Dutton, 3
B. & S. 821), unless the absence of some jurisdictional fact, as
that the victim of the maltreatment was not a cadet of the
fourth class, or that the accused was not a cadet of one of
the senior classes, should thereby be made to appear.
Whether the acts of the accused which were proved on the
trial constituted the offense wherewith he was charged was
a fact which the court had to decide; but how could it decide
without the possession and exercise of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter~

The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction ;
and it is coram judice whene,·er a case is presented which
brings this power into action. (United States v. Arredendo, 6
Pet., 709). It is a general rule that when the court has
jurisdiction by law of the offense charged, and of the party
who is charged therewith, its judgments in the case are not
nullities. (Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U. S., 328.) When it appears that the law has given the tribunal capacity to enter tain the complaint against the person or thing sought to be
charged or affected, that such complaint has actually been
preferred, and that such person or thing uas been properly
brought before the tribunal to answer the charge therein
contained. the jurisdiction has attaehed, the right to hear

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

379

Abatement of Tax on Distilled Spirits.

and determine is perfect, and the decision of every question
thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction thus
conferred, and whether determined rightfully or wrongfully,
correctly or erroneously, is alike immaterial to the validity,
force, and effect of the final judgment, when brought collaterally in question. (Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Olaio Stat., 494.)
The principles stated in the authorities just cited have
become axiomatic and apply to the court and case under
consideration. Upon examination of the record I find myself
unable to reach any other conclusion than that the case was
within the jurisdiction of the court.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.

The

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

ABATEMENT OF TAX ON DISTILLED SPIRITS.
A large quantity of whisky, part of which had been in warehouse beyon,d the bonded period of three years, was accidentally destroyed
by :fire in July, 1884, without any fraud, collusion, or negligence of
the distillers, and while the same remained under custody of an internal-revenue officer in a distillery warehouse. The tax thereon had
not peen paid. Application having been made to the secretary of the
Treasury for an abatement of the tax under section 3221, Revised
Statutes: Advised that the Secretary has authority, by the terms of
that section, under the state of facts shown, to abate the tax on said
spirits.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

JJ!arch 19, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 15th instant, in which you request an
expression of opinion as to the authority of the Secretary of
the Treasury, under section 3221 of the Revised Statutes, to
abate the tax on distilled spirits under the circumstances as
stated.
It appears from the statement that A. Overholt & Co., distillers in the twenty-second district of Pennsylvania, applied
to the Secretary under said section 3221 for an abatement
of the tax on 333,825 gallons of whisky which the proof
showed to have been accidentally destroyed by fire on the
night of the 23d of July, l.S84, without any fraud, collusion,
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or negligence of the distillers, while the same remained under
the custody of an internal-revenue officer in the distillery
warehouse of the claimants. Of the total amount thus destroyed, it was found that 22,962 gallons had been in the
warehouse some twenty-three days beyond the bonded period
of three years allowed by section 3293, Revised Statutes, as
amended by section 4 of the act of May 28, 1880 (21 Stat., 145).
Section 3221 of the Revised Statutes reads as follows:
" The Secretary of the Treasury, upon the prdduction to him
of satisfactory proof of the actual destruction by accidental fire
or other casualty, and without any fraud, collusion, or negligence of the owner thereof, of any distilled spirits, while the
same remained in the custody of any officer of internal revenue,
in any distillery warehouse or bonded warehouse of the
United States, and before the tax thereon has been paid, may
abate the amount of internal taxes accruing thereon, and may
cancel any warehouse bond, or enter satisfaction thereon, in
whole or in part, as the case may be. And if such taxes
have been collected since destruction of said spirits, the said
Secretary shall refund the same to the owners thereof out of
any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated."
Section 4 of the act entitled ''An act to amend· the laws
in relation to internal revenue,'' approved May 28, 1880,
provides among other things that, "in case the distiller or
owner fails orrefuses to give the bond hereinbefore required,
or to renew the same, or neglects to immediately withdraw
the spirits and pay the tax thereon, before the expiration of
the time limited in the bon<l, the collector shall proceed to
collect the tax by distraint," etc. The same section provides
also "that the tax on all distilled spirits hereafter entered
for deposit in distillery warehouses shall be payable before
and at the time the. same are withtlrawn therefrom, and
within three years of the date of the entry for deposit therein."
Undoubtedly the collector could have proceeded to collect
the tax by distraint immediately upon the expiration of the
bonded period of three years allowed by law, but it seems
that he has not done so, ao.d that the tax upon the distilled
spirits iu question has not been paid. Section 3221, being in
the nature of a remedial statute, must be construed liberally;
but, without invoking this principle, I am of opinion that
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before the tax bas been paid the Secretary of the Treasury
has authority, by the express terms of the statute under the
state of circurpstances as shown, to abate the tax on the distilled spirits.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

BONDED WAREHOUSE.
Where domestic merchandise, exported in good faith, has been imported
baclr again, and is subject to duty, it is entitled to be admitted to
entry for storage in a. bonded warehouse under section 2962, Revised
Statutes.

DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,
March 25, 1886.
SIR: Your communication of the 19th instant, as)dng an
opinion as to ''whether imported goods, wares, and merchandise the product or manufacture of the United States,
which, under section 2500, Revised Statutes, are liable to a
duty equal to the tax imposed by the internal-revenue laws,
are entitled to the privilege of the bonded-warehouse system
prescribed by sections 2962, etc., of the Revised Statutes,"
has received my consideration, and I have to say in reply
that, in my opinion, such goods, wares, and merchandise are
entitled to the privilege of the bonded-warehouse system.
The law (sec. 2962, Rev. Stat.) admits to entry for storage
in a bonded warehouse "any merchandise subject to duty,"
brought into any port of entry of the United States, and to
deny the right to enter for storage reimported domestic merchandise is to refuse to give proper effect to the words of the
Jaw.

The opinion of my predecessor of the 2d July, 1883, to
which you refer, does not admit of the construction that bas
been put on it in the Treasury Department. That opinion
goes no farther than to lay down that the privileges extended
to importations can not be enjoyed by domestic merchandise
taken out of the country upon a formed plan to bring it back
again, and that in such case there is a merely colorab,le exportation, and, consequently, no reimp:>rtation in the statu-
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tory sense. And this op-inion is applicable onl~ 1 to cases
where domestic merchandise exported in good faith has
been reim ported.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

AMERICAN CARRYING TRADE.
Section 14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chapter 121 " to remove certain burdens on the American merchant marine and to encourage the American carrying trad~," etc., considered in connection with the eighth
article of the treaty of 1827 with Sweden and Norway.
No warrant is found in the treaty for the claim that the shipping of that
power is entitled to the benefits of the act without submitting to its
conditions.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

]}Iarch 26, 1886.
Sm: As requested by you, I have reviewed in the light of
the note of the minister of Sweden and Norway to you, a
copy of which bas been furniRhed me, the opinion of this
Department of the 19th September, 1885, upon the claims of
certain foreign powers to be admitted to th6 benefits of the
fourteenth section of the act of Congress of the 26th June,
1884~ entitled " An act to remove certain burdens on the
American merchant marine and to encourage the American
carrying trade, and for other purposes," without submission
to the geographical conditions and limitations of that law,
and find it quite as difficult to yield to the claim of Sweden
ancl Norway under the eighth article of the treaty of 1827 as
to the supposed claim under the" most favored nation" clause
of that treaty.
The eighth article of the treaty of 1827 is in these words:
"The two high contracting parties engaged not to impose
upon the navigation between their respective territories, in
the vessels of either, any tonnage or other duties, of any
kind or denomination, which shall be higher or other than
those which shall be imposed on every other navigation
except that which they have reser,ed to themselves, respectively, by the sixth article of the present treaty."
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It is not denied that the benefit of the reduced tonnage
duty of the act of the 26th June, 1884, is open to the shipping of Sweden and Norway on the conditions of that law
wh_ich ap~ly to ''every other navigation," but it is claimed
that the shipping of that power is entitled to the benefits of
the act without submitting to its qualifications or conditions.
For this view I can find no warrant whatever in the treaty,
the object of which, in the article now under consideration,
was to secure the shipping of each of the contracting parties
from discriminations imposed by the other and not practiced against other powers.
The act of 1884 admits all nations to its benefits, but these
can only be enjoyed upon the terms on which they are offered,
and Sweden and Norway are expected to submit to those
terms in common with all other nations. The act of Congress
must have effect, as the last expression of the law-making
power, even though it should be in conflict with the treaty,
which, however, I do not think it is.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant~
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.
The article called toluidine, being a product of coal-tar, is within the
provision of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121. covering ''all preparations of coal-tar not colors or d~·e. not specially enumerated or provided
for," and is dutiable thereunder.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

·
March 30, 1886.
SIR: By your letter of the 19th instant it appears that a
certain article of merchandise, called toluidine, was by a Department decision, dated the 8th of December last, held to be
dutiable under the general provision of the act of 188:i, covering "all preparations of coal-tar, not colors or dye, not
specially enumerated or provided for" therein. (T. I., new,
83.) It is now claimed that the article mentioned should be
classified as "aniline, crude," which is exempt from duty
under that act. (T. I., new, 559.)
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The latter view is put upon the ground, I understand, that
crude aniljne, as an article of commerce, is practically unknown,
and that as toluidine, xylidine, curnidine, and other similar
products, constitute the only articles of commerce approximating to crude aniline, they should be admitted free of duty
as crude aniline. However, each of those articles (toluidine,
xylidine, etc.), being a product or preparation of coal-tar,
comes fairly within the terms of the provision quoted above,
''all preparations of coal.tar, not colors," etc., and in the
absence of any other provision in .the same act under which
such article may be classified, it is undoubtedly dutiabl~
under that. The ground suggested for classifying it as crude
aniline-its approximation to crude aniline--is to my mind
insufficient.
I perceive nothing in the accompanying papers which satisfies me that the Department decision above referred to is
erroneous, and therefore do not recommend a reversal or
modification thereof.
I am, sir, v~ry respectfully,
JOHN GOODE, ,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

TITLE TO " POINT PETER/' GEORGIA.
History of the title of the United States to the tract of land known as
"Point Peter," situated at the mouth of St. Mary's River, Georgia,
given, and adverse claims to ownership of the premises set up by one
Alex. Curtis, a resident of Georgia, shown to be utterly groundless.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 20, 1886.
SIR : I have examined the papers which accompanied your
letter of the 8th ultimo, in relation to a certain tract of land
known as ''Point Peter," situated at the mouth of St. Mary's
River, Georgia, and in compliance with your request have
now the honor to state to you my views concerning the title
of the United States to the premises.
It appears that by a deed made January 10, 1818, the land
referred to was conveyed to the United States in fee by
Samuel Breck, sole surviving executor of the last will and
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testament of John Ross, deceased, in consideration of the
sum of $6,000. The grantor in that deed derived title from
Samuel Howard and wife, dated October 21, 1815. Therecitals in the last-mentioned deed and other evidence show
that the premises were originally granted by the State of
Georgia to Jacob Weed, May 1~, 1787, and on the 6th of
:\fay, 1806, were sold and by a deed of that date conveyed to
the said Samuel Howard by the United States marshal for
the district of Georgia as the property of James Seagrove,
pursuant to a decree of the United States circuit court for
that district, rendered in a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage of the premises given by the said Seagrove, dated December 17, 1804. The originals of the aforesaid deeds of
Howard and wife and Samuel Breck, and a certified copy of
the above-mentioned deed of the United States marshal, are
among the papers herewith. In what way Seagrove succeeded to the title of Weed does not appear ; but information on. that point is deemed unimportant, in view of the
great length of time which has since elapsed and other circumstauces.
Such is the history of the title of the United States a·s disclosed by the papers. In the first place, the State of Georgia,
on the 12th of May, 1787,granted away all its interest in the·
premises. Next, title thereto is deduced to the United States.
by a regular chain of conveyances fouuded upon a judicial
sale in 1806 on the foreclosure of a mortgage decreed in 1804 ;.
and as it may well be presumed that the mortgagee had inquired into the title of the mortgagor, and would not have·
advanced his money upon one which was doubtful, the sale
under the foreclosure proceedings constitutes a very satisfactory commencement in the chain of title (especially after
the lapse of so long a time), a previous grant from the State
being shown.
Standing, then, upon that sale, together with the previous
grant of the State, as the foundation of the title which was
subsequently conveyed to the United States by the aforesaid
deed of Samuel Breck, Role surviving executor, etc., I entertain no doubt that the Government acquired by that deed,
and now holds thereunder, a good and valid title to the
premises.
273-VOL XVIII--25
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But it seems that a title adverse to that of the United
States is set up by Mr. Alex. Curtis, ·a resident of Georgia,
originating as follows: In 1870 Daniel R. Proctor having
located a head-right warrant, issued under the laws of Georgia
upon the premises, applied for and obtained a grant of the
same from the governor of the State. The grantee, Proctor, ·
by deed dated March 6, 1876,' which was recorded in January
following, conveyed all his right, title, and interest in the
premises to the said Curtis, who alleges that he bas since
spent considerable sums of money in fencing, clearing, and
otherwise impro·dng the land, etc.
Curtis claims that the deed of con,eyance to the United
States is invalid, because no't recorded within one year from
its date, agreeably to the law of the St<lte; that the right of
disposing of the land subsequently lapsed to the State; and
furthermore, that uncUsturbed occupancy for a period of
seven years gives title, etc. These claims are utterly groundless for the following reasons:
(1) Under the laws of Georgia failure to record a deed
concerns none excepting those who derive title from th.e sctme
g-r~mtor by a deed of subsequent date; as against others, the
validity and operation of the deed are under no circumstances
afl'ected by such failure. (Roe v. Doe ex dem. Neal, Dudley,
16H; Whittington v. Doe ex dem. Wright, 9 Ga., 23; Hand
v. McKinney, 25 Ga., 648; Martin v. Willis, 27 Ga., 407;
Anderson v. Dugas, 29 Ga., 440); and an unrecorded deed
thirry years old, apparent1y genuine, and coming from the
proper custody, is admissible in evidence without proof of
execution. (Whitman v. Thiot et. al., 6! Ga., 11.) So that
al ·hough the deed of Breck to the United St.ates, executed
in 1818, was not recorded until 1885, after the execution and
registration of the deed of Proctor to Curtis (both of which
occurred in 1876), yet as these deeds emanate .from different grantors, the latter deed, notwithstanding it was recorded
within a year from its execution, is entitled to no preference
over and can avail nothing as against the former deed,
which, for aught that appears, has the same validity now
that it had on the day of its delivery.
. ·(2) Ti tie to the land having passe(l out of the State by the
Grant to Weed in 1787, it thereupon ceased to be subject to
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be regranted-by the State, whether under the head-right or
any other laws. ( Viclcety v. Benson, 26 Ga., 590.) There is no
pretension that the title has since returned to the State by
escheat on proper inquest of office, which is the only mode
whereby it could lapse to the State. Moreover, escheated
lands in Georgia are disposed of under statutory provisions
specially applicable thereto; they are not subject to grant
under the head-right laws of the State. Only such land as
is of the public domain of the State and vacant is subject to grant thereunder. The premises not being land of
that description, and furthermore the State having no t·itle
whatever thereto, the grant thereof to Proctor in 1870, on
the location of a head-right warrant, could not impart a
valid title.
(3) By the laws of Georgia, adverse possession, no matter
for what length of time, gives no title against the State; nor
can it give any title against the United States for the reason
t,h at statutes of limitation of a State-which are necessary to
perfect a title thus acquired-do not apply to them. (United
States v. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13
Wall., 92; Lindlsey v. Miller's Lessee, 6 Pet., 666; Doe ex dem.
Daggett v. Roe et al., 20 Ga., 467.)
In your letter it is stated that jurisdiction over the premises was ceded to the United States by an act of the legislature of Georgia of December 22, 1808. On examination of
that act (of which a copy is herewith) I find that it grants
jurisdiction to the United States over all lands then acquired
or which may thereafter be acquired by them for the purpose
of erecting forts or fortifications in that State; but this is
coupled with a proviso that "the said United States do or
shall cause forts or fortifications to be erected thereon." The
proviso may be construed to operate as a condition precedent, which renders it at least doubtful whether the cession
of jurisdiction as to any land was intended to take effect
until the erection of a fort or fortification thereon.
I am, sir, very respectfully 5
JOHN GOODE,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

388

HON

A. H. GARLAND

Chinese Laborers.

CHINESE LABORERS.
The remedy for the alleged evil of Chinese laborers passing through the
territory of the United States to, and returning from, China and other
foreign countries, is proper matter for the consideration of Congress.
Opinion of Attorney-General Brewster, of July 18, 1882 (17 Opin., 416),
construing the act of May 6,1882, chapter 126, cited with approval.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 26, 1886.

SIR: Yours of the 3d instant, inclosing communications of
Bon. W. W. Morrow, in relation to" the alleged evil of Chinese laborers passing through the territory of the United
States to, and returning from, China and other foreign countries," has been received.
I have examined the opinions of my predecessor, in connection with the law now in force, and adhere to the statement contained in my letter of recent date, that the remedy
for the alleged evil is proper matter of legislation for the
Congress of the United States.
The act of Congress (22 Stat., 58) restricting the coming of
Chinese laborers to this country has been amended since the
opinions were rendered by my predecessor, and the exceptions to the general provisions of the original act have been
fully set out and made more explicit. ~23 Stat., 115.)
The opinion of 18th July, 1882, was based upon the construction of the enacting clauses of the statute, while the
opinion of December 2o, 1882, turns largely upon the intention of Congress as expressed in the preamble to the act.
In the absence of apparent ambiguity in the enacting
clauses, I deem it preferable to give e:fl'ect to the statute
without reference to the preamble. Under such circumstances, the preamble should not, in my judgment, control
the entire statute.
I still maintain my position, as above stated, that it is
properly a matter for Congress to determine, but if an opinion upon the subject is insisted upon, I do not hesitate to say
the opinion of my predecessor, dated 18th July, 1882, ex-
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presses the intention of Congress, and presents a fair and
clear construction of the law now in force upon the coming
of Chinese laborers into the United States.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

EIGHT-HOUR LAW.
Construction of the act of J nne 25, 1868, chapter 72, known as the eighthour law, as given by former Attorneys-Generals, and also by the Court
of Claims and Supreme Court, stated, and particular cases of alleged
violation of the act considered with reference thereto.
The act is a legislative declaration that for the -persons described therein
eight hours a day is a reasonable day's labor; and where the public
interests can be subserved, this should be a guide to officers, both
civil and military, in contracting for the public service.

DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE,
May 1, 1886.
Sm: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of 17th ultimo, inclosing letters from George
G. Orr, Atlanta, Ga.; John Connolly, Cincinnati, Ohio; T. C.
Rowe, secretary, etc., San Francisco, Cal.; Stephen Groves,
Ron. S.M. Stockslager.
You ask that I examine the reports of the officers of the
Army on these accompanying papers and inform you
whether in my opinion the conditions which governed the
employment of any class of labor by these officers involves
a violation of the eight-hour la,w, and whether any of the employes herein mentioned, who have been required to work
more than eight hours per day, should Be considered as
coming within that rule.
The construction of the act of June 25,. 1868, chapter 72,
(embraced in section 3738, Revised Statutes), has been frequently before this Department and has received careful
consideration. Almost every question upon which even a
fanciful or conjectural doubt could be raised in the interpretation of this statute, has been brought to the attention of
my predecessors; and the answers to the applications for
opinions have been singularly full and exp1icit.
OF
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And more, these questions have been submitted, and,
after full argument, they have been decided in both the
Court of Claims and the Supreme Court of the United.
States.
Before answering the questions presented to me, I refer to
the following authorities for the statement I have made:
Opinion of Attorney-General Evarts (12 Opin., 530); opinion of Attorney-General Hoar (13 Opin., 29); opinion ~fAt
torney-General Akerman (13 Opin., 424); opinion of SolicitorGeneral and Acting Attorney-General Bristow (14 Opin., 37,
45); opinion of .Acting Attorney-General Hill (14 Opin., 128);
opinion of Attorney-General Devens (16 Opin., 58); United
States v. Martin (10 C. Cis. R., 276); United States v. Martin
(94 IT. S., 400).
In an opinion of l\Ir. Attorney-General Brewster (MS.), a
copy of which I inclose with this, the whole matter is reviewed
and a valuable exposition of the law given. I concur fully
in the views therein expressed.
From these opinions of my predecessors, and the decisions
of the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court of the United
States, may be deduced the following propositions, which, I
think, will meet any case heretofore presented or that may
hereafter be presented to you:
(1) That the act of 1863 (sec. 3738, Rev. Stat.) prescribes the
length of time which shall constitute a day's work; but it
does not establish any rule by which the compensation for a
day's work shall be determine1l-this being-left to be fixed in
the ordinary or customary manner where the law does not
otherwise provide.
(2) That it does not contemplate a reduction of wages
simply because of the reduction thereby made in the length
of the day's work ; but, on the other hand, it does not require
that the same wages shall be paid therefor as are received by
those who, in similar private employments, work a greater
length of time per day. This matter of wages is to be dealt
with as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, having due
regard to the public interests.
(3) That it does not forbid the making of contracts for labor,
fixing a different length of time for the clay's work than that
prescribed in the law.
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(4) The provisions 9f the act are not applicable to mechanics, workmen, and laborers who are in the employment of a
contractor of the United States. It was not intended that
the act should extend to any others than the immediate employes of the Government.
(5) All persons who are employed and paid by the day are ,
included within the act, even though they do not fall within
the strict language of " laborers, workmen, and mechanics."
· Under date of January 23, 1886, 1\fr. George G. Orr complains to the President that carpenters at Fort Spokane were
compelled from September, 1882~ until July, 1884, to work·
more than eight hours per da,y , and asks that they be paid
as for extra time for labor done beyond those hours.
Where there is a special agreement between the employer
-in this case the Go\ernment-and tlle laborer that the laborer shall work less or more than eight hours a day, and it
is reasonable, there is nothing in the· statute to prohibit such
a contract.
The statute is regarded ~'as in the nature of a direction
from a principal to his agent, that eight hours is deemed to
be a proper length of time for a day's labor, and that his
contracts shall be based upon that theory. It is a matter
between the principal and his agent. in which a third party
has no interest. The proclamation of the President and the
act of 1872 are in harmony with this view of the statute.
We are of opinion, therefore, that ccntracts fixing or giving
a different length of time as the day's work are legal and
binding upon the parties making them." (United States v.
JJiartin, 94 U. S., 404.)
If the carpenters at Spokane understood that they were to
work nine or ten hours per day or to be discharged, and continued in employment with that understanding, they must
be held to the conditions of a contract both voluntary and
reasonable, and they can not now recover as for O\ertime.
Mr. Connolly writes that 1\Iajor King for three years violated the provisions of this statute in" ork upon the Tennessee Ri'Ver. But the record transmitted to me shows that the
stone-cutters and stone-masons accepted the employment
with a full knowledge of the time of labor required and the
compensation. It is altogether a mistake that by some reser-
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vation in mind the employe can have a claim against the
Government for compensation for hours beyond the eight
hours designated in the statute, he having accepted the employment with the understanding he is to labor the length
of time required.
Mr. T. C. Rowe, corresponding secretary Union 22, Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, writes that this statute is
violated by contractors on the Presidio Reservation. It has
been decided in this Department that ''the letter of the act
of Congress limits its operation to laborers, workmen, and
mechanics employed by or on behalf of the Government of
the United States, and has no application beyond the immediate employes of the Government." (14 Opin., 38.)
The contract is between the contractor and the workmen;
and the Government has no control over these relations.
Mr. Stephen Groves writes that ship carpenters at St.
Louis had been required to work ten hours a day by Major
Ernst.
The facts show that these employes always worked under
contract~ and recei\ed compensation by the month or by the
bJ:>ur. There was no Yiolation of the statute.
The same observations apply to the matter, referred from
S. 1\f. Stockslager, of watchmen, etc., at Jeffersonville, Ind.
I can see no violation of the statute there; the men being
willing to accept the employment for more hours than eight
per day.
There is one consideration, however, to which I desire to
call your attention. The enactment of this statute was a
legislative declaration that for the persons specified. eight
hours a day was a reasonable day's labor. And where the
public interesbi can be subserved this should be a guide to
officers, both ci·dl and military, in contracting for the public
service. There must of necessity be eases where it is impossible to consjder this as an arbitrary rule. There are
other cases where the party for whose benefit the statute
was made prefers to have the time extended, and he has that
privilege.
In conclusion, I am of opinion that the Jaw has not been
violated in any case presented to me; and I hope I have, in
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answering :your requests, covered all cases which may be
brought to your notice.
I inclose the papers referred to me.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF W .AR.

PROMOTION IN THE N.AVY.
On February 18, 1886, E., a rear-admiral, was, under section 1444, Revised
Statutes, transferred from the active to the retired list of the Navy,
and T., a commodore (being first in the line of promotion), was, after
having successfully passed an examination, nominated by the President to be a rear-admiral to fill tqe vacancy caused by the retirement
of E. While this nomination was before the Senate awaiting action
thereon, T. attaiued t.he age of sixty-two years, and under said section
was transferred from the active to the retired list to rank as commodore: Advised that, according to the law and usage of the service, T.
was entitled to be a rear-admiral from the 18th of February, 1886, by
relation, and to receive the pay of a rear-admiral from that date, and,
if the Senate should confirm his nomination, might be commissioned
as a rear-admiral and placed on the retired list as of that grade.

DEPARTMENT

JUS'l'ICE,
May 4, 1886.
SIR: An opinion is asked by you upon the following case:
,O n the 18th of February, 1886, Rear-Admiral Earl English
was, by virtue of section 144:4 of the Revised Statutes, transferred from the active to the retired list of the Navy, and
Commodore William T. Truxtun was nominated by the President to be a rear-admiral on the active list of the Navy to
fill the vacancy caused by the retirement of Rear-Admiral
English, after having been duly examined and found qualified
for promotion.
'
While this nomination was before the Senate awaiting
final action, Commodore Truxtun attained .the age of sixtytwo years, and was, by force of said section 1444, transferred
from the active to the retired list to rank as commodore.
If Commodore Truxtun had attained the age of sixty-two
after confirmation and appointment as rear-admiral be would
have gone upon the retired list with that rank.
OF
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The question arising upon this stat~ of facts is "Whether
this officer could still be commissioned as a rear.admiral if
the Senate should confirm his nomination for that position
which is now pending before them.
Promotion among officers in the line of the Navy goes by
seniority, and seniority. is determined by the date of commission, that is to say, the date from which the commission
recites that the appointment to a given grade begins.
By the law and usage of the sen·ice, a line officer of the
Navy has as good a right to promotion, if found qualified for
it, and to his proper rank in the grade to which he belongs,
as he bas to his pay, and questions involving the right to
rank or promotion are always important because of the bearing they have on the efficiency of the service.
By the settled practice of the service promotion to a higher
grade includes the right to the rank of that grade from the
date of the vacancy filled hy the promotion. This practice bas
the distinct recog·nition of Congress. Section 1562 of the
Revised Statutes provides that where an officer, through no
fault of his own, is prevented from undergoing an examination for promotion at the appointed time and shall afterwards
pass his examination, the increased pay to which the promotion entitles him shall commence from the time when he
should have been examined in regular course. And by the
first section of the act of June 22, 187 4 (18 Stat., 19), it is provided that'' any officer of the Navy who may be promoted in
course to fill a vacancy in the next higher grade shall be entitled to the pay of the grade to which promotedj1·om the
date he takes rank therein ifit be subsequent to the vacancy
be is appointed to fill,'' thus not only recognizing the practice of makiug the right to rank antedate the time of the appointment to which the rank belongs, but extending it so as
to give pay from the time rank begins.
Before the legislation referred to, several of my predecessors had decided. that it was competent for the appointing
power to give rank by relation in making promotions. ''For
instance," says Mr. Legare," an officer under arrest on groundless charges is not promoted, because promotion were a pardon; be is acquitted and is nominated by relation back.
Everybody sees that this is no arbitrary advancement through
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partiality, but sheer justice and a faithful execution of the
law. So, if any law entitle an officer to promotion at the end
of ten years, and the Executive, having neglected to give him
his due for some time, afterwards confer it, relation back
seems called for by the law itself. This is Vinton's Case, 2
Sumner, 299." (4 Opin., 124.) For other recognitions of the
practice of promoting by relation I beg to refer to the opinion of 1\Ir. Attorney-General Cushing on the Navy efficiency
act, and to the precedents therein mentioned. (8 Opin., 237.)
It follows, then, that Commodore Truxtun is, according to
the law and usage of the service, entitled to be a rear-admiral from the 19th of February, 1886~ by relation, and to
receive the pay of a rear-admiral from that date and be
placed on the retired list as of that grade, otherwise the nonaction of the Senate touching his nomination would have the
effect of depriving this officer of a valuable right.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

CADET ENGINEERS IN THE NAVY.
Cases of Robert B. Higp:ins, Clarence H. Matthews, and William B.
Day, for reinstatement in the Navy as cadet engineers, considered.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,
]}fay 14, 1886.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 7th instant, in which you submit for
decision certain questions that have arisen in the cases of
Robert B. Higgins, Olarence H. Matthews, and William B.
Day, who are seeking reinstatement in the Navy as cadet
engineers, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the cases of Redgrave and Perkins.
I will consider Mr. Higgins's case separately, as the question
presented in that is entirely different from the one involved
in the other two. In his case you ask:
"..poes the fact of Mr. Higgins's appointment to the office of
second assistant engineer in the Revenue Marine Service and
his acceptance thereof conflict with or operate to prevent
his reinRtatement as a cadet engineer in the Navy~"
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Mr. Hig·gins must be reinstated, if at all, upon the hypothesis that he has held the office de jure continuously from the
date of his appointment in 1878 to the present time.
Is that hypothesis reconcilable with the fact that during
this period he has held the office of second assistant engineer
in the Revenue Marine~ The question is not altogether free
from difficulty. The two offices are incompatible, and the
general rule is, that the acceptance of a second incompatible
office operates as a resignation of the first.
On the other hand~ at the time of the acceptance of the
second office, Mr. Higgins had been illegally deposed from a
performance of the duties and from an enjoyment of the
emoluments of the first office, and to deny him the right to
accept employment at such a time, though it be incompatible
with the duties and obligations of a cadet engineer in active
service, would enable the Navy Department to leave the
victim of an illegal discharge· no alternative but submission
or starvation.
In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, I do not
think it within the reason of the general rule. Acceptance
of the second office was not inconsistent with an intent on
Mr. Higgins's part to resume the exercise of the office of
cadet engineer as soon as he might be recognized as such.
Official employment by the same General Government should
not be held more inconsistent with the title to the office of
cadet engineer than any other employment from which he
might derive a support until his rights were recognized. The
difficulty of reconciling his occupancy of the second office
with his titl~ to the first is a purely technical one, for any obligations assumed by accepting the second office were between
him and the same general authority to whom his obligations
were due as cadet engineer, and a recognition of his rights
and duties as cadet engineer involved a cancellation of any
conflicting obligations. But has he been dejure second assistant engineer in the Revenue Marine Service¥
He could not resign the first office at will, nor is the doctrine of resignation by implication, applicable to civil officers,
to be favored in the Navy and Army where forms and regulations are prescribed and must be enforced.
A resignation by a naval officer is inoperative until accepted
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by the proper authority, and even if the acceptance of the
second office be held equivalent to a tender ofresignation by
:Mr. Higgins I am of opinion that he still remained an incumbent of the office of cadet engineer, because his resignation
has not been accepted, and therefore, as the two offices are
incompatible, he has never been de jure a second assistant
engineer in the Revenue l\iarine. Taking a broader view of
the que~tion al1 doubt vanishes. By the error of your predecessor Mr. Higgins was ejected from an office that he was
entitled to hold. If he has done anything which could be
construed into a resignation of the office, the act was a consequence of the injustice he had suffered, and not a willingness to abandon his place. Now that his title to the office
has been vindicated, he asks that it be restored to him. The
restoration can be made, justice demands that it should be
made, and any doubts as to technicalities should be resolved
in favor of its being made.
I am satisfied, in view of all the facts, that what be has
done does not amount to a resignation or- abandonment of
the office of cadet engineer, that he still holds it, and should
be reinstated in the actual enjoyment and occupation of it.
Next as to the cases of Clarence H. Matthews and William
B. Day : These gentlemen were appointed as cadet engineers;
completed the four years' course, passed their final examination, and received the usual certificate of graduation, one in
June, 1881, and the other in June, 1882. Under the theory
that the act of August 5, 1882, embraced them within its
provisions and transmuted them into naval cadets, they were
two years or more after their graduation as cadet engineers
returned to the Academy for final examination as naval
cadets. At such e~amination :Matthews was found disqualified
physically and Day deficient in certain academic branche8 not
prescribed for cadet engineers. Both were dropped from the
roll of the Navy by order of Secretary Chandler on account of
the failure to pass this examination. You ask whether this
action was legal' I reply that it was not. The orders dropping them are void, they are still in the service, and entitled to
reinstatement w~th their classmates upon the roll of the Navy.
The theory that they were transmuted by the act of. August
5, 1882, into naval cadets, and -consequently liable to exami-
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nation and dismissal for failure to pass as such, was wholly
fallacious. (United States v. Redgrave, 116 U.S., 474.)
Speaking in the case of their classmate, and of cadet engineers after graduation in the four .Years' course, Mr. Justice
Scofield, speaking for the court, says:
''They are not subject to academic orders, nor are they
expected to pursue academic studies, but to take charge of
and run engines. Their school exercises are ended and their
life work begun. They are as much in the service and as
subject to all its requirements as they ever will be. When, at
the end of the two sears or rather at the end of a course which
may last three years or more, they are examined, it is for promotion only. This examination is not at the Academy nor
before the Academic Board, but is the same kind of an examination that every officer at each step in his advancementis required to undergo. So emphatically does the law
consider these two years as years of service that it doubies
the pay." (Leopold v. United States, 18 0. Ols. R., 557.)
These men after graduation in the four years' academic
course were officers in the naval service, and could only lose
their offices against their will, in pursuance of the sentence
of a court-martial or in commutation thereof. (Perkins v.
United States, 116 U. S., 483.)
I return herewith the applications of Messrs. Higgins,
Matthews~ and Day, as requested.
Respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

COMPENSATION OF IN.T ERNAL REVENUE STORE-KEEPER.
Under the act of August 15, 1876, chapter :l87, an internal-revenue storekeeper is entitled to receive a ptr d·iem compensation only while
"rendering actual service." Hence during such time as he is not assigned to duty and does not pefform duty no compensation can he
allowed him,
DEP ~RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 19, 1886.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a
letter addressed to you on the 5th instant by the OommisSIR:
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sioner of Internal Re,Tenue and by your order of the 8th instant referred to me.
This letter and order of reference submit for determination
the claim for additional compensation of B. B. McNiel, late
internal-revenue store-keeper.
I have carefully considered the brief filed in support of the
claim, which, together with the letter of the late .Acting
Commissioner :gogers disallowing the same, were inclosed to
me and are herewith returned.
I am of opinion that the claim is without merit, and was
properly disallowed.
Mr. ~lcNiel during his term of office was from time to time
.assigned to duty at various distilleries and has been paid at
the maximum rate for every day while on duty under such
.assignments.
When not under an assignment to duty no service whatever was ~equired of him or rendered by him to the Government.
His present claim is for compensation for those days during his term wh~n he was not under any assignment to duty
and not performing any duties.
The law in force at the date of his appointment and
throughout his term provides that internal-revenue storekeepers shall receive such compensation, not exceeding $4: a
day, to be paid monthly, as mas be determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and "said store-keepers shall
only receive compensation when rendering actual service."
(19 Stat., 152.)
While the fact that a store-keeper, when not under an assignment to duty, was obliged to hold himself in readiness
to perform any duty that might be assigned, could have
been considered as an element in determining his compensation and may have been cousidered in fixing the amount
when on duty, the express inhibition of the statute prevents
any such consideration from entering into the determination
of the time during which the per diem salary is computed.
The timed uring which the store-keeper ''rendered actual service" could alone be taken into account. The interpretation
adopted by the Commissioner not only gives the words emJloyed their usual and natural significance, but is unem bar·
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rassed by conflicting considerations arising either from other
provisions in the law or any general policy or practice in
connection with the internal-revenue system.
Indeed it is the only possible construction. Under the
system arranged by law, the store-keeper in the service was
either rendering actual service under an assignment to duty,
or unable to rende:r any service because unassigned. Therefore the provision quoted either has the meaning assigned it
or none at all. If it does not prohibit per diem allowance
when the store-keeper is not assigned to duty, during what
time does it prohibit the allowance~
It is not presumed that Congress 'Yould have inserted any
clause which was altogether devoid _of meaning.
Respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
FORT BROWN RESERVATION, TEXAS.
Deed of conveyance executed by James Stillman and Thomas Carson
(the latter as administrator with the will annexed of Maria Josefa
Cavazos, deceased), dated May 12, 1886, and deed of release executed
by Kate M. Combe aud others, by their attorney in fact, James B.
Wells,jr., dated April17, 1886, not deemed sufficient to impart a valid
title to the whole of the Fort Brown Reservation, for reasons stated.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 20, 1886.
SIR: Your letter to me of the 23d of February last inclosed a communication from James R. Cox, esq., attorney
for P. G. Cavazos and James Stillman, together with one
from James B. Wells, jr., attorney for Charles S. Dana and
others, and called attention thereto in connection with an
opinion which I had the honor to submit to you on the 16th
of January last, concerning the title to the site of Fort
Brown, Texas. With a subsequent letter, dated March 4, you
transmitted all the papers then in your Department relating
to that subject, to enable me to examine the case upon the
points adverted to in the above-mentioned communications,
should I desire to do so.
Action on this matter bas been delayed, at the req11est of
Mr. Cox, to afford him an opportunity to adduce additional
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information touching some of the points referred to; but he
bas failed to produce any such information, and none having
been recei\eu from other source8, the case stands precisely
as it was at the date of your last-mentioned letter, with the
exception of .an additional paper (a copy of the will of Jose
Miguel Paredes) which has since been furnished at my
request and is with the other papers.
Upon further examination and reflection, I remain entirely
satisfied with thecon~lusions reached in my opinion as to the
questions there considered, and return herewith all the
papers which accompanied your above-mentioned letters.
After the foregoing was written, I received your letter of
the 18th instant, transmitting additional papers relating to
the same matter, among which are a number of powers of
attorney, deeds of conveyance, etc., and 1 equestiJ?g my opinion as to the validity of the title proposed to be conveyed by
these papers.
One of the instruments referred to is a deed to the United
States, dated May 12, 1886, which is executed by James
Stillman and Thomas Carson, the latter as administrator
with the will annexed of Maria Josefa Cavazos, deceased.
This deed, for the consideration therein stated, grants the
whole -of the premises embraced in the limits of the Fort
Brown reservation, comprising 358.8 acres, more or less,
and relinquishes all claim for past use and occupation of the
same.
Another is a deed to the United States, dated .April 17,.
1886, executed by the following parties: Kate M. Combe and
husband, .Annette P. Hicks and husband, Agnes A. Browne
and husband, and Frances C. Powers, by their attorney in
fact, James B. Wells, jr.; B. 0. Hicks, as guardian of Frances
E. Powers; B. 0. Hicks and 0. B. Combe, as executors of the
last will of Stephen Powers, deceased; Francisco Yturria,
Vicente Salinas, Matt. Gerhard, Juan Salinas, Marie Grogan Dana and husband, by their attorney in fact, James B.
Wells,jr. It releases to the United States, for the consideration mentioned therein, all right and interest of the grantors
to or in the same premises, and relinquishes all their claims
and demands for the use and occupancy thereof.
While all of the parties to the latter instrument are either
273-VOL XVIII---~6
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claimants under the so-called •·Salinas" title or under the
"Paredes" title, they do not comprise the whole of such claimants.
Thus it would appear by the abstract of title and accompanying exhibits that a part of the "Salinas" claim is still
in H. E. Woodhouse and Tiburcio Salinas, neither of whom
is a party to the deed. Besides, tllere are others not parties
to the deed who assert title to the premises embraced by the
same claim adversely to the grantors in such deed, namely:
Charlotte Miller and the heirs of Henry Miller deceased; the
title of these resting upon a sheriff's sale under an execution against Antonio Salinas, through whom the "Salinas"
claim is derived.
As regards the" Parede~" claim, the title thereto is partly
in the heirs of Stephen Powers and partly in Marie Grogan
Dana, wife of Charles S. Dana. All of said lleirs are parties
to the · deed; but one of them (Frances E. Powers) is a .
minor, aud although the deed is executed by her guardian,
yet 1here is nothing to show that he has been duly autharizell s.o to do. :ur~. Daua executes the deed by attorney,
hnt tlw pO\YPr of attt~ruey given by lJer is limited t'> ~~ relea~e
;i,r 1tt'r 1ight to the'' S<lliua~" claim (in "hieh she He,·er han
~1ny interest), and is tllerefore inadequate for the purpose of
r elinq uishing her rights under the "Paredes" title.
So far, then, as the "Salinas" and "Paredes" titles are
concerned, the last- ment.ioned deed appears to be insufficient
to extinguish the rights of claimants under those titles for
the following reasons : (1) H. E. Woodhouse and Tiburcio
Salinas, who apparently have claims under the former title,
are not parties to the deed; (2) Charlotte Miller and the
heirs of her deceased husband, Henry Miller (whose claim
is a cloud upon that of the other claimants under the" Salina.s" title), are not parties thereto; (3) No authority is
shown for B. 0. Hicks to execute the deed as guardian of
Fra.n ces E. Powers, a claimant under the "Paredes" title;
(4) The power of attorney given to James B. Wells, jr., by
Mrs. Dana and husband (Mrs. Dana being a claimant under
the last-mentioned title) is defective as above pointed out.
With respect to the instrument first hereinbefore mentioned, its sufficiency to pass title depends solely .upon
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whether it is of itself a valid conveyance of the entire inter·
ests of both James Stillman and the estate of Maria J osefa
Cavazos in tlle premises. As a conveyance of the Stillman
interest simply, it is not objectionable. But I entertain
some doubt whether it is free from objection as regards the
interest of the Cavazos estate. By the will of Mrs. Cavazos all the title which she had in the premises devolved upon
her son, Pedro G. Cavazos, as a devisee in trust. There was
no executor named in the will, but on the probate thereof
the said Pedro was appointed ''executor" and required to
give bond; failing in tllis he was removed, and Mr. Carson
appointed administrator with the will annexed. The duties
and powers of such administrator are regulated by and depend upon statute. The rights and powers of the devisee in
trust are imparted by the will. The latter may be removed
by a court of competent jurisdiction in a proper proceeding
before it for that purpose and a new trustee appointed to
execute the trust; but I do not understand that this has
been done. The administrator, Carson, who has signed the
deed, could do so only by virtue of such authority as he is
invested with as administrator. Apparently the trust
created by the will, together with the legal title to the trust
property, is still in Pedro, subject, of course, to the right of
the administrator to deal with such property in proper cases
arising in the due administration of the estate. Under these
circumstances I think that in order to convey an unobjectionable title to the entire interest of the Cavazos estate in
the premises, including release of all claims for past use and
occupation thereof, the said devisee, Pedro G. Cavazos,
should be a party to the deed as well as the said administrator Carson.
In reply to r,h e inquiry contained in your letter of the 18th
instant, I therefore beg to state, that in my opinion the instruments above referred to are not sufficient to convey a
valid titlf3 to the whole of the Fort Brown property, for reasons already indicated.
The papers which accompanied that letter are herewith
returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. G .A.RLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION.
Obstruction to navigation of certain rivers within the State of California,
caused by hydraulic mining, considered; and udvist:d that the case is
one calling for the interposition of the restraining arm of equity in an
appropriate action on behalf of the United States, with a view to
remedying the evil.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 25, 1886.
SIR: Your several communications, with the accompanying papers, relating to the alleged serious impairment of the
navigation of certain waters of the State of California, and
the threatened destruction of the navigation of some of those
waters by the debris which is being constantly discharged
into them from gold mines worked by hydraulic pressure,
and asking to know if there is any way, and. if any, what
way, by which the executive department of the National
Government can take action properly, with a view to stopping the evil complained of, have received my consideration.
Commerce between the people of the several States and
with foreign nations existed at the time the Constitution of
the United States was adopted, as it had always theretofore
existed between the nations of the earth, jure gentium, and
was so recognized by the Constitution, which simply gives
Congress the power to regulate it as a subsisting right.
(Vide, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1, 222_.)
This regulating pOW(-\r is, it is well settled, not confined to
the su'Qjects of traffic, but extends to the channels through
which traffic is carried on, and therefore embraces a jurisdiction in Congress over the navigable waters of the country as
to all things appertaining to them as highways of trade and
intercourse and especially as to whatever a.fl:'ects navigation.
(Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1; Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How.,
431; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.~ 714; Transportation
Company v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S., 700.) It rests with Congress, therefore, to say whether any of those waters shall be
bridged, and on what plan the bridge shall be constructed. For
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a like reason Congress establishes light-houses, lays down a
system of regulations to which all vessels navigating our
waters are required to conform, and adopts measures for the
improvement of navigation, to the extent even of changing
the channels of rivers. (South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S.,
410.) For such and like purposes these waters are "the
public property of the nation and subject to all the requisite
legislation·by Congress." (South Carolina v. Georgia, supra;
Gilman v. Philadelphia, supra.)
It was to promote commerce as a thing existing quite as
independently of the Constitution as the right to life and
the pursuit of happiness that the power to regulate it was
given, and given exclusi ~ely becCJnse essentially a unit. And
the States having thus abdicated control over commerce, a
high and imperative duty watJ bid on the National Government to protect and encourDJge it,
As to many things belonging to commerce Congress has
legislated, while as to many others it has preserved silence,
but its very silence is a regulation of them, for it indicates
the purpose to leave them absolutely free. (Welling v. Michigan, 115 U. S., 446, 455, and the cases referred. to.)
The power to regulate commerce is one of the instances in
which the Constitution operates proprio vigore, and its effect
as to the navigable waters of the Union was to establish
them as highways, open to the free and unrestricted use of
all persons engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. To
secure this great end was one of the inducements to the States
to surrender control over their waters.
Whether, then, Congress has spoken or not spoken, the
duty of the United States towards commerce in its several
departments of traffic, intercourse, and navigation is equally
imperative.
It follows, therefore, if what has been said is well founded,
that the Constitution has placed the National Government
under a high duty to take effective measures to repel all acts,
whether of States or individuals, having a tendency to injure
the navigation of waters over which interstate or foreign
commerce is carried on.
Nor is this duty of the United States to be deduced wholly
from the self-executing commercial power of the Constitution,
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for every enrollment and license under our navigation laws
to carry on the coastwise trade engages the national faith
to protect the license from unauthorized interference, such
as by injuring the navigation of waters open to that trad~.
This brings me to the consideration of the question submitted.
The papers before me furnish convincing evidence that the
navigation of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and
their tributaries has been seriously impaired and in some
places destroyed, and, moreover, is threatened with complete
destruction by the washings into them from gold mines worked
by the hydraulic process. It seems that the evil extends to
the Suisun and San Pablo Bays into which these rivers
empty, and even manifests itself in the great bay of San
Francisco.
The navy-yard at Mare Island and other Government works
requiring an unobstructed access to the sea must be seriously
damaged if hydraulic mining as now conducted is allowed
to continue; and Congress, in the rhyer and harbor bill for
1884 (23 Stat., 143), expresses its sense of the injurious consequences of making rivers the receptacles of the washings
from hydraulic mines by directing that the bulk of the money
appropriated for the improvement of the Sacramento and
Feather Rivers should not be used "until the Secretary of
War shall have been satisfied of the cessation of hydraulic
mining on said rivers and their tributaries."
The rivers referred to lie wholly within the limits o{ California, but they communicate directly with and are navigable
from the sea, and consequently are the highways of interstate
and foreign commerce, and fall within the jurisdiction of Congress under the commercial power.
It can not be doubted, if what is represented be true,
that the filling up of the channels of these great high ways Of
commerce is a public nuisanc~, stupendous in extent and
injury, and that it loudly calls for the interference of some
restraining power. The question is, can that restraining
power be exerted by the Government of the United States
without additional legislation ~
There are three ways of correcting a public nuisance in
the jurisprudence of England-by indictment, by information
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in chancery at the suit of the attorney-general, and by bill in
chancery exhibited by some private person who has sustained
a special damage over and above what can be laid ad commune
nocumentum (City of Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal
Company, 12 Pet., 91, 97, 98; Story, Eq. Jur., § 920, etc.;
Kerr, Inj., chap. 6, p. 165.)
There being no provision in the criminal legislation of
Congress making it an offense to obstruct navigation, the
remedy by indictment may be passed without further remark,
it being settled that a thing can not be an offense against
the United States except it has been declared such by act
of Congress. (United States v. Britton, 108 U. S., 199, 206;
United States v. Bevens, 3 Wheat., 336.)
Can the judicial department of the National Government
afford a remedy by injunction upon the application of the
.executive departmel'.t ~
Undoubtedly the jurisdiction of that department extends,
amongst other things, to all cases in law and equity arising
under the Constitution (Art. III, sec. 2), and it has been
established by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of t.he
United States that "the equity jurisdiction conferred on the
Federal courts is the same that the high court of chancery
in England possesses; is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by State legislation, and is uniform throughout the
different States of the Union." (Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall., 425,
430; Thompson v. Railroad Companies, G Wall., 134, 137;
Robi.nson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat., 212, 223; The Wheeling
Bridge Ca,se, 13- How., 518, 563; United States v. Howland,
4 Wheat.~ 108, 115.)
That the United States courts will interfere b~~ injunction to
restrain a public nuisance-as, for instance, the obstruction
of navigation by a bridge, at the suit of a party who has sustained a special damage-bas been settled, on great consideration, by the Supreme Court of the United States (The Wheeling Bridge case, supt·a), and as that court accepted, without
qualification, the doctrine of the English court of chancery as
to this particular mode of redress against a puhlic nuisance,
it may be safely assumed that when a proper case is presented
it will also accept the doctrine, equally well established in
England, that equity will give relief against a public nui-
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sance by injunction at the suit of the Attorney-General. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already distinctly recognized
this doctrine in a ease which did not, however, call for a decision on the point. Its language is, " Besides the remedy
at law, it is now settled that a court of equity may take jurisdiction in cases of public nuisance by an information filed by
the Attorney-General. This jurisdiction seems to have been
acted on with great caution and hesitancy." (City of Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal Company, 12 Pet., 98, 99.)
This subject of the proper form of remedy against nuisances
affecting the United States came before Mr. Attorney-General
Cushing in the matter of the Waukegan Breakwater (6 Opin.,
172), and the conclusion reached by him was, that it was the
UtHLeniable law of the laud that the Attorney-General of
the United 8tates has authority, "when occasion requires
the abatement of a public nuisance to na·\igable waters, to •
file an information therefor and a bill for injunction in a
proper court of the United States."
I am not called upon to consider the effect of any action
of the State of California authorizing the injurious use of.
the above-named rivers as receptacles of debris produced
by hydraulic mining, supposing such action could have
any possible validity in view of the ''express condition" on
which the State was admitted into the Union "that all the
navigable waters within the said State shall be common highways,
and foret1 er free, as well to the inhabitants of said State as to
the citizens of the United States," without duty or impost ther·efor, (9 Stat., 453), for no one pretends that the State has given
any such authority in express terms, and the argument that
the authority may be collected by implication from the legislation of the State or the U uited States or both together has
been completely met and overthrown by the learned circuit
judge of the ninth circuit in his opinion in the important cause
of Woodruffv. North Bloomfield Gravel 1.l:fining Company, in
which the facts now before me were held to constitute a public nuisance that might be properly enjoined on a bill filed
by a private person specially aggrieved.
Looking, tllen, at the question submitted on reason and authority, I can not entertain a doubt that the e\il complained
of is levelled at a great national right which is placed by the

TO THE SECRt:TAUY OF W AK

409

Civil Service Commission-Chief Examiner.

Constitution under the peculiar protection of the United
States, that it i~ a case specially calling for the interposition
of the restraining arm of equity, ihere being an entire absence
of the ordinary remedy at law by indictment, and that it is the
duty of the United States to take prompt action, either by an
information in chancery or by legislation making it penal to
obstruct or impair the navigation of any water under the
jurisdiction of the Umted States; and, in view of the urgency
and importance of the subject, I taKe leave to recommend
tbat it be brought to the attention of Congress at its present
session.
It may be proper to add, in conclusion, that this opinion
is in harmony with my opinions of the 1st of May and 16th
June, 1885, which presented the question whether any other
department of the National Government than the legislative
had authority to take action to abate as puolic nuisances
bridges erected over navigable rivers by State authority, one
of the bridges being over a river wholly within the State of
Virginia, and the other over that part of the Mississippi
River which flows e:utirely within the limits of the State of
Minnesota. And. the same may be said of the opinions of
one of my predecessors in the cases of the St. Louis and the
Steubenville dikes. (15 Opin., 515, 526.)
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

A. H. GARLAND.
The

SECRETA.R¥ OF WAR.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION-CHIEF EXAMINER.
The office of chief examiner in the Civil Service Commission, created by
the act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, is to be filleJ by appointment by
the President, with the ad vice and consent of the Senate.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 26, 1886.
On the 22d instant you requested my opinion whether
or not the appointment of t,h e chief examiner in the Civil
Service Commission is to be made by you or the Civil Service
SIR:
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Commission. The question turns upon the following words
in the civil-service act of January 16, 1883:
"That said Commission is authorized to employ a chief
examiner, a part of whose duty it shall be, under its direction, to act with the examining boards, so far as practicable,
whether at Washington or elsewhere, and to secure accuracy,
uniformity, and justice in all their proceedings, which shall
be at all times open to him." And the act then more specifically defines his duties, and fixes his compensation at the rate
of $3,000 per annum with his traveling expenses.
It is claimed tllat the chief examiner is an officer to be ap.
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, under
clause 2, section 2, Axticle II, of the Constitution, of which
clause the words pertinent to the questicn are that the President shall appoint "all other officers of the United States
whose appointments arc not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by law, and Congress may by
law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they
think proper in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of Departments."
The Constitution thus classifies ( 1) officers and (2) inferior
officers.
(1) ,;Officers."-Embassadors, ministers, consuls, judges
of 'the Supreme Court, and all other officli:rs of the United
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, which shall be established by law.
(2) "Inferior officers."-Those whose appointments are
vested by Congress in the President, courts of law, or heads
of Departments.
The examiner is certainly, under this act, an officer, as
distinguished from a mere agent, clerk, or employe. His
station embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument,
and clutieR, and then becomes an office. (United States v.
Hartwell, 6 Wall, 385.)
Under previous constructions of the clause of the Constitution already referred to, this appointment might well ha\Te
been placed with the bead of the appropriate Department,
but not with a subordinate commission. (Ex pa,rte Hennen,.
13 Pet., 230.)
The examiner whose employment is conferred by the statute
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upon the Uivil Service Commission does not appear to properly
belong to the ''inferior officers," the power of his appointment
not being vested by Congress in the President, a court of
law, or the head of a Department; and, although the civilservice act says that "said Commission is authorized to employ a chief examiner," the power to employ tho chief examiner as contemplated by the Constitution is relegated to
the President; as one of "all other officers of the United
States" established by law.
The examiner is an officer to be appointed by the President
Jy and with the ad vice and consent of the Senate.
VEry respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The PRESIDE:NT.

MAIL TRANSPORTATION.
The clause in the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 342, authorizing the Postmaster-General "to contract for inland and foreign steam-boat mail
service, when it can be confined in one route, where the foreign office
or offices are not more than two hundred miles distant from the domestic office, on the same terms and conditions as inbnd steam-boat
service, an(l pay for the same out of the appro13riation for inland steamboat service," is permanent in character and amendatory of the general law; but the authority of the Postmaster-General thereunder is
limited by the terms and conditions imposed in the latter part of the
same clause.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

May 27, 1886.
SIR: In your letter of yesterday my attention is called to
the following clause in the act of March 3, 1885, making appropriations for the service of the Post-Office Department,
taken from page 386, twenty-third Statutes: "The Postmaoter-General is authorized to contract for inland and foreign
steam-boat mail service, when it can be confined in one route,
where the foreign office or offices are not more than two hundred miles distant from the oomestic office, on the same terms
and conditions as inland steam-boat service, and pay for the·.
same out of the appropriation for inland steam-boat service,"
and then my opinion is asked whether this clause gives a con-
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tinning authority, amendatol'y of the general law, or whether
it must be regarded as Jjmited to the expenditure of the appropriation made in the act.
From the context it is quite clear to Jlle that the clause
referred to confers authority regardless of the appropriation
made just preceding it, and such legislation has- not been uncommon. Laying aside the w9rding of the who~e section
and a construction of it by itself, this view is strengthened
by going back a few clauses in the same act on the same
page, where an appropriation for rent, light, and fuel is made,
and in it limitations are fixed to the payment out of the particular appropriation and as to the term of years, etc. There
being no such restrictions in the clause you speak of, it may
well be inferred none were intended.
. In the latter part of the clause under consideration you will
observe certain terms and conditions are imposed and an appropriation for inland steam-boat service is specified, and as
a matter of course your authority under this clause will be
limited and restricted by those terms and conditions; and with
this exception I answer your question, the clause referred to
in your letter gives a continuing authority amendatory of the
general law.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
PAY OF THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS.
Unexpended balances of moneys appropriated for the pay of the Navy
and Marine Corps for the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1884, are not
available for payment of the Navy and Marine Corps for services rendered during the :fiscal year ending June 30, 1885.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 11, 1886.
SIR: I have this day received your letter, in which you

ask "'whether or not moneys appropriated under the heads
of pay of the Navy and pay of the Marine Corps," 1884 (of
which there are unexpended balances, without outstanding
indebtedness against them), "can now be used in payment
of sums due for pay of the N a\y and pay of the Marine
(.;orps on account of services in the fiscal year 1885."
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In answer to the inquiry, your attention is directed to the
language of the naval act of March ~, 1883, entitled "An
act making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1884, and for other purposes."
You observe that the language limits the time for which
the appropriation is available to the ''fiscal year ending
June 30, 1884."
This is the language of an annual appropriation bill, and
made specifically for the service of a fiscal year; and you
are referred to section 3690 of the Revised Statutes, viz:
"All balances of appropriations contained in the annual
appropriation bills and made specifically for the service of
any fiscal year and remaining unexpen<led at the expiration
of such fiscal year shall only l>e applied to the payment of
expenses properly incurred during that year, or to the fulfillment of contracts properly made within that year; and balances not needed for such purposes shall be carried to the
surplus fund. This section, however, shall not apply to ·appropriations known as permanent or indefinite appropriations."
This section makes the appropriation for the service of a
fiscal year applicable only to the payment of expenses properly incurred during that year, or the fulfillment of contracts
properly made within that year.
Your letter states that there are no outstanding claims
against the appropriation for the :fiscal year 1884:, so that
there is no existing contingency relative to the fulfillment of
contracts properly made within the fiscal year 1884.
Reference to act of June 19,1878 (20 Stat., 167), limits the
appropriation for pay of the NaYy, "to be exclusively used
to pay current obligations for its legitimate purpose as provided ·by law."
From this statement, the conclusion is reached that the
balance remaining unexpended at the expiration of the fiscal
year 1884 can not be applied to the payment of expenses incurred in the year 1R85.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

414

RON. JOHN GOODE
J\1 a 1 I C o n t r a c t s- D o u b l e Pay 011· n t s •

MAIL CONTRACTS-DOUBLE PAYMENTS.
H. and others were mail contractors for certain routes in the State of
Arkansas, service on which was discontinued May 31, 1861, up to
which time from January 1, 1861, they were paid by the Government
in full what was due them. Afterwards they collected from the State
of Arkansas for the same period of service (January 1 to May 31, 1861)
certain amounts, which were paid vut of moneys belonging to the
United States that had been seized by the State: Advised that the
contractors are under a legal liability to make restitution to the United
States of the amounts so collected, but that their sureties can not be
held responsible therefor upon the undertaking of the latter.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 16, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt ·of your
communication of the 13th of February, 1886, returning the
letter of P. Hanger, of Little Rock, Ark., addressed to the
Attorney-General under date of January 8, 1886, and referred to you by his indorsement of the 18th of January last,
relating to a proposed action to recm·er from him (Hanger)
moneys of the United States which be obtained by securing
double payments, one from the United States and one from
the State of Arkansas, out of moneys of the United States,
upon three several mail routes in which he was interested.
From the communication of the Assistant Attorney-General of your Department accompanying your letter, the following facts appear:
(1) In 1861, Peter Hanger was contractor on routes 7806,
7807, and 7937, in Arkansas. The service was discontinued
on these routes, and the contractor was paid for the time in
1861, viz, from January 1 to May 31, 1861, the sum of
$4,196.71. It appears also that said Peter Hanger collected
from the State of Arkansas for the s~me period of service on
the 2d of October, 1861, the sum of $1~915.44. This sum was
paid for such service on his making proof that the service
had been rendered and was unpaid; and that sum was thereupon paid him out of moneys which the State of Arkansas
had seized belonging to the United States. Hence it appears that for said service the contractor bas been paid twice
out of moneys belonging to the United States.
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(2) l\Ies8rs. Hanger and Ayliff were contractors for route
7803, Arkansas. For the service rendered from January 1,
1861, to May 31, 1861 (the date when the sen·ice was discontinued), there was due them the sum of $14,725.63, which
was paid in full. It appears also that for the same service
the State of Arkansas paid to the same contractors, out of
funds of tlte United States which the State of Arkansas had
seized, the sum of $10,211.82 on the 2d of October, 1861. The
last-mentioned amount is, therefore, an overpayment.
(3) 31essrs. Hanger, Rapley and Gaines were contractors
for routes Nos. 7801, 7802, 7804, 7831, and 7846. On these
routes there was due May 31, 18Gl, the sum of $14~265.61,
which was fully paid to them in the usual method. In addition to the abo\e-named amount it appears that the said
contractors recei\ed from the State of Arkansas, out of
moneys seized by that State and belonging to the United
States, the sum of $16,102.97 for the same service, covering
the same period, and on the same routes.
It is clear, I think, that there is a legal liability upon the
contractors to make restitution to the United States of the
sums of money thus overpaid them. The seizure of the money
by the State of Arkansas was illegal, and the demand made
upon that State by the contractors for payment was without
warrant of law. It is a well-settled principle of the common
law that an action lies for money paid by mistake, or upon a
consideration which happens to fail, or for money gotten
through imposition. The Supreme Court of the United States
has decided (in Bayne et al., trustees, v. The United States, 93
U.S., 642) that an action will lie whenever the defendant has
received money which is the property of the plaintiff, and
which the defendant is obliged by natural justice and equity
to refund. The form of the indebtedness or the mode in
which it was incurred is immaterial. While there can be no
aoubt, I think, as to the legal liability of the said contractors
to make restitution of the money which has been improperly
overpaid to them, your Department must decide, as a practical question, whether reco,·ery is now possillle by reason of
the circumstances referred to in the report of the special agent
of the Treasury. In my opinion the sureties of the contractors
can not be held responsible for the money which has been thus
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illegally and-improperly collected. According to the form of
contract which has been furnished to this Department the
undertaking of the sureties was as follows :
''They further undertake, covenant, and agree with the
Uuited States that the said contractors w1ll collect quarterly,
if required by the Postmaster-General, of postmasters on said
route the balances due from them to the United States on
their quarterly returns, and faithfully render an account
thereof to t~he Postmaster-General in the settlement of their
quarterly accounts, and will pay over to the Auditor of the
Treasury for the Post-Office Department, on the order of the
Postmaster-General, all balances remaining in their hands."
It does not appear from the statement of facts sn bmitted •
that there has been any failure on the part of the said contractors to comply with their undertaking in this resp~ct. It
seems to be conceded that the mail service was performed
according to the terms of the contract; that such service was
discontinued by the United States, and a settlement made
· up to the 31st of May, l~Gl. \Vhen the illegal seizure of the
money of tho United States by the State of Arkansas was
made and the payment · wrongfully made to the said parties
they were no longer mail contractors. Their duties bad been
fully performed as such and their aceounts had been adjusted.
In my opinion this operated as an acquittance and discharge
of the sureties. The sebure of the money by the State and
the wrongful payment of it can not be construed as a breach
of the contract by which the sureties were bound. In Miller
v. Stewart (9 Wheat., G80), Judge Story, in delivering the
opinion of the court, says: "Nothing can be clearer, both
upon principle and authority, than the doctrine that the
iiability of a surety is not to be extended by implication beyond the terms of his contract. To the extent and in the
manner and under the circumstances pointed out in his obfigation be is bound, and no further. He has a right to
stand on the very terms of his contract, and if he does not
assent to any variation of it and a variation is made, it is
fatal. And courts of equity, as well as of law, have been in
the constant habit of scanning the contracts of sureties with
considerable strictness."
This doctrtne has been fully recognized by the Supreme
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Court in United States v. Boyd (15 Pet., 187); McMicken v.
lVebb (6 How., 292). In the latter case the court said:
"Even as between principals a court will not bind parties
to conditions or obligations to which they have not bound
themselves, according to a fair interpretation of their contract; but as against a surety neither a court of law nor a
court of equity will lend its aid to affect him beyond the plain
necessary import of his undertaking. He must be permitted
to remain in precisely the situation in which he has placed
himself."
In view of this well-settled doctrine I am of opinion that
a suit against the sureties to recover the money improperly
paid to the contractors would be unavailing.
Very respectfully,
JOHN GOODE,
Acting Attorney- General in this Case.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
t

THE TRADE-DOLLAR.
The United States Treasurer is not authorized to receive ' 1 t.rade-dollars"
at par in exchange for silver certificates under the third section of the
act of February 21:3, 1878, chapter 20. Nor are such dollars receivable.
at par in pay;ment of public dues.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,.

June 17, 1886'.
SIR: The petition signed by the presidents of a number of
national banks, calling your attention to the refusal of the
Treasurer of the United States to receive trade dollars in
exchange for silver certificates, and asking that you will direct that officer to receive these do]Jars at par, or, in case of
doubt as to your power to do so, refer the subject to the Attorney-General, and other papers having more or less relation
to the object of the petition, have rect.ived my consideration, and I have the honor to submit an opinion upon the
questions which seem to be presented, namely: (1) whether
any power resides in your hands to direct the Treasurer to
receive the trade-dollar at par in exchange for silver certificates under the third section of the act of the 28th Febru273-voL XVIII--'27
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ary, 1878 (20 Stat., 25), as coin authorized by the first section
of tllat act; and (2) wllether the Government is bound to
receive trade-dollars at par in payment of public dues.
The coin called trade-dollar was established by the fifteenth
section of the act of February, 1873 (17 Stat., 427), now contained in section 3513 of the Revised Statu teo, which provides
that 4 ' the silver coins of the United States shall be a tradedollar, * * * and tile weight of the trade-dollar shall be
four hundred and twenty grains troy." * * * By the same
section of the act mentioned silver coins were made a legal
tend~r at their nominal value for any amount not exceeding
$5, and this provision is now represented by section 3586 of
thn Revised Statutes. By the second section of the joint
resolution of the 22d July, 1876 (19 Stat., 215), it is enacted
that the trade-rl.ollar "shall not hereafter be a legal tender.''
By the first section of the act of the 28th February, 1878'
(supra), it was enacted: ''There shall be coined at the several
mints of the United States, silver dollars of the weight of
fonr hundred and twel \e and a half grains troy of standard
.silver, as pro,iderl. in the act of January eighteenth, eighteen
:hundred and thirty-seven, on which ~hall be the devices and
;Superscriptions provided by said act; which coins, together
with all silver dollars heretofore coined by the United States,
·of likP. weight and fineness, shall be a legal tender, at
their nominal value, for all debts and dues, public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract" * * *
It would seem clear that it was the purpose of Congress
by this law to deny to some description or descriptions of
dollar previously authorized the quality of being legal tender for public and prh·ate dues, and that after it went 1nto
effect receivers of public moneys had no authority to take
payment in silver dollars not of the weight and fineness prescribed by it, that. is to say, not weighing 412-2- grains, and
containing 900 parts of pnre metal and 100 of alloy in the
1,000 parts by weight or, as usually exprE>ssed, "900 line,''
for, by directing that silver dollars of a particular description
should be accepted for public dues, Congress mnst be understood as prohibiting the receipt of any other kind, it being,
in my opinion, quite inadmissible to take the words of the
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act as directory only, or as consistent with a discretion of
any sort.
And by a parity of reasoning the authority conferred by
the third section of the act of 1878 on the Treasur~r and
assistant treasurers of the United States to give certificates
in exchange for "coin authorized by this act" must be restricted to silver dollars of the weight and fineness requirell
by the first section.
If these positions are sound, it follows that unless the tradedollar is of the description of dollar called for by the first
section of the act of 1878 it can not be received from the
public debtor or exchanged for certificates under the third
section of that act.
Turning now to the legislation on the silver dollar, not yet
mentioned, we find that by the act of the 2d April, 1792 (1
Stat., 246), it was required to contain 371!6 grains of pure or
416 grains of standard silver, and this continued to be t.he
law until the act of the 18th January, 1837 (5 Stat., 130), under
which the standard of both gold and silver coins wn,s such
that of 1,000 parts by weight 900 should be of pure metal and
100 of alloy, and the weight of the silver dollar was to be
4121 grains, which, at 900 fine, called for 371.25 grains of
pure silver. In 1873 Congress, by an act approved the 12th
February (17 Stat., 427, and sec. 3513 Rev. Stat.), declared
that the silver dollar should be a trade-dollar, weighing 420
grains and 900 fine, and so contain 378 grainc of pure silver.
Finally, by the act of 1878 (supra) Congress restored the
dollar of the act of 1837, and declared, as we have seen, that
it and all other dollars previously coim·d1of like weight and
fineness, that is to say, weighing 4121 grains and 900 fin·e,
should be legal tender "at their nominal -value" for debts
public and private; and here it may be pertinently remarked
that in restoring the silver dollar of 1837 Congress virtually
restored the dollar of 1792, both coins containing precisely
the same amount of pure silver (371.25 grains) although the
older one weighed 3~ grains more than the other, the excess
being of alloy merely.
If Congress bad intended to put all silver dollars previously
coined on .a footing with that established by the act of 1878
(supra) it would have said so, as it did in the act of 1837

•

420

HON. A.. H. GARLAND
The Trade-Dollar.

when the dollar of 4122- grains was introduced. The language of the act of 1878 compels us to deny the quality of
any legal tender to any dollar that does not weigh 4122grains and is not 900 fine. It is useless to argue, as has
been argued, that the dollars rDined under the act of 1792
and 1873 contained in the 0ne case as much pure metal as,
and in the other more, than the .Rtandard dollar, for they
could not be treated as the equivalents of the latter without exercising a dispensing power over the statute the intent of which in this respect is, I think, almost too clear for
argument.
Nor is therP- anything in the consequent resulting from
this interpretation, so far as I can see, to raise a doubt of its
soundness. The alleged injustice of rejecting silver dollars
coined before the act of 1837 is largely, and we suspect altogether, imaginary, there being little probability that any of
that coinage, not laid away in cabinets and museums, is outstanding. As to the trade-dollar, its name and history show
very satisfactorily that it was not expected to find its way
into the channels of domestic commerce, and when it did so,
through an unforeseen disturbance in the relative values of
silver and gold, Congress, by the third section of the joint
resolution of the 22d July, 1876 (supra), took from it the
quality of legal tender, furnishing at the same time additional
evidence of the purpose for which it was created by authorizing the restriction of its coinage to "the export demand for
the same."
But even if the interpretation given the act of 1878 were
not so clearly right, I should hesitate to advise you to supplant it by another, especially in view of the fact that Congress has resisted repeated vigorous efforts to have the tradedollar declared legal tender.
If the pmver of Congress to legislate on the currency does
not extend to declaring that a given description of money,
already in circulation, shall eease to be legal tender for public dues, it must be in virtue of some express or implied limitation of the Constitution. I think it clear that no such
limitation exists in respect of dues arising after the passage
of the act of 1876. It is unnecessary to inquire as to prior
debts in the present case.
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The result of the discussion, then, is that the action of the
Treasury Department as t~ the trade-dollar complained of is
iu accordance with the law.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The PRESIDENT.

CLAIM OF PARTICIPANT IN THE REBELLION.
In 1860 E., a naval officer, became entitled to a share in the proceeds of
a captured slaver, the amount of which was certified to the Treasury
Department by the Secreta~y of the Navy, but remains unpaid. In 1861
E. resigned his commission and entP-red the Confederate service: Held
that by force of the joint resolution of March 2, 1867 (sec. 3480, Rev.
Stat.), payment of such share can not now be made, notwithstanding
the President's proclamation of amnesty of December 25, 1868, and that
to authorize its payment an act of Congress is necessary.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
June 17, 1886.
SIR: Your communication of the 7th May, ultimo, presents
the following case for an opinion:
In 1860 one Eggleston, then an officer in the Navy of the
United States, became entitled, as such officer, to a certain
sum of money, being his share, according to the scheme of
distribution prescribed by law 9 of the proceeds of a slaver
captured off the coast of Cuba. The amount thus due was
certified to the Treasury Department by the Secretary of the
, Navy on the 19th September, 1860, and on the 20th of tho
same month the claim was referred to the First Auditor.
That officer took no action thereon. In 1861 Eggleston resigned his commission in the Navy and served in the Confederate army.
Upon this state of facts it is asked whether the President's
proclamation of amnesty of the 25th December, 1868, annulled
so much of the joint resolution of the 2d March, 1867 (14 Stat.,
571), and F<ection 3480, Revised Statutes, "as forbids accounting officers settling claim·s existing prior to the 13th day of
April, 1861, in favor of participants in the late insurrection
or rebellion and against the United States."
Congress bas said by this joint resolution that money in
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the Treasury shall not be applied to the payment of claimants" who promoted, encouraged, or in any manner sustained
the rebellion," or who, during such rebellion, were not
''known to be opposecl thereto and distinctly in favor of its
suppression," and that no pardon theretofore granted should
authorize any such payment.
The Constitution of the United States (Art. I, sec. 9) provides that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but
in consequence of appropriations made by law," * * *
"and Congress has the undeniable right to annex such conditions to the payment of the public money as it sees fit. It
has exercised that right by the joint resolution of the 2d
March, 1867 (supra), and the conditions so prescribed must
be respected, unless it can be shown that one of the consequences of a pardon in~.--:. case like the present is to enable
the grantee of it to dr::;,w money from the Treasury in a way
different from that required by Congress.
This view as to the rebtion of a pardon to the joint resolution of the2d March, 1867, has been distinctly laid down by the
Supreme Oourtofthe United States in therecentcaseofHart v.
Unitecl States (118 U.S.~ 62) affirming a judgment of the Court
of Claims. If this is tbe law in a case like Hart's, where the
claimant was pardoned some time before the joint resolution
was passed, it must be so, a fortior-i, in a case like the present,
where the pardon was granted after the joint resolution became law.
As a consequence, it must be replied to your question that
the proclamation of amnesty of the 25th December, 1868, did
not defeat the intent of the joint resolution of the 2d March,
1867, as to the claimant Eggleston, whose claim can not be
paid without an act of Congress authorizing it. .
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.

The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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EMIGRANT HALF-BREED INDIANS.
Half-breed Indians emigrating to the United States from Canada are
not precluded by existing legislation from retaining the bounty of the
United States in addition to that of the Dominion of Canada.
DEP AR'I'MENT OF JUS'I'ICE,

June 21, 1886.
SIR: Your communication of the 19th May, ultimo, with

the accompanying papers, has received my cousider::;.tion.
The Dominion Government of Canada asks to be furnished
official evidence of alleged applications to this Governmeut
of certain half-breeds commorant in the Territory of Dakota,
for grants of land or scrip, or both, the declared purpose of
the request for this evidence being to defeat certain applications of the same half-breeds, made while they were commorant in Manitoba, a province of the Dominion of Canada,
for the benefit of the Canadian order in council of the 20th
April, 1885.
Whether the evidence applied for should be furnished is a
matter that would seem to reside entirely in the discretion
of the Department of State, to which the ~~pplication has
been made, and is not understood to be submitted to me for
opinion.
As to the status of the half-breeds in question, they can
not become citizens of the United States except by some
authority of law giving them that privilege. No benefaction
of a pecuniary or property kind extended to thorn by t he
United States can clothe t.hem with the character of eitizens
unless conferred in such a way as to necessitate the im]!lication that such was the intention of Congress. In a li'ocent case
the Supreme Court of the United States has established the
principle that an Indian, to be a citizen, must, Hl~o cmy other
foreigner, be naturalized by authority of Congresso (Elk V o
Wilkins, 112 U. S., 94.)
In my opinion there is nothing in the Indian legislation t o
prevent these half-breeds from sharing the bounty of the
United States in addition to that of the Dominion of Canadao
But whether the order in council extending the Dominion
bounty excludes applicants who afterwards migrate from
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the Dominion or accept favors at ti:le bands of another government is a matter on which I am not asked to express an
opinion.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
'The SECRETARY OF STATE.

CONTINGENT FUND.
Under section 3683, Revised Statutes, heads of Departments ~Fe alone
authorized to gt ve orders for purchases payable from the contingent
fund and to approve vouchers t.herefor.

DEP.A.RTMENT

JUSTICE,
July 16, 1886.
SIR: Your communication of the 15th instant, requesting
my opinion as to whether any one besides the head of a
Department can order the purchase of any articles to be paid
for out of the contingent fund, and whether any one but the
head of a Department can approve the vouchers for such
purchase under section 3683 of the Revised Statutes, has
been received, and I beg leave to reply that the authority
delegated by that section to the heads of Departments is a
special authority, and cannot be by the head of the Department delegated or transferred to any one else, and the head
of the Department should not only give the order himself for
the purchase, but should approve the vouchers therefor also.
Very respe~tfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The ACTING Sl!JCRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
OF

PROHIBITED IMPORTATION-FORFEITURE.
The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to remit the forfeiture of
articles contained in the same package with other articles imported
in violation of section 2491, Revised Statutes.

DEP ARTMEN'l

1

OF

JUSTIOE,
July 17, 1886.

SIR: In reply to your communicatiOn requesting an
opinion upon the proposition, " Whether under section 2491,

•

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

425

Bridge Across the Little Kanawha.

Revised Statutes, which prohibits the importation into the
United States of certain obscene articles therein enumerated,
and declare~ such articles forfeited upon importation, it is
within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury, under
the provisions of Title LXVIII of the Revised b\atutes, to
remit the forfeiture of articles not obscene contained in the
.s ame invoice or package with such as a.re prohibited~"
In ID)J opinion there can be no such remission. The
.a rticles otherwise unobjectionable and entitled to entry
have become tainted with illegality by association, and were
therefore taken in delicto, and must share the fate of the
portion of the contents of the package which has produced
the contamination.
I have the honor to be, sir, you obedient servant,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

BRIDGE ACROSS THE LITTLE KANAWHA.
Under authority of the legislature of West Virginia it is proposed to construct a bridge over the Little Kanawha, a navigable river within the
limits of that State, which bridge, if built, will be an obstruction to
navigation; but its construction being neither expressly nor impliedly forbidden by any law of Congress : Advised that the case is not
one which warrants the institution of judicial proceedings for the prevention of obstruction to navigation threatened.
A State may authorize a navigable stream withl.n its limits to be obstructed by a bridge in the absence of any legislation by Congress on
the subject.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 17, 1886.
SrF: I have examined the accompan3·ing papers, which
were received with your letters to me of the 24th ultimo and
15th instant, in relation to a bridge proposed to be constructed
by the Ohio River Railroad Company across Little Kanawha
River near its mouth (about 300 feet from its junction with
the Ohio) under authority of a law of the State of West Virginia.
It is stated therein that the bridge, if constructed as now
projected, will be an obstruction to the commerce not only of
the Little Kanawha but of the Ohio River, the Little Kana-

426

HON. A. H. GARLAND
Bridge Across the Little Kanawha.
-----~

wha, for some 1,100 feet from its mouth, being used as an ice
harbor for the protection of the Ohio River boats, and also
as a landing place for them. Furthermore it is suggested
therein that the laws of the United States regulating the
constructi n of bridges across the Ohio may be applicable to
the bridging of the Little Kanawha at the point above indicated.
As regards the suggestion just mentioned, I :find nothing
in the laws referred to (act of December 17, 1872, chapter 4,
as amended by the act of Febrt1ary 14, 1883, chapter 44),
which authorizes their application to the constnfction of
bridges across any other river than the Ohio, and in my view
the case presented by the papers would not come within their
operation.
That case is briefly this : A bridge over the Little Ka·
nawha, a navigable stream within the limits of West Virginia,
is proposed to be constructed under authority of the legislature of that State. If built at the place and according to the
plan now contemplated the bridge will be an obstruction to
the navigation of that stream, and also greatly impair its use·
fulness as a harbor for boats navigating the Ohio .R iver. But
the construction of the bridge is neither expressly nor impliedly
forbiden by any law of Congress.
Such case, I am satisfied, in view of the doctrine asserted
and reasserted by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Wilson v. Blackford Qreek Marsh Company (2 Pet., 245),
Gilman v. Philadelphia (3 Wall., 713), Pound v. Turck (95
U. S., 459), Escanaba Company v. Chicago (107 U. S., 678), and
Cardwell v. Bridge Company (113 U.S., 205), would not justify
the institution of judicial proceedings for the prevention of
the obstruction to navigation, etc., threatened. It does not
appear to differ, in any essential feature, from the cases di. rectly passed upon by that court in its decisions referred to.
According to the doctrine there laid down, a State may authorize a navigable stream within its limits to be obstructe1l
by a bridge in the absence of any legislation by Congress on
the subject.
I observe that the attention of Congress has at the prPsent
session been officially called to the proposed bridge (see Ex.
Doc. No. 12, Senate, Forty-ninth Congress, first session, p. 55),
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and recently, as I gather from the accompa::::.ying papers, a
great many citizens engaged in the navigation of the Ohio
and its tributaries between Pittsburgh and Cincinnati have
memorialized Congress against the erection of such bridge,
particularly at the place selected therefor. My opinion is,
that some action by that body on the subject, having the effect
to supersede the authority of the State, is necessary before
any effective steps can be taken, by suit or otherwise, to prevent the construction of the bridge as now projected.
I am, sir, very, respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.

The

SECRETARY OF

W .A.R.

CASE OF CHARLES E. HOLMES.
H. entered the military service in August, 1862, as a volunteer, to serve
for three years; he subsequently deserted; but he afterwards volunta.rily returned to service under the President's proclamation (of pardon) of March 11, 1865, and was mustered out of service along with his
company in July 2, 1865: Advised thu,t the time which elapsed between his desertion and his return should not be credited to him in a
discharge or otherwise, but that he is entitled to have his actual service
credited to him in an honorable discharge.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

July 21, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the lOth instant, in which you call my
attention ''to the application of Mr. Charles E. Holmes for
the removal of the charge of desertion standing against his
record as a member of Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteen;;, and for an honorable di:scharge therefrom."
The facts in Mr. Holmes's case, as recited in your communication, are that he "was enrolled August ~1, 1862, to serve
;three years, in Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, and
served therein until June 15, 1863, when he was captured by
the enemy at Winchester, Va. He was paroled at City
Point, Va., July 8, 1863; reported at College Green Barracks, Annapolis, Md., July 9, 1863, and the words ' In hospi-

428

RON. A. H. GARLAND
Case of Charles E. Holmes.

tal' appear opposite his name on the records of said barracks.
The records do not show what disposition was made of him
after July 9, 1863, but he admits that he left Annapolis in
August, 1863. He is repQrted on the muster rolls of his company for July and August, September and October, 1863, as
absent paroled prisoner; on the roll for November and December, 1863, as 'deserted'; the date or place of desertion
is not stated. His name is dropped from subsequent muster
rolls of the company to February 28, 1865. He is reported
on the roll for March and April, 1H65, as 'present,' with the
remark, 'returned voluntarily under the President's ·proclama.
tion, April 3, 1865. He was transferred to Company 0,
First Mary land Volunteers, in May or J nne, 1865, and on
the muster-out roll of that company, dated July 2, 1865, be
is borne as mustered out with.the company, with the remark,
'Deserted June 24, 1863, from Camp Parole, Annapolis,
Md.; returned under the President's proclamation."
I understand from the foregoing statement that Mr. Holmes
received an honorable discharge from Company C, First
Maryland Volunteers, covering the time of his service in that
command, and that he now claims an honorable discharge
from Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, covering the
time from date of enlistment to date of transfer.
The discharge claimed, if given, would be a" formal final
judgment passed by the Government upon the entire military
record of the soldier, and an authoritative declaration by it
that he had left the service in a status of honor." (United
States v. Kelly, 15 Wall., 34.)
Is Mr. Holmes entitled to such a judgment' When he was
mustered into service August 21, 1862, he assumed grave
obligations to the Government. The Government provided
compensation for the performance and denounced penalties
against the violation of these obligations. By desertion in
August, 1863, he violated them, incurring a penalty or penalties. The desertion, persisted in as it was for twenty
months, involved not only crime, but a total failure during
that period to perform any service for which compensation
was provided. He returned to the performance of his obligations April 3, 1865, upon the terms offered by the President's
proclamation of March 11, 1865. Those terms were, pardon
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for his crime upon condition that he should serve the remainuer of his term of enlistment, and, in addition thereto, a
period equal to the time lost by desertion. His connection
with Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, ·w as severed
in May or June, 1865, by his transfer to Company C, ]?irst
Maryland Volunteers, and at the ·close of the war, to wit,
July 2, 1865, after a total service of about fifteen months, he
was mustered out with said latter company. By reason of
this mustering out the Government waived, and he was unable
to serve out, the full term of enlistment, and, in addition, a
period equal to that lost by desertion.
The solution of the question of the effect of this conditional
pardon and subsequent waiver upon his record and consequent rights as a soldier is not free from difficulty. Certainly" a full pardon reaches. both the puni~hment prescribed
for the offense and the guilt of the offender. • • * It
releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt,
so that in the eyes of the law .t he offender is as innocent as
if he had never committeu the offense. * * * It restores
him to all his rights." (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., p. 333.) '
I am perfectly clear in the opinion that the pardon did relieve Mr. Holmes not only from "corporal punishment for
the crime," but also from "the status into which his own act
bad placed him and from the onus df his crime." His record
is as clear from all stain by reason of desertion as though
the time from the last performance of duty prior to desertion up to his return had never been. He is clearly entitled
to full credit for service performed prior to desertion and
after his return, and his record during those periods is unaffected in the slightest by the crime for which he was pardoned. But for the period covereJ. by the desertion I do not
think he should be held to have '' been present at every rollcall" performing the duties of and earning a soldier's compensation.
Without considering the power of the President to produce
this result by a pardon, it is evident that the pardon extended in the proclamation was not intended to operate as
or to take the place of specific performance.
The crime was pardoned, and with legislative sanction

0
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the President's proclamation extended the time within which
Mr. Holmes might perform his contract obligations and earn
the compensation provided for performance. The effect was
to blot out the twenty months which covered the crime and
consequent failure to do duty, leaving Mr. Holmes just where
he was before desertion.
His original contract of service was for three years or the
war. Having served one year before desertion, his contract
upon return under the proclamation was for two years or the
war. He simply took up the original contract where he laid
it down. His past performance was credited on the total
measure of his original obligation, and the pardon became
absolute upon performance of the remainder. As the ending of the war in fifteen months after enlistment would have
deprh·ed him of the opportunity to earn and the right to de.
maud compensation dependent on greater length of service,
so the ending of the war within three months after his return
ueprived him of the opportunity to make good and the right
to demand compensation for the services he might have per.
formed in the twenty months lost by desertion.
The Goverment was not under any obligation at any time
to keep him in the service for the full term of tllree years,
uor to pay him for any length of time after the war ended
and he was mustered ou!.
If, after his return, he had served the two years which
would complete his original term and, in addition, make good
the time lost by desertion, be would have been entitled to
just that compensation which be indirectly demands now by
claiming a discharge covering time from enlistment to date
of transfer.
Since he did not serve but three months of that two years,
and since the clear purpose of tile proclamation was that the.
compensation should be measured by the service, I am of
opinion that he should be paid for that service, and not for
the whole service he might have been, but was not, called on
to render.
The pardon was not intended to place a deserter upon
higher ground nor to secure him more favorable terms than
were given to the soldier who never faltered in discharge of
duty. Such · a soldier was compensated for actual service .
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S.he deserter who accepted the terms of the President's
proclamation was entitled to no more, no less. Mr. Holmes
is eutitled to be creuited by his services from date of enlistment to date of desertion, alHl from date of return to date
on which he was mustered out. The mustering out before
the expiration of his full term waived continued service as
a CQndition to immuuity from all guilt, from all punishment,
from all stain, in the eye of the law, on his record as a soldier by reason of the desertion, but it diu not waive the condition of the original contract, that compensation should be
proportioned to length of service, nor the condition of the
proclamation that time lost by desertion should uot be computed in estimating length uf service.
Neither the President nor Congress could give back to
Mr. Holmes the time so full of opportunities for serving his
country that had elapsed after desertion and before the pardon was given and accepted, and the plain purpose of both
was to exclude such time from the estimate of his service.
I have thus generaily stated my conclusions as to the
effeet of the pardon and waiver of full term of service upon
:Mr. Holmes' rights on account of service in the Army, because
such a statement is necessary to a full answer of J-our
specific questions.
You ask, "(1) Whether, under the President's proclamation of March 11, 1865, Holmes was entitled by his voluntary
surrender as a deserter to a cancellation of the record of
desertion standing against him, and (2) Whether by virtue
of the said proclamation and his return thereunder be is
entitled to an honorable discharge from Company E, Sixth
:\fary laud Volunteers ~" He remained in the service as a
member of that company until the transfer to Company C,
First Maryland Volunteers, but the time which elapsed
between his desertion and his return should not be credited
to him in a discharge or otherwise. .Mr. Holmes is entitled
to have the actual ser·dce in Company B, Sixth l\faryland
Volunteers, credited to him in an honorable discharge. If a
soldier transferred from one company aud regiment to
another is entitled to a discharge from the company he leaves,
then Mr. Holmes is entitled to an honorable discharge from
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Company E, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, showing his length
of service exclusive of time lost by desertion.
The papers inclosed with your communication are herewith returned.
Respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R.

CONTI~GENT

FUND.

Opinion of July 16, 1886 (aute, p. 424), in regard to the power conferred
upon heads of Departments by section 3683, Revised Statutes, respecting purchases payable from the contingent fund, does not apply to the
Assistant ::iecretary of the Interior while in the exercise of authority
prescribed for him by the Secretary of the Interior under section 439t
Revised Statute.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

•

July 23, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to submit, in reply to your communication of the 22d instant, that my opinion touclliug theautho;.·ity delegated to heads of Departments under section 3683, Revised Statutes, does not apply to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior while in the exercise of authority prescribed for him by the Secretary of the Interior under
section 439, Revised Statutes. As to the authority so prescribed the Assistant Secretary has the full power of the
Secretary himself.
It is to be observed that section 3683, Revised Statutes,
was enacted in 1842, and section 439, Revised Statutes, in
1862. With this provision as to the contingent fund before
Congress when the duties of the Assistant Secretary were .
designated in 1862, it is to be presumed it was intended to
include this authority or duty, as well as all others that the
Secretary ·of the Interior might prescribe to the Assistant.
This section 439, in other words, empowers the Secretary to
make the Assistant, as it were, his deputy in all things. It
follows, then, that the .Secretary of the Interior can lawfully
devolve the authority vested in him by section :1683, Revised
Statutes, upon the Assistant Secretary of the Interior. This
is entirely consistent with my opinion of the 16th instant, to
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which you refer, which is in effect that the duty mentioned
in section 3683 can only be exercised by the head of a Department, and cannot be transferred to an inferior officer. So long
as the powers delegated to the Assistant Secretary of the
Interior by his superior remain unrevoked, the authority of
. the former is co-ordinate and concurrent with that of the
latter.
The opinion referred to, as you will observe, was given in
answer to an inquiry from the Secretary of the Treasury~
whet];ler the authority delegated under section 3683, Revised
Statutes, could be exercised by a chief clerk of a Department in the one case and by a chief of a division in the other.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,

WATCHMEN IN PUBLIC SQUARES OR RESERVATIONS.
The watchmen employed by the Government under the act of August 5,
1882, chapter 389, for service in the public squares or reservations in
the District of Columbia, are by that act invested with the powers of
the metropolitan police, and may make arrests outside of such squares
and reservations fo.r offenses committed within the same.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,.
July 30, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of'
your communication of the 29th instant, in which you ask
" Whether the District commissioners must appoint these
watchmen (the watchmen provided for by the United States
Government for service in any of the public squares or reservations in the District of Columbia) additional policemen
before they can perform the full duties and powers of the
metropolitan police, or whether tile law confers full authority
upon the watchmen to arrest persons outside of the reservations and take them to the police courts for crime committed
within the reservations or connected therewith in any way."
The language of the act of Congress, approved August 5,
1882 (22 Stat., 243), is so clear and explicit, that there can be
no doubt as to its meaning.
273-VOL XVIII--28
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The powers aml duties of the metropolitan police are conferred upon these watchmen by the act itself, without the
intervention of any appointment from the commissioners of
the District. The legislative purpose was to invest these
watchmen with the powers and duties of the metropolitan
police without connecting them with that organization.
One of these watchmen bas the same authority f.or arresting offenders and turning them over to the courts for trial
that a metropolitan policeman would have who was detailed
to perform a watchman's duties.
Respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF W .A.R.

TIMBER UNLAWFULLY CUT ON PUBLIC LANDS.
The Land Department has authority to make seizure, through .its officers or agents, of timber unlawfully cut on the public lands.
Timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, which has been sei~ea by dulyauthorized agents of the Land Department, and is in their custody, may
be disposed of by that Department; and whether this be done by
public or private sale, with or without previous advertisement, is a
matter entirely discretionary therewith.
DEPAR'rMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

· ,

August 23. 1886.

StR: By your letter to the Attorney-General of the 14th

ultimo attention is called to a communication received by
you from the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a
copy of which was transmitted therewith, touching the dispmdtion of a large quantity of timber alleged to have been
nnlawfully cut on the public lands in Montana Territory, and
which bas recently been seized as the property of the United
States under instructions from that office, and the question
presented for consideration is, Whether the Commissioner
may ''direct the sale of the property so seized, and if so,
whether it may be disposed of at private sale, and in such
way as may be both to the advantage of the Government
and to the benefit of the community, without advertising the
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same~" Having carefully examined this subject, I now beg
to submit the following in reply:
The question proposed seems to involve a preliminary
inquiry, namely, as to the authority of the officers of the
Land Department to make seizure of timber unlawfully cut
on the public lands. Upon this point I entertain no doubt.
Congress has provided a remedy for the protection of the
timber ou the public lands by imposing certain penalties and forfeitures (see sec. 2461 and 2462, Hev. Stats.;
also sec. 3 of the act of June 3, 1878, chap. 150, and sec.
4 of the act of June ~, 1878, chap. 151), which can only
be enforced by in<lictment or informati~n, and by section
2 of the act of April 30, 1878, chapter 76, it is further
provided "that if any timber cut on the public lands shall
be exported from the Territories of the United States it shall
be liable to seizure by United States authority wherever
found."
But these statutory remedies are not tile only ones availa·
ble to the Government. In Cotton v. United States (11 How.,
229) it wa,s held that the United States have a right to bring
an action of trespass quare clausum fregit agaiust a person
for cutting and carrying away trees from the public lands.
Agreeably to tile doctrine of that case the United States
may rm;ort to the same ci vii remedies for the protection of
their property which are open to any other proprietor. Thus
tney may seize the timber cut, arrest it by replevin, or recover
damages in trespass for the taking and conversion (United
States v. Cook, 19 Wall., 594). These are the ordinary remedies given by the common law for the reco\Tery of personal
property or its value. Seizure or recaption (which is one of
them) is a remedy by the mere act of the party injured, and
may be resorted to for the recovery of such property where
its exertion will not endanger the public peace. (3 Black.
Com., 4.)
Authority to exert this remedy in behalf of the United
States must be deemed to belong to the Commissioner of the
General Land-Office, under the supervision of the Secretary
of the Interior, as a power included in the general duties respecting the public lands which are devolved upon him (sec.
453, Rev. Stat.). Such authority, indeed, has long been
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asserted and frequently exercised by the Land Department
through its officers or agents, the latter acting under instructions issued by the Commissioner, with the sanction of
the Secretary. Referring to this, the Supreme Court in
Wells v. Nickles (104 U. S., 447) observes:
"The Department of the Interior, under the idea of protecting from depredation timber on the lands of the Government, has gradually come to as~ert the right to seize what
is cut and taken away from them wherever it can be traced.
In aid of this, the registers and receivers of the land-office
have, by instructions from the Secretary of the Interior, been
constituted agen,ts of the United States for these purposes,
with power to appoint special agents under themselves. If
any authority to do this was necessary, it may be fairly inferred from appropriations made to pay the service~ of these
special timber agents."
In that case a 1 compromise by timber agents with a trespasser respecting the ·disposition of timber cut by him on
the public lands and seized by such agents~ which was made
in conformity to instructions of the Commissioner of the
General Land-Office, was held to be valid. This amounts to
an affirmation of the authority of the Commissioner, through
those agents, to act for the United States in matters connected
with timber depredations on the public domain; and I think
it safe to say, that under such authority the remedy by recaption or seizure, as well as any other of the before- mentioned
common-law remedies, may be resorted.to for the recovery of
timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, according to the
circumstances of the case. While I entertain no doubt as to
the existence ' of the remedy by seizure, yet its iiability to
abuse and to become an instrument of oppression demand that
it should be used with judicious discretion and only in clear
or emergent cases; and except in such cases the regular procedure of the courts should be preferred.
As to the authority of the Commissioner to dispose of such
timber by public or private sale, where the same bas been
seized by cluly-aut.horized agents of the Land Department
and remains in their custody, I apprehend that this power
exists, subject to the general supervision or direction of the
Secr~tary of the Interior. There being no statutory pro-
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vision covering a case of that kind, or regulating the dis·
position of the property, it must be regarded as a subject
left to the Land Department to be dealt with in such manner
as in the judgment of that department will best protect the
interests of the Government. As the property is perishable
in its nature, and its custody may involve expense, it is not
only within the power, but it is the duty of the department,
for the avoidance of loss to the Government, to convert the
same into money; and whether this be done by public or
private sale, is a matter entirely discretionary with it.
While, ordinarily, the public interests (which are always to
be kept in view) will be best subserved by a public oole after
advertisement, yet I perceive no objection, legal or other, to
a private sale either with or without previous advertisement,
where the mode of disposal is advantageous to the Government; but as a general rule public sale should be had.
In direct response to the question presented by you, I
therefore submit that, in my opinion, the Commissioner may
direct the sale of the property seized, and that ''it may be
disposed of at private sale, and in such way as may be. both
to the advantage of the Government and to the benefit of
,the community without advertising the same."
I am, sir, very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.

The

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

POTOMAC FLATS IMPROVEMENT.
Title of the United States to certain parts (Sections II and Ill) of the
Potomac Flats Improvement considered, and advised that the prohibition contained in the acts of August 5, 1886, chapters 929 and 930,
against the expenditure of money appropriated for the improvement,
does not apply to such parts.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 28, 1886.
Your letters of the 18th and 25th instant, inclosing
communications addressed to the Chief of Engineers by Maj.
P. C. Hains, of the Engineer Corps, in charge of the Potomac
SIR:
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River Flats Imp1·ovement, together with a map of that improvement, call attention to section 6 of the act of August,
5, 1886, entitled ''An Act to provide for protecting the interests of the United States in the Potomac Ri 'Ter Flats," etc.,
and also to the proviso in that part of the river and harbor
act of August 5, 1886, which makes an appropriation "for
continuing the improvement of the Potomac River in the
vicinity of Washington," etc., and in connection therewith
submit the following inquiries, Yiz: Whether there is any
claim of title adverse to the title of the United States with
respect to Sections II and III of the Potomac Flats, as described on said map, and whether there is any impediment
to the immediate expenditure of said appropriation on such
sections.
In regard to all that part of the Potomac River Flats Improvement which is embraced in Sections II and III, as described on said map, this Department has no information of
any claim of title adverse to that of the United States covering any part of the soil included therein, nor is it believed
that any foundation for such a claim exists. Formerly the
whole of the soil referred to constituted part of the bed of
the river, and was owned by the State of Maryland. While
it still remained part of the river bed, the United States succeeded to the title of the State thereto by virtue of the act
of cession passed by the Maryland legislature December 19,
1791, and it does not appear that tlwre has been any change
of ownership since. In an official report to the Secretary of
tlle Interior dated February 18, 1885, the Commissioner of
the General Land Office states that the only patent or other
title paper shown l>y the records of this (the General Land)
office to ha't'e been issued for any portion of the Potomac
Flats, so called, is the patent issued December 6, 1869, to
John L. Kidwell, for 47.71 acres in the Potomac River adjacent to the United States Observatory." No part of the land
covered by this patent lies within either of the !1l>ove-mentioned sections.
The Kid well claim, just adverted to, is located wholly
within Section I on the map. This section includes a large
area, extending from Easby's Point (foot of Twenty seventh
street) to Seventeenth street, and between the points here
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indicated, fronting the same section, the Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal Company and others claim riparian rights. But
below Seventeeth street, and fronting on Sections II and III,
there is no riparian property except what is owned by the
United States, and no riparian rights are claimed there by
any one adversely to the United States, within the knowledge of this Department.
As t9 the expenditure of the appropriation referred to, the
act making that appropriation provides that it shall not be
expended " upon or with reference to any place in respect
of which the title of the United States is in doubt, or in
respect to which any claim adverse to the United States
has been made;" and section 6 of the first above-named act
of August 5, 1886, also forbids the expenditure of any moneys
so appropriated "otherwise than upon property in respect
of which there is no claim adverse to the title of the United
States," etc. Respecting the area within the limits of Section~ II and III on said map it has already been intimated
that the Department has no information of the existence of
any claim adverse to the title of the Unite1l States to any
part of the soil included in that area, or that any such claim
has ever been asserted. Indeed, the title of the United
States to ·the land within the whole of that area appears to
be absolute and free from all doubt. Under these circumstances I think it may reasonably be concluded that the
land is property in respect of which there ''is no claim adverse to the title of the United States," and that it is not a
"place in which the title of the United States is in doubt, or
in respect to which any claim adverse to the United States
has been made," and that, consequently, the prohibition contained in the acts above cited against expending the aforesaid
appropriation do not apply thereto.
I accordingly answer the inquiries submitted by you in the
negative.
I am, sir, very respectfu11y,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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INDIAN POLICE.
The powers and duties of the Indian police authorized by the act of May
15, 1886, chapter 333, cannot be exercised outside of the reservation to
which they may be assigned.
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

August 28, 1886.
SIR: The proposition submitted for consideration in your
letter of the 24th instant is, "Does the jurisdiction of the
Indian police, authorized by the act of May 15, 1886 (Public
No. 49), extend .for any purpose beyond the limits of the rel3ervation within which they are employed~"
The language of the act above referred to is, ''The service
* * * of Indian police to be employed in maintaining
order and prohibiting illegal traffic in liquor on the several
Indian reservations.'' No other definition of the power of
the Indian police is furnished by statute.
The l'tatute fixes their employment as on the several Indian reservations. It would be doing violence to the intent
of the statute, as clearly expressed by its language, to extend
the exercise of their power beyond the reservation. The purpose of their appointment is to'' maintain order and prohibit
illegal traffic in liquor." Their chief duty is rather to prevent crime than to punish criminals. When arrest becomes
necessary as an incident to the prevention of disorder or the
traffic in liquor, when the offender is delivered to the proper
tribunal within the reservation, if its jurisdiction extends for
purpose of punishment beyond the reservation, the convicted
criminal will then by the order of tne court be placed in the
custody of an officer with sufficient authority to execute the
sentence.
From the provisions of the statute and the necessarily
local character of the duties devolving upon the Indian
police, I am of opinion their power does not ex officio extend
outside of the Indian reservation to which they may be
assigned.
I am, very respectfully, yours,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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WHARVES IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON CITY. ·
.Semble that the Chief of Engineers of the Army is not and never has been
vested with authority t ' grant licenses for the erection of wharves
along the river front of the city of Washington, D. C.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 3, 1886.
SIR: I have considered with much care the question propounded by you in a letter to the Attorney General, dated
the 16th of April last, as to the authority of the Chi<~f of
Engineers to grant licenses for the erection of wharves along
the river front of the city of Washington.
It appears by the papers which accompanied your letter
that this authority is assumed by that officer to belong to
him by virtue of the act of the Maryland legislature of December 19, 1791, and the acts of Congress of May 1, 1802,
chapter 41; .April 29, 1816, chapter 150; and March 2, 1867,
chapter 167. The Maryland act of 1791 provided that the
commissioners appointed by the President under the act of
Congress of July 16, 1790, chapter 28, "should from time to
time, until Congress shall exercise the jurisdiction and governrnent within the said territory, have power to license the
building of wharves in the waters of the Potomac and the
Eastern Branch, adjoining the said city," etc. The offices of
these commissioners were abolished, and the appointment of
a new officer, called a superintendent, authorized, by the act
of Congress of 1802, which contained this provision: ''The
said superintendent is hereby invested with all powers, and
shall hereafter perform all duties, which the said commissioners are now vested with, or are required to perform, by or
in virtue of any act of Congress, or any act of the general
assembly of Maryland, or any deed or deeds of trust from
the original proprietors of the lots in the said city," etc.
The act of 1816 abolished the office of superintendent, and
authorized the appointment of a commissioner of public
buildings, and declared that the latter officer ''shall be vested
with all the powers and perform all the duties conferred
upon the superintendent aforesaid-." The act of 1867 abolished the office of Commissioner of Public Buildings, and pro-
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vided that ''the Chief Engineer of the Army shall perform all
the duties now required by law of said commissioner."
This legislation, however, should be viewed in connection
with other legislation, namel;y, the acts of CongresR of Feb·
ruary 27, 1801, chapter 15; February 24, 1804, chapter 14;
May 4, 1812, chapter 75; and May 15, 1820, chapter 104.
By the first of these acts Congress completely assumed to
exercise jurisdiction and government within the territory
described in the Maryland act of 1791. According to the
view of the supreme court of the District of Columbia in
the case of the District v. Johnson (3 l\fack., 120), the power
to license the erection of wharves which was conferred by
the last-mentioned act upon the commissioners named
therein, and which is regarded as of a purely temporary and
provisional character, ceased to exist by the very terms of
such act upon the assumption of jurisdiction by Congress as
above, and consequently did not devolve upon the superintendent created by the act of 1~02, as this act transferred to
him only the powers then vested in said commissioners. If
this view is correct, that power was not transmitt~d to the
Commissioner ofPublic Buildings and from him to the Chief
of Engineers by force of the subsequent acts of 1816 and 1867.
Furthermore, it would seem that the act of February 24,
1804, May, 4, 1812, and May 15, 1820, cited above, devolved
the same power elsewhere. Thus the act of 1804 provided
that the corporation of the city of Washington should have
• power "to erect, repair, and regulate public wharves," etc;
the act of 1812 authorized the raising of taxes by the same
corporation, to be expended "in erecting and repairing
wharves;" and the act of 1820, which gave a new charter to
the city of Washington, conferred upon the corporation
power ''to erect, repair and regulate public wharves," etc.,
and ;, to regulate the manner of erecting and the rates of
wharfage at private wharves."
The provisions of the last-named act, which embrace
wharves both public and private, confer plenary power over
their establishment, and they are manifestly irreconcilable
with the existence, separate from or independent of said corporation, of an authority .to license the erection of such
wharves. Commenting on the same provisions, the court iu
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the case aboYe referred to remarks: "The power, then,
claimed to be in the Commissioner of Public Buildings or the
Chief Engineer of the Army, his successor, to issue licenses .
for the building of wharves would be inconsistent with the
power given to the city. And therefore, even if the power
was conferred on the original commissioners, the act incorporating t~e city transferred it to the authorities of the city
of Washington. Therefore, in our judgment, the Engineer
of the Army never had the slightest power in the world to
license the erection of wharves on the Potomac and Eastern
Branch."
I observe that, in an opinion of Attorney-General Wirt,
dated July 8, 1818 (1 Opin., 223), in which the subject considered was the construction of wharves by the proprietors of
water lots on the Potomac and Eastern Branch, and therefore related to private wharves, the power to license the building thereof possessed under the Maryland act of 1791 by the
commissioners first in office is regarded (contrary to the view
of the supreme court of the District of Columbilt in the
case above cited) as having devolved upon their successor,
the superintendent, and upon the successor of the latter officer, the Commissioner of Public Buildiugs, by operation of
the acts of 1802 and 1816, hereinbefore mentioned, and that
at the date of the opinion the whole subject of licensing
thes~ wharves is deeme\l to be under the control of the
Commissioner of Public Buildings. But that opinion was
given prior to the enactment of the aforesaid act of 1820, the
·provisions of which includH private as well as public wharves,
and, as already intimated, would be clearly inconsistent with
the exercise of a licensing power by such commissioner; so
that, if this power had previously resided in the latter, it
ceased to exis'j in him upon the passage of that act, being
impliedly revoked thereby.
The powers granted to the city of Washington by the act
of 1820 over the establishment of wharves were subsequently exercised by the corporation, from time to time, in
the adoption of ordinances regulating that subject. ( See
Webb's Digest, p. 423.)
But there is another point which is suggested by the
Chief of Engineers in the papers transmitted with your
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letter, and which calls for examination in connection witlJ
the present inquiry, and that is, that the dock spaces are
pnblic reservations, and that it is his duty to see that they
are not occupied by any private person for any private pur.
pose whatever; in support of which he cites sections 222
and 226 of the ReviRed Statutes relating to the District of
Columbia.· The first of these sections declares. that "no
open space, public reservation, or other public ground in the
city of Washington, nor any portion of the public streets or
avenues in said city, shall be occupied by any pri\ate person,
or for any private purpose whateYer." This provision is taken
partly from the act of May 17, 184 8, amending the charter of
said city, and partly from the act of April 6, 1870, conferring certain authorit.y upon the city relative to parking
the streets and avenues. The term "public reservation,"
as there employed, signifies an area of ground set apart for
public purposes in the plan of the city; it would not ordinarily be taken to include a dock space; and in my opinion
neither !hat nor any of the other terms used in the section
were meant to apply to spaces of that sort. Besides, no
power is granted by that section to the Chief of Engineers;
and while section 226 makes it his duty "to cause obstacles
of every kind to be removed from such streets, avenues, and
sidewalks in the city of Washington as have been or may
be improved in whole or in part by the United States, and
to keep the same at all times free from obstructions," yet
this duty is by the terms of the statute limited to "streets,
avenues, and sidewalks" where the same are improved as
above, anrl cannot be deemed to embrace localities not within that description. There is clearly nothing in these sections from which a power to license the erection of wharves
may be derived.
In answer, then, to the question presented by you, I have
the honor to reply, that in my opinion the Chief of Engineers is not now and never has been clothed with authority
to grant licenses for the erection of wharves along the river
front of the city of Washington.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION IN FOREIGN VESSELS.
Under the eighth sectionof the act of June 19, 1886, chapter 421, a foreign
vessel is liable to a fine of $2 for every passenger transported by it
from one port in the United States to another port in the United States,
though the continuity of the voyage may have been broken by the vessel touching at an intermediate foreign port.
DEPAR'l'MENT'" OF JUSTICE,

September 4, 1886.
SIR: In your letter of the 25th of August you ask the fol-

lowing question:
"Under the eighth section of the act 'to abolish certain
fees for official services to American vessels,' etc., approved
June 19, 1886, is a foreign vessel liable to a fine of $2 for
every person transported by her from one American port to
another when such person takes passage for an intermediate
foreign port and thence again takes passage for a domestic
port~ the continuity of the voyage of the vessel being tempo. rarily broken ~"
The language of the section referred to is:
" SEC. 8. That foreign vessels found transporting passengers between places or ports in the United States, when
such passengers have been taken on board in the United
States, shall be liable to a fine of two dollars for every passenger landedo~"
By the provision of this act the fine is imposed upon the
vessel for the wrong·doing of the vessel, and not for any act
done by the passengers; hence the inquiry is one between
the United States and the vessel. The custom-bouse
officers are not burdened with the difficult task of inquiring
what each passenger did, whether he paid for his ticket, or
the terms on which he was transported by the vessel, or any
other act or doing of a passenger, exc~pt as a means of determining where the passenger was taken on board or
landed. In the case submitted, the fact that the vessel wa~
a foreign one is undisputed; that the paRsengers were landed
at Chicago is equally well established. If there is a crimip
nating fact which is involved in doubt, it is whether the pas- ·
sengers were taken on board at a port within the United
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States. They were first taken on board at Cleveland b,y the
vessel from which they were landed. The voyage was a continuous one, being, in the language of the case stated, "temporarily broken" at the port of Windsor, in Canada. Thus,
if it was a broken voyage, one part being from Cleveland to
Windsor and the other part from Windsor to Chicago, the ·
two parts (if but temporarily broken by the stopping at
Windsor and after that a resumption and consummation of
the original purpose) would constitute substantially a continuous voyage. If there had been no such temporary delay, but the vessel had gone directly from Cleveland to Chicago and carried the passengers from the one port to the
other, no doubt could have arisen as to the liability to the
payment of the fine~. The fact that each of the passengers
paid his fare in two separate payments, and had his trunks
examined by the custom-house officers, should not be
allowed to change the result following from the continuity of
the voyage; for it must be borne in mind that it is the vessel
that is subjected to tbe fine, and not the passengers. The
claim for the fine is by the United States against the vessel.
Those controlling the vessel may arrange with the passengers
or the officers of the foreign custom-house as it may best
suit their mutual convenience, but as the United States bas
no control over the parties to such arrangements, and is in
no way a party to them, her rights can not be prejudiced or
the operation of her laws evaded by them. Even if each
passenger, when taken on board, had intended making
Windsor the end of his voyage on that vessel, and in conse.
quence of the temporary suspension of the voyage changed
his mind and resumed travel on the same vessel, it would be
entirely in t!1e power of those controlling the vessel to add
the amount of the fine ($2) to the fare, and thereby without
loss pay the fine; or the passenger could, at his option, take
passage on another vessel, and the amercement be avoided.
A different construction of the law would render tlle act
practically inoperative and the intent of the law-makers ineffectual. Hence the conclusion follows that the decisive
facts in this and similar cases are: Was the vessel a foreign
one! Did she take the passengers on board at a port of the
United States and after a substantially continuous voyage
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land them at another port of the United States? When this
conjunction of facts exists, the vessel is subjected to liability
for the fine; and, as these facts are all found to exist in the
case submitted, the vessel is subject to the penalties provided by the act.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.

The

SECRE1\A.RY OF THE TREASURY.

POTTAW ATOMIE INDIANS.
Under the authority granted to the agents and attorneys named in the
letter of attorney made by certain beads of families and individual
members of the Pottawatomie Indians, the powers and duties committed to such agents and attorneys can not be performed by any two
of them in the absence or without the concurrence of the third.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 9, 1886.
SIR: Your Jetter of the 6th instant, with the documents
that accompanied it, was received.
The inquiry you tlropose is in substance whether, under
the authority granted to the attorneys named in the power of
attorney made by certain hea.ds of families and individual
members of the Pottawatomie nation of Indians, the powers
and duties can be performed· by any two of them in the absence of the third.
I find, in the examination of the power of attorney referred
to, these words:
"We, the undersigned, heads of families and individual
members of the Citizen Baud of the Pottawatomie nation of
Indians, * * * and also * * * the undersigned members of the Huron Band of the Pottawatomie nation of Indians, * * * for ourselves, our heirs and assigns, reposing
full faith and confidence in the fidelity, integrity, and capacity
of Anthony F. Navarre and Stephen Neyonquet and John
Anderson, memhers of our said Pottawatomie nation of Indians, residing in the Indian Territory, do hereby nominate,
constitute, and appoint, and by these presents have consti-
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tuted, nominated, ana appointed, said Anthony F. Navarre
and said John Anderson our lawful agents and attorneys in
fact," for the purposes therein stated.
Reading thus far it will appear that only two agents or
attorneys were empowered to act in the matter delegated.
It would seem, therefore, that the answer to your inquiry
must be confined to the authority of Navarre and Anderson,
unless the omission of Neyonquet's name was a clerical error.
But while this omission, if it be not a clerical error, might be
decisive of the question submitted, yet, assuming that three
agents were appointed, the question may be disposed of on
other grounds.
The duty to be performed by the agents nominated was to
present certain claims of the 1 Pottawatomie Indian nation
before Congress, the Departments, and courts, to contract
with responsible lawyers for the prosecution of the claims, to
agree upon the fees to be paid them, and to do and perform
all other acts necessary to the collection of the claims.
It is the general rule of the common law that when an authority is given to two or more persons to do an act the act
is valid to bind the principal only when all of them concur i~
doing it; for the authority is construed strictly, and the
power is understood to be joint and notfseveral. (Story on
Agency, 42; Greenleaf's Lessee v. Birch, 5 Pet., 139; Sugd.,
Pow., 129; 142, 143; Wardwell v. McDowell et al, 31 Ill., :164.)
The rule is different when the power is conferred by law.
Lord Coke says in respect to this difference : " Two or more
may have a trust or an authoritie ~ommitted to them jointly.
and yet it shall not survive. But herein are divers diversities to be observed. * * * Secondly, there is a diversiti11
between authorities created by the partie for private causes,
and authoritie created by law for execution of justice." And
he gives this illustration: "' If a man make a letter uf attorney to two, to do any act, if one of them dye, the survivor
shall not do it; but it a venire ftwias be a warded to four coroners to impannell and return a jury, and one of them dye, yet
the others shall execute and return the same." (Co.-Litt.,
181 b.) The sam · doctrine is laid down in Pennington against
:Moore (Dyer, 38 H. 861, b 34), and in Hoe's Case (5 Co.~ 91),.
and in Vincent and Lee (Oo.-Litt., 113 a; Sugd. Pow. 144).
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It is a principle in law that when the matter is one of personal confideuce or trust the power can not be extended beyond the express words and clear intention of the donot.
(Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves., 44; Stile v. Tomson, Dyer, 210 a;
Perry on Trusts, 496, 497.)
The power in the present case must, it appears to me, be
regarded as a personal trust and confidence, and as private
in its nature. Immediately preceding the nomination of the
persons named in the letter of attorney there is an express
declaration of faith and confidence in their fidelity, integrity,
and capacity; and there is absent from the instrument the
power of substitution, which is usual in such documents. If
there be any doubt on this point, it must be resolved, according to our Indian policy, in favor of the grantors of the power.
The acts to be done are not of a public or official character.
They affect only the rights of individual families and
members of two bands of the Pottawatomie nation of Indians, some residing in the Indian Territory and others in
the States of Kansas and Michigan. The claim is for individual rights, no public or national rights.
In private cases it is generally a question as to the intention of the donors, whether the power should be executed by
all the persons named, or by any one or more of them. lu,
othe£ words, to speak in the language of trusts, the question
is as to whether the grantor reposed a personal trust and
confi.denee in the trustees appointed, or whether he intended
the power to vest in whomsoever might in fact fill the office
of trustee.
<
In the case submitted there is, as already stated, express
language ofpersunal confideuce and trust in respect to the
agents named, and the power is of a private nature. I am,
therefore, of tlle opinion that all the grantees of the power
must unite in order to bind the principals.
Very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
:Acting Attorney- General.
Hon. H. L. MULDRow,
Acting Secretary of the Interior.
273-VOL XVIII--29
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ACCOUNTS RELATING TO THE PUBLIC LANDS.
The First Comptroller is not clothed with power, where in his opinion
further delay would be injurious to the Government, to direct the
Commissioner of the General Land Office forthwith to audit any
particular account relating to the public lands, the settlement whereof
• is deYolved upon the latter officer.
The Commissioner, with respect to tue discharge of his duties in such
matter, is subject only to the direction of the Secretary of the Interior.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 9, 1886.
SIR: The question presented by yours of the 18th of .August is: ''Has the First Comptroller, in every case where in
his opinion further delay would be injurious to the United
States, power to direct the Commissioner of the General
Land Office forthwith to audit and settle any particular account which said officer may be authorized to audit and set.
tle '"
If such power exists, it is vested in the Comptroller by the
second section of the act of the 3d of March, 1809, (2 Stat.,
536), which enacts: ''That it shall be the duty of the Comptroller of the Treasury, in every case where in his opinion
further delay would be injurious to the United States, and
he is hereby authorized, to direct the Auditor of the Treasury and the accountants of the War and Navy Departments
at any time forth with to audit and settle any particular account
which the said officers may be respectively authorized to audit and settle."
At the time of the passage of this act all the accounts of
the Go,ermrent, except those of the War and Navy Departments, were audited by the Auditor of the Treasury, there
bei.ng but oue; hence the accounts now audited by the Commissioner of the General Land Office were included in the
duties of the Auditor; and by the terms of the act of the 3rd
of March, 1809, the Comptroller in a proper case had power
to direct an immediate audit by the Auditors.
National growth increased official labor, and on the 25th
of April, 1812, tae General Land Office was established, and
at its head a new officer placed-the Commissioner of the General Land Office. By the ninth section of the organic act
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(~ Stat., 717), it is provided, "That all returns relative to the
public lands heretofore directed to be made to the Secretary
of the Treasury shall hereafter be made to the said Commissioner, who shall have power to audit and settle all public
accounts relative to the public lands: Provided, It shall be
the duty of the said Commissioner, upon the settlement of any
such account, to certify the balance and transmit the account,
with the vouchers and certificate, to the Comptroller of the
Treasury for his examination and decision thereon." At the
time of the passage of the act of 1809 the direction provided
by that act could not have applied to the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, as the office of the Commissioner
did not exist till 1812. The power was not extended over
the Commissioner by the act of 1812, nor by any other express statutory provisio'l, If, then, the power exists at all,
it must arise by extending the provisions of the act of 1809
and incorporating them, by implication, into the act of 1812.
The only ground to sustain this implication is that a part
of the duties imposed on the Auditor prior to the passage of
the act of 1809 was, on the redistribution of labor contained
in the act of 1812, transferred to the CommiRsioner. As a
priuei ple this could not, as a general rule, be sustained. For,
if it were true, then whenever a new bureau should be organized by aggregating difl'erent duties from several bureaus
or Departments, the head of the new bureau would be subject to the command of as many different chiefs as there were ·
different sources from which his bureau was ~ composed, and
the admiui~tration of such a composite bureau would be involved in inextricable confusion. To avoid this confusion, it
may fairly be inferred that when an officer or bureau is transferred from one Department of the Government to auother,
and express general power of direction is conferred on the
Department to which he or it is transferred, the power of
direction that existed in the Department from which it was
transferred is transferred to the Department last clothed.
with the power.
The Commissioner of the General Land Office was by the
act charged with many other important duties whose consideration might be sometimes emergent, of the urgency of
which other duties the Comptroller might have no oppor-
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tunity to know. That the Comptroller should be authorized,
without knowledge as to the other dutie~ or what evil might
accrue from diverting the attention of the Commissioner from
them, to direct a suspension of those duties and command
the auditing of a particular account would be an unreason~ble implication. A much more reasonable implication
would arise, in the absence of express legislatiion, that the
same officer who had supervision of the whole work should
have the power to direct the Commissioner (in case direction
became necessary) as to which work should have precedence.
In conformity to this better reason, the first section of the
act establishing the Land Office expressly provides: "The
chief officer shall be called Commissioner of the General
Land Office, whose duty it shall be, under the direction of
the head of the Department .(then the Secretary of the Treasury), to superintend, execute, and perform all such acts and
things touching and respecting the public lands of the
United States and other lands patented or granted by the
United States as have heretofore been directed by law to be
done or performed in the office of the Secretary of State, of
the Secretary and Register of the Treasury, and of the Secretary of War, or which shall hereafter by law be assigned to
the said office." Afterwards in the same act this duty of auditing is imposed on the Commissioner. The first section then
prescribes it shall be done under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, and rebuts the implication that the
Comptroller still retained the power of direction.
The ninth section, by its proviso-doubtless to avoid the implication that the audit of the Commissioner should be finalgrants express power to the Comptroller to examine and
dedde upon the account as audited by the Commissioner, but
as it does not provide for any power of direction such as the
act of 1809 authorized the Comptroller to exert over the Auditor, the express granting of one power, which the Oomp• troller before exercised over the Auditor, would seem to imply the exclu~ion of the other which is not granted.
Tbe act of 180!) gave the Comptroller the same power to
direct an audit forthwith by the accountants of the War and
Navy Departments that it J.id by the Auditor of the Treasury.
By the act of March 3, 1817 ('3 Stat., 366), the accounts au-
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dited by the accountants of the War and Navy were transferred to the Second, Third, and Fourth Auditors, which
officers were first provided for by that act; but it has never
been urged or claimed since the passage of the act of 1817,
as to the Second, Third and Fourth Auditors, that the power
to direct an audit forthwith existed in t,he First Comptroller
under the provisions of the act of 1809; on the contrary, in the
absence of express direction, Att(>rney-General Butler, on the
26th of March, 1834 (2 Opin., 621), announced tllat by the
act of 1817 the power before conferred upon the First Comptroller over tbe accountants of the War and Navy Depart ·
ments who were superseded by the Second, Third, and.Fourth
Auditors, was by implication taken from the First and transferred to the Second Comptroller, whose office was first created by that act.
On the 3d of 'f arch, 1849, Congress passed the act authorizing the organization of the Department of the Interior.
The third section of that act (9 Stat., 395), vested all the
powers formerly exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury
in the Secretary of the Interior, including the power to
direct the Commissioner of the General Land Office, with the
same control in the First Comptroller then exercised by him.
This act neither enlarges nor diminishes the power of the
Comptroller, but strongly rebuts the view that the act of 1809
by implication was extended by the act of 1812 over the
Commissioner of the General Land Office. For, if it might.
be difficult for the Commissioner to conform to a double allegiance in the discharge of his official duties while in the same
Department, that difficulty would be largely increased when
this right to command was lodged in a different Department.
The act of 1812 has received a clear legislative interpretation against an implied grant of power to the Comptroller to
direct the Commissioner, in the revision of the statutes approved 22d day of June,"1874.
Sectioh 5595, Revised Statutes, declares: '' The foregoing
seventy-three titles embrace the statutes of the United
States, general and permanent in their nature, in force on the
1st day of December, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three." The power of direction claimed by the Comptroller is not contained in the Revised Statutes.
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Section 5596 provides: ''All acts of Congress passed prior to
said first day of December, one thousand eight lmnured and
seventy-three, any portion of which is embraced in any section of said revision, are hereby repealed, and the section applicable thereto shall be in force in lieu thereof; all parts of
such acts not contained i'n such revision having been repealed
or superseded by subsequent acts, or not being general or permanent in their nature.'' A part of the act of 1809 is embraced in section 271 of the revision, but by this section its
operation is confined to the First and Fifth Auditors.
Section 441 enacts : " The Secretary of the Interior is
charged with the supervision of public business relating to
the following subjects:

*

*

" Second : The public lands, including mines." * * *
Section 453 ueclares : '' The Commissioner of the General
Land Office shall perform, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, all executive duties appertaining to the
surveying and sale of the public lauds of the United States or
in any wise respecting such public lands."
Section 271.. re-enacts so much of the act of 1809 as has not
been superseded by the act of 1812 under which the General
Land Office was organized, and is as follows : "The First
Comptroller, in every .case where, in his opinion, further delays would be injurious to the United States, shall direct
the First and Fifth Auditors of the Treasury forth with to
audit and settle any particular account which said officers
may be authorized to audit and settle, and to report such
settlement for revision and final decision by the First Comptroller."
This enactment does not include among the powers of the
First Comptroller the authority to direct the Second, Third,
and Fourth Auditors nor the Commissioner of the GPneral
Land Office, but expressly limits his power to the First and
Fifth Auditors. Those officers are omitted doubtless for the
same reason, which seems to be that the offices were
ereated after the passage of the act of 1809, and at the
time of the creation of each it was plaeed under the direc. tion of another officer; hence the power of the Comptroller was superseded. By the act of 1817 the Second, Third,
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and Fourth Auditors were first provided for and were impliedly subjected to the direction of the Second Comptroller;
and by the act of 1812 the Commissioner of the General
Land Office was first provided for, and was expressly subjected to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, and
afterward more broadly of the Secretary of the Interior.
Hence in neither case was the power vested in the First
Comptroller by the act of 1809, to direct an audit forthwith,
extended by implication to the new officers whose offices
were made subject at the time of their creation to the direction of the heads of other departments or bureaus.
This Congressional interpretation is additionally enforced
• by the provision of section 456, which is: "All returns relative to the public lands shall be made to the Commissioner
of the General Land Office; and he shall have power to
audit and settle all public accounts relative to the public
lands, and upon the settlement of every such account he
shall certify the balance and transmit the accounts with the
vouchers and certificate to the First Comptroller of the
Treasury for his examination and decision thereon."
This section, which defines the subjection, and the whole
subjection, of the Commissioner of the Gener~l Land Office
to the First Comptroller, so far as express statutory provision is concerned, was first enacted in 1812, re-enacted substantially in 1849, and again re-enacted almost literally on
the l'evision of the statutes, with an entire absence of any
statutory recognition from the beginning of any power in
the First Comptroller to di'i·ect the Commissioner to audit
forthwith. This repeated grant of express power with the as
often repeated omission of the power sought to be implied
seems to invoke the application of the maxim expressio ~tnius
est exclusio alterius.
While under the provisions of the act of 1817 it might be
a question of grave doubt whether the act granting the
power to the Commissioner of the General Land Office to
audit was not repealed, yet, as the act of 184:9 seems to imply
that the power was still left to the Commissioner, and since
1832 it has been exercised by him, departmental usage of
such long standing would solve the doubt in favor of the
power of the Commissioner; but, if it was revoked by the act
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of 1817, then the revision of the statutes, wherein the power
was expressly conferred, would be in the nature of a new
grant. If the revision was a grant of power not before intrusted to the Commissioner, a8 by the revision he was to
perform all his duties subject to the supervision and under
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, the power would
be lodged in the Secretary. The autonomy of the departmental system, which by the growth of the nation has become indispensable, is best preserved by maintaining, as far
as is consistent with legislative provisions, the unity of the
power of personal direction of subordinate officers under the
heads of the Departments. Doubtless this consideration
among others influenced Congress in the revision to limit the
power of the First Comptroller under the act of 1809, as carried into the re\Tision in section 271, to the F.irst and Fifth
Auditors. If additional support for the views indicated in
this opinion were needt>d, it may be found in the fact that
sinc,P the passage of the act of 1812, a period of seventy-four
years, the power now claimed by the First Comptroller has
never been aetually exercised, and, so far as known, but once
even claimed by the Comptroller to exist in him.
This general review of substantially all the legislation on
the subject, leads to the conclusion that the provisions of the
act of 1809 can n9t, by implication, be incorporated into the
act of 1812 ; hence tlle Comptroller has no power under the
law to direct the Commissioner to forthwith audit and settle
an account for survP;ying the public lands when in the judgment of the Comptroller a further delay in the settlemen~ of
the accounts would be injurious to the United States, but the
necessary power of direction is vested in the Secretary of the
Interior.
Very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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IMPORTATION BY MAIL.
Precious stones and other articles, where the same are liable to customs
duty, are prohibited by the Universal Postal Union Convention of June
1, 1~78, to be sent through the mail; and if imported by mail they become subject to seizure ant.l forfeiture under section 3061, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 15, 1886.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 8th instant, in which you ask for my
''opinion upon the follo.w ing points:"
"First. Whether precious stones and other articles enumerated in the third paragraph of said article 11 (Universal
Postal Union Convention of June, 18'78) are forbidden to be
imported by mail by any special legislation.
"Second. ·whether the same articles, even if not forbidden
by special statute to be imported by mail, are forbidden importation by mail by the second paragraph of said article, in
ease they shall be found to be dutiable; and, if they are thus
prohibited, whether they are liable to seizure and forfeiture."
I answer, first, I have been unable to find any" special
legislation'' forbidding the importation by mail of precious
stones and other articles enumerated in said article 11.
The laws passed by Congress at its last session have not
been printed, and I have not examined them in this connection.
Second. Article 11, Convention of June, 1878, provides:
"It is forbidden to the public to send by mail, (1) letters or
packets containing gold or silver substances, pieces of money,
jewelry, or preciom; articles; (2) any packages whatever containing articles liable to customs duty."
The convention of Lisbon, March 21, 1885, article 8, provides: "The first three paragraphs of article 11 are suppressed and are replaced by the following provisions : ' It is
forbidden to the public to senrl by mail, (1) letters or packets
~ontaining pieces of money; (2) any packet whatever containing articles liable to customs duty; (3) gold or silver
bullion, precious stones, jewelry, or other precious articles,
but only in case the legislation of the countries concerned

458

RON. G. A. JENKS
Collector's Bond.

prohibits their being placed in the mail, or their being forwarded.'"
The modification in the Lisbon convention of that paragraph in the convention of Paris which forbids the importation by mail of" gold or silver substances, pieces of money,
jewelry or precious articles," does not affect the inhibitiou
in both conventions against the importation by mail of articles liable to customs duty. Such of the enumerated articles
as are liable to customs duty are still prohibited from importation by mail. Their importation by mail being thus
prohibited is unlawful, and they are liable to seizure and forfeiture under section 3061, Revised Statutes ( Ootzhausen v.
Nazro, 107 U. S. 215).
I herewith return, as requested, the correspondence inclosed in your communication to me.
Respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.

The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

COLLECTOR'S BOND.
The omission of the words '' in the State of Vermont" from the official
bond of the collector of customs for the district of Vermont does not
impair its validity. The bond held to be valid, either under the statute or at common law.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 16, 1886.
SIR : Yours of September 14, 1886, received. You ask an
opinion as to whether the omission of the words " in the State
of Vermont'' from the official bond of Bradley B. Smalley,
collector of customs for the district of Vermont, impairs the
validity of the ·bond.
It was the intention, no doubt, to execute the bond accord. ing to the provisions of section 2619, Revised Statutes (19
Stat., 245). .
The first inquiry, then, is whether the omission would a:fl'ect
its validity as a statutory bond. The statute authorizing the
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execution of the bond is a directory one. A mistake occurred
in the form of an official bond of a paymaster, the conditions
of which were prescribed by a statute similar to the one now
under consideration, and in an opinion of the Supreme Court,
delivered by Mr. Justice Story (United States v. Bradley, 10
Pet., 365) it is said:
"It has been urged, however, in the present case, that the
act of 1816, chapter 69, does, by necessary implication, prohibit the taking of any bonds from paymasters, other than
those in the form prescribed by the sixth section of the act;
and therefore that bonds taken in any other form are utterly
void. We do not think so. The act merely prescribes the
form and purport of the bond to be taken of paymasters by
the War Department. It is in this respect directory to that
Department; and, doubtless, it would be illegal for that Department to insist upon a bond containing other provisions
and conditions difl'ering from those prescribed or required by
law. But the act has nowhere declared that all other bonds,
not taken in the prescribed form, shall be utterly void ; nor
does such an implication arise from any of the terms contained in the act., or· from any principles of public policy
which it is designed to promote. A bond may, by mutual
mistake or accident, and wholly without design, be take.n in
a form not prescribed by the act. It would be a very mischievous interpretation of the act to suppose that under such
circumstances it was the intendment of the act that the bond
should be utterly void. Nothing~ we think, but very strong'
and express language, should induce a court of justice to·
adopt such an interpretation. Where the act speaks out, it
would be our duty to follow it; where it is silent, it is a sufficient compliance with the policy of the act to declare the bond
void as to any conditions which are imposed upon a party
beyond what the law requires. This is not only the dictate
of the common law, but of common sense."
The above case has been frequently sustained by the Supreme Court, and was cited as the law in the case of Jessup
v. The United States (106 U. S., 151), where a number of the
decisions of the Supreme Court upon this question are reviewed. The decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the
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validity of bonds executed, under directory statutes, where
mistakes and omissions have occurred therein, are as follows:
Jessup v. United States (106 U.S., 147); Un-ited States Y. Mora
(97 U.S., 421); United States v. Bradley (10 Pet., 362); Brown
v. The United States (5 Pet., 372).
It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the
United States can make a contract in the absence of the authority of any statute. This being the case, the bond of
Smalley is good at common law. In the case of Jessup v.
The United States (106 U. S., 152), the court, after reviewing
the authorities, says:
" The authorities show that the United States can, without
the authority of any statute, make a valid contract, and that
when the form of a contract is prescribed by the statute, a
departure from its directions will not render the contract invalid. The bond is good at ,pommon law."
Other authorities sustain this doctrine, viz, United States
v. Mora (97 U.S, 421); United States v. Linn (15 Pet., 311);
United States v. Bradley (10 Pet., 343); United States v. Tingey
(5 Pet., 115).
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the omission of the words
as stated does not impair the validity of Smalley's bond as
collector, but that the bond is a valid one, either.'-under the
~tatute or at common law.
Respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney-General.
Hon. C. S. FAIRCHILD,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
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FREE LIST.
Where certain law reports, printed in th13 year 1i:l40-'41, were imported
into the United States in an unbound condition, the printed sheets
not being even stitched together: Held that they came within the
provision of the act of March 3, 18:33, chapter 121, exempting from
duty ''books * * * bound or unbound * * * which shall
have been been printed and manufactured more than twenty years
at the date of importation," and were therefore not dutiable.
DEP.A.RT~IENT OF JUSTICE,

September 16, 1886.
SIR: Yours of September 13, im;tant, has been duly considered.
The determination of the question presented depends
upon the construction of two paragraphs of the act of 1_\llarch
3, 1883, entitled "An act to reduce internal-revenue taxation,
and for other purposes." ( 22 Stat., 488.) The paragraph of
the act (ib., 510) which imposes the duty reads as follows:
"Books, pamphlets, bound or unbound, and all printed
matter, not. specifically enumerated or provided for in this
act, engravings, bound or unbound, etchings, illustrated
books, maps, and charts, twenty-five per centum ad valorem."
The other paragraph providing what articles of the same
character shaH be placed upon the free list and exempted
from duty reads as follows:
"Books, engravings, bound or unbound, etchings, maps·,
and charts, which shall have been printed and manufactured
more than twenty years at the date of importation." .
The articles imported in this instance are '• certain law
reports, printed in the years 1840 and 1841, but which are
imported into the United States in an unbound condition,
the printed sheets being neither sewed together nor bound."
The question is whether such imported goods are liable to
the ad valorem duty of 25 per centum as" printed matter"
or whether th~y are exempt as "Books * * * unbound
* ~ * which shall have been printed and manufactured
more than twenty years at the date of importation."
The imported law reports are printed matter not bound
into books, and dutiable, unless they are embraced in the
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free list. In order to be exempted they must therefore come
within the class of unbound books, which shall have been
printed more than twenty years at the date of importation.
It is admitted they were printed in 1840 and 1841, which
disposes of this branch of the question. The only question
remaining to be determined is, therefore, whether the
printed matter can be classed as unbound books, for if they
belong to this class they are exempt from duty. There is no
statutory definition of the word "book" in the United States
as there is in the English acts. And in the authorities the
courts have, in nearly every instance, been called upon to
define it in the copyright, -and not in the revenue statutes.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Mumford v. Wardell (6 Wall., 423 ), in passing upon the title
to real estate, where a deed was required to be registered or
recorded in some book in the recorder's office of the county,
held " that the term 'book ' was satisfied, within the meaning of the act, by copies of the deed on sheets, not bound or
fastened together in any manner, but folded, * * * the
sheets not being bound up in the form of books until1856,
•
when they were so bound."
The English courts have held that a single sheet of printed
matter, complete within itself, and unbound, is a book and
the American authorities have to some extent adopted this
doctrine. But these decisions, as stated before, relate to
~opyrights under the statutes.
They are Clayton v. Stone
( 2 Paine's C. C. Rep., 382); Stowe v. Thomas (:.! Am. Law
Register, 229); Clementi v. Golding ( 2 Campbell's N. P.
Rep., 39).
If the English courts have held a single printed sheet,
without binding, to be a book, under a statute in which the
word is used as it is in the one now under consideration,
and the American courts have adopted the doctrine, can it
be said in reason or common sense that a ·number of printed
sheets, properly paged, and ready for the bindery, is not an
unbound book and exempt under the revenue laws~ I think
not. This conclusion is entitled to additional force when
we take into consideration the fact that the exemption of
this class of goods from duty, under the condition named,
is a new feature in r~V"enue legislation, and appears in an
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act of Congress which declares its purpose to be a reduction
·o f taxation:
The statute imposing a duty on books, and the other items
mentioned, unless twenty years old at date of importation,
had for one of its objects, no doubt, the protection of copyrights in the United States, and for this reason the foreign
and American authorities cited above may be appropriately ·
used in reaching a conclusion herein.
I am of the opinion, ther_efore, that under the facts stated
in your communication the law reports are unbound books
which had been printed more than twenty years at the date
of importation, and therefore they are on the free list, and
exempt from the customs duty of twenty-five per cent. ad
valorem.
Respectfully,
G. A. JENKS~
Acting Attorney- General.
Hon. C. S. FAIR CHILD,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury .

•
MISSISSIPPI RIVER COMMISSION.
The salaries and \;raveling expenses of the members of the Mississippi
River Commission appointed from civil life (Congress having failed to
make a specific appropriation therefor) can not lawfully be defrayed
out of the fund provided for the Mississippi River improvement. The
application of such fund to that object would be inconsistent with
section 3678, Revised Statutes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 18, 1886.
SIR : l have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 3d instant, as follows :
" The river and harbor act of A11:gust 5, 1886, of which a
.copy is herewith inclosed, provides as follows :
" 'Improving Mississippi River from Head of the Passes to
the mouth of the Ohio River: Continuing improvement, two
million dollars, which sum shall be expended under the
direction of the Secretary of War, in accordance with the
plans, specifications, and recommendations of the Mississippi

•
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River Commission,' etc., and further provides, with reference
to the appropriation for deepening the channel at Vicksburg,
that this last-named sum shall not be expended, unless after
another examination or survey the Commission shall deem it
advisable.
''The sundry civil act of July 7, 1884, made provision
for the Mississippi River Commission as follows:
"'For salaries and traveling expenses of the Mississippi
River Commission, and for salaries and traveling expenses
of assistant engineers under them, and for office expenses
and contingencies, seventy-five thousand dollars.'
" Congress at its last session, though imposing continued
duties upon the Commission, as is above shown, failed to
make any provision for their salaries and other expenses, and
the question as to the means whereby such expenses may be
met is one involving important considerations, affecting, as
will be readily apparent, the whole work of improvement of
the Mississippi River.
" In thus briefly submitting the case, deeming it unnecessary to enlarge upon its importance, I have the honor to ask
that you will please favor this Department with an of>inion
whether, in view of the facts cited, the salaries and traveling
and other expenses of the Mississippi River Commission may
not properly be defrayed from the appropriation for the Mississippi River improvement, the appropriation made by the
actof July 7, 1884, as above quote(l, being wholly exhausted.
"It may be added that expenses incident to the improvement of rivers and harbors are uniformly paid from the
appropriation for the work of improvement, and that no specific appropriations for such expenses are made.
"In view of the importance of continuing the work, an
early reply is respectfully requested."
The :Mississippi River Commission was constituted by the
act of the 28th of June, 1879. (Sup. Rev. Stat., 496). By the
terms of the organic act it is composed of seven officers,
three of whom are selected from the Engineer Corps of the
Army, one fro.m the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and three
from civil life. The first four, who were selected from officers in the United States service, were to receive no additional salary; and $3,000 per annum was to be paid to those
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selected from civil life. The appointment of the members of
the Commission is made by the President, by and with tlle
advice and consent of the Senate. The Commission i~ permanent in its nature, and its constituent members are made
permanent officers of the Government. It is invested with
large powers and charged with important duties. Many
different appropriations are to be applied to the different
works which come under its supervision. The salaries and
expenses of such a body of permanent officers can not be all
charged up against one appropriation for one single improvement. The fact that by virtue of their offices they are required to perform certain duties with reference to such improvement will not sustain so broad an inference. In the
same section of the same act which imposes duties upon the
Commission duties are also imposed upon the Secretary of
War. If Congress had failed to appropriate for the salary
of the Secretary, it w.o nld not be seriously contended that
his salary ought to be paid out of this appropriation. If no
appropriation had been made for the salaries of the officers
oi the Engineer Corps or officers of the Coast and Geodetic
Survey, the appropriation under consideration could not be.
resorted to to pay their salaries. The present appropriation
is almost identical in terms with the two for the same purpose·
made by Congress in 1884. They were not considered by
Congress or the Department as embracing within their provisions the salaries and expenses of this Commission. On.
the contrary, Congress, after the passage of the two appropriation acts referred to, in 1884 (on the 7th of July of the
same year), passed an act specifically to provide for the salaries and expenses of the Commission. After the passage
of the act, on the 5th of August, 1886, in the House of Representatives, a joint resolution was offered and passed in the
Senate "for salaries and traveling expenses of the Mississippi River Commission, and for salaries and traveling expenses of assistant-engineers under them, and for office expenses and contingencies, one hundred thousand dollars.''
But, probably for want of time, the resolution was not
passed by the House of , Representatives.
In other departments of the Government, when there is a
failure to make appropriations for salaries and expenses of
273-VOL XVIII--30
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permanent officers, it has not been ~ermitted to pay their sal·
aries or expenses out of any appropriation made for any
other specific purpose. That failure has usually been supplied by the passage of a deficiency bill to meet the case.
There is no sufficient reason to sustain the view that the
intent of the legislative department in the passage of the act
under consideration was different from its intent in the passage of similar acts in the past, or that any new rule as to the
payment of permanent salaried officers was intended to be
inangura ted.
It would be inconsistent with section 3678 of the Revised
Statutes, which provides that "all sums appropriated .for
various branches of expenditure in the public service shall
be applied solely for the objects for which they are made
and no other," to appl,v the appropriation referred to in your
letter, or any part of it, t~ the payment of the salaries and
expenses cff the Mississippi River Commission.
Very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.

The

SECRETARY OF WAR.

DUTY ON IRON ORE.
In determining the meaning of "iron ore," as used in the provision of
t;he act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, which imposes a duty thereon,
regard should be had to the commercial signification of the term, as
Congress must be understood to have used the sam~ in its commercial
sense.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 17, 1886.
SIR: I have considered the subject contained in your letter, with inclosures, of the 14th of September, instant. You
state Messrs. l' Nailor & Co. now contend that the provision
in the tariff act of the 3rd of March, 1883, imposing a duty of
75 cents per ton upon iron ore, means ore dry at the temperature of212o, Fah., which, it is understood, is the test or stand- .
ard adopted in commercial transactions of iron ore." • • •
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I will thank you to return all the inclosures, with an expression of your opinion as to whether the provision in the tarifl'
act of the 3d of March, 1883, for iron ore should be construed
in the manner contended for b.Y the applicants to mean that
duty shall be assessed on the ore in a dry state."
The provision of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, imposing the duty, is ''Iron ore, including manganiferous iron ore,
also ~he dross or residuum from burnt pyrites, seventy-five
cents per ton." (22 Stat., 497.) By this a svecific duty of
75 cents per ton is charged on the importation of iron ore.
The inquiry involved in yours is substantially, What is the
legal meaning of iron ore, as used in the statute~ In the
interpretation of the customs laws Justice Story, in the case
of Two Hundred Chests of Tea (9 Wheat., 430), declares
•• Congress must be understood to use the word in its known
commercial sense." In the case of Barlow v. United States
(7 Pet., 404) he repeats, •' Congress must be presumed to
use words in their known habitual commercial sense." The
same rule for the definition of words has been reiterated in
numerous cases ever since, the latest of which is as late as
the case of Drew v Grinnell (115 U. S., 4 77). This is the rule
now. Whatever is the known commercial signification of
iron ore is that on which the duty is to be levied. If, as
stated in yours, "iron ore dried at a temperature of 212° Fah.,
which it is understood is the test or standard adopted in
commercial transactions of iron ore," be what is known in
commerce as iron ore, it is the. ore contemplated by the
statute, and on that basis the duty should be levied.
I return herewith the inclosures which accompanied your
letter.
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney-General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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COVERINGS OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE.
Sacks, boxes, or coverings of any kind, the duty on which as charges
was repealed by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, are
not subject to duty, eit.her separately from or as a part of the value o!
the goods imported therein, excepting where they come nnuer the
proviso in that section or fall within some special provision of law.
The 1 0 per centum ad valorem, mentioned in said proviso, can be imposed upon sacks, boxes, or other coverings of imported merchandise
only where their material or form justifies the conclusion that they
were used as coverings to evade duties, or where they were designed
or contemplated to be applied 'to some use other than that of coverings for imported merchandise, even though their use as coverings
only should continue after the goods had passed beyond the customhom;;e to the market or consumer.
The mere fact that the boxes, sacks, etc., are, after importation, put to
other uses, if such uses were not designed at or before the time of importation, and if there was no design to evade duty in using them as
coverings, will not subject them to the 100 per centum ad valorem
duty.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 17, 1886.
SIR: Your communication of the 2d instant submits for
consideration four subjects :
First : As sacks, boxes, and other receptacles which are
ordinarily used in the importation of merchandise wt':mld, if
imported separately, be dutiable under the respective provisions of the tariff applicable thereto, the question presents
itself whether they lose their dutiable character by being
filled with or used for the transportation of such goods.
Second: In the case of Oberteuffer v. Robertson, No.1192,
of October term, 1885, in the Supreme Court, in considering
the seventh section of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, the
following language is used: "This implied that if boxes or
coverings of any kind are not of material qr form designed
to evade the duties thereon, and are tiesigned to be used in
the bona fide transportation of the goods to the United
States, they are not subject to duty." With reference to which
you state" I will thank you for an expression of your opinion as to whether the 8tatement of the Supreme Court, that
such coverings are not subject to duty, should be considered
as mere dictum, used in the process of argument, or as an
authoritative expression of the views of the court."
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Third: "The further provision in said section;, by which
a duty of 100 per cent. ad valorem is authorized in certain
cases, as above referred to, is also submitted for your consideration."
Fourth. "The question of the proper interpretation of the
proviso in section 7 is also' submitted for your consideration."
The solution of the questions submitted depends upon the
true interpretation of the 7th section of 'the act of the 3d of
March, 1883.
That section provides: " That sections 2907 and 2908 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, and section 14 of the
act entitled "An act to amend the customs revenue laws and
to repeal moieties," approved June 22,1874, be and the same
are hereby repealed, and hereafter none of the charges imposed bv said sections, or any other provisions of existing
laws, shall be estimated in ascertaining the value of goods to
be imported, nor shall the value of the usual allll necessary
sacks, crates, boxes, or co-verings of any kind be estimated
as part of their value in determining the amount of duties
for which they are liable: Provided, That if any packages,
sacks, crates, boxes, or coverings of any kind shall be of any
material or form designed to eYade duties thereon, or designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of goods to the United States, the same shall be subject
to a duty of one hundred per centum ad valorem upon the
actual value of the same." By this section, whatever in sections 2907 and 2908 of the Revised Statutes and the fourteenth section of the act of June 22, 1874, was included as
charges is excluded from the estimate in fixing the dutiable
value of the goods to be imported. The three sections repealed by the section 'embrace as charges " the cost of transportation, shipment, and transshipment, with all expenses
included, from the place of growth, production, or manufacture, whether by land or water, to the vessel in which shipment is made to the United States, the value of the sack,
box, or covering of any kind in which merchandise is contained, commission at the usual rate, but in no case less than
two and one-half per centum, and brokerage, export duties,
and all other actual or usual charges for putting, preparing,
and packing for transportation or shipment." When these
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~barges

are excluded the goods to be imported are left to be
valued "at the actual market value or wholesale price
thereof at the period of the exportation to the United States,
in the principal markets of the country from which the same
has been exported." Taken in connection with the provisions of section 2906, Revised Statutes, which remains unrepealed, the effect of section 7 of the act of the 3d of March,
1883, is to make the dutiable value the same as '' the actual
market value or wholesale price" in the principal markets of
the country from which the goods were exported at the time
of the exportation Hence, the market value of the goods to
be imported, as above stated, as the law now stands, is identical with the dutiable value. Nor can any of the charges
above stated be added to that value for the purpose of charging duties thereon. Sacks, boxes, and coverings of any kind
in which merchandise is contained are embraced among the
charges which are not to be included with the value of the
goods.
As the statute in the broadest terms excludes all these,
it is not permissible to add to its terms either the words
':inside" or ~'outside." The exemvtion extends alike and
with equal force to both inside and outside sacks, boxes, or
coverings of merchandise. But the same sacks, boxes, or
coverings, if imported separately, would be subject to duty.
The inquiry arises whether each is not to be charged with a
duty when used as a covering to other dutiable merchandise
as though separately imported~ Did the legislative power
so intend it~ The revenue act of 1883, of which section 7 is
a part, was intended to reduce the revenue of the Government, which had become excessive. To reduce taxation on
imports was the means adopted. The increased dutiable
value of the importations occasioned by adding the value of ·
the coverings, etc., urider section 2907, if stricken off entirely,
would be a large reduction, but if the C.J\·erings were only to
be separated, for purposes of duty, from the value of the
goods, and then taxed at separate rates, whether such ' a
measure would increase or diminish the actual tax would be
very uncertain. It is unlikely Congress would intend a
reduction and pass an act which was subject to :guch uncertainty as to results. Simplicity in administration is an im-
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portant element of a judicious tax bill. The collection of
duties under section 2907, which was repealed, would be more
easily administered than under the act of 1883, if the duties
on the coverings were only intended to be charges as to rates
and be levied. The coverings were not by former laws subject to taxation except as charges on the goods imported;
yet under the former law they would have been liable to taxation if separately imported. The mere repeal of the charge
cannot be considered as an enactment of a duty on that which
before the repeal would not have been subject to duty. The
proviso to the section under consideration suggests beyond
mistake that a separate levy of the duty repealed was not
contemplated by Oougress. That proviso is, "that if any
packages, sacks, crates, boxeR, or coverings of any kind shall
be of any material or form designed to evade duties thereon, or
designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of goods to the United States, the same shall be subject
to a duty of one hundred per eeutum ad valorem upon the
actual value of the same." If the same tax was intended to
be imposed upon a given article, whether it was used as a
covering for other goods . or imported separately, it is not
possible that Congress would have imposed a penalty for an
evasion which, under such an interpretation of the law, could
not occur; but if, when used as a covering, it came in free
from duty, and when separately imported it was subject to
duty, then there would be a temptation for a colorable and
fraudulent use as a covering in order to evade duty. The
proviso was intended to prevent such an evasion. That the
charges repealed by this section are not subject to a separate
tax is distinctly ruled in the case of Oberteuffer v. Robertson
in the fo1lowing language, as quoted in your letter: ''This
implies that if the boxes or coverings of any kind are not of
a material or form designed to evade duties thereon, and are
designed to be used in the bona fide transportation of the
goods to the United States, they are not subject to duty."
That this is not dictum is well established by the fact that
it is a distinct answer to what the court in the opening of the
opinion says is the main point in the case, as follows: "The
main question left in the case is, whether it was lawful to impose duties on the items for boxes and packing in the invoices
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on the two cases and the twenty~one cases and on the items
added to the invoices of the one case, which item was one
for like boxes and packing."
The brief submitted in the case b;r Solicitor-General Goode
on part of the Govtrnment declares: "It will be seen that
the plaintiffs' protest stated substantially but a single grounfl.
of objection to the collector's liquidation, which was that the
cartons were not liable to d,uty." The court agaiu, after a discussion of an objection raised by the Solicitor-General that
the plaintiff's in the case had mistaken their remedy, in that
they had not demanded a reappraisement under section
2930, rules the objection not well founded, and concludes the
discussion of that branch of the subject by saying: " The
exaction of the duty on the packing, whether packing goods
in a carton or the customs in the outer case, or lining the
outer case, was not warranted by law."
Hence it would seem the very subject was distinctly before
the court, considered by it as flssential to a proper decision
of the case, was formally ruled upon, and thus became an
authoritative interpretation of the section undeT consideration.
But while section 7 does not permit a separate assessment of the boxes, coYerings, etc., nor an assessment as part
of the value of the goods, in order that this freedom from
duty may not be fraudulently or wrongfully used to import
dtitiable goods free, the proviso to the section was added,
b;y which a penalty of one hundreu per centum ad valorem
is imposed whenever such aJJ. evasion is attempted. This
penalty is only incurred, first, when the coverings, etc.,
''shall be of any material or form designed to evade duties
thereon ; " second, when " designed for use otherwise tllan in
the bona fide transportation of the goods to the United
States." The first cause for the imposition of the penalty
commits to the officer charged with the administration of
the law the duty of determining from the character, value,
form, and material, whether the purpose and design of the
covering was an evasion of duty or a good faith covering.
If the covering in either material or form is unusual, and
dutiable under other provisions of law, he is allowed to infer,
when its character is thus extraordinary, that evasion is
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designed. The second ground for the imposition of the penalty requires the officer to determine whether the CO\ering
was designed, at the time of its application to that use, to
be used again for the same, or some other use of substantial
commercial value, for which, if separately imported, it would
be subject to duty, or whether its utility will be substantially
exhausted as soon as it shall have subserved the use to which
as a covering it is then devoted. In the former event the
penalty of 100 per centum should be collected. In the latter
it should not. The mere fact that it is continued after importation as a co\ering for the same merchandise calls for
no penalty. The law does not contemplate that as soon as
the merchandise reaches the port and pays the duty it shall
then be denuded, and new covering, either inside or outside,
be v.rovided to protect it either in handling or sale ; neither
is there any time or place after the importation that the same
covering, used for the same merchandise as covering, from
which or in which to make sale of the merchandise, would
show that it was designed for use for importation, so as to
subject the covering to a duty at the rate imposed as a penalty in the proviso; nor would the fact that a box might,
possibly, afterwards be used for fuel, or the covering for
some other use, subject the box or covering to a penalty,
unless there is reason to believe such use was des-igned and
contemplated at or before the time of importation.
From this general consideration of the subject the conclusions follow(1) That the sacks, boxes, and coverings of any kind the
duty on which was repealed as charges b)~ the seventh section of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, are not subject to
duty, neither as a part of the value of the goods nor sepa:
rately, except when they come under the proviso to that section, or some special provision of law.
(2) That the portion of the opinion in the case of Oberteuffer
v. Robertson, quoted in your letter, is not dictum, but an authoritative interpretation of the law on the subject referred
to therein.
(=3) That the 100 per centum ad valorem can be imposed
upon coverings onl~- when their material or form justifies the
conclusion that they were used as such to evade duties, or
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when they were des.igned or contemplated to be applied to some
use other than to that of coverings for transportation to tlte
United States of the merchandise they then inclose, evl'n
though that use as a covering only should continue after the
goods bad passed beyond the custom-house to the market or
COnE~umer.

(4) The mere fact that the boxes, sacks, crates, or coverings of any kind might possibly be used after importation for
other uses, if such u8es were not designed at or before the
time of importation, and there was not at the time a design
to evade duty by their use as coverings, will not subject such
coverings to the 100 per centum ad valorem duty prescribed
as a penalty.
The 100 per centum duty in the proviso, although not in
terms a penalty, is an unusually high duty.
The section under consideration clearly excludes the coverings from valuation as a part of the goods.
The second element in the proviso to the section implies
no turpitude on part of the importer.
In balanced cases in a customs act the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the importer.
Hence, although the coverings after the port is reached
might by a liberal interpretation be construed, if intended
for use t,hereafter as a cover to the same goods, to be designed" for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation
of goods to the United States," yet such an interpretation,
while within the letter, would be a violation of the spirit of
the act.
The inclosures transmitted with yours are herewith returned.
I am, sir, respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting A. ttorney- General.
The SECRETARY
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CUSTOMS DUTIES.
The proper classifications for duty of cert.ain articles of imported merchandise, consisting of T beams, girders, joists, columns, posts, and
other manufactures of iron used in the construction of buildings, considered.
·
DEP ARMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 22, 1886.
By your letter of the 16th of September instant it
appears that Joseph Birtwell & Company entered at the
custom-house at Galveston Hsix hundred and ninety-six plain
iron beams, eight hundred and twenty-six pieces, boxes, and
bundles manufactured iron, and one hundred and two riveted lattices, manufactured iron; that, upon examination by
the customs-officers, it was found to consist ofT-beams, girders, plain and flanged at the ends and sides; bundles of strutting rods, threaded on the ends, with nuts on; bundles of anchor and brace plates and fish-plates, and fifteen boxes, containing bolts, nuts, and braces; wher~upon the same were
classified by the collector under the provision in the existing
tariff Scheuule... 0 tariff index, new 178, for ''iron or steel
beams, girders, joists, angles, * * • building forms, etc.\
and other structural shapes of iron and steel," at a duty of 1:!
cents per pound ; that the importers in their appeal claimed
that importation was a floor frame, and dutiable as an entirety, as a" manufacture of iron," at a duty of 45 per cent.
ad valorem, under the further provision in said Schedule C
(Tariff Index, new 216); and that the decision of the Department sustained the classification made by the collector."
After the above recital of facts you state : " I will thank
you to consider the matter, and to advise me at your early
convenience as to what, in your opinion, should be the proper
classification of such merchandise under the existing tariff
acts."
The collector classified the T- beams, girders, etc., under
tariff index, new 178, which provides: •' Iron or steel beams,
girders, joists, angles, channels, car-truck channels, TT columns and posts, or parts or Rections of columns and posts,
deck and bulb beams, and building forms, together with an
other st.r uctural shapes of iron or steel, one and one-fourth of
one cent per pound."
SIR :
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The other articles in the entry he classified under the appropriate provisions of the tariff act specially applicable to
each.
The importers maintain that all the articles should be
treated as an entirety, because when put together they wonl<l
constitute a floor-frame for one or more floors of an edifiee ·
they were erecting as a State-house, and that they all cou stituted a manufacture under the provisions of tariff index
new 216, which provides: "Manufactures, articles, or wares
not specially enumerated or provi<led for in this act, composed wholly or in part of iron, steel, copper, lead, nickel,
pewter, tin, zinc, gold, silver, platinum, or any other metal,
and whether partly or wholly manufactured, forty five per
centum ad valorem."
Unless they are relieved from the special provisions of the
tariff act applicable to each of the articles imported by the
operation of the section last quoted, the classification of' the
collector is right. If they are not to be treated as an entirety as a manufacture, they are severally beams, girders,
etc., and are substantially enumerated in the act.
In its broadest sense a manufacture includes whatever is
made by the hand of man, or by machinery subject to his
hand. In this sense edifices, building, railroads, and structures of all kinds would be comprehended. The rule was
not intended to be used by the legislature in this . broad
sense. It is used in the general clam;e at the conclusion of
a schedule in which enumeration and specification was the
plan. Only such works of man as were too unimportant to
warrant specification, or such as were so uncommon as to escape the attention of the legislat'ure, were intended to be
embraced by it. The iron floor frames in the United States
would be neither unimportant nor unusual. In the magnitude of their value or frequency of use nothing enumerated
in the bill has been more conspicuous, or, if they were to be
dutiable as an entirety, would be less likely to be omitted
in the enumeration. The inference is strong that they were
not intended to be charged as an entirety. At the time of
importation they were not an entirety. 'Vhat merchandise
is at the time of importation is what classifies it for duty;
not what it has been before, or what it may be in the future.
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The girders, beams, etc., in this case were not a floor frame.
They were only the prepared material for a floor frame.
Until actually put together at their final destination the
material was not a frame. When so put together it would
be a structure and not a manufacture. It would be realty,
such as is not appropriately the subject of the customs laws.
If all the rails, frogs, fish- plates, etc., that constitute the
material for a railroad track were fully finished for laying
in a foreign country it would not justify their admission as a
railroad track under this clause, yet such an importation
would be as much an entirety as this and as properly a manufacture. It is an unnatural stress on language to call the
iron frame of a large ~tate-house or the track of a railroad a
manufacture in a customs law, and I am constrained to believe the legislature did not so intend. Besides, this general clause to Schedule C was only to apply to manufactures
"not Sllecially enumerated or provided for in this act." Iron
"girders, beams, nuts, bolts, with an other structural shapes
of iron" are enumerated and specially provided for. " Stru()tural iron " is naturally interpreted to mean iron ada~Jted to
and prepared for use in a building. The importation in this
case would seem to be just such material, and therefore specified and enumerated. Hence it is concluded that the importation in this case should not be classified as an entirety
as a manufacture, but its several parts should be classified
under such several specific provisions of the act as are applicable to each class of merchandise in the entry.
The documents which yours inclosed are, as requested,
I
herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorneg- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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DUTY ON GINGER ALE OR BEER.
Under the clause in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, providing a
duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem on ginger-ale or ginger-beer, etc., no
separate or additional duty is to be collected on bottles or jugs containing the same. But where the ale or beer is bottled, the ad valorem
duty should be levied upon the wholesale value thereof as bottled ale
or beer in the general market of the country whence ,it is imported.
DEPA.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Reptember 24, 1886.
SIR: Your letter of the 11th of September instant was received, and the subject submitted in it has been considered.
The inquiry for determination is substantially what is the
interpretation to be put upon the last paragraph in Schedule
H of the tariff act of the 3d of March, 1883, which is, "Gingerale or ginger-beer, twenty per cent. ad valorem, but no separate or additional duty shall be collected on bottles or jugs
containing the same."
This enactment embraces two different clauses. The first
fixes the duty that is to be charged on ginger-ale or gingerbeer, which is 20 per cent. ad valorem. The rule for det~r
mining the value is found in section 2906 of the Revised
Statutes, and is " the actual market value or wholesale price
ther~of at the period of exportation to the United States in
the principal markets of the country from which the same
has been imported"; but the second clause of the paragraph,
fixing the duty on ginger-ale or ginger-beer, implies that the
importation, either from its nature or from mercantile usage,
must or will be in bottles or jugs, but provides "no separate
or additional duty shall be collected on bottles or jugs containing the same." This clause forbids the charging of a duty
separately on the bottle or jug, or the addition of the value
of the bottle or jug to the value of the ale or beer, and
thereby obtaining an aggregate value of both, and levying
the 20 per cent. ad valorem on this aggregate value. But it
does not forbid levying duty upon the full wholesale market
value of the ale or beer as bottled ginger ale or beer, as valued in the market, if from the constituent ingredients of the
import it derives its principal and almost sole value from its
compression and the exclusion of the air from it by the bottling. This distinction between the value of a liquor unbot-
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tled and bottled finds au illustration in a preeeding paragraph of the same act in the article of still wines, in which a
specific duty of 50 cents a gallon is imposed on the wine when
in casks and $1.60 per dozen in bottles, being 53! cents per
gallon when bottled, in which paragraph precisely the same
provision occurs as in the paragraph relating to ginger-ale
and ginger-beer, that ''no separate or additional duty shall
be collected on the bottles."
If, then, the-re is a difference between ginger ale or beer
bottled and unbottled in the market value at the wholesale
price in the general market of the country whence it is imported, it should be appraised at such value as is applicable
under the facts as bottled or unf>ottled.
I return the inclosures received with this.
I am, very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

COVERINGS OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE.
Certain boxes or cases containing zithers, piccolos, cornets, trial glasses,
etc., used as coverings for such instruments, held not subject to the
100 per cent. ad valorem duty prescribed in the proviso of section 7 of
the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 27, 1886.
SIR: In your communication of the 24th of September
instant you state :
"Referring to the letter of the Acting Attorney-General,
dated the 17th instant, in relation to the construction of
section 7, act of March 3, 1883, I have the honor to inform
you that under date of June 3, 1886, (Synopsis 7553, herewith
inclosed), the Department decided that certain boxes or cases
containing zithers, piccolos, cornets, and trial glasses were
subject to (luty at the rate of 100 per cent. ad valorem under
the proviso to said section.
" The boxes containing the zithers were described as
wooden boxes, lined with cotton plush; those containing the

•

480

HON. G. A. JENKS
Coverings of Imported Merchandise.

piccolos and cornets as wooden boxes covered with leather,
and lined with cotton plush; and those containing the trial
glasses as wooden boxes, covered with leather, with a glass
top, and lined with silk plush.
"These boxes conform in shape to, and are specially made
as permanent receptacles for, the various instruments imported in them, and in some cases are held for sale as sepa·
rate commodities, both the instruments and the boxes being ,
imported separately or together.
''The Department held that the boxes were dutiable at
the rate aforesaid because they were designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of goods to the
United States.
"Similar decisions have been made in relation to leather
and wooden cases for opera and marine glasses and telescopes; leather cases for pipes, razor· cases, and violin boxes,
which are similar in character and uses to those above described, as are also the cases cOt1taining flutes, clarionets,
and a great variety of other instruments and articles.
"In view of the provisions in section 2, act of March 3~
1875 (18 Stat., 469,) I will thank you for an expression of
your views as to the correctness of such assessments of
duty."
The several coverings referred to in yours were clearly not
intended to evade duty, as they are the usual and ordinary
coverings for such instruments. Although they may be
intended for coverings for the same after they shall have
been imported, there is no reason to believe they were designed for any further use or for sale separately as commodities. Hence, for the reasons set forth in the opinion
transmitted to your Department on the 17th instant, the
boxes and coverings referred to in yours are not subject to
the 100 per cent. duty ad valorem prescribed in the proviso
to the seventh section of the act of March 3, 1883.
Very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney· General..
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY•
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MONONGAHELA RIVER IMPROVEMENT.
The clause in the provision of the act of August 5, 1B8n, chapter 929, making an appropriation for the improvement of the Monongahela River,
which declares that "no charges or tolls shall be collected on any other
part of the river on any commerce on said river which originates above
the works herein appropriated for," does not impose any condition affecting the expenditure of the appropria,tion. There is nothing in its
language which requires the assent thereto of any person, company, or
corporation claiming a right to collect charges or tolls, or the relinquishment by any person, company, or corporation of such right, before
the money appropriated can become available for expenditure.
DJ!;P.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 27, 1886.
SIR : Your letter of the 15th ultimo, calling attention to the
appropriation made by the river and harbor act of AugutSt 5,
1886, for the improvement of the Monongahela River, informs
me that that river is being improved for slack-water navigation, and that the lock for the construction of which the said
,appropriation is made is the eighth in order from Pittsburgll;
that the other seven have been built and are now owned and
controlled by the Monongahela Navigation Company; which,
it is understood, is a company organized by charter from the
State of Pennsylvania, by which it is authorized to build locks·
and dams and operate slack-water navigation on the Mononga.
bela River from Pittsburgh to the Pennsylvania State line,
and to collect tolls on all commerce passing through its locks."·
You add : " Lock ~ o. 9, already built by the United States,,
is in West Virginia, and Lock No. 8, now in course of con-·
struction, is in Pennsylvania, but the pool above it is partly
in West Virginia, and both locks are above those of theN a vigation Company. The commerce originating above Lock No.
8 goes mainly to Pittsburgh for its market, and must therefore pass through all the locks of the Navigation Company,
and this commerce is understood to have hitherto paid full
tolls to the said company."
The provision in said act making the appropriation referred
to reads as follows :
''Improving Monongahela River, Pennsylvania and West
Virginia: Continuing improvement, ninety thousand nine
hundred dollars; uut no charges or tolls shall be collected
on any other part of the rhrer on any commerce on sai~river
which originates above the works herein appropriated for.'"
273-VOL xvni--31
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In -view of the clause in this provision which prohibits the
collection of charges or tolls a8 there descriued., you inquire
"whether or not the formal assent of the Monongahela Navigation Company to such clause is necessary before the mouey
appropriated can become available for expenditure."
While the clause above mentioned clearly forbids the collection of charges or tolls by the Monongahela Navigation
Oompany on any commerce on the Monongahela Ri\Ter which
originates above Lock No.8, it can uot, I think, fairly be construed to impose any condition affecting the expenditure of .
the appropriation such as is contained in your inquiry.
There is nothing in the language of the clause which requires
the assent thereto of any person, cog1pany, or corporation
claiming a right to collect charges or tolls, ·or the relinquishment by ans person, company, or corporation of such right
before the appropriation can be expended. Where Congress
has thought it proper to annex conditions of this sort to appropriations for similar objects, terms have been made use of
plainly indicative of its purpose so to do. See, for instance,
the appropriation in said act for improving Little Kanawha
River; also the appropriation for same river in acts of August 2, 1882, chapter 375, and July 5, 1884, chapter 229; also
the appropriation for improving the Monongahela River made
by act of Marcll 3, 1881, chapter 136. The instances here
'Oited, to which others might be added, wanant the conclusion that had Congress intended to make the expenditure of
the appropriation in the act. of August 5, 1886, conditional,
dependent upon the assent of the Monongahela Navigation
Company to the cLmse prohibiting the collection of charges
or tolls, or upon the relinquishment thereby of the right to
collect tolls or charges, it would have manifested its intent
so to do in terms sufficiently cl~ar and precise to leave no
doubt upon the subject. As the provision now stands, I am
of the opinion that neither such assent nor such relinquishment by that company is necessary before the money appropriated can become available for expenditure.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
, Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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COVERINGS OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE.
T1n cans containing French peas, prepared meats, :fish, fruit, vegetables,
and milk food-being neither of material nor form rlesigned to evade
the duties thereon, nor designed for use otherwise than in the bona
:fide transportation of goods to the United States-are not subject to
the 100 per cent: ad valorem duty prescribed by the proviso to the
seventh section of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

September 27, 1886.
SIR: I received yours of the 23d of September, instant, in

which you state :
''I have to inform you that under date of June 25, 1886,
the Department decided that tin cans containing French peas
were subject to duty at the rate of 100 per cent. ad valorem
under the proviso of section 7, act of March 3, 1883. • * *
In view of the provisions of .section 2, act of .March 3, 1875
(18 Stat., 469), I will thank you to inform the Department
whether such tin cans and similar tin cans containing prepared meats, :fish, fruit, and vegetables and milk food are
properly dutiable at the rate of 100 per cent. ad valorem."
The cans referred to in yours are neither of material nor
form designed to evade the duties thereon, nor are they designed for use otherwise than in the bona :fide transportation of goods to the United States, except as a covering to
the very goods imported, after which they are not adapted to
any further or additional use. In accordance with the views
expressed in a letter transmitted to your Department on the
17th instant, the ca:ns would not be subject to the 100 per
cent. ad valorem duty prescribed by the proviso to the
seventh section of the act of the 3d of March, 1883.
The inclosure referred with yours is herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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PUBLIC BUILDING SITE IN WILLIAMSPORT, PA.
Title to the additional ground authorized to be purchased by the act of
July 10, 1886, chapter 761, for the site of a public building to be erected
in Williamsport, Pa., may be acquired by the institution of condemnation proceedings under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, in case
no agreement for the purchase thereof can be made with the owner.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 2, 1886.
SIR: Your letter of the 23d ultimo calls attention to the
act of August 3, 1882, chapter 381, providing for the purchase of a site for a public building to be erected in the
city of Williamsport, Pa., and to the act of July 10, 1886,
amendatory thereof, wherein authority is given the Secretary
of the Treasury to purchase additional ground for said site,
and requests my opinion upon the question whether title to
such additional ground may be acquired by condemnation
proceedings instituted under the laws of the State of'Pennsylvania.
In connection with this question, and along with the above
acts, may properly be considered the act of August 7, 1882,
chapter 433, which made an appropriation for the purchase
of said site, and authorized the Secretary of the Treasury
. '"to acquire by private purchase or condemnation the necessary lands for the public buildings and the light-houses to
be constructed, and for which money is appropriated by this
act."
By the act of the Pennsylvania legislature of June 8,
1874 (Laws of Pa., 1874, 280), a mode is provided by wh\ch
the title to all estates and interests in lands in that State
may be vested in the United States, for any public use or
purpose whatever, when no agreement can be made with the
owners of the same for the purchase thereof; and by another
act of the same legislature, dated February 13, 1883 (Laws of
Pa., 1883, 1), the consent of the State is given ''to the acquisition by the United States by purchase, by condemnation, or by lawful appropriation, under the right of eminent
domain, under the laws of this State or of the United States,
of one or more lots or pieces of land situated in the city of
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Williamsport, not exceeding in quantity two acres, on which
to erect a court-house, post-office, and other Government
buildings and appurtenances," etc. Under this legislation
proceedings to condemn, where no agreement for a purchase
can be made with the owner, may be instituted on behalf of
the U niteq States in the proper State court, and title acquired through the eminent domain power of the State.
It would seem that power 'to condemn the additional ground
needed for the site of the public building at Williamsport is
expressly granted by the act of August 7, 1882, cited above.
However, irrespective of the provisions of that act, the authority ''to purchase" given by the act of JulY. 10, 1886
(although it might not alone be sufficient for invoking the
eminent domain power of the United States), may properly be
taken to warrant the· acquisition of the land in any mode
which is in conformity to the laws of the State wherein the
property is situated; and hence where, by the laws of the
State, the land may be condemned and title thereto acquired
under its en;linent domain power, recourse may be had as well
to this mode of acquisition as to any other under the authority conferred by the last mentioned act. (See opinion of
Jan nary 27, 1886.)
I am accordingly of the opinion that title to the additional
ground authorized to be purchased by the act of 1S86, in case
no ag~eement for the purchase thereof can be made with the
owner, may be acquired by the institution of condemnation
proceedings under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania,
assuming that the limit of two acres, as above, will not be
exceeded.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY OF 1.'HE TREASURY.
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INDIAN LEASES .

.Advised that certain mining .leases made by citizens of the Choctaw nation of Indians, in the Indian Territory, and the Osage Coal and Mining Company, a Missouri corporation, for the mining of coal, etc., in
said territory, are not such as may properly receive the approval of the
Secretary ofthe Interior under existing laws.
The inhibition contained in section 2116, Revised Statutes, has the same
application to individual Indians that it has to Indian nations and
tribes.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October_ 14, 1886.
SIR: Yours of the 8th instant is received. You transmit

a report of the Commissioner of India·n Affairs relating t(}
agreements made between citizens of the Choctaw nation of
Indians in the Indian Territory, and the Osage Coal and Mining Company, a corporation of the State of Missouri, for the
mining of coal, etc., in said nation. One of the agreements
is inclosed. An opinion is requested as to whether these
agreements are such as may properly receive the approval of
the Department of the Interior under existing laws.
A similar question arose heretoforb as to the authority of
the Interior Department to approve leases of land for grazing
purposes, entered into by the Indians of the Cherokee, Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Kiowa, and Comanche tribes in their respective reservations in the Indian Territory. The question
of the power of the Department of the Interior to authorize
leases to be made for grazing purposes was submitted t()
the Attorney-General, and in his opinion of 21st July, 1885,
it is said:
" I submit that the power of the Department to authorize
such leases to be made, or that of the President or the Secretary to approve or to make the same, if it exists at all, must
rest upon some law, and therefore be derived from either a
treaty or statutory provision. I am not aware of any treaty
provision applicable to the particular reservations in question that confers such powers. The Revised Statutes contain provisions regulating contracts or agreements with
Indiam:! and prescribing how they shall be executed and
approved (see sec. 2103 ;) but those provisions do not include
contracts of the character described in section 2116, herein-
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before mentioned. No general power appears to be conferred
by statute upon either the President or Secretary, or any
other officer of the Government, to make, authorize, or approve leases of lands held by Indian tribes; and the absence
of such power was doubtless one of the main considerations
which led to the adoption of the act of February 19, 1875,
chapter 90, 'to authorize the Seneca nation of New York Indians to lease lands within the Cattaraugus and Allegany reservations and to confirm existing leases.' The act just cited
is moreover significant as showing that, in the view of Congress, Indian tribes can not lease their reservations without
the authority of some law of the United States."
No laws have been enacted by Congress upon the subject
since the publication of the above opinion. The law has not,
therefore, conferred any express power upon the President or
Secretary to approve the mining leases referred to, and no
1
such authority can be implied.
Upon an examination of the statutes and treaties, I feel
_justified in coming to the conclusion that it was the intention
of Congress that the inhibition contained in section 2116, Revised Statutes, should have the same appliction to individual
Indians that it has to the Indian nations and tribes.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the mining leases referred to are not such as may properly receive the approval
of the Department of the Interior under existing laws.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

ATTORNEY-GENER.A.L.
Where a request is made for au opinion of the Attorney-General on
questions of law a~ising in any case, it should be accompanied by a.
st,atement of the facts of the case as well as of the questions on which
advice is desired. The Attorney-General can not undertake to find
and settle the facts from papers that may be submitted.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

..
October 14, 1887.
SIR: With every disposition to comply with the request
for an opinion contained in your communication of the 5th
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of October instant, which has been referred to me for action
by the Attorney-General as a matter upon which he does
not feel that be can properly pass, I am constrained to say
that before the Department can act upon the subject sulJmitted it must be provided with a statement of the actual
facts as they appear to you on consideration of the case as it
arises in the a<lministration of your Department. And as
the law requires that the case presented for opinion should
be settled by you, it is out of my power to substitute for a
case so settled the letter of Senator Call and the somewhat
voluminous papers transmitted with it by you, namely, the
speech of that Senator, the answer of 0. W. Holcomb, e~q.,
attorney for the Florida Railway and Navigation Company,
the charter of said company, a copy of the decision of your
Department of August 30, 1886, and Senate Executive Document No. 91; papers and documents which, instead of having the qualities of unity and harmony among themselves,
present questions of fact for solution as well as questions of
law. ·
It is, for example, impossible for me to give an opinion
upon the suuject submitted until you determine what the
fact is as to the alleged location of its route by the Florida
Railroad Company and the time of that location, which,
besides being cardinal facts in the case, are earnestly controverted.
It must, I conceive, be deemed settled that the AttorneyGeneral can only act on a determinate statement of facts
furnished by the officer asking his opiuion. (10 Opin., 267;
11 Opin., 189.) "Where," says Mr. Attorney-General Stanbery, ''a question of law arises upon facts submitted to the
Attorney General, · stwh facts must be agreed and stated as
facts established." ( 12 Opin., 205.)
.
Said Mr. Attorney-General Williams upon the same point:
"I deem it proper here to remind yon, that where an official
opinion from the head of this Department is desired on
questions of law arising on any case the requeRt should be
accompanied by a statement of the material facts of the
case, and also the precise queRtions on which advice is
wanted. By the observance of this simple rule the real
point of difficulty in the case will be at once perceived,
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much inconvenience avoided, and more practicable and satisfactory result~ obtained." (14 Opin., 367, 368.)
I hope it will appear as clearly to your mind as it does to
mine that if I am to find the facts in this important landgr<.mt case I can only do so after a trial, and, conse~uently,
after giving all interests adverse to those of the settlers on
the land in controversy an opportunity to adduce evidence
before me, which I have no power to do, for the law expressly
confines the duty of the Attorney-General to giving opinions
-on questions of law. (Rev. Stat., sec. 354-356.)
I am ~ure that these considerations will be sufficient to
.s atisfy you that it is nothing more than simple justice to the
railroad company and other parties claiming or in any way
interested in the land that I should decline to settle the
facts on a presentation ex parte, and then proceed to give an
opinion upon them.
As this action of mine does not defeat, but only delays, the
attainment of the object of your communication, I feel that
it is better to produce that inconvenience than to run the
risk of doing injustice by giving an opinion without a case
autheutieally stated and a specification of the points of law
arising upon that case·.
,
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
G. A. JENKS,
Acting Attorney- General.
The SECRETARY 0}1' THE INTERIOR.

OLEOMARGARINE.
The various simple and compound substances mentioned in section 2 of
the act of August 2, 1886, chapter 840, must be "made in imitation or
semblance of butter, or, when so made, calculated or intended to be
sold as butter or for butter," before any of them can be regarded as
taxable under that act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

October 18, 1886.
Your communication of the 2d October instant submits for opinion the question whether or not the various
simple and compound substances mentioned in the second
SIR:
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·s ection of the act of the 2d ~t\..ugust, 1886, entitled "An act
defining butter, also imposing a tax upon and regulating
the manufacture, sale, importation, and exportation of oleomargarine," mwst be" made in imitation or semblance of but·
ter, or, when so made, calculated or intended to be sold as
butter or for outter," before any of them can be regarded as
subjects of taxation under the law.
The question really is whether the language just quoted
from the second section of the act is a predicate and qualification of the whole section, or only of the clause or member in
immediate connection with whi~h it is found.
In mv opinion the qualification extends to the whole section, a~u is an essential element of the statutory definition of
oleomargarine.
·
If each of the simple or compound substances mentioned
in the law is taxable under the act regardless of whether it
is in imitation or semblance of butter or calculated or intended to be sold as such, it results that some lubricating
oils must bear the tax, although not supposed to have been
in the contemplation of Congress. '
But the language of the law is repugnant to that view.
Sections 6, 8, 10, and 13 can not be understood as applying
to fluid substances. In these sections are found directions
that oleomargarine shall be "packed" in ''firkins, tubs, or
other wooden packages;" that no package shall contain less
than "10 pounds;" that retail dealers shall pack what they
sell in suitable wooden ''or paper packages;" that ''any fractional part of a pound'' in a package shall be "taxed as a
pound;" that the imported article shall, in addition to the
import duty, pay an inte:rnal-revenue tax of "15 cents per
pound."
Now, as these embrace all the regulations of the kinds
mentioned in the act, it would seem to require the conclusion
that it was solids and not fluids that the legislature had in
view, and therefore that the oils and extracts referred to in
section 2 are not taxable as oleomargarine. We do not speak
of packing fluids, nor do we estimate their quantity by weight,
nor is it customary to pack them in firkins or tubs or other
like vessels.
Again, if the sii:nple o~.l is taxable, it must undergo a repeti-
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tion of the tax should it afterwards enter into any one of the
combinations or mixtures named in the second section, each
of which, upon this theory, must be taxed. S? that, unless
the maker of any of these composite substances produce all
its constituents himself, the double taxation he sustains must
put him at a competition with those who do-a very small
number, I am informed.
To resolve a doubt upon a statute it is a familiar rule to
look at the evil the statute was intended to cure. There
can be no question that the object in this case was to protect
the trade in legitimate. butter from the damage caused by the
sale of supposititious"'butter, by requiring the manufacturers
of the latter to distinguish their product by an appropriate
brand, and by fettering the production of the article with a
tax.
If the words of qualification or restriction at the end of
section 2 apply only to the clause in which they occur, it is
rather strange that the definition of butter did not follow
them instead of forming the subject of the first section and
being given a prominenee that indicates an application commensurate with the whole scope of the law.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
STATE TAX.
Where a State imposed a tax ·upon the registration of deeds, and a deed
to the United States conveying land within such State was put on record by an agent of the Government: Advised that, there being no provision in the State law exempting the registration of deeds to the
United States from the tax, the Government is properly chargeable
therewith, and that it should be paid.
The tax referred to is not, strictly speaking, a tax upon either the instrumentalities, agencies, or property of the United States.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

October 21, 1887.
SIR: I return herewith a communication ofOoJ. P. 0. Hains,
Corps of Engineers, under date of the 4th of January last,
which was some time sincP transmitted to me by you with
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request for advice as to whether the tax therein mentioned
should be paid.
It appears by said communication that the deed conveying
to the United States the Aqueduct Bridge and approaches
thereto, in view of the fact that the premises thereby granted
lie partly within Alexandria County, Virginia, was deposited
by Colonel Hains in the office of the clerk of that county to
be recorded. The clerk, having recorded the deed, rendered
a bill for this service containing two items, one of which is for
the amount of his recording fee, and the other the amount of
the tax imposed by the State law on deeds admitted to record.
Colonel Hains is in doubt as to whether such tax should be
paid, and the county clerk declines to give up the deed until
it is paid.
I find nothing in the State law which exempts deeds of
conveyance to the United States from the tax refered to; and
unless their exemption therefrom can be claimed on some
other ground, they would seem to stand on the same footing
as regards liability to the tax as deeds of conveyance to individuals. With respect to the liability of the former deeds,
I do not think that any constitutional objection exists. The
tax is upon the registration of deeds, a means provided by
the State for the prevention of fraud in transactions affecting
the title to real property; it is not a tax !IPOll either the instrumentalities, agencies, or property of the General Government, strictly speaking.
The case here does not differ essentially from one where a
tax is imposed by the State on the process of its courts and
an action in one of these courts is brought by the United
States. In such case, doubtless, the United States, unless
·e xempted by the State law, would be liable to pay the tax on
process sued out thereby the same as any other suitor. w~mld
be under like circumstances. The United States may or may
not put its d~ed on record in the county clerk's office, as it
may or may not bring its suit in the State court; but where
it does either, it w·o uld seem to be, equally with private parties, bound to pay the fees and charges therefor imposed by
the laws of the State.
The law of Virginia declares that "no deed shall be admitted to record until the tax is paid thereon to the clerk,"
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This provision is held by the court of appeals of the State
to be directory to him, and to give him authority to demand
and receive the tax before he can be required to admit the
deed to record: but the registration will be valid though the
tax be not prepaid. "If he chooses to admit it to record
without receiving prepayment of the tax," observes the court,
" he thereby assumes the liability for it, just as if it actually
had been paid to him. The government (State) loses nothing,
for his liability for it is the same as if he had actually received
it.'' (26 Va., 281.) In the present case the clerk waived prepayment of the tax, and by so doing has made himself liable
therefor. If, as I think is clear, the United States were primarily chargeable with it, the burden thereof ought not to·
be borne by him. I accordingly advise payment of the tax
by the United States.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS.
Where certain 3 per cent. bonds of the United States, held by the United
States Treasurer as security for the circulating notes of a national
bank, were called in for redemption and ceased to be interest bearing:
AdviBed that unless the bank substitute interest-bearing bonds for
the called bonds, the proceeds of the latter must be applied to retiring
the circulation secured thereby.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
October 28, 1886.
SIR: Certain 3 per cent. bonds of the United States, held
by its Treasurer as security for the circulating notes of the
First National Bank of North Bend, Nebr., having been called
in for redemption and having ceased to be interest bearing,
the bank has been notified by the Comptroller of the Currency to exchange those bonds for intm;est-bearing bonds of
the United States.
The bank, in reply, asks to know by what authority the
demand has been made, allowing that it has once complied
with section 5159 of the Revised Statutes by depositing with

I
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the Treasurer interest-bearing bonds of the United States
which are worth par.
An opinion is requested upon the question thus presented,
namely, whether the stopping of interest on the boncls (1eposited, resulting from the call of the Secretary of the Treasury,
authorized the Comptroller of the Currency to require the
bank to substitute interest-bearing bonds for the bonds now
on deposit.
It is not open to question that the bonds deposited by a
national bank to secure its circulation must be interest bearing at the time the deposit is made. On that point the law
is explicit. It would seem to be equally clear that whatever
purpose Congress had in view in requiring bonds to be deposited b;y nntional banks to be interest bearing, that purpose has continued the same from the first law on the subject,
in 1863, down to the present time, there being an absence of
any legislative declaration of a change of intention in that
particular.
In resolving the question whether it is essential to a valid
deposit of bonds by a national bank that the bonds deposited
should be interest bearing during the whole time of the deposit, it may assist us to read the act of 1863, under which
the national-bank system was introduced, in the light of .the
circumstances in which it was passed.
The country was engaged in a great war. It was of vital
importance to strengthen the credit of the Government by
increasing the demand for its bonds and by averting the impending calamities of an unregulated and rapidly expanding
paper circulation. It was to accomplish these objects tllat
the national-bank system was devised, and it is impossible to
doubt that it was the intention that the banks composing the
system Rhould have no bonds on deposit with the Govern·
ment except such as were still current and as the Government was interested in keeping buoyant in the market. And
this would seem to have been the view of the eminent Secretary of the Treasury to whom is generally ascribed the
authorship of the national-bank system. In his report of the
4th of December, 1862, he says, in recommendation of the
proposed system :
"The Secretary has already mentioned the support to public
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credit which may be expected from the proposed associations.
The importance of this point may excuse some additional
()bserTations. The organization proposed, if sanct,i oned by
·C ongress, would require a Yery few years for deposit as
security for circulation bonds of the United States to an
amount not less than $250,000,000. It may well be expected,
indeed, since the circulation, by uniformity in credit and
value and capacity of quick and cheap transportation, will
be likely to be used more extensively than any heretofore
issued, that the demand for bonds will overpass this limit.
Should Congress see fit to restrict the privilege of deposit to
the bonds known as five-twenties, authorized by the act of
last session, the demand would promptly absorb all of that
description already issued and make large room for more.
A steady market for the bonds would thus be established
and tbe negotiation of them greatly facilitated.
"But it is not in immediate results that tbe value of this
support would be only or chiefly seen. There are always
holders who desire to sell securities of whatever kind. If
buyers are few or uncertain, the market value must decline.
But the plan proposed would create a constant demand,
equaling.and often exceeding the supply. Thus a steady uniformity in price would be maintained, and generally at a rate
somewhat above those of bonds of equal credit but not available to banking associations. It is not easy to appreciate
the full benefits of such conditions to a Government obligAd
to borrow."
That the conclusion arrived at, namely, that it was the intention of Congress that deposits of bonds by national banks
should be kept interest bearing during the whole period of
the deposits is correct would seem to be rendered absolutely
certain by the act of the 12th of July, 1882 (22 Stat., 162),
"to enable national-banking associations to extend their corporate existence, and for other purposes."
Section 9 provides that any national bank may, on depositing lawful money with the Treasurer of the United
States, withdraw a proportionate amount of its bonds on deposit, subject, however, to the proviso "that not more than
three millions of dollars shall be deposited during any calendar month for this purpose," and to the further proviso ''that
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the provisions of this section shall not apply to bonds called
for redemption by the Secretary of the Treasury, nor to the
withdrawal of circulating notes in consequence thereof."
This language, it would seem, leaves no doubt that it was the
intention of Congress that, when the bonds deposited to se·
cure the circulation of a bank are called for redemption, payment of them means retiring ·the circulation they secure,
unless indeed the bank, as it may lawfully do, should make
a new deposit of an adequate amount of interest bearing
bonds.
It follows then that unless the First National Bank of North
Bend substitute interest-bearing bonds for the existing de.
posit of bonds called for redemption, the proceeds of the
latter must be applied to retiring the circulation secured by it..
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. · GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.
Spools on which thread is wound for transportation or shipment are duty
free, under the provisions of section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883,
chapter 121.

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE,

October 29, 1886.

SIR: Your communication of the 26th instant submits the
question whether the spools on which linen thread is wound
are subject to taxation separately as spools, or whether they
are free from taxation, under the provisions of the seventh
section of the act of March 3, 1883. That section repeals,
among others, all the charges imposed by section 2907 of
the Revised Statutes. Among those charges thus repealed
are included "all the actual or usual charges for putting
up, preparing, or packing for transportation or shipment."
In the case of Oberteuffer v. Robertson (116 U. S., 499), the
Supreme Court of the United States, in considering the seventh section of the act of the 3d· of March, 181;3, declares :
"The exaction of duty on the packing, whether packing the
goods in the cartons, or the cartons in the outer case, or lining
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the outer case, was not warranted by law." The spools on
which the linen thread is wound seems to be the usual manner
of packing the thread referred to in yours for transportation
or shipment. The tax as to such spools as packing or preparation for shipm~nt is, under the ruling in Oberteuffer v.
Robertson, therefore, repealed, and in accordonce with the
view expressed in the opinion rendered on September 17,
1886, it should not be levied on the spools. The Department rulings referred to in your letter should be modified to
harmonize them with the opinion referred to and the views
now expressed.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.

The SECRE'rARY OF. THE TREASURY.
INDIAN CONTRACT.
Opinion of September 9, 1886 (ante, p. 447), as to the validity of a certain
contract with Pottawatomie Indians, cited and reaffirmed; and advised that the approval of such contract by the'' business committee
of the Citizen Pottawatomies" does not cure the defect therein or authorize the Secretary of the Interior to approve it.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEr

November 3, 1886'.
SIR: Pursuant to yonr request of this date, asking myopinion as to the validity of a certain contract, and your
authority to recognize the same, alleged to have been approved by the b~tsiness committee of the Citizen Pottawatomies, I beg leave to state that I have examined the matter,
and I find that on the 9th of Septern ber last the SolicitorGeneral rendered you an opinion upon this same contract,
involving a different question. Referring to that opinion
(which I approve, and the reasoning of which virtually set .
ties this question), I find the following:
"The acts to be done are not of a public or official character. They affect only the rights of individual families and
members of two bands of the Pottawatomie nation of Indians, some residing in the Indian Territory and others in
the States of Kansas and Michigan. The claim is for individual rights, not public or national rights"
273-VOL XVIII--32
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The question now presented is whether the appro''<tl of
the contract by the bu,siness committee of the Citizen Pottawatomies supplies the defect on which the opinion abm·e
referred to was given. The law (Rev. Stat., sec. 2103) under
which this whole proceediug is supposed to have been carried on is very explicit, and leaves no .margin of discretion 4
- to the Secretary of the Interior. The law must be literally
complied with, and nothing can be taken by intendment, nor
can the Secretary dispense with any of its requirements. I
do not think that the contract is in accordance with the law.
It should have been a good and valid contract from the
beginning; and even if it could be admitted that a subsequent ratification could make this defective contract Yalid
and binding, yet it does not appear anywhere in the papers
what authority this business committee has to bind the interests of the various parties here involved and to which reference is had in the quotation already made from the opinion
of the Solicitor-General. The reasons and purposes of a
law so exacting as the one referred to, in dealing with the
Indians through agents and attorneys in this way, are obvious, and these could be easily defeated and rendered of
no avail if such authority to ratify such a contract as is here
presented is recognized; and my opinion therefore is, ~-ou
cannot approve the contract in question.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

JURISDICTION OF CONSULAR COURTS.
The criminal jurisdiction conferred upon United States consular officers
by section 408-t, Revised Statutes, is limited to "citizens" oft he United
States charged with offenses committed in the countries therein rnf~rred
to. It does not extend to subjects of foreign powers.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 4, 1886.
have the honor to submit a reply to your communicatiOn presenting for opinion several questions arising upon
the petition for pardon of one Peter C. Fullert, convicted by
SIR: I
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Consul-(Mneral Green of aiding and assisting Paymaster
Watkins to escape from the U. S. S. Ossipee in the harbor of
Yokohama, Japan.
I am of the opinion that the consular court had no jurisdiction over Fullert.
The criminal jurisdiction of that court is defined by section 4084 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
which is in these words:
" The officers mentioned in the preceding section are fully
,e mpowered to arraign and try, in the manner herein provided,
all citizens of the United States charged with offenses against
law, committed in such countries, respectively, and to sentence such offenders in the manner herein authorized ; and
each of them is authorized to issue all such processes as are
suitable and necessary to carry this authority into ex~cu
tion."
It is a conceded fact that Fullert was, at the time the
· alJeged offense was committed, a German subject. Whether
Congress could or cou!d not have made a foreign subject justiciable in a cons-ular court is a question that does not arise.
Congress has seen fit to confine the criminal jurisdiction of
this description of courts to citizens of the United States.
A reference to the legislation of Congress touching crimes
and offenses will show that, whenever criminal jurisdiction
is meant to be exerted, regardless of the citizenship of the
accused, a term (namely, "person") commensurate with such
purpose is invariably employed.
When Congress gives a court jurisdiction to try offenses
committed by citizens of the United States, especially in foreign parts, we must understand it as using the term in its
legal and ordinary signification, there being nothing in the
context to show a different intention.
This conclusion is supported by the reasoning of the opinion of one of my predecessors in a case involving the jurisdiction of a consular court sitting in Japan to render judgment
in a civil case against a foreign subject. (11 Opin., 474.)
It may be that if Fullert should come to this country he
might be tried by a Federai court, but I am not called on to
express an opinion on that point.
1

•
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It follows, therefore, that the proceedings against Fullert
were unauthorized, and that he should be set at large as one
held without warrant of law.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

IMMIGRATION LAW.
Provision of the second section of the act of August 3, 1882, chapter
376, viz, that if among the passengers of li/lr vessel arriving at one of
our ports is found a "convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person m~able to
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge,''
such person shall not be permitted to land, considered; and held not
to apply to the case of a lunatic whose father will engage satisfactorily that he will not become a public charge.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 6, 1886.
Your commut.ication asking whether an alien residing in Brooklyn, N. Y., can briug into this country a lunatic
son whom he is now maintaining in a foreign country and
will engage satisfactorily shall not become a. public charge,
has received my consideration.
The question presented arises upon that part of the second
section of the act of the 3d August, 1882, entitled '~An
act to regulate immigration" (22 Stat., 214), which provhleR
that if among the passengers of a vessel coming into one of
our ports -is found a "convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person
unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a
public charge," such person shall not be permitted to land.
If the case presented is within the statute,__then also would '
seem to be that of a child of tender years or a decrepit person coming here under the care and protection of another,
competent for these purposes. But such cases are manifestly not within the statute, whose object is to forbid the
introduction of immigrants likely to become chargeable.
If, then, a child of tender years may be brought· .here by
his parents, why may ~ot one of any age, who is dependent
from imbecility of mind or body, if his parent will engage
satisfactorily that he shall not become chargeable?
SIR:
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The authority conferred on you by the third section of the
statute, to require bonds "under and in the enforcement of
the various provision's of this act," would seem to have been
given in contemplation of such cases as the one now before
me. If, therefore, the father of the lunatic will duly comply
with any regulation you may make looking to the prevention
of t.his lunatic and others in Jike case from becoming public
charges, I think he may be brought into the country lawfully.
This is but another of the many instances in the books
where the literal sense of statutes has been made to yielrl to
the manifest legisl~tive intent. Oates v. National Bank
(100 U.S., 244); Chew Heong v. United Sta.tes (112 U. S., 555,
and cases cited); Ryegate v. Wa·rdsboro' (30 Vt., 746); Henry
v. Tilson (17 ib., 479); Ex parte Ellis (11 Cal., 222); Ingraham ·
v. Speed (30 Miss., 410); State v. Clark (5 Dutch., N. J., 96;
ib. 415 ;) People v. Admire (39 III., 251); Burch v. Newburg
(10 N. Y., 374).
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.

The

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CLAIM OF MARTIN AND PATRICK W. MURPHY.
The act of August 4, 1P86, chapter 907, made an appropriation to pay certain claims, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to pay to
"Martin and P. B. Murphy $10,000." It being alleged that this was
intended by Congress to satisfy a claim for that amount, of which Martin Murphy was a joint owner with Patrick W. Murphy: Advised,
that should the identity of their claim with that provided for in the
act be clearly established, the fact that "B "is used in the act instead
of " W" as the initial letter of the middle name of Patrick W. M nrphy,
is immaterial, and may be disregarded.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

N o·vember 10, 1886.
SIR: On the 4th of August, 1886, an act was passed providing that "the Secretary of the Treasury be and hereby is
authorized and directed to pay, out of any moneys in the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of eighteen
thousand four hundred and sixty-five dollars and sixty-five
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cents, in payment of certain claim& against the United States
Government not heretofore paid because of the defalcation
and forgeries of John T. Best, late clerk of the engineer of
the twelfth light-house district, and due the several claimant8
as follows: Employes at Point Conception Light, three thousand seven hundred· and eighty-four dollars and seventy
cents; Miguel Ortego, four lbundred and seventy-eight dollars and fourteen cents; Charles Ashton, two hundred and
seventy dollars; Pigeon Point Light Station, nine hundred
and eighty dollars and ninety-nine cents; sundry small bills,
one thousand two hundred dollars and ninety-five cents;
Martin and P. B. Murphy, ten thousand dollars; 0. B. Shaw,
one thousand seven hundred and forty eight dollars and
eightY,·Seven cents."
·
From the transmittals accompanying yours, it appears that
the $10,000 appropriated to Martin and P. B. Murphy should
have been appropriated to :Martin and Patrick W. Murphy.
The inquiry is whether the use of "B" instead of'' W" as
the middle initial letter in the name of Patrick W. Murphy,
precludes the payment to Martin and Patrick W. Murphy.
From the words of the act, the context, and the subjectmatter of the enactment, it appears the law-makers intended
this appropriation to be applied to a claim that originated in
the defalcation of John T. Best, that the claim related to the
. Light-House Board, that the amount claimed was $10,000,
and that the claim was a joint one in which Martin Murphy
was a joint owner. Now, as, there is no claim by Martin and
P. B. Murphy, nor any such person known asP. B. Murphy
in any way connected with the subject-matter, and the claim
of Martin and Patrick W. Murphy precisely corresponds with
the intent and purpose of the act, the whole intent of the enactment must fail, or the substitution of the '' B" instead of
the" W" in the name of Patrick W. Murphy be disregarded.
The intent of the law.makers should prevail over the mistaken middle letter. For as was ruled in the case of Games v.
Stiles (14 Pet., 327), "the law knows of bnt one Christian
name, and the omission or insertion of the middle name or of
the initial letter of that name is immaterial." To the same
import is the ruling in the case of Keene v . ..:Mead (3 Pet., 263),
Hence if the identity of the parties and th'e claim of Martin
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and Patrick W. Murphy is otherwise clearly established as
the parties and claim referred to in the act, the fact that" B"
is used in the act instead of" W" as the middle letter in the
name of Patrick W. Murphy is immaterial, and should be
disregarded.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION OVER PACIFiC RAILROADS.
In the settlement of the accounts of the Sioux City ancl Pacific Railroad
Company (whose road was in part con~<tructed with the aid of subsidy
bonds issued under tbe acts of July 1, 1862, chapter 120, and July 2, 1864,
chapter 216) for Government transportation over the subsidized por.
tion of its road: Adviqed, that the direction in the second section of
the act of March 3, 1873, chapter 226 (sec. 5260, Rev. Stat.), "to withholtl all payments," etc., is now, November 12, 1886, no longer applicable thereto; that only one-hJ:tlf the amount of compensation due the
company for such transportation should be withheld, to be applied as
required by the act of July 2, 1864; and that the remaining one-half
should be paid over to the company.

DEPARTMENT .OF JUSTICE,
November 12, 1886.
SIR: In a letter received from the Acting Secretary of the
Treasury, dated the 22d of June last, transmitting a copy of
a communication addressed to him uy the Second Comptroller of the Treasury under date of the 16th of same month,
relative to certain accounts of the Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Company for transportation, my opinion is asked upon
be following question: ''Whether in the settlement and adjustment of the accounts of that company for Government
transportation over the subsidized portion of its road the accounting officers should direct that the full amount of the compensation so earned be withheld under section .5260, Revised
Statutes, or whether only one-half thereof should be withheld, under the act of July 2, 1864, and the remaining onehalf directed to be paid to the company."
It appears by these papers that the Sioux City and Pacific
Railr~>ad was constructed in part with the aid of subsidy bonds
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issued under the Pacific Railroad acts of July 1, 1862, chapter
120, and July 2, 1864, chapter 216. By the former act all
compensation for services rendered for the Government by
the company was to be applied to the payment of said bonds
and interest until the whole amount is fully paid. This provision was modified by the latter act, which requires only onehalf of such compensation to be so applied. ·subsequently,
by section 2 of the act of March 3, 1873, chapter 226 (out of
which section are formed sections 5260 and 5261, Revised Statutes), Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury "to
withhold all payments to any railroad company and its assigns, on account of freigh!s or transportation, over their respective roads, of any kind, to the amount of payments made
by the United States for interest upon bonds of the United
States issued to any such company, and which shall not have
been re-imbursed together with the 5 per.cent. of net earnings
<]ue and unapplied as provided by law; and any such company may bring suit in the Court of Claims to recover the price
of such freight and transportation; and m such suit the
right of such company to recover the same upon the law and
the facts of the case shall be determined and also the rights
of the United States upon the merits of all the points presented by it in answer thereto by them, and either party to
such suit may appeal to the Supreme Court; and both said
courts shall give such cause or causes preceden.ce of all other
business."
Tae consideration of this legislation was directly involved
in the case of the United States v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company (91 U. S. 72). Suit was originally brought by that
company in the Court of Claims to recover one half of certain freight earnings on transportation performed for the
United States between the 1st of Januar-y, 1873, and March
1, 1874, the whole of which was withheld by the Government
1or the purpose of applying the same on account of interest
paid by it upon subsidy bonds issued to the company; the company conceding the right of the Government to retain the
other half of the earnings for that purpose. The claim of the
company was sustained aud judgment rendered in its favor,
and on appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment of the
Court of Claims was affirmed.
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In the opinion of the Supreme Court delivered in that case
the obligation of the company with respect to the reimbursement of interest as well as principal was declared to depend
upon the meaning of the act of 1862 and the amendatory act
of 1864; and it was held that under the act of 1862 the company was not required to reimburse the Government, for interest paid by the latter on the said bonds before their maturity,
any further than this might be done by allowing the Government to retain for that purpose all the compensation due the
company for services rendred, and by paying over to the
Government 5 per cent. of the net earnings of the road, to be
applied to the same purpose; that the provision in the act of
1864, hereinbefore mentioned, was intended to modify the act
of 1862 so far as to allow the Government to retain only onehalf of said compensation, instead of all, and that the company
was therefore entitled to receive the remaining half. As to
the act of 1873, the provision in this act referred to abov~
was regarded by the court as not repealing the aforesaid provision of the act of 1864, and was interpreted to mean "nothing more nor less than the remission to the judicial tribunals
of the questwn 7 whether this company, and others similarly
.situated, have the right to recover from the Government onehalf of what they earned by transportation; and this question," COntinueS tbe COUrt, "iR to be determined UpOn its merits. * • * It is hardly necessary to say that it would
ha,'e been idle to authorize a suit, had Congress intended to
repeal the provision on which alone it could be maintained."
Agreeably to that interpretation of the act of 1873, the
direction thereby given "to withhold all payments, etc., on
account of freight or transportation," etc., is of a provisional
character, and does not contemplate that this action shall be
taken after the right of the bond-subsidized companies to
recover payment for such freight and transportation shall
ba ,-e been established by the proper courts and the principles governing the payment thus been authoritatively ascertained. The purpose of the statute seems to be to have the
rights of the Government and the obligations of the companies, with respect to the reimbursement of interest paid
by the Government on the subsidy bonds (a matter that had
formerly been the subject of discussion in the Executive
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Devartments and concerning which a diversity of practice
bad theretofore existed) judicially determined before any
further payments are made on account of freight or transportation; but after their respective rights and obligations
have been so determined, and the law governing the matter
declared and settled by the courts, it may reasonably be
presumed that tbP; direction to withhold payment, in cases
where according to the law as thus declared and settled the
company is clearly entitled to have payment made thereto,
was not intended to apply or be followed. As remarked
in an opinion of this Department addressed to the Secretary
of the Treasury under date of February 6, 1883, which was
given upon a question similar to the present, there is no
appearance of an intention to substitute the courts to the
Treasury as a machinery for ascertaining and paying debts,
the law about which shall have already been established by
judgment obtained in the way directed since the passage of
the statute.
The Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Company is not
within the scope of the sinking fund act of May 7, 1878,
chapter 96, and the solution of the question submitted, relative to its accounts for Government transportation performed over the subsidized part of its road, depends
entirely on the meaning and effect of the provisions of the
other acts named above. Upon consideration of these provisions as already interpreted by the Supreme Court, I am
of the opinion that in the settlement and adjustment of said
accounts the direction in the act of 1873 (sec. 5260, Rev.
Stat.), "to withhold all payments," is no longer applicable
thereto; that only one-half the amount of compensation due
the company for such transportation should be withheld, to
be applied as required by the act of 1864; and that the
remaining one-half should be paid over to the company.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRE~J.1ARY OF THE TREASURY.
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CASES OF NAVAL CADETS CLINTON AND FIFE.
Where a cadet entered the Naval Academy and became a member of the
fourth class in 18~5, and also remained a member of the same class in
1886, he is at the latter period as much an "older cadet,; within the
definition of the offense of" hazing" as a cadet who, having entered
the Academy at the same time (1885), has since been advanced to a
higher class, and (equally with the latter) is capable of committing
that offense.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 16, 1886.
SIR: Your communication of the 13th instant, inclosing
the records of and certain papers pertaining to the cases of
Naval Cadets James W. Clinton and George B. Fife, has been
received.
You ask, first, "When did the appointments of Naval Cadets Olin ton 41nd Fife take effect, so as to render them liable to
trial upon the charge of hazing o.J Did such appointments tak~
effect in May and September -respectively, when the cadets
were admitted to the Academy, or upon the issuance of their
appointments, on the 11th of October, 1886 ;" second, "If it
shall be held that Messrs. Clinton and Fife were on the 11th
of September, 1886, naval cadets of the fourth class, were
they, in view of the fact that they had been members of the
fourth class in 1885, properly chargeable with 'hazing,' the.
offense having been committed by them against members of
the fourth class of the present year~"
I answer, first: Messrs. Cli11ton and Fife became naval
cadets in the full sense of the term upon the lOth of May and
4th of September, 1886, respectively. · They had on those
dates respectively, been duly nominated to the place, accepted
the nomination, passed successfully the examination required
by law, taken the oath prescribed for naval cadets, been assigned to and entered upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to the position, and from those dates their salaries as
such commenced. Their commissions, though issued afterwards, relate back by express recitals to these dates respectively, and are conclusive evidence of the appointments at the
dates aforesaid.
' Second: .As I understand the second question, you de-
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sire to know if a member of the fourth class can commit the
offense "commonly known as hazing."
In an opinion of date March 12, 1886, speaking generally
of the ingredients in the offense of "hazing," as constituted
by the statute of 1874, I referred to those who could be guilty
of the offense as members of the classes senior to the fourth
class.
This description of the parties who could commit the offense was accurate enough for the purposes of that opinion.
Inasmuch as cadets who have been longer at Annapolis than
''new cadets of the fourth class" are very generally in one
of the' higher classes, the term '' a cadet of one of the senior
classes " was used by myself as well as in some of the orders
issued by the commandant of the Academy as synonymous
with the term ''other cadets," as employed in other regulations.
The question now under consideration was not then before
me, nor was the language used in that opinion chosen with
reference to it.
A cadet who entered the Naval Academy a session before
"new cadets ofth2 fourth class" entered it, and whose present
membership in the fourth class is due to a failure to pass an
examination and not to the recency of his entry in the Academy, is as much an " older uadet " within the definition of the
offense of "hazing" as those cadets who, entering the Academy with him and serving a term of equal length, have passed
their examination and been advanced to classes senior to the
fourth class.
I take it that "older cadets" maltreat "new cadets of the
fourth class " not because of ~uperior academic acquirements,
but because their familiarity with the routine, the customs
and personnel of the Naval Academy, enable them to deceive
others who are without such acquaintance, and to combine
with each other for the oppression of new-comers. Therefore
an old cadet in the fourth class is as much within the reason
of the law as one in a higher class.
Just how much longer a naval cadet must have been in the
Academy than '" new cadets of the fourth class" in order to
be considered an " older cadet " I can not undertake from
this record to determine.
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All who are not "new cadets of the fourth class" and therefore liable to be victims of" hazing" should, I think, be held
to be "old cadets" and capable of being the perpetrators of
the offense.
I can not lay down any general rule for determining whether
a cadet should be held a "new cadet of the fourth class" or
an "' old cadet." In most cases the distinction is clear; but
in cases like these u-pder consideration each must be decided
by the proof. The length of service at the Academy which
takes a cadet out of the one class and into the other must be
determined by proof as to the local customs and traditions
and the popular meaning of the terms used in the orders and
regulations describing each class as understood in the Academy at the date of the passage of the act of 187 4.
With this exposition of the statute, the courts-martial will
have no difficulty, I trust~ i~ deciding the cases as they arise.
I see nothing in the record that ousts the jurisdiction of
the court-martial which corrected Messrs. Clinton and Fife,
though I can not without more information as to the local
meaning of the term "older cadet" or " old cadet," as contradistinguished from new cadets of the '"fourth class," undertake to say that the evidence warranted the conclusion
that these gentlemen belonged to the class designated in the
orders and reguTations of the Academy in force June 23, 1874,
against hazing.
I inclose herewith the papers inclosed with your communication.
Respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

'
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CUSTOMS DUTIES.
Boxes in which safety and ordinary matches are usually imported ar:e not
dutiable as part of the merchandise which they contain, but (being
composed in part of a material designed for a use other than that of a
bona fide transportation of their contents) they are subject to the duty
of 100 per centum ad valorem prescribed by the proviso in the seventh section of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
DEP AR1'MENT OF JUSTICE,

November 17, 1886.
SIR: I have considered your communication asking an
opinion whether the boxes in which safety and ordinary
matches are imported are dutiable as part of the merchandise they contain and at the same rate, or at one hundred
per cent. ad valorem under the proviso of the seventh section of the act of the 3d of March, 1883 .(22 Stat., 523).
By "boxes" I understand you to mean '' the usual and
necessary" boxes in which this species of merchandise is sold
and imported.
I think it very clear that such boxes are not dutiable as
part of the merchandise they contain, for it is the express
mandate of the seventh section of the act referred to that
" the value of usual and necessary sacks, crates, boxes, or
coverings of any kind shall not be estimated" as part of the
value of any goods entered for importation. Certainly there
is no longer room for quest,ion on this point since the decision
of the Supreme Court in Oberteu.ffer v. Robertson (116 U. S.,
499).
It remains, therefore, to inquire whether the boxes in
question are dutiable under the proviso of the seventh section of the act, which is in these words :
'' If any packages, sacks, crates, boxes, or coverings of any
kind shall be of any material of form designed to evade duties
thereon, or designed for use otherwise than in the bona tied
transportation of goods to the United States, the same shall
be subject to a duty of one hundred per centum ad valorem
upon the actual value of the same."
The boxes containing the safety matches have on the outside a prepared surface upon which the matches must be
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scraped o.f ignition can not be produced, at least without
great difficulty. The boxts containing the ordinary matches
have on the outside a roughened surface, like sand-paper, by
scraping on which ~his kind of matches may be ignited,
although such scraping is not at all necessary to produce
ignition, which may be caused by scraping on any surface
.offering the necessary resistance.
In each case the boxes are composed in part of a material
designed for a use other than of '~ a bona fide transportation" of their contents. To be sure, in the case of ordinary
matches this use is of a somewhat inconsiderable value, but
still it is one which is designed and which, at the same time,
bas nothing to do with the transportation of the matches,
and, therefore, brings the box of which it is an adjunct as
dearlY. within the proviso as the prepared surface of the
safety match-sox 'brings it within the proviso.
In United States v. Thu'rber (28 Fed. Rep., 59) the court
seems to lay down that to make the box dutiable under the
proviso the additional use must appear to be "substantial,
material, and valuable," but I have reached the conclusion
that it is enough for that purpose to show that such use was
designed to be unconnected with the transportation of the
contents of the box. To go further and require that such
use shall be "substantial, material, and valuable," is, it seems
to me, to add to the statute.
It results, therefore, that the boxes in both cases are dutiable under the proviso of the seventh section of the act.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY•

•
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CONSTRUCTION OJ;' BRIDGES ACROSS THE OHIO.
Under the provisions of the acts of December 17, 1872, chapter 4, and
February 14, 1883, chapter 44, authorizing and regulating the 6onstruction of bridges over the Ohio River, the Secretary of War has power
to disapprove of the plans of such bridges where be is of the opinion
that they would unduly obstruct the navigation of the river.
The Covington and Cincinnati Elevated Railway Transportation and
Bridge Company, authorized by act of May 20,1886, chapter 363, to erect
a bridge across the Ohio between Covington and Cincinnati, has no
power under that act to sell the franchise granted to i~ thereby. Such
power is not to be implied from the words "successors or assigns" in
the act.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 23, 1886.
SIR: I have received your letter of the .1lth of November

•

instant, in whiGh you submit for my opinion the following
questions:
"(1) Do the provisions of the general laws, viz, the acts
of December 17, 1872·, and February 14, 1883, which subject the plans of bridges over the Ohio River to the approval of the Secretary of War, give him authority to disapprove such plans if he is of opinion that they would unduly
obstruct the navigation of the river.
"(2) Can the Railway Transfer and Bridge Company,.
authorized by the special act of Congress of May 20, 1886,
sell its privileges thus obtained under the clause in the act
to 'its successors or assigns.'"
In answer to the first: the act of the 14th of August,
1883 (22 Stat., 414), is an amendment to the act of the 17th
of December, 1872, by which section@ 2 and 4 of the last
named act are "stricken out" and supplied. The whole act,
as thus amended, is a general law, authorizing the construction of bridges across the Ohio RiYer. The second section
very minutely describes and limits the construction, the
height, the length of principal span, and piers of the bridges
authorized by the act. In all this elaborate description, the
preservation of the navigation of the river is in the mind of
the legishtor. The fourth section requires an extensively
published notice to be given to the public by any person
about to build a bridge; the submission of the design and
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drawings to the Secretary of War; with maps showing the
topography of the banks, their lines, the bottom of the river
above and below, the force and direction of the current at
different stages of the water, with such other information as
the Secretary of 'Var may require for a full and satisfactory
understanding of the subject. After all this shall have been
done by the projectors, the Secretary is required to refer
this information to a board of engineers, who are to go to
the site of the bridge in that vicinity, give notice, hold public sessions, hear all objections to the bridge as proposed in
the plans and maps, by any person interested. In case on
examination the site is unfavorable, on report of the board
of engineers, the Secretal'y is empowered to order changes
in the bridge or its piers, guiding dikes, and any such auxiliary works as may be· necessary. Throughout the whole act
all its elaborate and circumsta:utial provisions fully and
uncontrovertibly show that the intent of the law is that as
little interruption shall be occasioned by the bridge to the
free navigation of the river as is consistent with the exercise
of the power to build, as granted by the act. This clear intent is to be recognized and effectuated in the interpretation
and administration of this law. The second section pr~
scribes generally the conditions subject to which the briged
must be built. The fourth section authorizes the Secretary
by order, after investigation, to add to these conditions in
case the site be unfavorable. If all the general conditions
prescribed by the act, and such additional ones as he may
lawfully order, are complied with, his duty to approve does
not follow as of course, regardless as to whether the per- ·
formauce of the conditions has been only one of mere form,
and not substantially in accordance with the intent and purpose of the conditions. Before approving he- should see
that the intent as well as the form is recognized. Wilen
this is done, he should approve; when it is not, he should
disapprove. He should demand as a condition of his approval that all the conditions should be so performed as that
the purpose and intent of the conditions should be subserved. That purpose and intent are to prevent an undue
interruption of navigation. Hence, he is authorized to disapprove any proposed bridge unless all the conditions, both
273-VOL XVIII --- -33
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geueral and special, prescribed by the law, shall have been
complied with according to the intent and purpose that the
llavigation of the river shall not be unduly obstructed. The
opinion of one of my preLi ecessors (14 opin., 254), cited and
relied on by the party in interest here, relates merely to
what consideratious should influence tbe Secretar,Y of War
in his dealing with questions of this kind. And in its gen eral summary of these duties (p. 258) the opinion would
seem by strong implication to rather support the view I
have expressed, and not to antagonize it. Hence the first
inquiry is answered in the affirmative.
The act of the ~Oth of May, 1886, is: "Be it enacted by the
Senate and House of Representati-e,es in Congress assembled,
That the Covington and Cincinnati Elevated Rail way Transfer and Bridge Company, and it~ successors or assigns, are
hereby authorized and empowered to erect a bridge across
the Ohio River between Covington, Kentucky, and Cincinnati,
Ohio, subject to the general law regulating the construction
of bridges over the Ohio !Uver: Provided, however, the said
bridge shall not be of less elevation than the Covington and
Cincinnati suspension bridge, a :Hl may be constructed witheut a pivot draw span."
The privilege given by this act is a franchise, pure and
simple, granted to the corporation tberein named. As is well
stated in Wood v Bedford and Bridgeport Railroad Company
(8 Phila. Rep., 94), a corporation "has no right to assign its
frauchise, either in whole or in part, unless specially authorized by law. The general canon of construction applicable
to legislative grants of this branch, derogating as they do
from common right and public policy, requires that the
iutention should be very manifest, if not unequivocally
t>xpressed; at aU events, not dependent upon ambiguous
phrases, rendering the implication doubtful." The same principle is announced in Stewart's appeal (56 Pa. State Rep.,
522). In the case of Branch v Jessup (106 U.S., 484) the general principle is reserved as follows:
"We do not mean i~ the slightest degree to disaffirm the
general rule that a corporation can not dispose of its franchise without legislative authority." The definition of a franchise which is given by Blackstone is "a royal privilege or
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branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a
subject." From its nature the privilege would indicate a
personal trust. Being gran ted by a Sovereign it can not be
extended by implication. Thera is no express power to assign
found in the grant under consideration. The words "successors or assigns" in the act are only the ordinary words of limitation of an estate granted -..l perpetuity to a corporation,
and as a power have no more force than the words" heirs
and assigns" in au ordinary conveyance to an individual.
No power to sell is to be implied from these words in such a
grant. This comes within the well-known rule that grants of
this character must be strictly construed. Sedgwick Constr.,
291-296; Rice v Railroad Company, ( 1 Black~ 358); Tucker v
Ferguson (22 Wall., 527) ; Fertilizing Company v Hyde Park
{97 U. S., 667). Hence the second inquiry is answered in the
negative.
And the reasoning herein so far pursued compels an answer
to your third question in the affirmative.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.

CUSTOMS LAWS-CHARGES.
The cost of winding on spools, or skeining, yarn or thread, is one of the
usual charges for preparing and packing the merchandise for transportation, which, by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121,
are not to be included as part of the dutiable value of such merchandise.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 26, 1886.
Your communication of the 23d instant states : " It
will be seen from the inclosed communication from the
appraiser at Philadelphia that the charge for skeining,
banking, or lapping woolen yarns, and the charge for spooling or winding the thread on the spools, differ som~what from
the cost of the Rpools on which the thread is wound, and the
cost of the parceling or tying in bundles of yarn. In the
latter case the Department held by its decision of May 21,
SIR :

'
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1886 (Syn. 7533), that the skeining of the yarn constituting
part of the finishing process, and the cost thereof, should be
included in the dutiallle value. I will thank you to return
the inclosed letter of the appraiser at Philadelphia, with a
statement of your opinion, under section 2, act of March 3,
1875, as to whether the ruling referred to by this Department should be reversed, and also as to whether the cost of
the spooling of linen thread forms a part of the dutiable
value of such merchandise."
The answer to this inquiry depends upon the determination of the question whether the skeining and winding on
the spools is an element in the manufacture of the thread or
yarn, or one of the actual or usual charges of putting up,
preparing, and packing for transportation or shipment. In
the former event, it would be subject to duty; in the latter,
it would be only one of the charges imposed by section 2907, '
Rev. Stat., which in the case of Oberteuffer v. Robertson (116
U.S., 499) was repealed by the seventh section of the act of
the 3d of March, 1883, and therefore not subject to duty.
Whenever the thread or yarn is finished so that if the consumer, if present in the factory, would nnd all the uses to
which the article finished was usually applied completely
subserved without further addition or work, the process of
manufacture ig complete. The preparation beyond that
·point is intended to prevent destruction or detriment to the
article in transportation from the point of manufacture to
the consumer. The winding on the spool~ or in skeins does
not add a single additional element to the goods, but it does
prepare th~ goods as finished to be safely and conveniently
transported. The winding and skeining therefore are within
the range known as charges in section 2907, and the duty
thereon was repealed.
The inclosure transmitted with yours is herewith returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SEORETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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INDIAN CONTRACT.
Where a contract made by three attorneys-in-fact of certain persons of
the Pottawatomie tribe of Indians with E., an attorney-at-law, for
services of the latter, was not executed by one of the attorneys-in-fact
until some months after it had been executed by the other two and by
E., nor until after the services stipulated therefor had been performed
by E.: Held that the Secretary of the Interior was not authorized to
approve the contract or recognize the cla:m of E. for compensation
thereunder.
DEPARTMENT OF

JUS1'ICE,

December 4, 1886.
SIR: Your communication of the 1st instant touching a
contract purporting to have been made by the attorneys-in.
fact of certain persons of the Pottawatomie tribe of Imlians
with E. John Ellis as attorney-at-law for services rendered
and to be rendered, with accompanying papers, is received.
You wish to know whether, in my opinion, this contract 1s
such a one as will authorize the Department of the Interior
to recognize Mr. Ellis's claim for compensation thereunder as
an attorney.
This subject-matter has been before this Department upon
two previous occasions for opinions, which were given, but
they did not involve the point here and now suggested. The
question now is, whether the execution of the contract by
Stephen Negonqo.ett, one of the attorneys-injact, on the 23d
day of November, 18~";6, after the contract had been executed
by the two other named attorneys-in-fact, and by Mr. Ellis
himself, and after the services stipulated for had been performed, is valid ~ Referring to the opinion I had the honor
to render you on the 3d of November last, I find in it this
expression: "'It" (the contract) "should have been a good
and valid contract from the beginning." I adhere to this
view still, and I do not think that, by the law in question,
there was any contract to operate under until there was a
complete execution of it b;v all the attorneys-in-fact. I do not
think that a waiting of two months or more by one of the
named attorneys-in-fact before hs attempts to execute the
~ontract, and when the work sought for has been done, as is
alleged, is permissible.
The relation of principal and agent is, by the law, rigidly
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enforced in so far as the rights of the principal are to be in·
terpreted away, and a stricter adherence to this rule, if possi·
ble, should be had when the rights of Indians, "the wards
of the nation,'? are involved. A complete contract is required
by the law before anything can be done under it, and as there
is no waiver, exception, or qualification in the law modifying
this requirement, the Department of the Interior can not
make one. As the Supreme Court has said, speaking of its
power in this respect: "We can not supply qualifications
which the legislature has failed to express." (Fox v. United
States, 95 U. S., 670.) There is no power given the Depart·
ment by the law in mere "permissible language;" the language used, on the contrary, is without qualification. The
duty.is therefore mandatory, in every sense of the word (Su·
pervisors v. United States, 4 Wall., 435). It is not pretended
that these three attorneys-in-fact should have executed the
contract at the same time, but it is held that they should
have all executed it before any proceedings or steps were
taken or had in the premises; and in this view of the matter
the subsequent Pxeeution by Stephen Negonquett of this
supposed contract did not cure the defect, and therefore you
can not recognize Mr. Ellis's claim for compensation thereunder.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

INDIAN CONTRACT.
Secretary of the Interior has no power to approve the contract in the
case presented for any purpose.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
December 14, 1886.
SIR: Your letter of yesterday transmitting again to me a
supposed contract between the band of Pottawatomie Indians
and Mr. E. John Ellis for an opinion, has been received, and
you propound to me the following inquiry: ''Can I properly
and legally approve of this contract," etc.
From the opinions, three in number, heretofore rendered
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to you upon tllis subject, I am clearly of tlle opinion that
you can ~ot approve this contract for any purpose. It is
useless to give additional reasons. You will find those
already given in the opinions of recent date, to wit: September 9, 1886, November 3, 1886, and December 4, 1886.
Very respectfully,
.A. H. GARLAND ..
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

ABATEMENT OR REFUND OF DUTY.
The provisions of section 2984, Revised Statutes, authorizing the abatementor refund of duty on imported merchandise which, under the circumstances therein stated, is injured or destroyed by accidental :fire or
other casualty, extend to a loss caused by freezing.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 7, 1887.
Your letter of the 30th nf December, 1886, submits
whether the owner or consignee of merchandise, which, while
in the custody of the officers "in any public or private warehouse under bond, or in tll<' appraiser's stores undergoing
appraisal," is injured or destroyed by freezing, is entitled to
the benefit of the provisions of section 2984 of the Revised
Statutes. That section is as follows :
''The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, upon
production of satisfactory proof to him of the actual [industry]
[injury] or destruction, in whole or in part, of any merchandise, by accidental fire or other casualty, while the same
remained in the custody of the offim•rs of the customs in any
public or private warehouse under bond, or in the appraiser's
stores undergoing appraisal, or in pursuance of law or regulations of the Treasury Department, or while in transportation under bond from the port of entry to any other port in
the United States, or while in the custody of the officers of
the customs and not in bond, or while within the limits of any
port of entry, and before the same have been landed under
the ~:;upervision of the officers of tbe customs, to abate or refund, as the case may be, out of any moneys in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, the amount of impost duties paid
SIR:

•
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or accruing thereupon; and. likewise to cancel any warehouse
bond or bonds, or enter satisfaction thereon in whole or in
part as the case may be."
Where, under the circumstances set forth in the sta.tute, the
merchandise is "injured or destroyed by accidental fire or
other casualty" the statute applies. The intent of the enactment js to relieve the owner or consignee from the payment
of duty ou merchandise in proportion as it has, by accidental
fire or other unforeseen cause, been.injured or destroyed, while
actually or potentially in the custody of the officers of the
customs in the discharge of their duty. It would be a great
hardship on the merchant whose goods were destroyed by
accidental fire while in the possession of the officers, to
add to his misfortune by charging him duty on that which
was a total loss, and as to which his capital and anticipated
profits were both irretrievably gone. The hardship would be
equally as great, if the loss under the like circumstances occurred by freezing, as by fire. The Government, by the enactment in recognition of a clear equity, declared that in proportion as the merchandise was injured or destroyed in the
manner and under the circumstances as set forth in the statute the taxes thereon should be abated. The manner of the
destruction which calls for such abatement is ''by accidental
fire, or other casualty." ''Other casualty," in the connection
used, is equivalent to "other unforeseen cause" or circumstance not to be guarded against by human agency and in
which man takes no part. If the freezing which injureH or
destroys the merchandise occurs without the negligence, fault,
or connivance of the importer, consignee, or owner, it is such
a casualty as is contemplated by the statute and would come
under the provisions of section 2984.
Very respectfully,
A, H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

521

Attorney-Genera I.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
The Attorney-General will not interpret a regulatiOn of practice made by
the Commissioner of Patents for his own guidance and that of his subordinates, for the convenient, intelligent, and orderly disposal of the
business of his office. Such regulations, which the heads of bureaus
and Departments can. make, modify, or annul at will, or enforce or
waive, as seems expedient, may well be left for their interpretation to
the head of the Department or bureau to which they pertain.
DEPARTI\fENT OF JUSTICE,

January 7, 1887.
SIR: Your reference of the 18th of December, 1886~ submits for an expression of my views the question whether the
Commissioner of Agriculture is the head of one of the Departments referred to in rule 62 of the Patent Office.
Section 356 of the Revised Statutes provides: "The head
of any Executive Department may require the opinion of the
Attorney-General on any questions of law arising in the administration of his Department."
By this enactment the Attorney-General is required and
empowered officially to give his opinion on questions of law
only. Rule No. 62 referred to is purely a rule of administrative practice, with reference to the classification and order of
precedence in the consideration of cases in the Patent Office.
No question is raised as to the power of the Commissioner,
with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to make the
rule, nor as to its legality. It is simply a request to interpret
a regulation of practice made by the Commissioner of Patents
for his own guidance and that of his subordinates, for the
convenient, intelligent, and orderly disposal of the business
of his office. Such a regulation, when not specially authorized
or demanded by law, is not law in the sense in which that
term is used in the statute above quoted. If every rule or
regulation of such a character in all the different departments
of the Government might be submitted to the Attorney-General for interpretation when doubts arose, it would unduly
increase his labors as well as delay action while awaiting the
opinion. Rules such as No. 62 referred to, which the officers
of bureaus and departments can make or annul at will, or
enforce or waive as seems expedient, may well be left for in-
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terpretatiou to the administrative discretion of the department or bureau to which they pertain. I therefore herewith
return your communication with the accompanying pap~r.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE InTERIOR.

SWAMP LAND INDEMNITY.
Under the provisions of the acts of March 2, 1855, chapter 147, and March
3, 18G7, chapter 117, the State of Louisiana is entitled to indemnity for
any swamp lands granted thereto by the act of March 2, 1849, chapter
87, which were sold by the United States between the date o~ this
act and the 28th of September, 1850.
But as to such swamp lands as were excepted out of the grant made by
the said act of 1849 (viz, "lands fronting on rivers, creeks, bayous,
water courses," etc.), and as were first granted to that State by the
act of September 28, Hl50, chapter 84, it is entitled to indemnity only
for thosn which have been sold by the United States since the 28th of
September, 1850.
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Jcmuary 11, 1887.
Your letter of the 15th of December, 188G, submits
whether, under the provisions of the act of the 2d of March,
1855, and the act of the 3d of March, 1857, known as the
swamp land indemnity acts, the State of Louisiana is entitled to indemnity for such swamp lands as were sold by the
United States between the 2d of March, 1849, and the 28th
of September, 1850.
On the 2d of March, 1849, the United States granted thP
State of Louisiana ''the whole of the swamp and overflowed
lands" within her borders owned by the United States at
that time H except lands fronting on rivers, creeks, bayous,
water courses, etc., which bad been surveyed." (9Stat., 352.)
On the 28th of September, 1850 (9 Stat., 519), an act was
passed of substantially the same tenor and efl'ect, known a.::;
the Arkansas swamp land act, which by its fourth section
applied to each of the other States of the Union in which
swamp and overflowed lands existed, without the exception
contained in the act of 1849 as to lands ufronting on rivers,
creeks, bayou!:!, water courses," etc. This last act was subSIR:

J
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stantially a re-enactment of the act of the 2d of March, 1849,
so far as Louisiana was concerned, with an extension of the
grant in that act so as to include the lands which had been
excluded by the exception in the former enactment, as to
wlJich it was a new and substantive grant on the 28th of
September, 1850. Both these acts were grants in prmsenti
by which, from their respective dates, the title to the lands
therein described became vested in the several States.
(Railroad v. Smith, 9 Wall., 95; French v. Fya,n, et al., 93 U.
S., 169; EmigrantCompanyv. Countyof Wrigkt,97U.S.,339;
Martin v. Marks, 97 U. S., 345; Gaston v. Stott, Oregon Acts
and De~is., 1874, 534, 554; Fletcher v. Pool, 20 Ark., 100;
Hempstead v. Underh,ill, Ib., 346; Branch v. 1l1itchell, 24 lb.,
431; Daniel v. Purv·is, 50 1\Iiss., 261.)
Notwithstanding these grants of the swamp lands to the
States (by which they had become the owners of the lands,
and the United States had been substantially divested of
ownership and could convey no title thereto), after the passage of the respective acts, through some inadvertance or
uegligence of the officers of the United States, some of tlle
swamp lands to which the United States had no sufficient
title were sold to pre-emptors and others, and the consideration was received therefor. Although the United States
could not be legally held as a warrantor as to the defective
and void title thus conveyed, yet in equity and good conscience she would be bound to refund to each purchaser the
purchase money received for the land. But, as many such
purchasers bad improved their lands, full justice could not
be done them by the mere return of the purclla~:;e money.
The Siates at any time could assert their title ann eject the
purchasers. To avoid this injustice and invest the purchasers with titles to the homes they had made under a void purchase from the United States, on the 2d of March, 1855,
Cong-ress passed an act entitled "An act for the relief of
purchasers and locators of swamp and o\erflowed lands."
(10 Stat., 634.) This statute is remedial, and should be
interpreted liberally, so as to include whatever is within the
. mischief inteuded to be remedied. (Potter's Dwarris, 207.)
The substance of the remedy was that the United States,
instead of refunding to the purchasers the money which she

,
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unjustly obtained from them, would pay it to the States who
held the title and owned the land, and thereby save the land
with its improvements to the purchasers, and indemnify the
States for their loss with the money received. The second
section, being the indemnity clause of the act·, is as follows:
" That upon due proof by the authorized agent of the
State or States before the Commissioner of the General Land
Office that any of tbe lands purchased were swamp lands
within the true intent and meaning of the act aforesaid, the
purchase money shall be paid over to the· said State or
States; and where the land has been located by warrant or
scrip, the said State or States shall be authorized to locate a
quantity of like amount upon any of the public lands subject
to entry at $1.25 per acre or less, and patent shall issue
·therefor upon the t~rms and conditions enumerated in the
act: Provided, however, That the decisions of the Commis,
sioner of the Land Office shall be approved by the Secretary
of the Interior."
The first clause of the section provides that " Upon due
proof that any of tqe lands purchased were swamp lands,
within the true intent and meaning of the act aforesaid, the
purchase money shall be paid over to the said State or
States." The words '~ of the act aforesaid" above cited refer
to the act of the 28th of September, 1S50, as shown by the
preceding section. Whenever the lands were within the
intent and mea11ing of the description of swamp lands as contained in the act of 1850, the purchasers were entitled to the
protection and the State to the indemnity of the act of 1855.
The description . of swamp lands under the act of 1850 is
found in the third section, and is: "All legal subdivisions,
the greater part of which is wet and unfit for cultivatron; or
when the greater part of the subdivision is not of that character, the whole shall be excluded therefrom."
In the act of 1849 the description of swamp lands is: "Subject to overflow and unfit for cultivation, all legal subdivisions the greater part of which is of that character shall be
included, but when the greater part of a subdivision rs not
of that character, th'e whQ].e shaH be excluded therefrom."
These definitions of swamp lands in the acts of 184\l and
1850 are substantially the same. Therefore all swamp lands
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granted by the act of 1849 would be within the '"intent and
meaning" of the words "swamp lands" in the act of 1850.
The consideration for the grauts in the acts of 1849 antll850
was the same. The errors committed by the officers of the
United States against both grantees was the same in effect.
The wrongs done to both classes of purchasers were the
same. If Congress Lau intenued to remedy the wrong and
to relieve only the purchasers who had purchased from the
United States titles granted to the States by the act of 1850,
and leave those who stood in exactly the same relations,
under circumstancts exactly similar, to the mercy of the State
of Louisiana or purchasers from her, doubtless, insteau of
using the language ''within the intent and meaning of the
act aforesaid" such unjust discrimination against those purchasers would have been indicated by fit words, such as
"granted by the act aforesaid,~' or some other equivalent
language. No such language is found in the act of 1855.
On the contrary the language which is used is equivalent to
"all who are subject to this same mischief shall have the
benefit of the same remedy." The ''intent'~ of the act was
to give a good title to those to whom the United States had
sold such lands, and the '' meaning" was to indemnify the
States by giving them for their lands she had sold the purchase money she had received therefor, and tliereby do justice to both.
This view is enforced by legislative interpretation by the
act of the 3d of March, 18fl7 (11 ~tat., 251), by which the
titles under the acts of 1849 and 1850 are confirmed as on the
same footing, and by the proviso thereto the act of 1855 is
extended to the third day of March, 1857, as to both as follows:
"Provided, however, That nothing in this act contained
shall interfere with the provisions ot the act of Congress entitled 'An act for the relief of purchasers of swamp and
overflowed lands, approved March 2, 1855,' which shall be
anu is hereby continue.l in force and extended to all entries
and locations of lands claimed as swamp lands made since its
passage."
It is scarcely conceivable that Congress would extend the
act of 1855 from the 2d day of March, 1855, to the 3d day of
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March, 1857, as to lands in Louisiana, unless those lands
within the '• intent and meaning-" of the act of 1855 were
embraced in that act. It is ruled in a well-considered opinion of Attorney-General Speed, found in 11 Opin., 472, that
the proviso to the act of 1857 should be interpreted as though
attached to the act of 1855. If so attached, the language
''au act approved March 2, 1855, shall be and is hereb)T coutinueu in force and extended to all entries and locations of
lands clairned as swamp lands made since its passage" must
certainly embrace lands granted to Louisiana by the act of
1849. The departmental interpretation, which is entitled to
great weight, bas, in principle, been conformable to this
view of the statute. In 3d vol. Land Decisions, page 396, an
opinion of the Commissioner of t.he Land Office, approved by
the Secretary of the Interior, dated the 12th of February,
1885, is found, which decides that the indemnity act of 1855
was applicable to Louisiana as to lands granted to that State
by the act of 1849 and sold by the U nitetl States since the
act of 1850. If that indemnity was payable to the State as
to any of the lands granted by the act of 1849~ the same
principle would apply as well to those which we~e sold by
the United States before 1850 as to those that were sold after;
if the act of 1855 applied to any of the lauds conveyed by
the act of 1849 to Louisiana, it must, on the same principle,
apply to all, for as to such lands the title was as fully vested
in the State of Louisiana before the passage of the act of
1850 as ,i t was after. Hence it is concluded that as to such
lands as were granted to Louisiana by the act of 1849, the
purchasers are entitled to the protection and the State to the
indemnity for any such lands as were sold by the United
States between the 2d of .March, 1849, and the 28th of September, 1850, but as to such as were excepted out of the
grant of 1849, and were first granted to Louisiana by the act
of 1850, being the lands fronting on rivers, creeks, ba~'ous,
water-courses, etc., the State is only entitled to an indemnity after the passage of the act of the 28th of September,
1850.
The papers by you transmitted are herewith returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. II. GARLAND.

The
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FREE LIST.
Hair of the common goat, which is unfit for com bing purposes, should
be admitted free of duty under the provisions in the free list for hair
of horses and cattle, and hair of all kinds not specifically enumerated,
act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 15, 1887.
SIR: Your communication of the 7th instant submits for
determination whether the hair of the common goat, which
is unfit for combing purposes, and fit only for mixing mortar
and other kindred purposes, is subject to duty under class 2
of Schedule K, '' Wool and woolens."
The wools or hair of the alpaca goat enumerated in Schedule K are distinctly divided in to three classes.
Class 2 embraces only" combing wools," among which are
enumerated "the hair of the alpaca goat and other like animals." The words u and other like animals" in this clause
should be interpreted with reference to the subject of the
·e nactment, which is combing wools; for If all goat?s hair
was intended to be included, the word " goat" would not
have been qualified and limited by the specific word "alpaca."
The words ''other like animals" mean animals producing
hair or wool like that of the alpaca goat. They are intended
to describe the taxable commodity, and not a genus of animals. Such hair as is described in yours should be admitted
free, under the ~'provisions in the free list for hair of horses
and cattle, and hair of all kinds not specifically enumerated."
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. II. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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LIGHT-HOUSE ESTABLISHMENT.
Neither the Light-House Board nor the collector of customs has a legal
right to nominate assistant light-house keepers.
The Secretary of the Treasury is not restricted to such appointments as
tbe Board recommends, but may appoint any one who, in his judgment,
will best discharge the dutie~:~ of the office.
Where a regulation, made under and within the power granted by section 4669, Revised Statutes, is regularly approved, neither the Board
without the approval of the Secretary nor the Secretary without the
approval of the Board can change it. But such regulation can not
abridge or control in any manner the power of appointment conferred
by law upon the Secretary.
·
DEP .A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 15, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the ,12th instant submits tor my opinion the following propositions:
"(1) Whether, under the laws and regulations governing
the Light-House Estal>lishment, the right to nominate assistant keepers of light-ships rest,s with the Light-House Board
or with collectors of customs;
"(2) Whether a seaman can be legally nominated hy the
Board for promotion to assistant keeper of a light-ship, or
whether Huch appointment, if made, must be deemed an original appointment;
"(3) Whether appointment.s and promotions in the LightHouse Service must be restricted to such as the Board may
recommend, or whether the Secretary of the Treasury may
make such appointments and promotions independent of the
recommendation of the Board; and
"(4) Whether the Secretary of the Treasury bas power to
amend or change the existing regulations of the Light-House
Establishment without the concurrence of the Board."
In an opmion rendered on the 18th of January, 1886, upon
examination of the powers of the Light-House Board to make
regulations, after full consideration the conclusion was reached
that ''section 4669, Revised Statutes, contines the power of
the Light- House Board to the adoption and enforcement of
such regulations as have reference to the management and
control of light keepers, inspectors, and employes for the
purpose of securing responsibilit.v from them, and for the
further purpose of properly administering the Light-House
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Establishment, but the statute does not authorize such Board
to adopt and enforce regulations abridging or controlling
in any manner tlle appointment of light-house keepers or
other inferior officers, nor does it authorize such Board to
designate such appointments. The ~ mthority to appoint is
vested elsewhere, as indicated in this opinion."
If any power exists, only l;>y virtue of regulations of the
Board, by which the right to nominate is conferred on either
the Light-House Board or the collector of customs, it is not a
legal right, but a mere courtesy, as neither the Board nor the
collector of customs can be legally authorized by a regulation, unauthorized by law, to abridge or control the power of
the officer, intrusted by law with the duty to appoint, in the
exercise of his appointing power. The interpretation of a
regulation or regulations not authorized by law, and which,
if they exist, have no legal force, and are obligatory or not
at the option of the proper appointing officer, is not within
my province, but must be left to the discretion of the proper
appointing officer. Hence, to your first inquiry, the reply
is that neither the Light-House Board nor the collector of
customs has a legal right to nominate assistant keepers.
In answer to the third question, except when the power t()
nominate is expressly given by law, you are not restricted to·
such as the Board recommends, but may appoint any one who·
in your judgment (being otherwise qualified) will best discharge the duties of the office.
The first branch of the second inquiry is sufficiently an··''
swered as above. The second branch, as to whether the
appointment of a seaman would be a new appointment or a
promotion,.requires the consideration of a question not involved in the former opinion. Promotion generally signifies an
exaltation or advance from a lower to a higher rank or grade
in the same general line of service under the same employer.
If the seaman referred to in yours was, before the appointment, regularly in the Light-House Service, in a subordinate
capacity as seaman, and that is in the same general line of
service, such appointment to the higher grade would be
deemed a promotion.
To the fourth inquiry submitted: Section 4669, Revised
Statutes, empowers the Board, with the approval of the Sec273-VOL XVIII--34
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retary of the Treasury, to make regulations. Regulations
within the power thus granted, when made and approved,
are until amended or altered obligatory. The Board, as a
Board, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized by
the statute to amend or alter such regulations. Hence, after
a regulation, within the power granted by the statute, is
regularly made and approved, neither the Board without the
approval of the Secretary, nor the Secretary without the
action of the Board, can change such regulation. But, as
announced in the former opinion as q noted, the power to
make regulations does not ext.end to al;>ridging or controlling
in any manner the power of the Secretary in the appointment of such officers as by law is conferred upon him. If,
then, any regulation does so abridge or control such power
of appointment, it is beyond the regulating power of the
Board, and the Secretar_y of the Treasury may disregard or
conform to it as in his judgment may best conduce to the
good of the service.
Very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
_T he SEORETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS LAWS-IRON ORE.
Principles of law stated for determining what is comprehended by
terms " iron ore,'' as used in the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.

th~

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
January 19, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the 12th instant submits for consideration substantially the whole question, whether the word
"iron ore "'(as used in the tariff act of the 3d of March, 1883)
is iron ore dried at a temperature of 212° Fah., or iron ore as
it is delivered at the port of entry for weighing.
Thus broadly stated the response to the question would involve a determination of facts as well as law, which, if undertaken, would involve an assumption of power not by law
committed to me. Upon the disputed facts I can not pass;
but upon Lhe facts found by you and the briefs of argument

/

TO THE SECRETAKY OF THE TREASURY.

531

Customs Laws-Iron Ore.

made before you, it is not improper to announce such principles of law as may materially aid you in reaching a truth·
ful result.
In an opinion rendered on the same subject on the 17th of
September, 1886, the principle was declared that the iron ore
of the statute was to be interpreted as the'~ iron ore of commerce." What the iron ore of commerce was, was left as a
question of fact to be determined from knowledge possessed
by or evidence submitted to you. The testimony laid before you
was found to be inconsistent, the importer mainly testifying
that ore dried at 212° Fah., is the iron ore of commerce; the
home producers that ore as ordinarily delivered for weighing,
.is iron ore by its commercial designation. This discrepancy
of testimony,according to classes, between witnesses who are
presumed t9 be equally upright, wo11ld suggest that the statements of one or the other, or both, are to some degree influ:
enced by intere~t~ or that they each testified from a partial
view of different facts, by giving different interpretations to
the word "qommerce." The uncertainty arising from this
discrepancy of testimony, so far as it may arise from the influence of "interest, may be overcome by calling upon those
who buy both imported and home-produceu iron ore. Such
testimony would seem to be easily accessible, for where there
is a seller, such as the importer or home producer, there must
be a buyer, belonging to neither of the classes of sellers, who
would apparently be disinterested. So far as the discrepancy in the testimony arises from the fact that the witnesses
testified to uifferent facts, arising from a different understanding of the words " iron ore of commerce," the weight of evidence can be determined by comparing the witnesses' understanding of the words w1th the true signification which should
be given to them as used in the interpretation of customs
cases. By the act, the duty is a specifiu one on iron ore.
"Iron or~" as thus used is generic, embracing all the different species of iron ore, regardless of their price, value, or
accidental component chemical ingredients. The word ''commerce" is to be understood as the commerce of our own country
as it is understood b.r English-speaking Americans. It, too,
is to be understood in its generic sense, with this exception
that it is limited to our own commerce in our own markets,
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and embraces both foreign and domestic. As expressed by
Justice Story in the .Two Hundred Chests of Tea (9 Wheat.,
480): "Whether a particular article were designated by one
name or another in the country of its origin, or whether it
were a simple or mixed substance, was of no importance in the
view of the legislature. It did not suppose our merchants to
be naturalists or geologists or botanists; it applied its attention to the description of articles as they derived their appellations in our own markets, in our domestic as well as in our
foreign traffic."
The same thought is substantially repeated in the case of
Barlow v. The United States (7 Pet., 410), as follows: "Congress must be presumed to use the words in their known
commercial sense, not indeed in that of foreign countries, if
it should differ from our own, but that known in our own
trade, foreign and domestic." The same view is corroborated
in the case of Elliott v. Swartwout (10 Pet., 151).
"Commerce," as used, then, in this connection, is to ·be understood in its comprehensive sense of buying, selling, and
exchange in -.,he general sales or traffic of our own markets ;
but especial contracts in which the term "iron ore" is defined
in the contract by special description or qualifying words
would be no evidence of the general commercial signification
of the term.
But if, from the application of the facts to these general
principles, you are still unable to determine from the evidence
before you what state the ore must be in to be the iron-ore
of commerce, other considerations- may aid you. The intent
of the law-maker is the law, and outside of the words some
reflected light may be invoked. Other earlier statutes have
imposed customs duties on iron-ore which have been collected,
probably for a very considerable time before the passage of
the act of 1883. In the administration of such laws, doul>tless, departmental practice has established what was understood and acted upon as to the collection of customs on ironore. If that practice and departmental interpretation were of
long standing, and uniform, prior to 1883, if the interpretation had been false and vicious it is to be presumed Congress
would have guarded against a-like interpretation upon the passage of the act under consideration. But, as no such guards
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are found indicating a repudiation of any prior interpretation,
the presumption is very strong that the legislator, in the enactment of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, adopted and understood the iron-ore of commerce to be what the departmental
practice had established it. On the 8th of September, 1879,
a decision was rendered by the Secretary of the Treasury,
No. 4183, ruling that ''the total quantity landed as shown
by the weigher's return * * * without allowance for
increase of weight from moisture on certain iron-ore" was
subject to duty. If this decision was in accordance with
departmental practice prior to that date, and was adhered
to afterwards as the rule, it would be a pregnant fact to guide
you to the same conclusion.
The result of the legal principle above considered is substantially(1) In customs laws, as in all others, the intent of the lawmakers is the law.
(2) Where, in the expression of that intent, a name is used
describing an article which has a well-established commercial signification, that commercial signification should be
adopted.
(3) When the name is general and the tariff specific, it
embraces the whole class, and questions of price, value, or
accidental chemical components are immaterial.
(4) The commercial signification of a name is that which
those engaged in foreign and domestic sale, purchase, and
exchange generally adopt to describe the article.
(5) If it be disputed what this commercial designation embraces it is to be determined upon a clear preponderance of
evidence.
(6) The ordinary rules of evidence are to be applied with
reference to interest, character, and weight of testimony, to
be received from those engaged in or familiar with commerce, trade, and traffic in the article.
(7) Where a clear preponderance of evidence can not be
adducPd, departmental construction tacitly approved by Congressional recognition should turn the scale and be accepted
as sufficient evidence of the legislative intent.
I am, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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CUSTOMS DUTIES.
Wool-tops, imported in the ordinary condition of scoured wool, are not
subject to the penal double duty imposed by the act of March 3, 1883,
chapter 121, on "wool of the sheep, etc., which shall be imported in
any other than ordinary condition as now and heretofore practiced,"
etc.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

·

January 21, 1887.

SIR: Your communication of the 21st of December, 1886,

with the accompanying papers, submits whether " wool-tops"
which ''are the result of th~ com bing process, in which the
long hairs are separated from the short hairs, the long hairs
being known as wool-tops while the short hairs are known
as noils,~' should be subjected to double duty under the provisions of clause No. 356, Tariff Index. The clause reads:
"The duty qn wools of the first class which shall be imported washed shall be twice the amouht of the duty to which
they would be subjected if imported unwashed; and the duty
on wools of all classe~ which shall be imported scoured shall
be three times the duty to which they would be subjected if
imported unwashed. The duty on wool of the sheep or hair
of the alpaca goat, and other like animals, which shall be
imported in any otlwr than ordinary condition as now and
heretofore practiced, or which shall be changed in its character or condition for the purpose of evading the duty, or
which shall be reduced in value by the admixture of dirt or
any other foreign substance, shall be twice the duty to which
it would be otherwise subjected."
The subject of this clause is with reference to the condition
of wools as washed, unwashed, and scoured. The words "in
any other than ordinary condition" in the clause must be interpreted with reference to the subject to which the clause
refers, as to the condition of the wool as to being washed,
unwashed, or scoured. The double duty imposed would indicate a purpose of the legislator to subject to a penalty goous
in any such condition as to washing or scouring as would be
calculated to evade the legitimate duty charged on such a
class of goods, or which the importer purposely intended and
attempted to bring in on a lower classification than the proper
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one. Tlw appraiser reports that at, and a lung time before, the passage of the act of the 3d of March, 1883, ''wool
was imported in the form of tops." It is undisputed that.
the wool-tops in this case were in the" ordinars condition'
of scoured wool. I am therefore of the opinion that the
decisions of the Department of the Treasury, S. 4777 and
S. 7217, imposing the double duty should be modified and
changed so that the wool referred to in yours and other
similar importations be relieved from the penal double duty.
I return your inclosures herewith.
I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.
Mahogany boards and planks are not dutiable as manufactures of rna_
hogany, under the clause in ScheduleD (act of March 3, 1883, chapter
121) imposing a duty on ''manufactures of cedar wood," etc.; but they
fall within the designation of lumber in the clause in same schedule
which imposes a duty ou "sawed boards, planks, deals," etc., and are
dntiable under the latter clause.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 21, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the 12th instant submits the inquiry
''whether mahogany boards and planks fall within the designation of lumber, within the provisions of Tariff Index No.
219, which is:
''Sawed boards, planks, deals, and other lumber, of white
wood, sycamore, and bass wood, one dollar per thousand feet,
board measur~. All other articles of sawed lumber, two
dollars per thousand feet, board m~asure; but when lumber
of any sort is planed or finished, in addition to the rates
herein provided there shall be levied aud paid for each side
so planed or finished fifty cents for each one thousand feet,
bohlrd measure; "
Or whether such boards or plank are to be construed as
"manufactures of mahogany," within the meaning of Tariff
Index No. 232, which is as follows:
''Manufactures of cedar wood, granadilla, ebony, mahog-
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any, rosewood, and ~atin wood, thirty-five per cent. ad
valorem."
Both of these clauses occur in Schedule D, " wood and
wooden wares." Throughout that schedule the different de·
grees of advancement in wbicb the a£·ticle therein enumerated
may be found in process of manufacture, from the crude material to the perfected product, are used as a basis of classification. The timber, the lumber, the lumber planed, the
unfinished final product, and the finished p11oduct gh-e rise
to difl'erent classifications and rates of duty, the rates increasing as the proc·ess of manufacture advances, the rate
imposed on the import described in Tariff Index No. 232,
''manufactures of cedar wood, granadilla, ebony, mahogany,''
etc., being the highest, and corresponding with the other
clauses of the schedule, Nos. 230 and 233, as the perfected
product. Tllis would indicate that at least some degree of
advancement in the process of manufacture was intended in
clause No. 232 beyond the mere crude material intended for
nothing special, except for sale or to be manufactured. The
word "manufactures" in this clause is intended to describe
an article that bas been madA or formed by hand or machinery for some known and specific use or purpose, either a!:) a
whole or a :ijnisbed part or element in such an article. When
a mahogany tree is cut down and cut in appropriate lengths
for transportation, and its bark or useless excrescenees re ·
moved by ax or saw, it might, in some possible sense, be
called a manufacture, but the statute .did not intend to impose the highest rate of duty on such an article. A distinction i made by Justice Woodbury in the case of Lawrence \ .
Allen (7 How., 785), as follows:
"Here, the juice or sap oft he india-rubber tree while liquid
or in its milky staw, whether then called caoutchouc or some
other name, is still a natural substaiJce and in its natural form;
and in one sense, and to a certain extent, its being hardened
and changed in color no less than consistency and bulk, by
fire and evaporation, whatever new form it may then be
turned into is a manufacture • * * yet, from the words
of the law, as well as its design, it is manifest that the indiarubber is not meant to be taxed as a manufacture, though so
hardened and changed, unless at the same time it is put into
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a shape which is suitable for use and adapted with a design to
be used in a way that is calculated to rival some domestic
manufacture here. rather than merely to furnish a raw material in a more portable, useful, and convenient form for other
manufactures here. In the latter case, within the policy and
purpose of the tarift law yielding protection, it is manufactured, or in other words, not rnc(;de abroad for use in its existing form, except as a raw material, like pig-iron, or pig-lead."
To the same effect see UnitedStates V". Potts (5 Cranch, 284).
This distinction would seem to be entirely apvlicable to the
question submitted. The mahogany boards and plank described in yours are chiefly designed for no particular design,
purpose, or use, only" to furnish a raw material in a more
portable, useful, and convenient form for other manufactures." Hence they are not dutiable as manufactures of mahogany under Tariff Index No. 232.
Clause 219, Tariff Index, divides lumber into two classes,
and imposes on the first class a duty of $1 per thousand feet
and on the second $2 per thousand. The first class in this
clause describes by name the less vaiuable character of lumber, and the second class.by general description em braces the
more valuable. Among the latter, mahogany, cherry, walnut,
and other valuable woods, doubtless are intended to be comprised. The imposition of duties, according to state of advancement in this schedule between the growing timber and
the perfected manufacture, would clearly indicate that the
ordinary American signification of the words "timber" and
''lumber" is adopted by the law-makers, by which timber is
generally understood to mean trees felled and unfeUed, and
the larger sills, beams, plates, etc., for houses, or corresponding materials for ships and other large structures. Lumber,
as so understood, is a further advancement in the preparation of the material for convenience and economy in transportation, and embraces such materials as are described in clause
No. 219, Tariff Index, as "sawed boards, plank deals," joist,
studdings, etc. Lumber, as so understood, is generic with
reference to the kind of wood of which it may be composed,
and if intended to he limited to any species of wood is qualified by the name of the wood, as "pine lumber," "cherry
lumber,"" ash lumber," etc. Hence, the.roahogany lumberre-
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ferred to in yours is included in the generic term ''lumber,"
and would, when merely sawed into boards and planks, come
within the clause No. 219, Tariff Index, and is dutiable accordingly.
The inclosures transmitted with yours are herewith returned.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND ..
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

FREE LIST.
A steam-pump and boring apparatus, used in deep prospecting for oil and
coal, with connectmg iron tubes, etc., brought into this country by a
coal and petroleum seeker for the purpose of pursuing his profession
here, do not come within the meaning and intent of the clause in the
act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, exempting from duty "implements,
instruments, and tools of trade, occupation, or employment of persous
arriving in the United States,'' and should not be admitted free.
DEPAR1.'MENT OF JUSTICE,

January 29, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the 21st instant submits whether" a
steam-pump and a drilling and boring apparatus, such as is
used for deep prospecting for oil and coal; certain iron tubes,
varying in length from 12 to 25 feet each, and tools for u~e in
connection therewith; which articles were brought into the
United States by Leon Mulet,, who is represented to be a coal
and petroleum seeker, and brought them with him for the
purpose of pursuing his profession in this country," should
be admitted free under the provisions of the clause of the
tariff act, Tariff Index No. 15, which is as follows:
"Wearing apparel in actual use and other personal e:ftects
(not merchandise), professional books, implements, instruments, and tools of trade, occupation. or employment of persons arriving in the United States; but this section shall not
be construed to include machinery or other articles imported
for use in any manufacturing establishment or for sale."
It is claimed that the importation should be admitted free
as the " implements, instruments, and tools of trade, occu-
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pation, or employment of persons arriving in the United
States."
The boring of artesian wells is closely allied in the variety
of machinery, tools, apparatus, implements, appliances, and
materials, to the driving of tunnels, engines, piping, tubing,
pumps, reamers, bits, steam-boilers, cables, ropes, packing;
and a very large assortment of different classes of manufacture are used and are essential to its intelligent prosecution.
In the use of a11 this material the employment of several persons of varied acquirements and occupations is necessary.
The steam-pump, piping, etc., are not intended for manual
use, but constitute, when combined, usually a large and powerful structure, which in no sense could be called a mere
"tool, implement, or instrument." The profession which with
this machinery undertakes to furnish or control the necessary
structure, material, and human help is that of a constructor
or superintendent. The clause in question was not intended
to receive so broad an interpretation. From its context it
would seem to apply to such implements, instruments, and tools
as were intended for the actual per~onal use of the immigrant,
or those following one and the same trade or occupation,
'under his personal supervision or employment. . The employes
in the boring of an artesian well belong to different occupations, varying from the common laborer to the skilled blacksmith, engineer, or driller. The implements, tools, apparatus,
and structures for all the different classes of work, do not
come within any single recognized trade, occupation, or employment. It is possible an exceptionally skilled mechanic
or machinist might be capable of successfully working at
each, but a true interpretation of the customs laws can not be
based upon such exceptio:Jal cases; and, in my opinion, the
pump, connecting pipes, etc., referred to in yours, should not
be recognized as coming within the intent of the clause of
the act above quoted.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY

OF

THE TREASURY.
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TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE.
In tbe act of June 19, 1878, chapter 329, which repeals section 1861,
Revised Statues, the clause, "one enrolling and engrossing clerk, l1t
$5 per day," is to be construed as providing for the employment of
but one clerk at the per diem mentioned.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 8, 1887.
SIR: In reply to yours of the 29th ultimo, in which my
attention is directed to the act of J une -19, 1878 (Stat. L.,
vol. 20, 193)! under the head ''Government in the Territories," repealing section 1861, Revised Statutes, I beg to say:
Section 1861 reads thus: ''The subordinate officers of each
branch of everJ' legislative assembly shall consist of one
chief clerk, who shall receive a compensation of eight dollars
per day, and of one assistant clerk, one enrolling clerk, one
engrossing clerk, one sergeant-at-arms, one door-keeper, one
messenger, and one watchman, who shall each receive a
compensation of five dollars per day during the sessions, and
no charge for a greater number of officers and attendants,
or any larger per diem, shall be allowed or paid by the United
States to any Territory."
The repealing section of 1878 provides: "That the subordinate officers of each branch of said Territorial legislatures
shall consist of one chief clerk, who shall receive a compensation of six dollars per day; one enrolling and engrossing
clerk, at five dollars per day; sergeant-at-arms. and doorkeeper, at five dollars per day; a messenger and watchman,
at four dolla1 s per day each; and one chaplain at one dollar
and fifty cents per day."
Is the copulative "and" disjunctive or conjunctive in
meaning in these phrases~
Section 1861 enumerates "one"enrolling clerk, one engrossing clerk, at five dollars per day," and makes provision for
the payment of both.
It is right to interpret the word "and" with a disjunctive
meaning when such meaning entirely coincides with the rest
of the statute and with the evident intention of the legislature. If there is evidence that a disjunctive meaning does
not harmonize with the. whdle statute, and does not repre-
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sent the intention of the legislature, then such meaning is
not admissible.
The repealing act aims at a reduction of United States. expenses, and this is the controlling idea. Another paragraph
of this section provides for ';one messenger and watchman
at four dollars per day each." The word '' each" makes the
difference-being for two persons" one messenger and watchman." The word "each" was not used after ''one enrolling
and engrossing clerk."
If it intended to pay $5 to an enrolling clerk and $5 to an
engrossing clerk, it was its duty to use similar language,
namely, "one enrolling and one engrossing clerk at $5 per
•
day each."
The legislature probably meant just what it said.
Using the punctuation as it stands, there is no doubt that
this is the meaning of the legislature. It is better for the
accounting officers of the Treasury to adopt this punctuation.
as mandatory in the settlement of Territorial accounts; and
/it is better therefore to avoid misleading a disbursing agent
into a loss, and this idea should prevail with the Territorial
officers.
This practical conclusion may not, however, be considered
the legitimate conclusion.
Does this punctuation express the meaning of the legislature~

The Supreme Court (105 U.S., 34, last paragraph) quotes
the opinion of Lord Kenyon that '' courts in construing acts
of Parliament or deeds should read them with such stops as
will give effect to the whole."
Applying this to the text in question, it will be seen that
while this printed punctuation gives" effect to the whole"
another punctuation leads to an opposite conclusion.
If punctuation be disregarded the provision will read:
" That the subordinate officers of each branch of said Territorial legislatures shall consist of one chief clerk who shall
receive a compensation of six dollars per day one enrolling
and engrossing clerk five dollars per day sergeant-at-arms
and door·keeper at :five dollars per day a messenger and
watchman at four dollars per day each."
This reading assigns a per diem of $5 each to an enrolling
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clerk and an engrossing clerk-and conflicts with no language of the act-allll it also gives ''effect to the whole."
In this alternative of constructicn another criteriou wust
be used, and that is the intention of the leg·islature, aud
that being plainly to reduce expenses it must l>e determiued
the law provides for only one clerk to enroll and engross at
Government expense.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF 1'HE IN1'ERIOR.
CHINESE EXCLUSION• ACT.
Body servants or nurses (Chinese) are not persons "other than laborers"
within the meaning of section 6 of the act of May 6, 1882, chapter 126,
as amehded by the act of July 5, 1884, chapter·220, when they come to
this country to ply their vocations, and are excluded .
• Where, however, such servants or nurses accompany visitors entitled to
enter the United States, and only remain here temporarily during the
stay of such visitors, they do not fall within the scope of the legislation referred to.

DEP .ARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,

Febrtttary 14, 1887.
SIR: In reply to your communication sub!;llitting for opinion the following questions :
"(1) Whether body servants or nurses may be considered
as persons 'other than laborers' within the meaning of section 6; and (2) whether Chinese persons, laborers or not,
coming into the United States as servants or nurses in the
service of temporary visitors other than those mentioned in
section 13 may properly be considered as 'in transit merely
across the territory of the United States,' within the meaning of these terms, as used in the opinion of the United States
Attorney-General referred to in the inclosed circular of Jannary 23, 1~83; "
I have the honor to submit the following opinion:
In answer to the first question I have to say that Chinese
''body servants or nurses" are not persons other than laborers, within the meaning of section 6 of the act of 1882, as
amended by the act of 1884, entitled "An act to execute
certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese," when such
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"body servant~ or nursetS '' eome within the United States to
plJ· their vocations in competition with our own people similarl,y employed.
In answer to the second question, I beg to submit that Chinese persons accofllpanying, as servants or nurses, visitors
entitled to enter the United States, and only temporarily remaining here during the stay of such visitors, whether to be
regarded as "in transit merely across tbe territory of the
United States," within the meaning of the opinion of Mr.
Attorney-General Brewster of the 26th December, 1882, or
not, they fall within a description of Ohinese laborers who,
according to the reasoning of that opinion, were not intended
to be excluded from the country by the legislation above
mentioned.
According to the opinion of my predecessor, it was the
Chinese laborer, who came to ·our shores for the purpose of
exercising his calling as laborer in competition with our own
labor, that was intended to be excluded as a disturbing element. But it can ·not be said, in my opinion (concurring as
I do in the views of my predecessor, whose reasoning I need
not repeat) that a Chinese servant accompanying a temporary
visitor to tbis country belongs to that class of Chinese laborers against whom our ports are closed as endangering
"the good order of certain localities."
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TRElSURY.

DRAGOON BARRACKS LOT AT ST. AUGUSTINE.
The piece of land known as the Dragoon Barracks lot, in St. Augustine,
Fla., and the buildings thereon, being the property of the United
States, may be appraised and disposed of in the manner provid~d by
the second and third sections of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 214.
DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

February H>, 1887.
SIR: I have considered the communication of the assistant
commissioner of the General Land Office, and other papers,
relative to the Dragoon Barracks lot in St. Augustine, Fla.,
which were referred to me by yon on the 28th ultimo.
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By these pape1·s it appears that said lot was set apart for
military purposes under the act of June 28, 1t;32, cltapter
152, and that recently, in accordance with the provisions uf
the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 214, it has been turned over
to the ~ecretary of the Interior for disposition under the
latter act. In 1869 or 1870 a frame building was erected
thereon by the Freedmen's Bureau for school purposes, and
subsequently a cottage was built upon the premises for the
accommodation of the teachers of the school, which has been
turned over to the American Missionary Society for its use.
This, however, did not alter the purpose of the reservation
from what it originally was. It still rell}ained a military
reservation, and as such came within the operation of the
act of 1884.
Assuming, then, that the ownership of the buildings mentioned, as well as the ownership of the land, is in the United
States, the whole of the property may be appraised and disposed of in the manner provided by the second and third
sections of that act. On the other hand, if the ownership of'
the buildings is not in the United States, but only that of
the land, I am nevertheless of the opinion that the latter
may be appraised and disposed of as provided by the second
section of the same act. Of course, in such case, the proprietors of the buildings should be notified to remove them
from the premises.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

SEIZURES IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY.
Where property is seized by the military authorities in the Indian
country for violation of the laws relating to the Indians, on or a~ soon
as practicable after report is made to the United States attorney it
should be placed in the custody of the proper civil offic~rs.
The provision of section 3086, Revised Statutes, by which property
seized under any law relating to the customs is left in the custody of
the collector or principal officer of the customs of the district, is not
to be considered as embraced in the prpceedings contemplated in section 2125 Revised Statutes, so as to permit the military employed in
making seizures to retain the custody rf the property to abide adjudication.
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DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUS'l'ICE,

February 16, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the 8th instant requests my opinion
.on the following question, contained in the communication
of the -acting judge advocate of the Department of the Mis·
souri:
"In cases of arrest in the Indian territories, where civil
proceedings only result, and when it is not deemed expedient
to transport the prisoners arrested to the seat of the district
court at Wichita, Kans., would it not be proper to hold the
goods authorized by law to be seized, making to the district
attorney the report required by section 3086, Revised Statutes (customs officers), and hold these goods in custody abiding the action of the civil authorities~"
Section 2137, Revised Statutes, provides that the traps,
guns, ammunition, aud peltries of persons found hunting,
who are unauthorized to hunt or trap on Indian reservations,
shall be forfeited.
Section 2150 authorizes the President to employ the mili·
tary to make such seizures as are authorized by law in the
Indian country.
Section 2125 provides : ''When goods or other property
shall be seized for any violation of this title (Indians), it
shall be lawful for the person prosecuting on behalf of the·
United States to proceed against such goods or other property
in the manner directed to be observed in the case of goods,
wares, or merchandise brought into the United States iu
violation of the revenue laws."
Section 3086 declares that "all merchandise or property
ol' any kind seized under the provisions of any law of the
United States relating to the customs shall, unless otherwise
provided for by law, be placed and remain in the custody of
the collector or other principal officer of the customs of the
district in which the seizure shall be made, to abide adjudication by the proper tribunal or other disposition according
to law."
The seizure suggested by the inquiry is the taking possession, without legal process, by the military forces, of the
property believed by the Government officer or agent to be
subject to forfeiture. This possession without process is in273-VOL XVIII--35
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tended to be limited in time to such reasonable period as
may be necessary to obtain legal process to deterrniue by
judicial proceedings in the civil courts whether the goods
seized are liable to forfeiture. The proceedings in the civil
courts are in rern, which implies the property to be passed
upon is in the possession of the court, actually or constructively. Hence, under the revenue laws of the United States,
in interpreting the provisions of the sixty-ninth section of
the revenue act of 1799 (1 Stat. L., 678), in the case of Ex parte
Hoyt, collector (13 Peters, 279), it wa~ ruled: ''The collector .
is not entitled to the custody of the goods seized under the
collection act of 1799 any longer than until proper proceedings have been ii1sLituted ulHler the eigbty-ninth section of
that act to ascertain whether they are forfeited."
This decision would, without further disetu;;sion, answer
the inquiry submitted, were it not that section 3086, wllich
supplied the place of the sixty-ninth section of the act of
1799, differs from it in that it expressly provides that the
merchandise seized shall ''remain in the custody of the collector or other principal officer of the customs of the district
in which the seizure shall be made, to abide adjudication by
the proper tribunal, or other disposition according to law.''
But this change in the law of 1799 does not prescribe that
the person or officer who makes the seizures shall retain the
~custody, but limits it expressly to the collector or the prin·c ipal officer of the customs, both of whom are local and bonded
officers. If, then, the military who make the seizure are to
reta;in the custody of the property SAized to abide official adjudication, it must be on some other ground than that the
military forces were employed in the seizure; for, regardless
of the fact as to whom the seizure may be made by, the collector or principal officer of customs becomes the custodian.
No othet sufficient reason exists. After the seizure, all proceediu gs as to the property are carried on by the civil officers
of the Goverument. The employment of the military forces
by the President to make the seizure, authorized as it is by
the statute, is substantially the employment of the military
outside of the ordinary duties of the Army, in a civil or quasicivil rlnty.
The residence of the military forces is constantly liable to
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change, and that change may be sudden aml to distant
points, outside of the jurisdiction of the court where the
z·iglltfulness of the seizure is required by law to be determined. The property seized or it8 proceeds, from the nature
of the proceeding, must be so secured as to be constantly
subject to the direct commands, orders, and decrees of the
proper court, and in such hands that a failure to obey such
orders or decrees can be directly and immediat.ely punished
by the court. Were the custody of the. property left in the
hands of the military forces, the danger of misunderstanding
.and collision between the civil and military authorities
would be incurred. The possibility that the property might
,suddenly be carried beyond the jurisdiction of the court
would be involved.
From these considerations it is concluded that the special
provision of section 3086, by which the property seized is
left in the custody of the collector or priucipal officer of the
·Customs for violation of the revenue service, i:s not to be considered as em braced in the proceedingR contemplated in
section 2125, so as to permit the military forces employed in
making seizures to retain the custody of the property t.o
.abide adjudication, but that on or as soon as is reasonably
practicable, after report is made to the United States district
attorney, the property should be placed in the custody of the
proper ciYil officer.
Very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The

SECRE1.'ARY OF WAR.

INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
A judgment against the United States for the sum of $44,800.74 was
given by the Court of Claims in favor of a claimant on April 20, 1885,
and on same day the latter presented this judgment to the Treasury
Department for payment. On July 14, 1885, the United States were
allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court, and on the next day a cross
appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed the claimant. On January
31,1887, the judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court, and a mandate subsequently issued therefrom ~lirecting the Court of Claims to
enter judgment in favor of the claimant for the sum of $130,196.9tl.
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Pursuant to such mandate judgment for this sum was entered by the
Court of Claims on February 10, 1887, and claimant thereupon presented the judgment so entered to the Treasury Department for pay.
ment, demanding interest ou the latter sum from April 20, 1885, at 5
per cent. per annum: Held th-at as the judgment of the Court of
Claims was not affirmed, but on the contrary was 1'e11ersed by the Supreme Court, interest is not allowable thereon under the provisions ot
section lO~JO, Revised Statutes.
Only such judgments of the Court of Claims as have been appealed
from to the Supreme Court and affirmed by the latter are interestbearing under that s~ction, antl they become interest-bearing from the
date of their presentation in good faith for payment.
Semble that a presentation made by a claimant who afterwards takes
an appeal from the judgment is of no avail.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 17, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the lOth instant, submits the following:
'" On the 20th day of April, 1885, in the Court of Claims,
the Pacific Railroad, claimant, recovered a judgment against
the United States for the sum of $44,800.74. On the 14th
day of July, 1885, the United States applied for and gave
notice of appeal from said judgment to the Supreme Court,
which application was on the same day fully allowed by the
Chief-Justice of the Court of Claims. On the 15th day of
July, 1885, the claimant made a similar application that was
also allowed. On the 20th day of April, 1885, the claimant
presented this judgment to the Treasury Department for
payment, and, on the ilth day of May, 1886, the same was
reported to Congress for an appropriation, and a sufficient
sum was appropriated to pay the same, without interest,
which sum is now available for that purpose. These appeals,
Nos. 728 and 1303 respectively, were duly docketed in the
Supreme Court and prosecuted to a hea.ring therein, and on
the 31st day of January, 1887, the judgment of the Court of
Claims was reversed, and a mandate ordered directing the
Court of Claims to enter judgment in favor of the claimant
for the full amount of the claim, viz, $130,196.98. On the
lOth day of February, 1887, judgment on the mandate was
entered in the Court of Claims, and the judgment thereon
presented for payment. The claimant now demands interest
on the latter sum from the 20th day of April, 1885, the date
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of the first judgment in the Court of Claims, at 5 per centum
per annum, and asks the Department that a recommendation
ue made to Congress that an appropriation be made to cover
such interest. As a matter of law, based on the foregoing
facts and existing statutes, is the claimant entitled to any
interest whatever; and if so, for what sum, and for what
period?"
The general rule is, that the Government does not pay interest. The exceptions to this rule are, when interest is provided for specifically by lawtul contract or by express statute
law. The canon of construction, that all laws which give
away public money are to be construed strictly against the
party to whom it is given, must be applied in the const,ruction of statutes allowing interest against the Government.
The statute allowing interest on judgments of :the Court of
Claims, applicable to the questions presented in your letter,
is section 1090, Revised Statutes, viz: "In cases where the
judgment appealed from is in fayor of the claimant, and the
same is affirmed by the Supreme Court, interest thereon at
the rate of 5 per centum shall be allowed from the date of
its presentation to the Secretary of tbe Treasury for payment
as aforesaid, but no interest shall be allowed subsequent to
the affirmance unless presented for payment to the Secretary
of the Treasury as aforesaid."
The clause ~'as aforesaid," twice occurring in thise sction,
refers to the preceding section (1089), which fixes what judgments of the Court of Claims shall be paid by the Secretary
of the Treasury, and what evidence shall be presented to him
before he is warranted in making payment. This section
divides the judgments of the Court ofUlaim~ into two classes:
the first, those which are not appealed to the Supreme Court;
and second, those which are appealed and affirmed. Section
1090 allows interest on the latter class onl~·. Judgments of
this class affirmed, become interest-bearing from the date
they are certified in legal form and duly presented by the
claimant for payment. The necessary elements of the indebtedness fixed by the statute authorizing the payment of in·
terest by the Government are:
(1) It must be a judgment of the Court of Claims.
(2) It must be appealed to the Supreme Court.
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(3) It muot be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
(4) It. must be a final judgment of the Court of Claims.
(5) It must be presented duly certified for p~yment.
Until all these requisites have been complied with, the·
judgment bears no interest. The facts stated by you show
that the claim presented is a judgment of the Court of Claims,
and that it was appealed both by the United States and the
claimant to the Supreme Court. The .first two conditions are
complied with. The third, under the facts stated and certificate presented, is not fulfilled. The certificate presented by
the claimaut, by virtue of which he demands interest, is as
follows: ".At a Court of Claims held in the city of Washington ou the 9th day of February, 1887, in the cause aforesaid,.
a mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States was
filed reversin the judgment of the Court of Claims rendered
on the 20th day of .April, 1885, for the claimant in the sum of
$44,800.74, and directing that judgment be entered for the full
amount claimed by said railway company; and, in pursuance
of said mandate, the court now orders, adjudges, and decrees that the said claimant, the Pacific Railway Company,do
have and recover of and from the United States the sum of
$130,196.98."
This copy of the judgment is all you have before you. It
is all the statute requires you shall have to act upon. The
statute says you shall only pay interest on judgments affirmed.
The certified copy of the judgment shows this judgment was
reversed. It is not permissible to take such liberties with the
language of the statute as to interpret the word "affirmed" as
meaning" reversed." Neither can you assume to construe the
word "reversed," in the certificate, into the word "affirmed,"
used in the statute. As stated by .Attorney-General Black,
in 9 Opinions, 59: "But if Congress has all the money of the
United States under its control, it has the whole English language to giveitawaywith, and it is so easy to usede.finiteterms
iu a law like this that when they were not used we will pretsume them not meant." If Congress had intended the wonl::;
''affirmed" in the statute and" reversed" iu the certified COJJ.Y
of the judgment to be construed by you as synonymous it
would have said so.
With full recognition of the learning and due defer~nce for
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the opinion of the Court of Claims, I am unable to concur in
\
the conclusions reached by tha.t court in the case of Ho'bbs v.
The United States (19 C. Cls. R., 226). I cannot conceive that
Congress intended the office1s of the Treasury, when a judgment came duly certified for payment, to enter into an analysis of that judgment, and allow interest on such part or parts
thereof as the Supreme Court concurred in the view of the
lower court, and refuse to allow on those which were modified or added thereto. In a case involving any items, this
analysis would be very onerous. In many cases it would impose on the administrative officer the interpretation of decrees requiring a high order ofjudieial knowledge and much
research. It would lead to great uncertainty in administration. When it is further considered that the law has limited
the evidence submitted to you to the record of the judgment
only, which furnishes neither the opinion nor :fiudings of the
Court of Claims, nor the opinion nor action of the Supreme
Court specifically on the several findings, it seems obvious
that the plain fact of what the judgment is, and the result
set out in the copy presented, without any analysis or subdivision, is to l)e the sole guide in determining whether interest,
so far as this question is concerned, is to be charged or not.
When the Supreme Oourt declar,· s the judgment is reversed,
it must be accepted as reversed; when it declares the judgment is affirmed, that fact is not open to question. If reversed it bears no interest; if affirmed, and the other requireements exist, it bears interest. In this case, the certified
copy shows the judgment reversed; tllerefore it bears no
interest.
The conclusion thus reached on the third element essential to constitute an interest-bearing judgment disposes of
the whole case submitted; but it may be added, before allowing interest on judgments, the rema·i ning two necessary
facts above mentioned must be shown to exist, for section
1092 provides that '"The payment of the amount due by any
jndgrnent of the Court of Claims, and of any interest thereon
allowed by law as Lereinbefore provided, shall be a full discllarge to the United States of all claims and demands touching any of the matters involved in the controversy."
That the payment ''shall be a full discharge" of the whole

\
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controversy clearly implies that, so long as the controversy
is stiil pending, with the possibility of increase in amount,
the payment was not intended to be made. The law can not
properly be regarded as intending that a dew and on the Secretary of the Treasury for the payment of that which he could
not fully discharge by payment, and which he is forbidden
to pay unless fully discharged,. should be such a default on
the part of the Government as would subject it to interest.
By the statute the claimant is not authorized to present his
judgment only to comply with a mere unsubstantial form,
by demanding that which can not be done, and which the act
of the complainant under the law prevented compliance with,
in order to enable him to draw interest from that date. The
complainant must present it in good faith for payment. If
it is presented for any other purpose it is not such a presentation as the statute req aires. Hence, I apprehend it is only
where the payment of the judgment of the Court of Claims
appealed from is left as final aud undisturbed by an affirmance by the Supreme Court, and a copy of the judgment has
been duly presented for payment, that interest runs from the
date of presentation. But when the claimant himself within
the niuety days takes his appeal after presentation, it is such
evidence that tbe presentation was not made for payment,
but as a means to secure interest on his claim, as would
make such presenting of his claim of no avail.
The papers with yours transmitted are herewith returned.
Very respectfully,
.A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.
The article known as" Cooper's Sheep Dipping Powder" is dutiable at
50 per centum ad valorem, under the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121.
DEP lt.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the 12th instant requests, substantially,

my views as to the construction of clause No. 99, Tariff Index of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, with reference to the
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appeal of R. Francklyn & Co. from the assessment of duty
<HI an importation of "Cooper's Sheep Dipping Powder.''
If those portions of the clause which have no direct bearing be eliminated, it provides: "All powders recommended
to the public as proprietary articles, or prepared according
to some private formula as remedies or specifics for any
disease or diseases or affections whatever afi'ecting the human
or animal body~ not specifically enumerate<l or provided for
in this act, fifty per centum ad valorem."
With reference to the last sentence in this clause, it is only
necessary to say the importation is not elsewhere in the act
specifically provided for; and if not dutiable under the
:elause, it would be subject to the provisions of section 2513,
as non-enumerated. That the importation is a powder is undisputed. The collector of the port of New York, with his
communication of the 24th of November, 1886, furnishes a
pamphlet taken from an importation of the powder, prepared by the manufacturer and intended for distribution
with the goods imported, which contains the purpose for
which the article was made and the uses for which it is
recommended, with testimonials as to its utility and efficiency. If the statements and testimonials furnished by the
manufacturer be true as set forth in this pamphlet, they
establish all the facts necessary to subject the importation
to the provisions of the clause quoted above. The whole
pamphlet has for its purpose the recommendation of the powder. It alleges that William Cooper and nephews are the
''sole proprietors and manufacturers" of this powder. It
advertises it by the proprietary name of ''Cooper's Sheep
Dipping Powder." It describes it as having a character of
its own, distinct from all other competing preparations. It
claims an especial merit from the particular mode of manufacture. It cautions the public against spurious imitations.
It seems to have all the characteristics to constitute it a proprietary article,· as that term is defined in the case of Ferguson v. Arthur (117 U.S. R., 488.) On page 5 of the pamphlet, after quoting other advertisements concerning other
cures for "scab in sheep," it claims especial merit as a '" specific for scab." It expressly declares'' Cooper's Dip has always been a certain specific for scab at ordinary strength." In
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describing "scab in sheep'' the pamphlet d~clares it ' 6 a disease * * * working fearful havoc;" a" fearfully virulent
and infectious disease;" a "terribly formidable disease;" and
dEscribes the disease as one of "an insidious and virulent
nature." The testimonials printed seem to corroborate tllese
statements. If these statements be true, the powder is
dutiable as assessed.
The ground taken by the importer, that "disease" and
"affection" are synonymous in strictly scientific lang·uage,
does not relieve the importation from the effect of the enactment; for the word is in popular use, and, as is ruled in the
case of Maillard v. Lawrence (16 How., ~61), "the popular
or received import of words furnish the general rule fo!' the
interpretation of public laws, as well as of private and personal .t rausactions." It is clear from the language of the enactment itself, '• disease or diseases or affections whatever
affecting the human or animal body," that, if the words be
synonymous, the term "dl's€ase" was intended to be interpreted in the broadest generic sense. As popularly understood in this sense, the people do not stop before using the
term ~o inquire whether s~entifically an ailment was caused
by a microscopically small insect under the skin or among
the tissues of the body, or was the result of poisonous gas
inhaled through the lungs. The fact that it is not produced
by perceptible actual external violence, and is harmful to
health, and may occasion suffering or death, is sufficient to fill
the popular definition of "disease" as used in the statute.
The second ground assumed by the importer, that the
powder is a prevention of the scab and not the cure, in that
it only kills the insects that are alleged to cause the disease,
is not tenable. One of the main purposes of any remedy for
disease is to remove the cause, so that the health-restoring
powers of nature may overcome the effect. It is not at all
inconsistent with the character of a remedy for, that it is a
preventive as well of the disease. It may be both ; and if
the allegations of the manufacturer be true, the powder described in this importation is both. He claims it will kill the
insect before the scab has resulted, and it will cure the scab
after it has developed, b.v remodng from under the skin the
cause which produced it, so as to permit the recuperatiYe
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powers of nature to assert themselves with effect. To destroy an agent harmful to health befOie it is attached to or
bas affected the body is to prevent-to destroy it after it has
penetrated the body and produced effects which will be perpetuated and progressive in the body and baleful to health,
is an ordinary means to cure.
Hence, it is concluded no sufficient reason appears to exist to warrant a change in your former ruling, No. 7472, on
substantially the samR questions involved in this appeal.
Very respectfully,
A.H.GARLAND • .,
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
CHEROKEE STRIP.
The lands lying in the "Cherokee Strip" which are leased to the whites
are not lands of the United States within the meaning of section 5388,
Revised Statutes.
The woru "foreigner,'; in section 2134, Revised Statute3, i8 used in its
ordinary signification-meaning one who is born out of the United
States and is not naturalized, or who owes allegiance to any other gov- .
ernment than that ofthe United States.
Property seized by the military under the provisions of section 2137,
Revised Statutes, should, as soon as practicable, after report of seizure
to the United States attorney, be placed in the custody of the proper
civil officers.
Section 5388, Revised Statutes, makes no provision for seizure of property belonging to a wrong-doer.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 24, 1887.
SIR : By your letter of the 18th instant, you request my
opinion on three questions:
The first is, HAre the lands leased to the whites in Cher.okee Strip lands of the United States referred to in section
5388, Revised Statutes, or otherwise~"
The Cherokee Strip referred to in your inquiry, I assume, ,
is the land described in the seventeenth article of the treaty
of the 19th of June, 18G6 (14 Stat., 804), by which the land
therein described is ceded to the United States in trust as
set forth in the treaty. Section 5388 is almost a literal reenactment of the act of the 3d of March, 1859, the title to
which is "An act to protect the timber growing upon lands

556

liON. A. II. GARLAND
Cherokee Strip.

of the United States reserved for military and other purposes." The enactment in its terms limits its provisions to
lands "which, in pursuance of law, may be reserved or purchased for military or other purposes." The section being
highly penal, the reservation or purchase contemplated
therein must be for some specific national purpose or use of
the United States. The beneficiary of the proceeds of the
land contained in the strip, by virtue of the provisions of the
trust, is the Cherokee tribe of Indians. When the United
States became the trustee the purpose of the trust was, and
siill js, the sale of the lands according to the terms of the
treaty. This is not such a purpose or reservation for the use
of the United States as is contemplated by section 5388, referred to in your first inquiry.
Your second inquiry js, '' What does the word' foreigner'
embrace in section 2134, Revised Statutes~"
The word referred to embraces those who are born out of
the United States, who are not naturalized, and who owe
allegiance to any other Government than that of the United
States; an alien. It is used in its ordinary signification.
This section was originally enacted as the sixth section of
the act of the 30th of June, 1834 (4 Stat., 730). The fifteenth
section of the same act imposes the same penalty prescriued
by this section on any citizen or other person residing among
the Indians who shall carry on correspondence with any foreign power to incite any Indian nation to war against the
United States. This fifteenth section described specifically
the mischief which was intended to be guarded against by
the sixth section. The history of the early days of theRepublic inspired the belief that many of the Indian wars and
outbreaks were instigated by the influence of aliens un- .
friendly to the Government. This induced the policy of
forbidding access to the Indian tribes for foreigners without
passports from the proper Government official. Section 2134
was originally enacted in pursuance of that policy, and was
literally re-enacted in the Revised Statutes. In the context,
·both in the Revised Statutes and in the act of 1834, when
others beside foreigners are intended to be embraced, the
language "any person other than an Indian" is used. In
the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (5 ·Peters) it is ruled
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"An Indian tribe or nation witilin tile United States is not a
foreign state within tile meaning of sect,ion 2 of the third
article of the Constitution." ''They may more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations." From
this it would seem to follow that a citizen of the United
States is not described as a foreigner as to the Indian
tribes resident in the United States, in the legislation of the
National Government.
Your third inquiry is: ''Can timber, hunting traps, etc.,
seized under the provisions of sections 5388 and 2137, Revised Statutes, be held by the militars to await the result of
prosecution, as in the case of goods seized by custom-house
officers 1"
By reference to my letter of the 16th of February, 1887,
you will find the subject involved in this question fully con·
sidered. The result there reaclled is that property seized by
the military under the provisions uf section 2137 should, as
soon as is reasonably practicable after report of the seizure
shall have been made to the United States district attorney,
be placed in the custody of the proper civil officer. Section
5388 makes no provision for seizure of the property which
belongs to a wrong-doer, but subjects him to the penalties of
:fine and imprisonment.
I am, very respectfully,

A. H. GARLAND.
The

SECRETARY OF WAR.

INDIAN IMMIGRATION.
A body of Indians bom and dwelling outside of the territorial limits of
the United States, and still maintaining their tribal relations, can not,
without authority of Congress, enter upon and occupy our public
domain as emigrants.
The power of tlie President to set apart a portion of the public domain
for the exclusive occupancy of Indians does not include the case of a
reservation for Indians not born or commorant in the United States.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

February 28, 1877.
Your letter of the 24th instant, with the accompanying inclosures, presents for consideration the statement that
SIR:
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a body of about one thousand Indians, who are natives of
and residents within the limits of Briti~Sh Columbia, about
20 miles from the line of Alaska, who ha\'e attained an advanced state of civilization, are self-supporting, and are
organized into a community governed by a council, wish to
emigrate into Alaska. You inquire, "Whether the Indians
as alJove described can go into Alaska as emigrants and then
secure such rights alS are accorded to the residents of th9.t
Territory who are not Indians; and as they wish to go as a
colony, whether, under existing laws, it would be competent
for the Presideilt to set aside as a reservation for such colony
such reas()nable portion of unoccupied land in that Territory
as they may select for their location."
Immigration of peaceful iudividual Indians who have dissolved tribal relations is not prohibited by statute and is
not inconsistent with the general policy of our Government,
but a band of Indians boru within the United States, who
maintain their tribal relations, is regarded by the law substantially as an independent domestic nation under the
guardianship of the United States. If such tribe be born and
reside outside of the United States, and still maintains the
tribal or national character, it can not be entitled to emigrate
and locate on public lauds of the Government; for the very
fact of a national existence implies possession of a place of
habitation, laws, customs, or traditions vf government, with
some or all of the attrilJutes of a body politic. Such a
people thus organized, locating upon a body of public lands,
would exclude such occupancy and enjoyment as is contemplated by our land laws by such persons as are entitled to
purchase and appropriate, or subject them to usages, customs,
and traditions inconsistent with the general laws. The permanent guardianship or supervision of such a domestic dependent nation can not be assumed by the executive department of the Government without the authority of positive
laws, except as to those Indians who are born within the
United States. If the Indians referred to in yours should
as distribed individual Indians immigrate, the rights of
such individual Indians would not in any respect rise higher
that those of any other foreigner, and they would be much
less than foreign white emigrants, lJecause the provision of
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law for naturalization would not apply to them. The provisions of the homestead law, by the fifteenth section of the
act of the 3d of March, 1875 (18 Stat., 420), which extended
the benefits of the homestead law to Indians who have abandoned the tribal relation properly qualified, is limited in its
operations to Int1ians ~'born iil the United States." The proviso to the eighth section of the act of the 17th of May, 1884
(23 Stat., 26), only reserves in Alaska the rights of Indians
and other persons then in possession or claiming lands
therein. There seems to be no provision of law assuring to
suchioreign Indians any legal right to acquire lands. The
geueralland laws of the United States, except the mining
laws, have not been extended to Alaska. The President,
then, can not by virtue of any necessity arising in the administration of those laws set aside a reservation. His power
to declare permanent reservation for Indians to the exclusion of others on the public domain does not extend to Indians not born or resilient in the United States. The case
you submit does not c me within the scope of any power
granted to the Executive; but while the present policy of the
Government and tendency of legislation is to aid and encourage the Indian tribes to advance in civilization and enlightenment, so that at no distant period they may be qualified
to become a part of the homogeneous mass of the American
people, skilled and educated in the arts of peace, with all
the rights and privileges of citizenship, if the case submitted
be one properly the subject of relief, that relief must be sought
at the hands of Congress.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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REGISTRY OF VESSELS.
A registered vessel of the United States which has been altered in form
or burden in a foreign port may be registered anew on her arrival in
t,he United States; but the new registry can not be made unless the
ship and owners conform to the requirements necessary for an original
registry.
If the alteration amounts to such a substantial rebuilding of the vessel
as that the owner could not truthfully make oath that it was built iu
the United States it would not be entitled to registry.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 4, 1887.
SIR: I understand from your letter of the 24th of February, 1887, with the papers therewith transmitted, that Peter
Wright and son desire to register as "a vessel of the United
States" the steam-ship Ohio, and with reference thereto yon
ask my opinion as to "whether a vessel of the United States,
sent abroad for alteration in form or burden in a foreign
port other than a lake port, may be registered as a vessel of
the United States anew on her arrival in the United States.''
The law with reference to the registry of vessels is statutory. The essential requisites of a vessel, tC! authorize an
original registry, are set forth in the second section of the
act of the 31st of December, 1792, which was substantially
re-enacted as section 3142 Revised Statutes, and so far asapplicable to the case submitted are as follows : ''Vessels built
within the United States and belonging wholly or in part to
citizens thereof * * * may be registered."
The Ohio was built in the United States, regularly registered according to law, and was and yet appears to be owned
wholly by a corporation of citizens of the United States. The
fact that she was and is now registered as a vessel of the
United States is sufficient ground for a presumption that all
the facts necessary to warrant registry existed. But a change
has been or is about to be made by repairs or alterations to
the vessel in Glasgow, Scotland. She is undergoing renewals or alterations in her boiler and machinery; the deckhouses on her spar-deck are to be extended and the cabin
below removed, which will increase the carrying capacity
of the vessel. Under the provisions of section 4170, Revised.
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Statutes, which also was originally enacted in 1'f92, such
changes will require a new measurement and a new registry.
The real question to be answered is : Do the changes described, being made in Scotland, preclude the registry as " a
vessel of the United States¥"
The general rule of law is, a ship is always presumed the
same though all the materials which at first had given it
existence have been succesRively changed; though all the
mern bers of a body or its parts are changed through the lapse
of time, nevertheless by force of substitution the body is still
presumed the sawe; it is always the same people, the same
Senate, the same legion, the same edifice, the same flock, the
sawe ship (Emerigon, Insu., pp. 144, 145). How far is this
general principle affected by our law in reference to the
registry of vessels t
Section 4170, Revised Statutes, so far as relevant to this
inquiry, is: ''Whenever any vessel which has been registered is altered in form or burden, by being lengthened or
built upon, or from one denomination to another, by the mode
or method of rigging or fitting, the vessel shall be registered
anew by her former name, according to the directions hereinbefore contained, otherwise she shall cease to be deemed a
vessel of the United States."
This section would seem to very accurately describe the
changes that are made, or to be made, in the Ohio. If the
changes were made in the United States instead of Scotland,
the vessel, without doubt, would be entitled to registry as
the 8ame vessel with the same name. To allow new registry
the section does not require that the alteration or change
shall be made in the United States. In the interpretation
of section 4170, the words" in the United States," can not
be added so as to have it read "or is altered in form or burden in the United States." Such a change would be legislation and not interpretation.
It would very materially
change the statute as written. The navigation act may well
require, to encourage ship-building, that no vessel shall be
entitled to the provisions of registry as a vessel of the United
States unless built in the United States; but to declare,
with a knowledge of the perils of the sea and the vicissitudes
of distant navigation, that any or every alteration or refit273-VOL XVI n--36
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ting of the vessel, after it has been built or launched, should
forfeit the rights of registry and denationalize the ship, would
be quite a difl"erellt matter, and one that should not be incorporated into the navigation laws by mere int('.rpretation.
That the general navigation laws were not to bear such a
construction is shown by the fact that the twenty-third section of the act of the 28th of July, 1866, re·enacted as section 3114, Revised Statutes, provides specially for the le,·ying of duties on the value of repairs, refittings, etc., in a
foreign country of vessels licensed under the laws of the
United States on the northern, northeastern, and northwestern frontiers foreign or coasting trade; but no implica·
tion is contained in the act that such repairs should forfeit
the right to license as to vessels so repaired. If, in connection with this, it be borne in mind that section 4312, ReYised
Statutes, originally enacted in 1793, requires the same qualifications for the enrollment of such vessels for such tra<le as
are required by law for registry for general foreign trade,
the inference is strong that mere repairing in a foreign
.country is not such a change in the ship as to prPclude
registry. But section 4170 does require that the applicant
·for new registry shall comply with "the directions hereinbefore contained." The directions referred to are tl.wse contained in the act of 1792 as re enacted. The new registry
can not be made unless the ship and owners conform to the
requirements necessary for an original registry, and furnish
the e\'ittence in conformit~· to law. If the refitting, altering,
or repairing in the foreign country amounts to such a substantial rebuilding of the ship as that the owner could not
truthfully make the oath that she was built in the United
States, such a ship would not be entitled to registry; but if
the modification, alteration, or repairing leaves the main
structure substantially identical so that it can truthfully be
regarded b~· those familiar with maritime afhtirs as an alteration or repairing· only, and not a substantially new construe
tion, when considered as a whole, it may rightfully, upon
compliance with the other requirements of the navigation
laws, be granted a new registry.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
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LEMHI INDIAN RESERVATION.
Where Indians on a reservation made by order of the President are organized tribes or bands, and placed under the charge of an agent appointed by the Government, the laws applicable to Indian reservations
must be regarded as applicable to t.hem.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 7, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the 1st of March, 1887, with the in-

closed papers, presents a petition by Charles H. Thompson,
in behalf of a mining company which he represents, asking
you to make an order directing the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs "to instruct the agent in charge of the Lemhi Indian
Reservation" that be is not to interfere with the petitioner
or prevent him from constructing H a ditch from a point on
the Lemhi River, within the reservation, through a part of
the reservation, for the purpose of carrying water from the
river for use below for mining and agricultural purposes."
It is Rtated the division of the water and the right to dig
the canal or ditch would be useful to the petitioners and beneficial in its effect to the Indians. These same facts exist in
many cases where one man could use his neighbor's property
with advantage both to himself and his neighbor; bu't still,
as a rule, it is better to maintain the rights of property under
the law. All the questions involved in this case are substantially answered by an opinion rendered to your Department,
July 21, 1885.
But tbe petitioners allege the reservation is not a legal one,
and in consequence thereof the Indians for whom the reservation was made are only tenants at will of the Government.
But the rights of tenants at will, so long as the landlord does
not elect to determine the tenancy, are as sacred as those of
a tenant in fee. If the reservation is not authorized by law,
on dispossessing the Indians by the Government the land
would be subject to the general laws applicable to the public
domain; but while Indians in a reservation made by order
of the President are organized in tribes or bands, and as such
maiutain a quasi-national character; are placed under the
charge of an agent appointrd by the Government according
to law; and are in the actual peaceable possession, the laws
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applicable to Indian reservations must be recognized as applicable to them. In the case of Purnpelly v. Green Bay Company (13 Wall, 166), the principle is ruled that taking such
privileges as are asked by the petitioner would be the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
Attorney-General Devens, in an opinion reported in 16
Opinions, page 553 (in which I concur), maintained that the
United States had power to grant such privileges as are
asked for by the petitioner in this case; but the power to make
the grant exists only in Congress, and without action by Congress it can not be lawfully exercised. The conclusion then
is, in the absence of Congressional action, the right should
not be granted to the petitioners in this case to enter upon
the Lemhi Reservation, unless the Indians be lawfully removed or dispossessed.
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SEORETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

SHIPPING.
Vessels used exclusively for pleasure, and not carrying freight or passengers for pay, are not liable to the penalty prescribed in section 4371,
Revised Statutes.
Nor are such vessels, when navigating waters of the United States between district and district, or between different places in the same
district, subject to the duties prescribed by section 4219, Revised
Statutes.
·
DEP.A.RTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 10, 1887:
By your letter of the 24th February, 1887, you ask
my opinion as to "whether foreign-built or domestic vessels,
undocumented under the laws of the United States and used
exclusively for pleasure, and therefore not carrying freight
or passengers for pay, are en titled, if owned by American
citizens, to proceed in waters of the United States between
district and district, or between different places in the same
district, without becoming liable to the dues and penalties
mentioned in sections 4371 and 4219 of the Revised Statutes,
SIR:
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and section 7 of the act of June 19, 1886, on their arrival at a
port of the United States."
The penalties mentioned in section 4371 as well as section
7 of the act of the 19t'h of June, 1886, are, by the terms of·
the enactments, imposed upon and limited to vessels found
"trading between district and district." The statutes, being
penal, are not to be enlarged by interpretation. While the
very enlarged sense in which "trade" is used by lexicographers and poets may possibly include the mere pursuit of
pleasure as a relaxation or amusement within the term
''trading," such is not its common and commercial signification. In this latter sense the statute should be construed.
The act of the 7th of August, 1848, reproduced as section
4214 of the Revised Statutes, and re-enacted and amended
by the act of the 3d of March, 1883 (22 Stat., 566), indicates
that a vessel exclusively used only for that purpose, and
which carried no passengers nor freight, is not embraced in
the term " trading " as used in section 4371. This last system of legislation originates and recognizes a class of v.e ssels
used exclusively for pleasure, or by competition to inspire
improvement in construction and navigation, as one distinguished from trade. It relieves the vessels in this new class,
when properly documented, from the obligation of entry and
clearing at the custom-houses. Section 4371 only includes
those '~found trading." The vessels described in yours are
vessels constructed for pleasure and not trade, and are therefore not subject to the penalties prescribed in section 4371.
'rhe portion of section 4219 to be considered in reply to
your inquiry is: "Upon vessels which shall be entered in the
United States from any foreign port or place there shall be
paid duties as follows : On vessels built within the United
States, but belonging wholly or in part to subjects offoreign
powers, at the rate of thirty cents per ton ; on other vessels
not of the United States, at the rate of fifty cents per ton.
Upon every vessel not of the United States which shall be
entered in one district from another district, having on board
goods, wares, or merchandise, taken in one district to be
delivered in another district, duties shall be paid at the rate
of fifty cents per ton."
The vessels described in the first clause of this statute are
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those "which shall be entered in the United States from any
foreign port." This is inapplicable to the subject submitted
by you, which is confined to vessels" proceeding in waters
of the United States between district and district, or between
different places in the same district." The vessels described
in the second clause are those "having on board goods,
wares, or merchandise taken in one district to be delivered
in another district." This clause is not applicable to the
character of the vessels described in your letter, the language of which is, such as are" used exclusively for pleasure,
and therefore not carrying freight - or passengers for pay."
The vessels described in yours I understand to mean those
"not having on board goods, wares~ or merchandise, taken
in one district to be delivered to another." Therefore theduties prescribed by section 4219 are not collectible thereon.
I am, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CRUISERS CHICAGO, BOSTON, AND ATLANTA.
The unexpended balances of the appropriations made by the act of
March 3, 1883, chapter 97, under the beadings" Bureau of Construction
and Repair," and "Bureau of Steam Engineering," may be n~:oed in
completing the bulls and machinery of the cruisers Chicago, Boston,
and Atlanta, proviG.ed the total expenditure shall not exceed the total
estimated cost thereof, as reported by the Naval Advisory Board.
The balance of an appropriation made for a specific purpose may be used
for that purpose in the discharge of obligations imposed by a lawful
continuous contract;
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 12, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the lOth instant submits for my opinion the following questions:
"First. Whether the available balances of general appropriations under the Bureau of Construction and Repair,
and Steam Engineering, or a sufficieut portion thereof, can
or ean not be lawfully put to use in or toward the completion
of the un:fini~hed cruisers known as the Chicago, Boston, and
Atlanta.
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"Second. Whether thea,ailable balances of the appropriations under the respective heads of Bureau of Construction
and Repairs and Bureau of Steam Engineering can be used
in completing the bulls and machinery of the Chicago, Boston,
and Atlanta, provided tbe total expenditure shall not exceed
the total el:'timated cvst of the hulls of said vessels as reported by the Naval Advisory Doard."
On the 26th day of July, 1883, the Secretary of the Navy
made a contract with John Roach for the building of three
cruisers, the Chicago, Atlanta, and Boston, and dispatch boat
Dolphin. That contract was authorized by an act of Congress of the 3d of March, 18H3 (22 Stat., 477). The contract
was reported in full to Congress by the Secretary of the Navy
in his report of the 1st day of December, 1883 (Report, p. 56).
It was recognized by name and description by Congress in
an appropriation made in pursuance of it, in an act of the
7th of J ulJ, 1884 (13 Stat., 262). The act of the 3d of March,
1883, contemplated a continuous contract, for which the estimate for tbe vessels made according to express statutory requirements, for the hulls and machinery, was $3,:390,000. The
appropriation for the year ending J nne 30, 1884, including
the expenditures of the balances of general appropriations
for construction and repair, was $1,340,000. As this appropriation was so far below the estimate, the inference arises
that the contract was intended by the original authorization
to be continuous. The contract as made and reported to
Congress was continuous. Its obligatory covenants ran to
the building and finishing of the vessels as to their hulls and
machinery.
The seventh paragraph of the contract provides for the
completion of the vessels for delivery on or within eighteeu
montbs from its date, and for a lien thereon to insure their
completion and indemnify tbe Government.
The eleventh paragraph provides for the enforcement of
the lien by forfeiture for breach.
The twelfth paragraph providts for the completion of the
vessels by the Secretary of the Navy in case of forfeiture,
with right to take possession of the yard, plant, and tools
of Roach, the contractor, for that purpose.
The thirteenth provides that the work on the vessels shall
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be proceeded with when so forfeited without unnecessary
delay to completion; that if the cost~ of completion exceed
the contract price, John Roach and his sureties shall make
up the difference; and if, after completion and payment of
the outlay thereon, any balance shall appear in favor of the
contractor it shall be paid him. In pursuance of these provisions of the contract the vessels have become the property
of the United States, unfinished, and their completion under
the contract is an urgent continuous obligation of the Government, whose discharge is imposed .on the Navy Department. It has therefore become the duty of the United States
to finish the construction of the vessels, which now belong
to the General Government and are unfinished.
Attorney-General Cushing (7 Opin., 3), on the 9th of October, 1854, in discussing the subject of unexpended balances
of appropriations, states:
''Now the rule of construction and the practice of the
Government is believed to be universal as applied to appropriations: that where a contract, a personal se:rvice,
or other claim of the Government is a coptinuous one, there
the balance remaining of the appropriation made in and for
one year laps over into the following year. Thus, where an
appropriation is marle for building a specific number of frigates, though it be nominally in and for the service of one year,
yet it may be applied in continuation into the next year."
On the 12th of N o'rem ber, 1854 (7 Opin., 15), discussing the
same subj~ct and referring to the former opinion, he re·peats
the same thought as follows :
"By the copy of that opinion, which is herewith inclosed,
you will perceive that, upon sufficient consideration of the
subject, I came to the conclusion that, as a general rule, where
a contract or other claim of the Go,ernment is a continuous
one, and still current, there the balance of appropriations
made for one year for such serdce laps over into the following year, and is continuously applicable. to the same
object. No room for controversy oo the point can exist, unless by the lapse of time the balance be alleged to belong to
the surplus fund in the Treasury. That happens in two years
after the expiration of the fiscal year for which an appropriation is made."
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But, on the 1st day of July, 1870, an act was passed, the
fifth, sixth, and seventh sections of whicl' are reproduced as
sections 3690, 3691, and 3679 of the Revised Statutes. The
effect of this legislation upon continuous contracts was very
fully and carefully reviewed by Attorney-Genera] Ackerman,
as reported in 13 Opinions, page 291.
The first inquiry propounded to him was: "First. Can
balances of appropriations made for the fiscal years 1869 and
1870 be applied to the service of the years 1870 and 1871 '"
The answer is: "Recurring then to your first question, I
am of opinion that balances of appropriations made for the
fiscal years 1869-'70 of any description, even when contained
in annual appropriation bills and made specifically for that
fiscal year, may be applied to the service of the years 1870-'71
so far as, first, to pay any current year expenses properly
incurred in the former year: and second, to pay dues upon
contracts properly made within the former year, even if the
contracts be not performed until within the latter or current
year. This is plainly allowed (by express exception to prohibitions) in the very terms of section 5."
I concur in this view, that the balance of the appropriation
made for a given purpose may be used for that purpose, in
the discharge of the ouligations imposed by a lawful continuous contract, even though the appropriation be contained in
the general annual appropriation bill, if the terms of the appropriation are applicable to the purpose to which it is proposed to be applied. The language of the appropriation to
which you refer is:
''Bureau of Construction and Repair: For * * * completion of vessels on the stocks; purchase of materials of
all kinds; and for the general care, increase, and protection
of the Navy in the lines of construction and repair, nine.
hundred thousand dollars.
"Bureau of Steam Engineering: For * * * completion of machinery and boilers of naval vessels, * * *
seven hundred and sixty- three thousand dollars."
The vessels named in yours are now naval vessels of the
United States. They are in charge of the Department of the
Navy; they are uncompleted, and by a continuous contract,
as well as an urgent duty, their completion is by law im-
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posed on that Department. An available balance of a former
appropriation, appropriated in the above language, stands
unexpended on the books of the Department. The terms of
the appropriation acts seem to warrant the application to the
purpose proposed.
But there is a limitation in the act of the 3d of 1\farch,.
1883, which, as to the hulls, machinery, and armament of the
vessels, must be borne in mind, which is: ''And the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to construct said vessels, and
to procure their armament, at a total cost not exceeding the
amounts estimated by the Naval Advisory Board." This
enactment, being pari materia with the legislation under consideration, must be construed with and regarded as a part of
it. Hence the expenditure on the bulls and machinery must
be kept within the limits of the estimate made by the Board.
This would be true as applied as a whole to the hulls, machinery, and armament, had not the armament been excluded
from the contract with Roach, and, by subsequent legislation
and specific appropriations therefor made, which as to the
armament exceeded the estimate; which relieved the armament, to the extent the amount the specific appropriation
exceeded the estimate therefor, from the limitation. Hence,.
the armament is prevented by the limitation from further
completion, except to the extent that, by the specific appropriations therefor, that limitation as to it was enlarged. The
bulls and machinery you state have not yet reached the
amounts of estimates made by the Advisory Board therefor
by $239,659.77. To that extent the hulls and machinery are
then relieved from the effect of the limitation.
Hence, as your first question would include the armament
as well as the hu11s and machinery, it is answered in the negative. Your second question is answered in the affirmative
to the extent above suggested.
I am, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
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CASE 01!., GUILFORD MILLER.
On December 29, 1884, M. made a homestead entry of part of an odd section ofland lying within the indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific
Railroad land-grant, alleging that his settlement. thereon commenced
June 15, 1878. Said odd section was included in a withdrawal from
pre-emption or homestead entry, etc., made by the Land Department
March 30, 1872, for the benefit of said grant, upon the .filing of the map
of general route. On the definite location of the road, of which a plat
was filed October 4, 1880, it fell within the "indemr.ity" limits of the
grant; but the withdrawal aforesaid, in so far as it included odd sections which thus came within those limits, continued in force thereafter, no restoration of such odd sections to entry having since been
made. The said odd section was selected as ''lieu land" by theN orthern Pacific Railroad Company December 17, 1883: Held that the land
entered by M., being in a state of reservation from the date of the
withdrawal in 1872 until its selection by the company in 1883, was not
during that periol1 op<3n to homestead settlement, and consequently
that, he could acq nire no right adverse to the claim of the company by
his alleged settlement commencing in 1878.
When public lands have been once withdrawn by competent authority
from private appropriation under the general land laws, they do not
again become subject to such appropriation until restored to entry by
like authority.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 14, 1887.
SIR: In compliance with your request., I have considered
the case of the No'tthernPacijic Railroad Company v. Guilford
Miller, pending on appeal in your Department, and now have
the .honor to present to you my opinion upon the question
involved.
The facts of the case as gathered from the papers submitted are these: On December 29, 1884, Miller made a
homestead entry for theSE.! of Sec. 21, T. 15 N., R. 42 E.,
in the \Valla Walla district, Washington Territory, alleging
that his settlement thereon commenced June 15, 1878. The
tract so entered lies within the indemnity limits of the landgrant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company (act of July
2, 1864, chapter 2J.. 7) and was selected as " lieu land" by that
company, December 17, 1883. Originally it was included in
a withdrawal from pre-emption or homestead entry, etc., for
the benefit of that company, of all the surveyed and unsur-
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veyed odd sections lying within 40 miles on each side of the
line of general route, this withdrawal having been ordered
by the Land Department March 30, 1872, upon the filing by
the company of a map of such route. But on the definite
location of the road, of which a plat was filed October 4,
1880, and by which both the "granted" limits and the "indemnity " limits were determined, it fell outside of the former and came within the latter limits. The withdrawal of
March 30, 1872, in so far as it included odd sections which
thus came within the indemnity limits, was continued in force
by an order of the Land Department, dated November 17,
1880 (the order at the same time restoring to entry other
lands included in that withdrawal which lay beyond those
limits), since which time no restoration to entry of such odd
sections appears to have been made.
Upon the foregoing facts the following question arises:
Whether at the commencement of or at any time during
the alleged settlement by Miller, and before the selection
made by the railroad company, the tract referred to was open
to homestead settlement and entry. If so, the right of Miller
to perfect his entry i~ undoubted; if otherwise, the company
would seem to have, by virtue of its selection, the better
claim to the premises.
The solution of that question depends upon the validity
and effect of the withdrawal made by the Land Department
as above. And here I deem it pertinent to observe that,
with respect to the odd sections Ising within the limits of 40
miles on each side of the line of general route, the statute
itself (section 6 of the act of July 2, 1864) operated to reserve
these sections from homestead settlement upon the filing by
the company of the map of such route in the Land Department (Bultz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U.S., 55), and
consequently that, as the tract in question was situated
within those limits and so remained until the filing of the
plat of definite location of the road, no homestead or other
right could attach thereto under the general land laws during
the period between the filing of the map of general route and
the filing of the plat of definite location, whatsoever might be
the action of the Land Department in the premises. For
present purposes, therefore, it is only important to inquire
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what the condition of the tract was after the filing of the
plat of definite location (October 4, 1880) whe~ it fell outside
of the granted limits and came within the indemnity limits.
Did it then become open to homestead settlement~ or was
it excluded therefrom by the previous withdrawal ordered
by the Land Department~ or by the subsequent order of
November 17, 1880, by which that withdrawal was continued~

Aside from the last mentioned order, two points are presented by this case for consideration, namely: (1) whether
the withdrawal of March 30, 1872, which applied to all odd
sections within 40 mil~s of the line of general route was valid
and efl'ecti,Te; if so, then (2) whether lands originally within
that withdrawal remained subject thereto until restored to
entry by the Laud Department, notwithstanding they afterwards (by change of line on definite location of the road) fell
within the indemnity limits.
\
The withdrawal just adverted to does not rest upon any
express statutory provision requiring H, but upon a general
authority in the Land Department, the existence of which
has been recognized by Congress (act of March 27, 1854,
chap. 25; Hev. Stat., sec. 2281) and repeatedly affirmed by
the supreme court (Wolcott v. Des 11foines County, 5 Wall., 681;
Riley v. Wells, unreported, December term, 1869; Williams
v. Baker, 17 Wall., 144; Wolsey v. Chapman, 101, U. S. 755;
see also 8 Opin., 246 ; 16 Opin., 87) and may now be regarded
as too well established to he questioned. It appears, moreover, to be in entire harmony with the provisions of the land
grant act, which, as already intimated, in effect made a corresponding withdrawal, and it accords with the practice of
the Land Department in like cases. But the existen·ce of a
statutory withdrawal including the same lands, which had
previously taken effect, may suggest the inquiry whether the
department withdrawal referred to had any legal efficacy as
such. In other words, did it operate as a withdrawal when
the lands covered thereby were thus already withdrawn ~ The
answer is, that if the act of the department was within the
competency thereof, and of this there appears to be no room
for doubt, its validity and force were not affected by the fact
that it embraced the same subject-matter and was directed
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to tlle same end as the statute. It operated concurrently with
the statute, and the lands may properly be deemed to have
been withdrawn as well by the one as by the other. Although,
as remarked by the court in Buttz v. Northern Pacific Rail·
road Company, supra, it did not add to the force of the statute
itself in that regard, yet it gave notice to all parties seeking
to make a pre-emption or homestead settlement that lands
within certain defined limits might be appropriated for the
road, and was the exljrcise of a wise precaution by the Department to give such information to the local land officers
as may serve to guide aright those seeking settlements on
the public lauds and thus prevent settlements and expenditures connected with them which would afterwards prove to
be useless." Viewed in the above light, I arrive at the conclusion that the withdrawal of March 30, 1872, was valid and
efficient for the purpose intended.
That withdrawal, when ordered, embraced only the odd
sections within the 40 mile limits ; but part of these lands
having subsequently fallen within the indemnity limits, the
point now is, whether thereafter such part still continued in
reservation. Upon this I llold the affirmative, being of
()pinion that when public lands have once been withdrawn
from private appropriation under the general land laws by
competent authority, they do not again qecome subject to
such appropriation until restored to entry by like authority.
This is understood to be a settled rule of the land-law system, and is (as well as the executive power of withdrawal)
recognized by Congress (see section 1 of the act of April21,
1876, chapter 72).
The result to which the foregoing leads is, that at the date
of the.order of November 17,1880, the tract in question was
still subject to the withdrawal referred to. That order, indeed, as~umes the continuation of such withdrawal as regards
lands that fell out
the 40-mile limits as above, in formally
restoring to entry some of these lands while continuing the
withdrawal as to others. So far as appears, no restoration
of the said tract took place then or thereafter up to the time
of its selection by the company.
Such tract being thus in a ~tate of reservation during the
period which intervened between the filing of the plat of

of
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definite location and the selection by the company, it was not
during that period (nor was it prior thereto from the filing of
the map of generai route) open to homestead settlement, and
therefore no rights thereto adverse to the claim of the company were acquired by Miller by his alleged settlement.
I remark that in some of the papers submitted the order
of ~ovember 17, 1880, is dealt with as if it originated a new
withdrawal, and the question is much discussed whether it
was competent to the Land Department to withdraw from
pre-emption or homestead settlement lands lying within the
indemnity limits of the grant, after those limits had become
established by the filing of the plat of definite location of
the road.
In denial of the authority of the Department to withdraw
in such case, it is urged that the provision in the sixth section
of the act, extending the pre-emption and homestead laws
"to all other lands on the line of said roa~l when surveyed,
excepting the lands hereby granted to said company," in
effect prohibited a withdrawal of any lands within the indemnity limits.
Assuming that its terms comprehend all lands within such
limits, I do not understand the provision referred to as having that effect. It does nothing more than declare what was
already enacted by general laws. By these laws all unappropriated public lands, ~urveyed or unsurveyed, were thrown
open to pre-emption settlement, and all such lands, when surveyed, were thrown open to homestead settlement, before the
passage of the land grant act. The provision of the lat.ter
produced no modification of the previous law as regards the
lands mentioned, nor did it place any restriction upon the
exercise of the executive power of withdrawal theretofore
existing.
After the indemnity limits were fixed by definite location
· of the road, a right of selecting "lieu lands" within such
limits, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior,
accrued to the company under the third section of the act;
and it would seem to be within the general power just mentioned, and also within the discretionary authority specially
conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior by that section,
to place in reservation those lands to which the right of
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selection is limited, for the purpose of adjusting the grant
and effectuating its objects.
I am, sir, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRET.A.RY OF THE INTERIOR.

APPOINTMENT OF CIVIL OFFICERS.
The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 353, repealing the tenure-of-office law
(sectiOns 1767 to 1772, Revised Statutes), leaves unaffected such designations, nominations, and appointments as shall have been made before the repeal, and requires all business begun but unfinished before
the repeal to be completed under the law as it then stood.
Appointments and r6movalf\ after the repeal are to be made under the
law as it now exists.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 14, 1887.
By your letter of the 9th instant you request me to
advise you as to the effect of the act of the 3d of March,
1887, entitled "An act to repeal certain sections of theRevised Statutes of the United States relating to the appointment of civil officers," upon the appointment, removal, and.
suspension of officers.
The first section of the act repeals sections 1767 to 1772,
inclusive, of the Revised Statutes, known as the tenure-ofoffice act. Had this section stood alone much unfinished
business would have been left which has been begun, as to
which serious questions might have arisen in consequence of
the repeal. Some of the provisions of the law repealed seemed
to be necessary to an orderly consummation of the work begun. This gave rise to the necessity for the second section
of the act, which is :
" 'fhis repeal shall not affect any officer heretofore suspended under the provisions of said sections, or any designation, nomination, or appointment heretofore made by virtue
of the provisions thereof."
This section is analogous to, and to be interpreted as,
like legislation, which frequently constitutes part of reSIR:

•
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pealing acts, by which the rights and procedure are preserved under the old Jaw as to business finished, and commenced but not finished. This section requires all action
begun but not finished during the life of the tenure-of~office
act to be consummated under the Constitution and the law
as they existed prior to the repeal, and as to all removals
from, or nominations and appointments to, office, after therepeal to be made under the provisions oftheConstitutiou alone.
As an illustration, section 1768 (which is repealed) provides
for suspensions from office during the recess of the Senate.
The place of an officer so suspended was to be filled by
a temporary designation. After the expiration of the temporary designation the officer suspended resumed the f unctions of his office. There would be no express provision of
law for the discharge of the duties of this chss of offices if
the duty of the suspended officer to resume was not pr<,>vided for by the reservation in the repeal. The repeal thus
limited leaves such and similar circumstance<! officers as it
found them, their rights and their duties neither abridged
nor enlarged. In case of the failure of the Senate to act upon
the nomination during the session after the suspension of an
officer, the officer in commission would resume his official
functions. After this has taken place the full requirements.
of the tenure of-office act are complied with. The officer, if
the law had not been repealed, being an officer in the full
possession of his office, would have been again subject to.
suspension, at the official disoretion of the President. Since·
the law is repealed, after he shall have so resumed he is not
a suspended officer or an '' officer suspended" under the
provisions of the tenure-of-office act, but simply an officer
of the United States, and holds subjt.>ct to the power of the
President to remove under the Constitution. If this power
to remove did not exist the right of the officer so suspended
would be enlarged, which would be contrary to the limitation in section 2, which expressly provides it shall not aftect
such an officer. The whole act, then, is to be so interpreted
as to leave unaffected such designations, nominations, and
appointments as shall have been made and finished before
the repeal, and to require all business begun but unfinished
to be terminated under the Constitution and law as they
273-VOL XVIII--37
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applied, after which, as in all other cases, the constitutional
powers and duties of the President alone are to be the basis
of future action.
I am, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF 'l'HE TREASURY.

REFCND OF DUTIES.
In December, 1855, several hundred packages of seeds were imported,
which were entered for consumption and tue estimated duties thereon
paid. Some of the packages were sent to the appraiser's store for
examination and appraisement, and the remainder delivered to the
importer, who (having given bond as required by section 2899, Reviseil.
Statutes) took possession thereof and stored them in his warehouse.
Pending the appraisement and liquidation of the entry the warehouse
took fire and was totally destroyed, with all contents. Thereupon
the importer applied for a refund of the duty paid on the packages so
destroyed under section 2~84, Revised Statutes: IIeld that he is not
entitled to the relief asked, the merchandise destroyed not having
been, at the time of its destruction, in the custody of the officers of
the customs, as contemplated by said section 29~4.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
~March

18, 1887.
'SIR: By your letter of the 28th of February, 1887, you
ask my opinion on the following case:
"Messrs. D. M. Ferry & Company, of Detroit, imported
into that port in December, 1885, nine hundred and sixtySIX packages of dutiable seeds, which they entered for consumption, and on which they paid the estim~ted duties.
Ninety-six of said packages were sent to the appraiser's store
for examination and appraisement, as is customary, while
the remainder, consisting of eight hundred and seventy
packages, were delivered immediately to the importers, wlw
duly took possession thereof and stored them in their warehouse or store at Detroit. Pending the appraisement and
liquidation of the entry, the said private warehouse took fire
and was totally destroyed with all its contents, including
tbe said eight hundred and seventy packages of Sl'ed. The
importers applied to tbe Department for a refund of the
duties paid on said seeds, under section 2984 of the Revised
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Statutes, claiming that the said packages were in the custody
of the Government at the time of the casualty, and that they
were entitled to a refund of the duties paid on the merchandise destroyed."
At the time of the loss of the merchandise destroyed, it
was in the possession and under the control of the importers,
under the provisions of section 2899. This section provides:
''No mercllanuise liable to be inspected or appraised shall
be dAlivered from the custody of the officers of the customs
until the same has been inspected or appraised, or until the
packages sent to be inspected or appraised shall be found
correctly and fairly invoiced and put up, and so reported to
the collector. The collector may, however, at the request of
the owner, importer, consignee, or agent, take bonds, with
.approved security in double the estimated value of such
merchandise, conditioned that it shall be delivered to the
-order of the collector at any time within ten days after the
package sent to the public stores has been appraised and
reported to the collector. If in the meantime any package
shall be opened without the consent of the collector or surveyor given in writing, and then in the presence of one of
the inspectors of the customs, or if the package is not delivered to the order of the collector according to the condition
of the bond, the bond shall in either case be forfeited."
The first clause of t,his section declares merchandise shall
remain in the custouy of the officers of the customs until inspectecl and appraised. The second clause pr~vides an exception which the officers may make to the requirements of
the first clause at the request of the importers. Under tllis
exception the importers received the goods destroyed, the
customs officers retaining in their custody, instead of all the
goods as called for by the first clatase, only " one package
from every ten packages." u der the provisions of section
2901. Bond was given for the packages delivered to the importer. The bond was substituted for the actual custody of
the goods. The bond by its terms showed the goods were iu
the custody of the importers, for it provided for delivery by
the importers of the goods to the collector, in case he should
find it necessary to call for such de~ivery in consequence
of any facts discovered upon the opening of the sample pack-
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ages which were retained for inspection and appraisement.
A bond conditioned for the delivery of an article by no means
amounts to the possession of the article, nor imposes the care
or keeping thereof on the obligee. On the contrary it is incum bent on the obligor to guard and keep it that he may
comply with the obligations of his bond. Custody, in the intent of this statute, means keeping, guardianship, or care of
the merchandise. In this case the keeping, guardianship,
and care of the merchandise was left with the imp9rter. It
was in his own store-room under the charge and control exclusively of his -own employes. The store-room was not a
private warehouse ·as contemplated by section 2060, Revised
Statutes. If the casualty occurred through any negligence,
it must have been his own; if through misfortune, that misfortune did not arise in any way from any action of the officers of the customs, or from the character of any building
under their control in which it might be stored, nor while
the goods were in their possession. The refund asked for is
under section 2984, which is" The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized, upon.
production of satisfactory proof to him of the actual injury
or destruction, in whole or in part, of any merchandise, by
accidental fire or other casualty, while the same remained in
the custody of the officers of the customs in any public or
private ware-house under bond,- or in the appraisers' stores
undergoing appraisal, in pursuance of law or regulations of
the Treasury Department, or while in transportation under
bond from the port of entry to any other port in the United
States, or while in the custody of the officers of the customs
and not in bond, or while within the limits of any port of
entry and before the same have been landed under the supervision of the officers o:f.ttthe customs, to abate or refund., as
the case may be, out of ani moneys in the Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, the amount of impost duties paid or
accruing thereupon, and likewise to cancel any warehouse
bond or bonds or enter satisfaction thereon, in whole or in
part, as the case may be."
This section, so far as applicable to the facts presented';
only authorizes an abatement or' refund of the duties when
the custody of the goods is ih the officers of the customs. As
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therefore they were not, in the case submitted, in their
custody or under their control, the refund asked for is not
authorized by the statute.
I am, respectfully yours,

A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

INDIAN TRUST FUNDS.
Where bonds of the State of North Carolina, held by the Treasurer of
the United States for the benefit of certain Indian tribes, were past
due and payment thereof demanded and refused: Ad?Jised that the
Secretary of the Interior may authorize the acceptance of a proposition
of a third party (a citizen of the State) to pay,the principal and accrued interest of the bonds, provided their market value does not exceed their face value with the accrued interest, and provided the
acceptance will best snbserve the trust.
If the United States has advanced for the State any money on account
of interest due on said bonds, and there is " any moneys due on any
account from the United States to such State," it is the duty of the
Treasurer to retain the interest upon such advances from such moneys.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 19, 1887.
SIR: Your communication of September 27 of last year,
inclosing "certain correspondence and papers relating to a
proposition of Mr. A.M. McPheeters, of Raleigh, N.C., to
pay the principal of $147,000 North Carolina State bonds
past due, and which are described in the papers, and all in. terest which shall accrue on them to the date of payment,"
has been received.
You inquire: (1) Is it within the power of this Department, under existing laws, to aceept or authorize the acceptance of the proposition~ (2) If the proposition shall be
accepted, should interest be calculated on the moneys advanced by the United States from time to time on account
of interest due on eaid bonds, as provided in the act of
March 25, 1870 (16 Stat., 77) ~"
The bonds referred to, as described in an inclosed paper,
are as follows: North Carolina uonds, N.C. N. R. Co., issued
under acts of the legislature of North Carolina approved
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January 27, 18-19, December 2 and 25, 18.32, and February
1-1, 1855, and belonging to an Indian trust fund; $19,000
maturing January 1, 1884, with 6 per cent. intere 't from
. January 1,1880, to July 1, 1886, amounting to $7,410; $7,000
maturing January 1, 1886, with 6 per cent. interest from
January 1, 1880, to July 1, 1886, amounting to $~,730;
$121,000 maturing April 1, 1885, with 6 per cent. interest
from October 1, 1879, to July 1, 1886, amounting to $49,005.
The principal sum now due without interest amounts to
$147,000; interest to July 1, 1886, $59,145; total, $206,145.
The proposition of Mr. A. 1\f. .McPheeters, as contained
in his inclosed letter to the Acting Secretary of the Interior,
dated September 17, 1886, is as follows: "Briefly stated my
proposition is to pay the principal of the $147,000 bonds past
d'Lte, and which are' described above, and all interest which
shall accrue on them to the date of payment."
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, by letter to the Secretary of the Interior dated September 25, 1886, recommends
• the acceptance of 1\fr. 1\IcPheeters's proposition.
By act of J nne 10, 1876 (19 Stat., 5S), •' all stocks, bonds,
or other securities or evidences of indebtedness now held by
the Secretary of the Interior in trust for the benefit of certain Indian tribes shall, within thirty days from the passag-e
of this act, be transferred to the Treasurer of the United
States, who shall become the custodian thereof, *
* *
and th-e Treasurer of the United States shall also become the
custodian of all bonds and stocks which may be purcllased
for the benefit of any Indian tribe or tribes after the tram;;fer
of funds herein authorized, and shall make all purchases and
sales of bonds and stocks authorized by treaty stipulations
or by acts of Congress when requested so to do by the Secretary of the Interior."
In an inclosed letter from 1\fr. A. l\L )fcPheeters to the
Secretary of the Treasury, dated Raleigh, N. C., August 31,
1886, he says: ''Payment of tllese bonds was some time
since formally demanded by tlle Government and refused uy
the treasurer of this State. I propose to !Jay tlleni."
If the amount due upon these bonds were tendered to the
Treasurer of the United States by the railroad company or
the treasurer of the State of North Carolina there would he
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no doubt but that it would be your duty to authorize the acceptance of the money.
The proposition now made virtually is, that the bonds
should be sold to a third party for their face value with accruecl interest.
It would be in the power of the Secretary of the Interior
to authorize the acceptance of the proposition above referred
to, if the sale of the bonds is authorized either expressly or
impliedly "by treaty stipulations or acts of Congress." No
information is contained in the papers referred as to which
of the Indian tribes the Treasurer holds the bonds in trust.
No opportunity is therefore afforded for an examination for
express authority in "treaty stipulations or acts of Congress."
But as the bonds are past due and payment has been refused
by the treasurer of the State of North Carolina, in the performance of his duties as trustee the Secretary of the Interior
has the power. to authorize the acceptance of the proposition
made, provided the market value does not exceed the face
value of the bonds with accrued interest, and provided the
acceptance will best subserve the interest of the trust. In
such case if the bonds are sold it should .b e for the highest
price to be obtained.
As to the inquiry, "Should interest be calculated on the
moneys advanced by the United States from time to time on
account of interest due on said bonds~"
The act of March 25, 1876 (16 Stat., 77 ), is as follows:
''Whenever any State shall have been or may be in default in the payment of interest or principal on investments
in stocks or bonds issued or guarantied by such State and held
by the United States in trust, it shall be the duty of the Secretary -of the Treasury to retain thew hole, or so much thereof as
maybe 11ecessary, of any moneys due on any account from the
United States to such State, and to apply the same to the
payment of such principal and interest, or either, or to the
re·imbursement with interest thereon of moneys advanced by
thR United States on account of interest due on such stocks
or bonds."
The inclosed papers do not show the amount of money, if
any, "advanced by the United States on account of interest
due on said bonds."
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Nor does it appear that there is any money due by the
United States to the State of North Carolina on any account.
If the United States has advanced for the State any money
on account of the interest due on said bonds, and there is
''any moneys due on any account from the United States to
such State,'' it is the duty of the Treasurer to retain the interest upon such advances from such money.
If, however, the money for payment of interest was not
advanced by the General GoV'ernment at the instance and
request of the State (and of that there appears to he no
claim in tlle inclosed papers) compound interest could not be
recovered by suit upon the bonds, if not expressly stipulated
therein. (No copies of the bonds are among the papers
transmitted.) The liability of the State, in case there is no
indebtedness of the United States to the State, is determined
by the evidences of indebtedness and not by the act of Congress. The claim of the United States, if any, for interest
on advances should n~t be required to be paid before authorizing the sale of the bonds.
The inclosed papers are herewith returned as requested.
very respectfully'
A. H. GARLAND.

The

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

REMISSION OF FORFEITURE.
Section 1958, Revised. Statutes, does not confer upon the Secretary of the
Treasury authority to remit the forfeiture of a vessel condemned by
the United States district court for Alaska for being engaged in killing fur seals.
Under section 5293, Revised States, fifth paragraph, he has power to remit in such case, but only where the forfeiture was impor:;ed ''by virtue of any provisions of law relating to fur seals upon the islands of
St. Paul and St. George."
' DEPARTMEN'l' OF JUSTICE,

Ma.rch 19, 1887.
SIR: I have considered ;your communication of the lOth
instant, and the accompanying papers, presenting the question whether you have the power to remit the forfeiture of
the schooner San Diego, her tackle, apparel, and furniture,
by virtue of the sentence of conrlemnation pronounced against
the said vessel, etc., on the 4th of October, 18~6, in the case

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

585

Remission of Forfeiture.

of The United States v-. L. JJ1. Handy and the schooner San
Diego, by the United States district court for the district of
.Alaska, under section 1956_, Revised Statutes, for being engaged in killing fur seals ; and an opinion is asked as to
whether such power of remission resides in the Secretary of
the Treasury under sectwn 1;)58, or the fifth paragraph of
.section 5293, Revised Statutes, or any other statute of the
United StatAs.
Section 1958 'is a reproduction of the eighth section of the
act of 27th July, 1868 (15 Stat., 240), entitled '•An act to extend the laws of tlle United States relating to customs commerce and navigation over the territory ceded to the United
States by Russia, to establish a collection district therein,
.and for other purposes," and its· object was to extend the
power of the Secretary of the Treasury to remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures in cases covered by the act of the 3d
March, 1797 (1 Stat., 506), and all laws adding to and amending the same, to similar cases arising in the collection district
~~~~

.

Now the cases falling within the act of 1797 and the additions and amendments therAof are cases where the fine, penalty, or forfeiture which it is sought to have remitted was exacted" by force of any present or future law of the United
States, for the laying, levying, or collecting any duties or
taxes, or by force of any present or future act, concerning the
registering or recording of ships or vessels, or any act concerning the enrolling and licensing ships or vessels employed
in the coasting trade or fisheries, and for regulating the
same."
The principal object of the statute of 1868 was to establish
the collection district of Alaska and extend to it the revenue
and navigation systems of tbe United. States, and as the act
of 1797 with its additions and amewlments formed a part of
the legislation on those subjects, it was, as a matter of course,
re-enacted with the rest of that legislation.
So far, then, as section 1958 is cemcerned, it is quite clear
that it gives the Secretary no authority to remit the forfeiture of a vessel for being engaged in killing fur seals, an offense
which bas no connection with the revenue or navigation laws
of the United States.
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It remains to inquire whether the Secretary of tlJC Treasury is vested with power to remit the forfeiture in questi.on
by the fifth paragra.ph of section 5293, Revised Statutes.
This provision contains a substantial re-enactment of tlle
seventh section of the act of the 1st July, . 1870, entitled
"An act to prevent the extermination of fur-bearing animals
in Alaska" (16 Stat., 180), which adopted and. appli('d to the
purposes of its enactment the seventh and eighth sections of
tlle act of 1868 (supra), thereby extending the provisions of
law for the enforcement and remission of fines, penalties,
11nd forfeitures incurred under the customs and navigation
\aws to fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred under this
::tct ''to prevent the extermination of fur-bearing animals in
1\-laska."
That Congre~s deemed the seventh section of the act of
1870 (supra), necessary shows that it djd not consider tQe
fines, penalties, and forfeitures prescribed by that law as
within the power of remission given by the eighth section of
the act of 18G8 (supra) and confirms the view taken herein
of the scope of that section.
The seventh section of the act of 1870 adopted the eighth
section of the act of 1868 for the purposes of that act only,
and as the operation of the act of 1870, as passed originally
and as now given in the Revised Statutes (sections 1960-1972
aJd section 5293, paragraph 5), is confined to the islandR of
St. Paul and St. George, it would seem impossible to hold
that the forfeiture in question, which was not incurred by
reason of any act done in either of those islands, is within
the power of remission conferred on the Secretary of the
Treasury by the fifth paragraph of section 5293, whicb provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may exercise that
power" if the fine, penalty, or forfeiture * • • was imposed by virtue of any provisions of law relating to fur seals
upon the isl-ands of St. Paul anu St. George.''
It only remains for me to say that my investigations have
not conducted me to any legislation under which you could
remit the forfeiture in question.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREAS'CRY.
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-POSTAL SERVICE.
The provisions of the interstate commerce act of February 4, 1887, chapter 104, do not extend to the postal service of the United States, nor
prohibit the transportation by railroad companies, free of charge, of
such officers or agents of the Government as are employed in that service.
DEP.ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 28, 1887.
SIR: I reply to your letter of the 21st March, 1887, which
is:
"It has for many years been the almost universal practice
of railroad companies engaged in transportation of the mails
to transport without special charge the inspectors of this Department, including such officers as the Postmaster-General
is by statute authorized to employ as inspectors or special
agents; and also to transport without charge postal clerks,
not only when engaged in the actual service of distributing
mails upon the car en route and on their return trips, but to
transport them between their places of residence and the
point at which they are required by the rules of the service
to begin their runs, when on the occurrence of their' lay-offs'
they are at liberty to go home for rest and study.
" The question has been raised by various communications
to the Department whether, since the recent act of Congress
of February 4, 1887, entitled 'An act to reg·ulate commerce,'
the continuance of such facilities will contravene the law.
"Inspectors and special agents have habitually received a
commission signed by the head of this Department, designating them as inspectors, and requiring all railroads and
other contractors engaged in the transportation of the mails
to carry the respectively designated persons without special
charge for transportation. Similar commissions have been
issued to postal clerks; but, in addition, passes have been
granted them by the railroad companies to enable them to
make return trips, although not actually engaged in distributing mails, and to travel between the termini of their routes
and their homes.
"Your opinion is solicited upon the questions whether
there be anything in the act referrerl. to which prohibits the
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practices heretofore prevailing as above stated; and if in any
particular the act prohibits the continuance by the railroad
companies of the facilities heretofore afforded, in what degree
and in what limitations¥"
The title of the act of the 4th of February, 1887, is "An act
to regulate commerce." It is not entitled ''An act to regulate
the United States mail service." The question presented is,
substantially, Was it the intent of the law-makers that it
should be construed to include the mail service of the United
States~

The constitutional power authorizing the act is the third
clause of the eighth section of Article II of the Constitution~
which empowers" Congress to regulate C@mmerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes." If this provision of the Constitution bad
been understood by the framers of the Constitution to have
embraced the mail service of the United States in the term
"commerce," there would have been no sufficie11t reason for
the introduction of the seventh clause of the same section
and article: ''Congress shall have power to establish postoffices and post-roads;" under which last the postal system
has been organized. The magnitude of that system is such
that its main operations can only be conducted successfully
by uniform and general rules. Equal justice in the administration of the service requires that the burden of its execution shall not be subject to the possibility of different rates
between those portions of the service which may be.performed
exclusively within individual States and those which include
service in two or more States. The provisions of the act as
applied to subjects Intended to be embraced therein do not
apply to the former, but do to the latter. It is not to be supposed the law-makers intended, under a regulation of commerce, to subject a part of the mail service to the provisions
of the act while another part would be excluded. The mail
service is a unit, a system organized in pursuance of an
established Government policy.
The Postmaster-General, as the head of the Department,
is placed over the system. He is required by law, among
. many other specific duties, ''to superintend generally the
business of the Department and execute all laws relative to
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the postal service" (Rev. Stat., sec. 396). It could not be the
purpose of the act under consideration to join the PostmasterGeneral with the Commissioner of Interstate Commerce in
the adminh;tration of the iuterstate commerce act, nor torelieve the Postmaster-General from the duty of superintending
and executing" all laws relative to the'postal service." No
intent is manifeRted indicating a division of service, labor, or
responsibility between the Postmaster-General and the Commissioner of Interstate Commerce. The act was intended to
relate "to the postal service." The system of postal service
confers upon the Postmaster-General the power to make contracts, some of which must be exceptional, arising from unexpected emergencies which could not in all cases be made in
conformity to prescribed general rules as to price or terms,
and concerning which the urgency or necessity would preclude
the possibility of conference for exceptions with the Commissioners of Interstate Commerce. The amount of compensation is, in many instances, submitted to his judgment. In
othe,rs the law provides a fixed ·price per mile for a given
service _; others provide for the carriage of persons in the
service free of charge. .A general examination of the whole
scope.of postal laws shows that, if t~e interstate commerce
act were treated as if incorporated into the postal system of
laws, the change would be so radical as to render it highly
improbable that so extensive a modification or repeal would
be left to mere implication; indeed, such a change could be
recognized only by expre~s language of the statute. In the
conduct of the postal service the United States, to the exclusion of all others, exercises one of the functions of governmental sovereignty. The service is purely goverumental. It
is a common law rule of construction that the sovereign is not
bound by general statutes unless expressly named tb.erein.
In the Eng1ish courts prerogative was claimed as the foundation of this rule, but American courts have based it upon
reason, and except from the rule modes of procedure, process, with such other transac-tions as are not strictly governmental. But "lftbe statute tends to restrain or diminish the
power, right, or interests of a sovereign" the rule of construction is adhered to (United States v. Heron, 20 Wall.,
255). "The doctrine that the Government should not, un-
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less named, be bound by an act of limitations, is in accordance with that just cited from Bacon; because, if bound, it
would be barred of a right; and in all such cases is not to l>e
construed to be em braced unle8s named, or what would be
equivalent, unless the language is such as to show clearly that
such was the intent of the act" (Un-ited States v. Knight, 14
Peters, 315). If the interstate commerce act were to be applied to the mail service of the United States it would materially diminish the power and rights heretofore exercised and
held under the postal laws, and modify a clearly defined policy,
established as the result of the experience of the whole national life. The United States is not specially named in the
act of the '4th of February, 1887, except in the twenty-second
section, which provides that" nothing in this act shall apply
to the carriage, storage, or handling of property, free or at
reduced rates, for the United Statf>s." If the carriage, storage, or handling of the property of the United S~ates were,
in all instances, purely governmental, this exception would
be entitled to great weight, as an implication that, in all not
excepted, the sovereign was intended to be included in pursuance of the maxim ExQeptio fermat regulum 'in casibus non
exceptis.
But in many transactions of the Government, as in carrying stores and delivery to the Indian tribes in pursuance of
treaty or coutract, the action of the Government is quasicommercial, and of such a nature that no attribute of sovereignty is involved therein. This exception in the statute
was doubtless intended to relieve rsucb transactions of a
doubtful character from the provisions of the act. If so intended, the excepting out Qf the enactment of that which,.
under the less rigid application of the principle of construction b~- the American courts, might or would not have been
considered as within the principle, would be an affirmance
of the principle as applicable to the construction of the statute. But, in any event, the general principle of construction
can not l>e avoided by mere implication; for, in the language
of the ca~e last cited, implication can not produce such results " unless the language is such as to show clearly that
such was the intent of the act," which tl.le language in th!g
case does not do.
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It is therefore clear the United States mail ~ervice is not
embraced in or subject to the provisions of the act of the
4th of February, 1887. That service consists in the receipt,
speedy transmission, distribution, and delivery of mail matter to the people. As the act does 11ot include the mail service in its provisions, none of the lawful, customary, and
necessary instrumentalities by which · that service is ·con- ·
ducted is subjected to the law. Among the lawful, customary, ana necessary instrumentalities for the efficient, consistent, and successful conduct of the service, the Post-Office
Department is authorized by law to send officers, agents,
and clerks of the Government to take charge of, protect, and
distribute the mails, and to search for and investigate errors,
frauds, or crimes relating to them. Persons thus employed,
when in the actual Hne of duty or when in pursuance thereof
going to or returning from their places of residence while in
the performance of service, or to or from their assigned line
of duty in the ordinary and customar.r course of the administration of the service, should be regarded as in the performance of official labor and unaffected by the provisions
()f the act.
I am, yours respectfully,
A.. H. GARLAND.
The POSTMASTER-GENERAL.

COLLECTION DISTRICT.
The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 348, amending se~tions 2533 and 2534,
Revised Statutes, and making Hartford a port of entry in place of
Middletown, creates a new collection district a,nd also a new office
(that of collector), requiring a new commissiol} and a new bond.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 28, 1887.
SIR: On the 3d of March, 1887, Congress passed "An act
to amend sections 2533 'a1ld 2534 of the Rmrised Statutes,
and making Hartford a pol'L of entry in place of Middletown/'
which provided that paragraph third of section 2533 of the ·
Revised Statutes of the United States of Americ3t is hereby
am'ended so that said paragraph shall read as follows :
"Third. The district of Hartford, to comprise the waters
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and shores of the town of Saybrook, Clinton, Westbrook, Old
Saybrook, Essex, Chester, Hauuam, East Haddam, 1\fiudletown, Cromwell, Chatham, Portland, vVeathersfield, Rocky
Hill, Glastonbury, Hartford, East Hartford, Windsor, \Viudsor Locks, East Windsor, South Windsor, Suffield, and Enfield, as bounded on the 1st day of January, 1886, in which
· Har'tford shall be the port of entry, and Saybrook, Clinton,
Westbrook, Old Saybrook, Essex, Chester, Haddam, East
Haddam, Middletown, Chatham, Portland, Cromwell, Rocky
Hill, Weathersfield, Glastonbury, and East Hartford ports of
delivery.
'' SEc. 2. That paragraph third of section 2534: of the Revised Statutes of the United States of America is hereby
amended so that said paragraph shall read as follows:
"Thir<l. In the district of Hartford a collector, who shall
reside at Hartford."
By your letter of the 21Rt instant you inquire whether, by
this law, a new office is thus created, and whether a new
commission and bond must necessarily issue.
The legal life of the district of Middletown was derived
from the clauses which are wholly supplanted by the act above
quoted. No part of the former law relating to it longer survives. Its name and place are wholly among things of the
past. A new district is created, not new in name and place
of collector's residence only, but in territorial limits.
The new district does not appear to include the waters and
shores of the town of Killingsworth as the district of :Middletown did; but it does contain within its limits the waters
and shores of twelve other towns which the district of Middletown did not contain. The waters and shores of eleven
of the towns comprised in the Middletown district are in the
Hartford district. Thus the new third district is made to
consist of twenty-three towns, eleven of which were in the
Middletown district and twelve were not. From a comparison of the two districts it appears tlw name is changed; the
residence of the collector is changed; the port of entry is
changed; the ports of deli very are changed and increased
by four in number ; the territorial limits are changed and increased in number eleven towns, and more than half the new

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

593

Allotment of Lands to Indians.

district as to the number of the towns therein does not appear to have been in the former district.
The commission of the collector of the Middletown district
would, if it survived the change, not empower him to exercil:m
his official functions in the twelve added towns. His bondsmen could not be held for the new district, which embraces
greater responsibility than they assumed when they executed
the bond. In the case of Miller v. Stewart et al. (9 Wheat.,
681) it is ruled: "A bond by a deputy collector of taxes, with
sureties reciting his appointment. for eight townships and
conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of said
appointment, is avoided as against the sureties by the iuterlineation of another township, so as to make it an appointment for nine instead of eight without the consent of the
sureties."
But one collector is provided for the new district. That
co.llector's commission must be co-extensive with his duties,
which require him to exercise his official functions over the
whole district. A new commission is required, and a new
bond is the necessary consequence of the new commission.
I am, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ALLOTMENT OF LANDS TO INDIANS.
By the ninth section of the act of February 8, 1887, chapter 119, an ap~
propriation is made " for the purpose of making the surveys and resurveys mentioned in section two" of that act. In section 2 there is no
mention of" surveys and resurveys." But section one of the same act
contains a provision for " surveys and resurveys. " Advised that the
appropriation made as above is applicable to the making of "surveys
and resurveys," as provided for in said secti9ill-such being the clear
intent of Congress.

DEPARTMEN'l'

JUS'J.'ICE,
March 31, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the 29th of March, 1887, is as follows:
"Referring to the act (Public No. 43) entitled 'An act to
provide for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on
the various reservations, and to extend the protection of the
273-VOL XVIII--38
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laws of the United States and the Territories over the Indians, and for other purposes,' approved February 8, 1887,
it will be observed tllat section 9 provides · That for the purpose of making the surveys and resurveys mentioned iu section 2 of this act, there be, and hereby is, appropriated, out
of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
the sum of$ WO,OOO , to be repaid proportionately out of the
proceeds of the sales of such land as may be acquired from
the Indians under the pro,Tisions of this act.'
"By reference to section 2 of the act, it will be seen that
no mention is made therein of the making of ' surveys and
resurveys.' The provision of the law for 'surveys and resurveys' of reservations or parts thereof, for the purpose of making allotments of lands to the Indians, is contained in the
first section of the act.
''A copy of the law of February 8, 1887, is herewith inclosed.
"In the original draft of the bill (S. 5!) the pro""ision for
'surveys and resurveys' was contained in section 2, but in the
process of passage of the act sections 1 and 2 of the original bill
were materially altered and modified, and were finally merged
into one, or the first section. Section 10 of the original bill became section 9 of the act, but there appears to have been a
failure to make the necessary change in the body of section
9 of the words ' section 2' to ' section 1.'
''In view of the foregoing statement, I have the honor to
request to be advised whether the appropriation rnade by
section 9 of the act is applicable for the purposes of making
' surveys and resurveys' of reservations or parts thereof,
provided for in section 1 of the act/'
The intent of the law-maker is the law. That the land
described in the first section shall be surveyed was intended.
That the cost of the survey of the land shall be paid by the
appropriation contained in the ninth section is just as clearly
within the intent. As there are no surveys mentioned in the
second section, the whole of section 9 must be rejected, or
the erroneously descriptive reference ''section 2 of." If
these words be disregarded so that the section shall read,
"That for the purpose of making the t'Urveys and resurveys
* * * in this act, there be," etc., the undoubted intention
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of Congress will be carried out. Otherwise the whole enactment will be nugatory. The inquiry contained in yours
is therefore answered in the affirmative.
I am, yours respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF 1'HE INTERIOR.

UTAH TERRITORY.
Officers in the Territory of Utah who were commissioned and holding
office previous to the passage of the act of .March 3, 18R7, chapter 397,
are not required to take the oath prescribed by the twenty-fourth section of that act.
The provision of that section making such oath a'' condition precedent
to hold office in or under said Territory" applies as well to officers thereafter appointed by the General Government as to those thereafter appointed by the Territorial government or elected in the Territory.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 31', 1887.
SIR: I .have considered your communication of the 17th
instant, and the accompanying letter therein referred to,
from the chairman of the Utah Commission and the governor
of the Territory of Utah, presenting, for an opinion, certain
questions arising upon .t he twenty-fourth section of the act ~n
titled "An act to amend 'An act to amend section fifty-three
hundred and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes,' approved March twenty . second, eighteen hundred and eightytwo."
The first question asked is: ''Are the officers in this Territory (Utah) who were commissioned and holding office prior
to the passage of said act required to take said oath~" meaning the oath prescribed by the said twenty-fourth section.
In my opinion this question should be answered in the negative. It is true the law declares the oath required to be'' a
condition precedent to the right to hold office in or under said
Territory," but it also declares that the officer shall take and
sn bscribe the oath "before entering on the duties of his office,"
words which of themselves, in my opinion, have a strong
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tendency to show that it was officers thereafter to be elected
or appointed who were in the mind of Congress.
If it was intended that the law should affect officers in
commission when it went into operation, it is hard to understanu why Congress ommitted to provide for the conting-ency
of a failure or refusal to take and subscribe the required oath,
such as by declaring the recusant's office vacant and the manner in which the vacancy should be filled. Furthermore, if
Congress harl intended the oath requfrement to apply to
officers already in commission, we must presume it would
have provided either that the law should not go into effect
until a time within which it could be made known in all the
Territories, or that the oath should be taken and subscribed
. within a certain time after the law went into force, thu.s preventing the serious doubts that might arise as to the validity
of official acts performed after the statute took effect but
before its provisions could be known by the communities
afl'ected by them, if it should be held tltat the oath requirement af)plied to officers in commission when tlte act became
operative.
Now, this failure of Congress to guard its legislation with
respect to the official oath in ~orne such way a~ has been
pointed out, and the express prov"ision already adverted to
that the oath shall be taken before the officer " enters on the
duties of his office," and the consideration that the officers in
commission when the act went into force ' bad been holding
office under the act of the 22d March, 1882 (22 Stat., 30),
which contained a provision that no bigamist, polygamist, or
person cohabiting with more than one woman, and that no
woman cohabiting with any such person in any Territory or
other place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, should be entitled to vote or be eligible 1for or entitled to bold any office of honor, trust, or emolument in such
Territory or under the United States, all go to show that in
the absence of language compelling such a sense it wouJd be
unreasonable to attribute to Congress the intention to give
the act a retrospective effect as to existing officers without
any adequate reason for resorting to a mode of legislation
which is never regarded with favor.
When the act of 1887 was passed there was not the same
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state of things in the Territories as existed when the act ~f
1882 was passed-a state of things which made it necessary to
put in the latter act a provision vacating all registration
and election offices. On the contrary, the act of 1882 had
been in force within less than amonth of:fiveyears when the
new law was passed, and it was but fair to assume that persons having the qualifications to hold office required by the
act of 1882, and in office under that act when the new act of
1887 went into operation, were in sympathy with that act,
and could be relied on to carry out its provisions.
It is clear, then, to my mind that I would be doing violence to this law as well as shaking public faith in various
official proceedings, if I held it to have a retroactive operation.
The second question is: "If su9h officers in this Territory
(Utah) are required to take the oath, what would be the consequence of theiL· failure to comply with the requirement~"
The answer to the first question renders an answer to this
question unnecessary.
The third question is: "Are the Federal office holders, as
the governor, Utah commissioners, secretary of the treasury,
etc., to take the oath ~ "
The law (sec. 24) makes the oath a" condition precedent to
the right to hold office in or under said Territory," and, in my
opinion, applies as well to the officers referred to who were
thereafter to be appointed by the United 8tates to offices in
the Territory as to the officers holding under and by appointment thereafter of the Territorial government. This meaningis called for by the use of the particles "in" and ''under"
in the law, the former being understood to refer to officers appointed by the United States to perform duties in a Territory,
and the latter to officers appointed by a Territorial government itself.
The disjunctive particle ''or" that comes between the two
words ''in" and •' under" as well as a known rule of interpretation requires that each of those words should ha\'"e its
own proper force. This I have endeavored to give it.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
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SINKING FUNDS OF THE UNION .AND CENTRAL PACIFIC.
Section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, chapter 345, relating to the sinking
funds of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad Cbmpanies,
applies to moneys belonging to those funds which are uninvested, and
such moneys may be invested as therein provided.
But that section does not authorize a sale of the United States bonds in
which the funds are already, invested for the purpose of re-investment
in the first-mortgage bonds of said companies.
Money paid into the sinking funds of said companies, under said act, may
be invested (1) in United States bonds, as provided in act of May 7,
1878, chapter 96; (2) in any United States railroad subsidy bonds of
any of the aided roads de!:!cribed in the act of July 1, 1862, chapter 120,
and its supplements; and (3) in any of the first-mortgage bonds of said
companies, such as are described in section 5 of the act of March 31
1887, chapter 345.
DEP .ARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

1lfarch 31, 1887.
SIR: Your letter of the 161h of March, 1887, submits for
my opinion:
First. H Whether the provisions of section 5 of the act of
the 3d of March, 1887, may be construed as applying to
moneys now in the funds uninvesteu and moneys hereafter
paid in to be inYested, or whether United States bonds in
which the funds are now invested could be sold and the
proceeds re-invested in the first mortgage bonds of the company."
Second. H Whether investments can be made in the firstmortgage bonds of any of the companies, or only in the firstmortgage l>onds of the company for which the investment
is made."
The fifth section referred to is :
"That the sinking funus which are or may be held in the
Treasury for the security of the indebteuness of either or Hll
of said railroad companies may, in addition to the investments now authorized by law, be invested in any bonds of
the United States heretofore issued for the benefit of either
or all of said companies, or in any of the first-mortgage bonds
of either of said companies which have been issued under th~
authority of any law of the United States, and S3curecl by
mortgages of their roads and franchises which by any law
of the United States have been made prior and paramount
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to the mortgage lien or other security of the United States
in respect of its advances to either of said companies, as
provided. by law."
The sinking funds referred to in this section were established by the act of the 7th of May, 1878 (~0 Stat., 56),
known as the Thurman act. "The investments authorized
by law," the officer by whom they are to be made, the source
whence the fund. is to be derived, its administrative and final
distribution, all are fixed by the same act. The section
referred to in yours is concerning the s~e subject, and is
substantially an amendment of the prior act. The two are
to be construed together as one, and, as a whole, they must
be viewed in connection, so as to make all the parts harmonious if practicable. The whole law, as thus considered,
received an authoritative interpretation in the ''Sinking
Fuud Cases" (99 U. S. R., 725), by which certain principles
were announced which will aid in the determination of the
questions submitted. It is there settled the fund is a fund
of the Union and Central Pacific Railroad established by law,
mtended for the security and payment of certain of their
several debts at maturity; that the United States Trea~mry
is the depository, and the Secretary of tlle Treasury is the
agent charged with the administration of the fund. The
power of the Secretary of the Treasury as agent over the fund
is not enlarged by the section referred to in yours, except
that he i~ empowered ''in addition to the investments now
authorized by law" to invest in certain other securities not
before authorized. His power is a special one fixed by law, and
must be strictly followed. We can not enter into the inquiry as
to whether the power is too limited or too extensive; whether
the interests of the corpor~tions and their creditors would
haYe been better subserved had the Secretary been allowed
to make other in vestments, or to buy and sell bonds as to him
would seem best or not. That question has been already
passed upon by Congress, and we are limited to determining
whether Congress empowered him to sell the bonds in which
the fund has been invested, and with the proceeds to buy
others. If that power exists now it will continue as long as
the law remains unchanged. The bonds which might be
bought with the proceeds of those sold to-day might to-mor-
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row, by a change in the market, appear to be profitable to sell
and re-inYest. Each change in tlw market might be made an
occasion for sale and re-investment. A general power to
deal in the bonds referred to in the act and amendment would
be the result of such a construction. Whether a good or
bad investment of the fund might he the result of the exercise of such a power would largely depend upon the agent's
knowledge of the market and his judgment in the application of that knowledge. An error in the sale or purchase
might result in a loss. During the course of such dealing
the interest on the fund must be suspended. The Jaw contemplated no uncertainty on this subject. A certain steady
gain, and not Rpeculative profits, is shown to be the intent,
for the third section of the act of 1878 provides that ''the
semi-annual income thereon shall be in like manner from
time to time invested, and the same shall accumulate and be
disposed of as hereinafter mentioned."
This semi-annual income cl~arly refers to the interest on the
bonds purchased, and does not contemplate the uncertain
quantity of profit or loss. The "same shall accumulate"
leaves no discretion in the agent to subject the fund to a
possible loss. The gain was intended to he a fixed and certain accumulation. The law authorizes the Secretary to invest
the fund e tablished in bonds. This is equivalent to saying
"with tbe money paid in you shall buy bonds;" it does not
say, " with the bonds you shall bay bonds." Does the power
to buy the bonds, or the whole scope of the law, imply the
power to sell them~ The langaage of the sediou just quoted
says: ''The semi-annual income shall be from time to time invested." If it had been the intention of the law-makers to
allow the investment from time to time of the princip~l from
which the income was derived, such from time to time investment would not have been limited to the income only. The
inclu~ion of one is the exclusion of the other. The power of
an agent to buy does not imply the power to sell. The subject is considered in Story on Agency, section 88, and the conclusion stated in the following lauguage: ''So that we here
see it laid down in positive terms that the agent to buy has
no implied authority to sell, and an agent employed to sell
has no implied authority to buy."
·
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Without a conversion or sale of the bonds now in the Treasury until their maturity there can be no reinvestment.
The section referred to in your letter only authorizes the
investment of "the sinking funds which are or may be held
in the Treasury." The ordinary signification of the word
"funds" is "cash on hand" (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol.
1, p. 701). As a means of purchase this is the only signification the word could have in this connection, and this is the
sense in which it is here used. This is shown by reference to
the third section of the prioT act of which this is an amendment, the '.first clause of which is:
" That there shall be established in the Treasury of the
the United States a sinking fund which shall be invested,"
etc.
It is clear the law-makers did not contemplate that the
Secretary of the Treasury should buy bonds with anything
but cash on hand. The law says he is to buy them with the
fund established.
Another clause in the same· section states :
"All the bonds belonging to said funds shall, as fast as
they shall be obtained, be so stamped as to show that they
belong to the said fund, and they are not good in the hands
of other holders than the Secretary of the Treasury until
they shall have been indorsed by him and publicly disposed
of pursuant to this act."
Here the bonds are not spoken of as constituting part of
the fund, but as investments of or as property of which the
fund personified is spoken of as the owner, indicating a
distinction between the money with which the property is
bought and the property purchas3d therewith. The investment is showu to be intended as permanent, for the
property thus obtained must be stamped and rendered
valueless, except in the hands of the agent of the fund,
until by him indorsed and publicly disposed of pursuant
to the act. This is the only authority to sell the bonds.
The act provides the fund, directs its investment, directs
the investment from time to time of the semi-annual income,
and authorizes nothing further with reference to the fund as
a fund until the final distribution is provided for in the sev-
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enth and eighth sections of the act of the 7th of May, 1878.
The seventh section of that act is:
"That the said sinking fund so established and accumu lated shall, at the mat~trity of the said bonds so respectively
issued by the United States, be applied to the payment and
satisfaction thereof according to the interest and proportion
of each of said companies in said fund, and of all interest
paid by the United States thereon and not re-imbursed, subject to the provisions of the next section."
Until action is to be taken in pursuance of this section, the
law authorizes no use of the bonds nor further disposition
of them by the agent. After the investment is made th~
first step required to be taken with reference thereto pursuant
to law is the sale for the purpose of the application to the
payment of the debts for which it was accumulated. The
time when this step is to be taken is at the maturity of the
bonds. The bonds whose maturity is referred to in this section are the United States railroad subsidy bonds issued on
account of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroads.
Until those bonds mature, the power to dispose of the United
States bonds purchased in pursuance of the act does not.
take effect. Therefore, in answer to your first inquiry, you
are not authorized to sell the United States bonds in which
the funds are now invested, for the purpose of reinvesting
in the first-mortgage bonds of the company.
In reply to your second inquiry: the fifth section of the
act of the 3d of March, 1887, authorizes the fund, "in addition to the investments now authorized hy law, (to) be hJvested in any bonds of the United States heretofore issued
for the benefit of either or all of said companie~, or in any of
the first-mortgage bonds of either of said companies which
have been issued under the authority of any law of the
United States and secured by mortgages of their roads and
franchises, which by any law of the United States have been
made prior and paramount to the mortgage, lien, or other
security of the United States in respect of its advances to
either of said companies as provided by law."
The second section of the same act defines the words " all
such railroads" to mean "all the railroads that have received
aid from the Government in honrls." The railroads which
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have received aid from the Government in bonds are set forth
in the act of the 1st day of July, 1862, and the amendment
thereto of the 2d day of July, 1864, and any of the United
States railroad subsidy bonds issued in pursuance of said
act as amended are a legitimate security in which to invest
the fund under the first clause of the quotation under consideration. In the second clause, '' or in any of the firstmortgage bonds of either of said companies," the word "either"
is substituted instead of the phrase "either or all of said
companies" in the former clause.
This substitution of
"either" for" either or all" is intended to limit the investment in mortgage bonds of the roads to fewer roads than
are included in the expression "either <lr all." "Either" is
generally used as signifying " one or the other of two." It
is thus used here. The two roads, in either of whose firstmortgage bonds the investment may be made, as referred to
by the word ''either," are to be determined by reference to
the act of the 1st of July, 1~62, with its amendments of the
~d of July, 1864, and the ·7 th of May, 1878. By reference to
these acts it will be found the Union Pacific and the Central
Pacific Companies compose the main line and central object
of the legislation, that they and they alone pay in the money
which constitutes the fund. They are the sole corporations
embraced in the provisions of the Thurman act, in which
they are frequently grouped under the word "either." Hence
it is concluded they are the railroads em braced in the term
"either" in the clause under consideration~ and investments
of the fund may be made in the first-mortgage bonds of either
the Union or Central Pacific Railroads. You may, then, invest any money paid into the sinking fund in pursuance of
the act of the 7th of May, 1878, now in the Treasury, or which
may in future be paid inFirst. In United States bonds, as provided in the act of
the 7th of May, 1878.
Second. In any United States railroad subsidy bonds of
any of the aided roads, as described in the act of the 1st of
July, 1862, and its several amendments.
Third. In any of the first-mortgage bonds of the Union
Pacific or the Central Pacific Railroad Companies, such as are
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described in the third section of the act of the 3d of March,
1887.
Within this range the law leaves it to your discretion to
invest in whichever of the securities will best subserve the
securing and accumulating of the fund.
I am, yours respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ESTATE OF JAMES B. EADS.
Payment of amonnt due the estate of James B. Eads, deceased, for services m connection with the improvement of the South Pass of the
Mississippi River, may lawfully be made to James P. How and Estill
McHenry, the executors and trustees under his will, if the certificate
of the engineer officer in charge shows satisfactorily the performance
of the services.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April11, 1887.
Sm : By letter of the 31st of March, 1887, the executors of
James B. Eads, deceased, request the payment to them of
$50,000, which they claim to be due to his estate from the
United States for services and interest in connection with
the Mississippi jetties.
By yours of the 1st of April you ask my opinion "whether,
under the terms of the will and the other papers submitted,"
you will be "justified under the law in ordering this payment to the executors and trustees under the will in case the
certificate of services be satisfactory."
On the 30th of March, 1887, James F. How and Estill McHenry, as executors of James B. Eads, deceased., presented to
the surrogate of the county of New York, in the State of
New York, for probate his will, dated the 2d of October, 1883.
It was duly proven and decree of probate made thereon in
regular form. On the same day letters testamentary were
granted to James F. How and Estill McHenry as executors.
The only two essential jurisdictional ~acts to warrant the
exercise of the power to grant letters testamentary by the
surrogate under the law of :New York "are the death of the
~estator, and that at or immediately previous to his death he
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was an inhabitant of the same county with the surrogate.''
(Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill'::; Report, 13.4). These two facts
are sufficiently shown by the records submitted. The adjudication by the surrogate where he bas jurisdiction is not
exposed to collateral impeachment, but is conclusive of the
validity of the will when not directly attacked. The same conclusiveness attaches to the granting of letters testamentary.
In this case, then, the papers submitted show the will is valid,
and that James F. How and Estill McHenry are the legal
representatives of James B. Eads, deeeased, with tbA power
over his estate provided for by the terms of the will. One of the
provisions of the will is a::; follows: "James F. How and Estill
McHenry are appointed as executors and trustees to execute
and administer this will and to collect and disburse the various payments to be made to me under the several acts of
Congress on account of the jetties, etc., at the South Pass."
'fbe second section of the act of Congress of the 3d of March,
1875 (18 Stat., 463), which provides for the work and payment
therefor, declared : "The United States hereby promise and
agree to pay said Eads or his successors or legal representatives," etc. The ninth section enacts ''that in case of death
or other disability of said Eads before the completion of said
works the same shall be prosecuted and completed by his
legal representatives and associates aforesaid, with the same
powers, rights, obligations, and compensations as if done by
him in person." The tenth section authorizes the Secretary
of War, upon fulfillment of the conditions of the act," to draw
his warrants upon the Treasury of the United States in favor
of said Eads or his legal representatives in payment of the aforesaid amounts as they respecti 'I ely become due by the provisions of this act."
If, then, the certificate of the engineer shows satisfactorily
the performance of the services contemplated by the act for
wllich the compensation remains due and unpaid, payment
therefor may be ma<le to his executors to whom letters testa·
mentary have been granted.
This is in accordance with legal principles heretofore recognized by this Department. (7 Opin., 60.)
Very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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CUSTOMS DUTIES.
Confectionery known as "fruit tablets" is dutiable under the clause in
the act of March 3, 181:33, chapter 121, namely: "Sugar candy not colored, five cents per pound."
DEPAR'l'MENT OF JUSTICE,

April 13, 1887.
Your letter of the 6th of April, 1887, submits for consideration the question raised by the appeal of Wright and
.Rich, which is, whether certain confectionery known as'' fruit
tablets" is dutiable under clause 242 Tariff Index, new, or
243 of the Tarifl' Act of l\larch 3, 1883. These clauses are as
follows: No. 242, "sugar candy not colored, five cents per
pound." No. 243, "All other confectionery not specially
enumerated or provided for in this act, made wholly or in
part of sugar, and on sugars after being refined~ when tinctured, colored, or in any way adulteratec., valued at thirty
cents per pound or less, ten cents per pound." The duty
was collected under the latter. By its -terms this clause is
applicable only to "other confectionery not specially enumerated or provided for w this act." The appellants claimed
these tablets are " specially enumerated and pro,Tided for"
by clause No. 242, above quoted, as "sugar candy not colored." The " confectionery is manufactured from sugar and
flavored with fruit extracts, such as lime, lemon, hoarhound,
orange, etc., which extracts also tinctured and colored the
tablets to a certain extent;" but the color or tincture given
to the cand~y was only the accidental result of the nature of
the ingredi~?nts used as a flavor. No ingredient was used in
the manufacture of the candy purposed or intended to beautify or ornament it. The chemist at the port of New ,York
reports "that in his opinion the tablets in question do not
represent what are commercially known as colored candies
or colored confectioneries." A 1 eport of the second appraiser
at the same port, approved by the appraiser, finds ''if the
commercial designation is to govern the classification of the
confectionery under consideration, it should undoubtedly be
returned for duty at fi.\e cents per pound~ as pro\ided for in
paragragh 242, Tariff Index, new." The same view is adopted
and elaborated in carefully considered opinions by the nava~
SIR :
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officer of the port and the Acting Solicitor of the Treasury.
Certificates of over sixty dealers in the article in different
large cities of the countr~· attest that it is "commercially
understood, designated, bought and sold by the trade as
' sugar candy not colored.' "
From all the facts found in the papers with yours transmitted, it seems to be well estabiished that the article has a
well known commercial designation as " sugar candy n~t
colored." In the cases of _Arthur v. Morrison and Arthur v.
Lahey (96 U. S. R., 108-113) a well established principle in
the interpretation of tariff legislation is formulated as follows:
·' 'The commercial designation of an article among traders
and importers, when such designation is clearly established,
fixes its character for the purpose of the tariff laws."
It is therefore concluded the tablets referred to in the appeal should have been classified according to their commercial
designation, under Tariff Index, new, 242, instead of 243,
under which the duty was collected.
I am, very respectfully,
A. H. GARLAND.
The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

INDEX.
ABATEMENT OF TAX.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 39; INTERNAL REVENUE, 7.
ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS.
1. Upon the facts presented in the case: Advised, that it is not incumbent upon the Postmaster-General to have an account for mail
transportation performed in July, 1876, audited in favor of the
Lak~ Superior and Mississippi Railroad Company, until satisfactory evidence is presented that the company has maintained
its existence and that there are proper officers to receive andreceipt for the money. 129.
2. Leave of absence was granted Lieutenant R., of the Army, for one
year from August 1, 18S1, during part of which period, namely,
from August 1 to November 1, 1881, he was entitled to cumulative leave with full pay. On March 16, 1882, the order granting:
said leave of absence was revoked, and a new order was issued
by direction of the Secretary of War placing Lieutenant R. "oa
a status of waiting orders for one year from August 1, 1881."'
He has drawn full pay (not only from August 1 to November 1,.
1881, to which he was entitled, but) from November 1, 1881, toMarch 16, 1882, when, for this period, he was only entitled t.o.
half pay: Held, that the difference between full pay and half'
pay for the last-mentioned period can not be withheld in the adjustment of another and subsequent pay account presented by
Lieutenant R. (But see paragraph 6, p. 610.) 158.
3. The Secretary of the Interior is warranted in approving certain
statements of account between the United States and the State
of Ohio, made by the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
for cash indemnity for swamp lands sold during the period intervening between the passage of the swamp -land act of September 2S, 1850, and March 3, 1857. 170.
4. Where an account has once beeu duly adjusted, settled, and closed
by the proper officers, UJlOn a full knowledge of all the facts,
and no errors of calculation have been made, it can not be reopened in the absence of statutory authority. 223.
i. Tbe provisions of the act of August 7, 1882, entitled ''An act to
authorize the auditing of certain unpaid claims against the Indian Bureau by the accounting officers of the Treasury,'' do not
extend to the opening of settled accounts. Ibid.
273-VOL XVIII--39
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6. The case of Lieutenant R. reconsidered in the light of new and material facts; and it appearing that there has been no such settlement of his account as was heretofore supposed: Held, that he is
bound to refund the sum which has been paid him without authority of law. 229.
7. In the adjustment of a marshal's emolument account, he may be
allowed credit for expenses of travel incurreti by himself while
serving process. 290.
8. So a deputy marshal may be reimbursed for expenses incurred
while serving process, and also be allowed turee-fourths of the
profits arising from his services. Ibid.
9. The First Comptroller is not clothed with power, where in his
"Opinion further delay would be injurious to the Government,
to dit·ect the Commissioner of the General Land Office forthwith
to audit any particuiar account relating to the public lands, the
settlement whereof is devolved upon the lat.ter officer. 450.
10. The Commissioner, with respect to the discharge of his duties in
such matter, is subject only to the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior. Ibid.
11. In the settlement of the accounts of the Sioux City and Pacific
Railroad Company (whose road was in part constructed with
the aid of subsidy bonds issued under the acts of July 1, 1862,
chapter 120, and July:!, 1864, chapter 216), for Government transportation over the subsidized portion of its road: Advised, that
the direction in the second section of the act of March 3, 1873,
ehapter 2:26 (Sec. 5260, Rev. Stat.), "to withhold all payments,"
etc., is now, November 12, 1886, no longer applicable thereto;
that only one-half the amount of compensation due the company
lor such transportation should be withheld to be applied as required by the act of July 2, 1864, and that the remaining onehalf should be paid over to the company. 503.
AD INTERDf APPOINTMENT.
See OFFICE.
ADVANCES.
The fund appropriated by the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 234, to
defray the expenses of delegates to the Universal Postal Union
Congress at Lisbon, Portugal, is subject to the re<>trictions, as to
advances, contained iu section 3648, Revised Statutes. 93.
ALABAMA CLADIS COMMISSION.
See COURT OF COMMISSIO~ERS OF ALABAMA CLAIMS.
ALASKA.
The fourteenth section of the act of May 17, 1884, chapter 53, which
prohibits the importation of ''intoxicating liquors" into the
Territory of Alaska, does not apply to wines imported for sacramental use. 139.
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.ALLOTMENT.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 12.
AMERICAN AND MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION.
Q:1e":~tion considered as to whom payment should be made, under
the circumstances stated, of an award of the American and Mexican Claims Commission in favor of a claimant, a resident of
Mexico, who has deceased. 99.
AMERICAN ARTIST.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 14.
AMNESTY.
See PARDON .
.APPEAL.
An appeal does not lie to the President from a decision made by
the Secretary of the Interior touching the correctness or validity
of a resurvey of a private land c~aim. :11.
APPOINTMENT.
1. The provisions of.section 1769, R~vised Statutes, relative to filling
vacancies during a recess of the Senate, are limited to vacancies
happening by death or resignation or expiration of term of office,
but do not apply to original vacancies. 28.
2. When an office is created by a law taking effect during a session of
the Senate, and no nomination is made thereto, the original
vacancy thus existing may be filled by the President during the
ensuing recess of the Senate by a temporary appointment. Ibid.
3. The power of the President to fill vacancies in office by temporary
appointment, derived under section 2, Article II, of the Constitution, comprehends all vacancies that may happen to exist in a
recess of the Senate, irrespective of the time when such vacancies
first occur. 29.
4. The appointment of the assistant collector at the port of New York
(who was formerly employed by the collector with the approval
of the Secretary of the Treasury) should now be made by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 98.
5. The President can not appoint an honorary commissioner to the
"Inventions International Exposition" at London, such office
not existing by virtue of any law of the United States. 171.
6. An Indian residing in the Indian Territory, who is a member of one
of the tribes there, and subject to tribal jurisdiction, is not eligible to appointment as a postmaster; he being incompetent, in
contemplation oflaw, to take the required oath of office. 181.
7. Where a post-office of either the first, second, or third class (all of
which classes are filled by appointment by the President) is reducecl to a post-office of the fourth class (which is filled by appointment by the Postmaster-General), the commission of the
then incumbent, though he may not have served out the term for
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which he was appointed, expires, and a new appointment (by the
Postmaster-General) becomes necessary. 271.
8. The office of chief examiner in the Civil Service Commission, created
by the act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27, is to be filled by
appointment by the President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate. 409.
9. The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 353, repealing the tenure-of-office
law (sections 1767 to 1772, Revised Statutes), leaves unaffected
such designations, nominations, and appointments as shaH have
been made before the repeal, and requires all business begun bnt
unfinished before the repeal to be completed under the law as it
then stood. 576.
10. Appointments and removals after the repeal are to be made under
the law as it now exists. Ibid.
See CIVIIr SERVICE; LIGHT-HousE ESTABLISHMENT; OFFICE.
APPRAISEMENT OF DUTIABLE MERCHANDISE.
See CuSTOMS LAws, 3, 10, 15, 22.
APPROPRIATIONS.
See UNEXPENDED BALANCES OF APPROPRIATIONS.
ARMY.
1. Where an officer of the Army was tendered a place on a ' 1 board
of experts," created by a city ordinance to determine the most
durable and best pavement for the streets of the city: Advised
that, in view of the provisions of section 1222, Revised Statutes,
the place be not accepted by the officer. 11.
2. In the matter of the claims of Sergeant Robinson and Corporal
Speddin, of the Signal Corps, for extra-duty pay for services
performed by them from July 1, 188:3, to December 20, 1884, it
appearing that Congress has made no provision for extra-duty
pay to signal service men in either of the appropriation acts of
March 3, 1883, chapter 143, and July 7, 188-1, chapter 332, for the
fiscal years ending June 30, 1884, and June 30, 1885, respectively,
or in any other appropriation act for the same fiscal years :
Held that the claimants have no right to such pay for the period
covered by their claims, unless the right is elsewhere conferred
by statute, which does not appear. 201.
3. The claimants being non-commissioned officers, and not employed
on extra duty as overseers, their claims are not within section
1287, Revised Statutes. Ibid.
4. A discharge of an officer from the military service, under the act
of July 15, 1870, chapter 294, in order to be valid, must, like a
resignat,i on, be founded on an offer on the one part and an acceptance on the other. 311.
5. Accordingly, where Assistant Surgeon P., in September, 1870,
offered to take the benefit of that act, and in November followirg his offer was virtually rejected, an order subsequently (in
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December, 1870) issued discharging him from the service is held
to be invalid and his status in the service unaffected thereby.
Ibid
6. H. entered the military service in August, 1862, as a volunteer, to
serve for three years; he subsequently deserted; but he afterwards voluntarily returned to service underthePresident's proclamation (of pardon) of March 11, 1865, and was mustered out
of service along with his company in July 2, 1865: Advised that
the time which elapbed between his desertion and his return
should not be credited to him in a discharge or otherwise, but
that he is entitled to have his actual service credited to him in
an lionorable discharge. 427.
ARMY OFFICER HOLDING CIVIL OFFICE.
See ARMY, 1.
ARMY SUPPLIES, PURCHASE OF.
1. Purchases of supplies for the Army made in open market after
advertisement, where no bids have been received in response to
such advertisement, are ~mergency purchases within the meaning of the act of July 5, 1884, chapter.217, and should be" at once
reported to the Secretary of War for his approval." 349.
2. When parts of machinery, or of stoves or ranges or patented articles, are needed, such articles are required by that act to be purchased in the same way as other quartermaster's suppliesthat is, by contract after arlvertisement, except in cases of emergency, in which cases the purchases are to be reported to the
Secretary of War for approval. Ibid.
ASSIGNMENT.
See CoNTRACT, 1,

~.

ASSISTANT COLLECTOR AT NEW YORK.
See APPOINTMENT, 4.
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR OF STEAM-VESSELS.
See INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS, 3, 4.
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES TREASURER.
See BoND.
ATTORNEY FEES.
An attorney was employed by the War Department in 1868 to defend certain parties against whom suits were brought, in the
result of which the Government was interested. The suits were
not determined until some time after the passage of the act of
June 22, 1870, chapter 150, up to which time the attorney was
continued therein: Advised that the anthorfty under which the
attorney was originally employed was sufficient, and that the
Secretary of War is authorized to pay for his services out of any
fund under his 9ontrol which may be available for that purpose.
124.

614.

INDEX.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL.
1. Where a question is submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to
the Solicitor of the Treasury for the opinion of the latter thereon,.
the Attorney-General will not, at the request of the Solicitor,
consider such opinion and express his views as to its conclusions. 57.
2. An opinion of the Att.:>rney-General upon any question arising i D
the administration of the Treasury Department can only be had
at the instance of the Secretary. - 59.
3. Where a que!iltion has been submitted by the Secretary to the Solicitor of the Treasury for advice thereon, the latter is not entitled, by virtue of section 361, Revised Statutes, to call upon the
Attorney-General for his views on such question. Ibid.
4. The Soliciter should, in such case, return his aflvice directly to the
Secretary, who may, if he choose, require an opinion from theAttorney-General upon the same quf<stion. Ibid.
5. It is not the duty of the Attorney-General to give an opinion to the
Secretary of the Treasury upon questions relating to the past action of the Board of Supervising Inspectors, which was had on a
matter properly submitted to such board under the provisions or
s.ection 4491, Revised Statutes, and which is not reviewable by
the Secretary. 77.
6. The Attorney-General is not authorized by law to give an official
opinion to the House of Representatives in response to a reso'lution thereof. 87.
7. Where a call for an opinion from the Attorney-General was made
by the head of a Department, in compliance with a resolution of
the House of Representatives, for the information of the latter,
and without reference to any question of law arising in the administration of such Department: Advised that the AttorneyGeneral is without authority to give an official opinion in such
case. 107.
8. ;where a request is made for an opinion of the Attorney-General on
questitms of law arising in any case, it should be accompanied
by a statement of the facts of the case as well as of the questions
on which ad vice is desired. The Attorney-General can not undertake to find and settle the facts from papers that may be submitted. 487.
9. The Attorney-General will not interpret a regulation of practice
made by the Commissioner of Patents for his own guidance and
that of his subordinates, for the convenient, intelligent, and orderly disposal of the business of his office. Such regulations,
which the heads of bureaus and Departments can make, modify~
or annul at will, or enforce or waive, as seems expedient, may
well be left for their interpretation to the head of the Department ur bureau to which they pertain. 521.
AWARD.
See AMERICAN AND MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION.
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BOARD OF IMMIGRATION.
It is not the duty of a United States attorney to advise or defend
boards of immigration; but the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered by the act of August 3, 1882, chapter 376, to employ, and
pay out of the immigrant fund, counsel for those purposes. 108.
BOND.
1. The form of the bond required to be given by assistant treasurers
of the United States under section 3600, Revised Statuteswhether the parties thereto are to be jointly and severally, or
may be only jointly bound, and whether each surety is to bind
himself for the full amount of the penalty, or may restrict his
liability to a less amount-is not made the subject of statutory
regulation, but is left to the determination of the officers by
whom the houd is to be approved. 274.
2. But the form ordinarily made use of in practice is that wherein the
principal ancl sureties are jointly and severally bound for the
full amount of the penalty. Ibid.
3. This form being preferable to any other, and its use sanctioned by
long practice, the adoption of a different form (though it might
not be inconsistent with the terms of the statute so to do) would
not be warranted unless the circumstances of the particular
case were such that the public interests could not otherwise be
served. 2i 5 .
.(. The omission of the words" in the State of Vermont" from the official bond of the collector of customs for the district of Vermont
does not impair its validity. The bond held to be valid, either
under the statute or at common law. 458.
See SuRETY; SusPENSIO~ OF OFFICER, 2.
BONDED WAREHOUSE.
See CUSTOMS LAws, 2, 25.
BOUNDARY.
See SHEYENNE ISLAND.
BRIDGE.
1. The provision in the act of J nly 5, 1884, chapter ~15, fixing the
width of the water-way between the spans of the proposed
bridge across the Mississippi River at St. Paul, Minn., extends
to the entire structure over so much of the river as is ordinarily
navigable at some seasons of the year for either boats or rafts.
133.
2. The power of Congress to regulate bridges over navigable waters
is paramount, and where it comes in conflict with that of a State
the latter necessarily becomes ineffective. 164.
3. Yet, until Congress acts, and by appropriate legislation assumes
control of the subject, the power of a State over bridges across
navigable streams within its limits is plenary. Ibid.
4. Accordingly, where a railroad company was authorized by the
laws of Minnesota to construct a bridge across the Mississippi
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River within the limits of that State: Held that, if such authority is unaffected by any law of Congress, the company may
act thereunder, though in so doing it will subject itself to the
risk of future Congressional interference. Ibid.
5. In the case of the bridges of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company across the Southern and Eastern branches of Elizabeth
River, the facts set forth are insufficient to authorize judicial
proceedings against said company in behalf of the United States
on the ground that such bridges are an obstruction to navigation. 200.
6. Under authority of the legislature of West Virginia it is proposed
to cor•struct a bridge overthe~ittleKanawha, 3navigableriver
within the limits of that State, which bridge, if built, will be
an obstruction to navigation; but its construction being neither
expressly nor impliedly forbidden by any law of Congress: Advised that the case is not one which warrants the institution of
judicial proceedings for the prevention of obstruction to navigation threatened. 42fi.
7. A State may authorize a navigable stream within its limits to be
obstructed by a bridge in the absence of any legislation by Congress on the subject. Ibid.
8. Under the provisions of the acts of December 17, 1872, chapter 4,
and February 14, 1883, chapter 44, authorizing and regulating
the construction of hridges over the Ohio River, the Secretary
of War has power to disapprove of the plans of such bridges
where he is of the opinion that they would unduly obstruct the
navigation of the river. 512.
9. The Covington anu Cincinnati Elevated Railway Transportation
and Bridge Company, authorized by act of May 20, 1886, chapter 363, to erect a bridge across the Ohio between Covington
and Cincinnati, has no power under that act to sell the franchise granted to it thereby. Such power is not to be iv.tplied
from the words "successors or assigns" in the act. Ibid.
CADET ENGINEERS.
See NAVY, 4, 6.
CALLED BONDS.
See NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATIONS.
CASH INDEMNITY FOR S\V.AMP LANDS SOLD.
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 3.
CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
See SINKING FUND.
CHARWIN LAND-GRANT.
See APPEAL.
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CHEROKEE STRIP.
The lands lying in the "Cherokee Strip" which are leased to the
whites are not lands of the United States within the meaning of
section 5388, Revised Statutes. 555.
CHIEF OF ENGINEERS.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2.
CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT.
See CHINESE LABORERS.
CHINESE LABORERS.
1. Where a sheriff in Washington Territory apprehended certain Chinamen and brought them before a United States commissioner,
who, having found them to be in the country unlawfully, remanded them to the custody of the sheriff, to be sent out of the
country: Held that the expenses incurred by the sheriff in the
performance of such service are payable from the appropriation
made by the act of July 7, 1884, chapter 332, to meet expenses
incurred in executing the act relating to the Chinese, approved
May 6, 1882. 90.
2. The remedy for the alleged evil of Chinese laborers passing through
the territory of the United States to, and returning from, China
and other foreign .countries, is proper matter for the consideration of Congress. 388.
3. Opinion of Attorney-General Brewster, of July 18, 1882 (17 Opin.,
416), construing the act of May 6, 1882, chapter 1:l6, cited with
approval. Ibid.
4. Body servants or nurses (Chinese) are not persons "other than
laborers" within the meaning of section 6 of the act of May 6,
1882, chapter 126, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884, chapter 220, when they come to this country to ply their vocations,
and are excluded. 542.
5. Where, however, such servants or nurses accompany visitors entitled to enter the United States, and only remain here temporarily during the stay of such visitors, they do not fall within the
scope of the legislation referred to. Ibid.
CHOCTAW AND CHICKASAW PERMIT LAWS.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 1, 2.
CIVIL SERVICE.
1. Wher.e father and daughter held each an office in the classified .
service in one of the Departments, and another daughter, having
passed the required examination, was proposed for appoiu"tment
in another Department: Held that, by force of section 9 of the
act of January 16, 1H83, chapter27, the last-mentioned daughter,
so long as the above state of facts exists, is ineligible for appoi:n~
ment to any office or place in the classified service. 83.
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2. Special examiners of the Pension Bureau authorized to be appointed
by the act of July 7, 1884, chavter 331, and by the act of March
3, 1885, chapter 334, come within the purview of the civil-service
act of January 16, 1883, chapter 27; and in appointing snell officers the latter act and rulfls thereunder should be observed. 172.
3. The officers in the Pension Bureau described as medical referee,
assistant medical referee, medical examiners, and law clerk, being " exclusively professional," do not fall within the operation
of the civil-service law; they are excepted therefrom by Rule
XIX. 187.
4. Those described as principal examiners for review board are not
excepted and in appointing them the civil-service law a.nd regulations should be observed, Ibid.
'
5. The act of January 16, 18i33, chapter 27, to regulate and improve the
civil service of the United States, repeals by implication section
164, Revised Statutes. 215.

CLAIMS.
1. Upon the facts presented in the matter of the claim ofVann and
Adair for compensation for their services rendered the Osage Indians in 1869 and 1870 respecting the disposal of the lands of the
latter: Advised, that the payment of the $50,000 awarded by the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Acting Secretary of the
Interior in 1874 was a satisfaction in full of any claims that the
said Vann and Adair had for their services. 5.
2. Sernble that an assistant attorney of the District of Columbia is not
within the prohibitions of sections 178:t and 5498, Revised Sta.tuteA. 161.
3. The claims of Ely Moore, J. W. Whitfield, and Daniel Woodson, as
special agents and receivers, for additional compensation for the
sale of the trust l::j.nds of the Delaware, Kaskaskia, Piankeshaw,
Peoria, and W ea Indians, considered. 167.
4. Upon the facts stated : Advised that no action whatever should be
taken by the Executive Departments on the claim of Ely Moore
and others for additional compensation for selliJ"ig certain Indian
trust lands, without legislation by Congress providing therefor.
223.
5. Opinions of May 5 and July 7, 1885, 1, touching the claims of Ely .
Moore and others (see ante, pp. 167, 223), reaffirmed. 369.
6. In 1860 E., a naval officer, became entitled to a share in the proceeds of a captured slaver, the amount of which was certified to
the Treasury Department by the Secretary of the Navy, but remains unpaid. In 1861 E. resigned his commission and entered
the Confederate service : Htld that by for.ce of the joint resolution
of March 2, 1867 (sec. 3480, Rev. Stat.), payment of such share can
not now be made, notwithstanding the President's proclamation
of amnesty of December 25, 1868, and that to authorize its payment an act of Congress is necessary. 421.
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CLAIMS-Con tinned.
7. The act of August 4, 1886, chapter 907, made an approJ?riation to
pay certain claims, and directed the 8ecretary of the Treasury
to pay t,o "Martin and P. B. Murphy$10,000." It being alleged
that this was intended by Congress to satisfy a claim for that
amount, of which Martin.~furphy was a joint owner with Patrick
W. Murphy: Ad1!ised, that should the identity of their claim
with that provided for in the act be clearly established, the fact
that " B" is used in the act instead of " W" as the initial letter
of the middle name of Patrick W. Murphy, is immaterial, and
may be disregarded. 501.
CLAIMS OF THE UNITED S1'ATES.
See COM;PROMISE.
CLASSIFICATION FOR DUTY.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 24, 26, 32.
COLLECTION DISTRICT.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 47.
COLLECTOR'S CERTIFICATE.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 16.
IJOMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
See INTERNAL-REVENUE STAMPS.
COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE.
See AccouNTS AND AccouNTING OFFICERS, 9, 10.
COMPENSATION.
1. Opinion of February 13, 1884 (17 Opin., p. 658), on the subject of
the re-adjustment of postmasters' salaries, rftferred to and explained. 17.
2. Statutory provisions relating to the appointment and duties of
supervisors of elections considered; and held that when they
have served any given number of days not exceeding ten, and
it is so duly made to appear, they are entitled to be paid a per
diem therefor, and that it is not for the Attorney-General to determine whether their period of servi\le is reasonable or unreasonable. 102.
3. Certain fees claimed by a United States attorney for special services held to be "compensation allowed by law" within the
meaning of the third section of the act of J nne 20, 1874, chapter
328, and therefore not precluded by that section from being
paid. 121.
4. Section 838. Revised Statutes does not authorize an allowance to
be made by the Secretary of the Treasury to a district attorney
for services in internal-revenue cases reported to the latter
wherein no judicial proceedings have been instituted. 126.
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5. W. was appointed minister resident and consul-general to Hayti,
and took the oath of office, but failing to execute a bont'l as required by section 1697, Revised Statutes, his commission was
not delivered to him: Held that by the provisions of that section he never became qualified to receive the commission or to
enter upon the duties of the office, and that he is not entitled to
pay as an incumbent of such office. 157.
6. Compensation of the United States attorney for the southern district of New York, under sections 770, 836, and 827, Revised
Statutes, considered. 192.
7. The provision of section 4769, Revised Statutes, authorizing pension
agents to deduct from the fees of attorneys in each pension case
30 cents, in payment of the services of the former for forwarding
the same, is repealed by the act of June 14, 1878, chapter 188.
251.
8. D., while a clerk in the office of the auditor of the District of Columbia, was appointed a referee by the Court of Claims under
the provisions of the act of June 16, 1880, chapter 243, and performed services as such; and in consideration of such services
the court issued certificates to him fixing the amount of compensation allowed therefor: Held that D. is entitled to receive
the amount thus allowed. 30:3.
9. Under the act of August 15, 1876, chapter 287, an internal-revenue
store-keeper is entitled to receive a per diem compensation only
while "rendering actual service." Hence during such time as
he is not assigned to duty and does not perform duty no compensation can be allowed him. 3\:IS.
10. Unexpended balances of moneys appropriated for the pay of the
Navy and Marine Corps for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1884,
are not available for payment of the Navy and Marine Corps for
services rendered during the fiscal year ending June ~0, 1885. 412.
See ATTORNEY FEES; CLAIMS, 2, 3, 4, 5; EXTRA-DUTY PAY.
COMPROMISE.
1. Where judgment was recovered in the name of the United States
against G. for damages and penalties, under sections 3490, 3491,
3492, and 3493 Rev. Stat., the action having been instituted
and prosecuted by D.: Advised that the Secretary of the Treasury has power, by virtue of section 3469 Rev. Stat., to compromise such judgment, irrespective of the quasi interest which
D. may have therein. 72.
2. Claims in favor of the Government, founded on judgments entered
upon forfeited recognizances taken in the prosecution of offenses against the postal laws, may be compromised by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions and upon the considerations imposed by section 3496 Rev. Stat. 277.
.a, Such claims do not arise under the postal laws within the meaning of the exception in that section. Ibid.
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CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF,

CONSUL.
See CoMPENSATION,

5;

FEES OF CoNSULS.

CONSULAR COURT.
1. Where a citizen of the United States, trading in the island of Gnap,
a barbarous or semi-civilized country, was charged with cruelly
and inhumanly punishing a boy on said islan<l: Advised that the
case is cognizable by a consul or commercial agent under the
provisions of section 4088 Rev Stat., and that a special commercial agent might be sent to the island for the trial of the
accused. 219.
2. The criminal jurisdiction conferred upon United States consular
officers by section 4084 Rev. Stat., i& limited to ''citizens"
of the United States charged with offenses committed in the
countries therein referred to. It does not extend to subjects of
foreign powers. 498.
CONTINGENT FUND.
1. Under section 3683 Rev. Stat., heads of Departments are alone
a·nthorized to give orders for purchases payable from the contingent fund and to approve vouchers therefor. 424.
2. Opinion of July 16, 1886 (ante, p. 424), in regard to the power
conferred upon heads of Departments by section 3683 Rev. Stat.
respecting purchases payable f:.-om the contingent fund, does
not apply to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior while in
the exercise of authority prescribed for him by the Secretary of
the Interior under section 439 Rev. Stat. 432.
CONTRACT.
1. 'l'he contract entered into by the Chief of Ordnance with the South
Boston Iron Company in October, 1880, and subsequently transferrecl by that company to the South Boston Iron Works, may
still be treated by the Government as obligatory upon the former
company, notwithstanding such transfer. 88.
2. Under the provisions of section 3737 Rev. Stat., such transfer
operated to annul the contract so far as the United States are
concerned; but these provisi0ns were not made to enable a contractor to avoid his agreement with the Government and relieve
himself from his obligations by a mere transfer. Ibid.
3. The Secretary of the N aYy may assent to a modification of the contract for building the new cruisers where the interests of the
Government will not be prejudiced or any statutory provision
violated thereby. 101.
4. Contracts entered into by the Post-Office Department for carrying
the mail should be in the name of the United States as directed
by statute. (See section 3949 Rev. Stat. ; also section 403, ibid.)
112.
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5. The express condition mentioned in section 3741 Rev. Stat., need
not be inserted in those contracts made with railroad corporations. Ibid.
6. Examination of the contract entered into between Mr. John RoaCJh
and the Secretary of the ·Navy for the construction of the dispatch boat Dolphin, and consideration of the rights and duties
of the United States arising thereunder. 207.
7. Opinion of June 30, 1885, touching the contract with Mr. John
Roach for building the Dolphin (ante, p. 207) reaffirmed. 240.
8. Upon the facts of the case as presented: Advised that the contract
relating to certain coal mines at Savanna, Choctaw Nation, between Mrs. A. G. Ream and her husband and the Atoka Coal
Mining Company, dated November 3, 1883, be considered as in
full force for the period for which it was executed and approved
by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and Secretary of the Interior. 242.
9. The authority to make contracts for carrying the mail between
ports of the U[l_ited States and foreign ports, given by section
4007 Rev. Stat., is limited by section 4009 Rev. Stat., with
respect to the amount of compensation; so that in such contracts under the former section no greater compensation can
be allowed to American steam-ship lines than the sea and inland postage upon the mail transported. 248.
COURT-MARTIAL.
1. Review of the finding of the court-martial in the case of JndgeAdvocate·General David G. Swaim. 113.
2. Special counsel ruay 1e employed by the Attorney-General, at the
request of the Secretary of the Na-vy, to assist tho judge-advocate in a trial by court-martial, the compensation of such counsel (in the absence of other provision) to be paid from the appropriation for tile contingent expenses of the Navy. 135.
3. Such counsel should be commissioned by the Attorney-General
under section 366 Rev. Stat. Ibid.
4. The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in the Navy Department is amenable to the jurisdiction of a naval court-martial
upon charges and specifications preferred against him for acts
done as such chief. 176.
5. Where a civilian witness is brought before a court-martial but
refuses to testify, the court is not invested with any inherent
power to punish the witness in such case, either summarily or
otherwise, as for a contempt. Such power can only be exercised
by it when given by the positive terms of some statute. 278.
6. Section 1202 Rev. Stat. arms the court with authority to compel the witness to appear and testify so far as this can be
done by process; but in securing his testimony the court is restri~ted to the means which it is thus authorized to employ. It
can not inflict any punishment where the power to impose it is
not clearly conferred by Congress. Ibid.
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COURT-MARTIAL-Continued.
7. Where the record of the proceedings of a court-martial in the case
of a naval cadet of the second class, who was tried under the act
of June ~3, 1874, chap. 453, for the offense of hazing, showed
that the acts complained of were pulling the nose, striking at,
striking, and otherwise maltreating a naval cadet of the fourth
class: Held that these facts in conjunction with other circumstances present a case containing all that is essential to constitute the offense of hazing within the meaning of the statute, and
that the court had jurisdiction uf the complaint. 376.
COURT OF COMMISSIONERS OF ALABAMA CLAIMS.
The officers composing the Court of Commissioners of Alabama
Claims, re-established by the act of June 5, 1'l82, chap. 195,
were appointed in conformity to the provisions of that act, but
were not commissioned for any stated period. That act limited
the duration of the court to two years from the time of its organization thereunder; but by the act of June 3, 18?4, chap. 62, its
existence was extended to December :n, 1885; and under the
latter act the officers of the court continued to perform their
duties after the expiration of the two years referred to, without
any other appointment than that originally received: Held that
the limitation upon the duration of the court prescribed by the
act of 1882 was not a limitation upon the terms of the officers
thereof, and that the court remained after the expiration of the
two years limited by that act, by virtue of the act of 1884, a
legally constituted body, notwithstanding the officers composing it received no other commissions than those originally
given. 298.
COVERINGS OF IMPORTED MERCHANDISE.
See CusTOM LAws, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY INDIANS.
See JURISDICTION.
CROW CREEK RESERVATION.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS.
CUSTOMS LAWS. ·
1. Clause in Schedule F of the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121, imposing a duty upon "leaf tobacco," considered and commented
on; and advised that the duty attaches to tabacco of the statutory description, irrespective of the bale or package in which it
is imported, and that, consistently with the terms of the statute,
bales and packages may be broken np in order to sort such
different grades of leaf tobacco as may be contained therein.
Page 1.
2. Goods which arrived in a port of the United States on the 30th of
June, 1883, and from want of time to make other disposition of
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them remained on board ship until the next day, are to be regarded as in a public store or bonded warehouse within the
meaning of section 10 of the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121. 13.
3. The subject of the proper appraisement of varnish imported intO>
the United States from a bonded warehouse in Canada, wherein
it had been manufactured-a component of such varnish of chief
value being distilled spirits produced in the United States aml
exported thence into the said warehouse, where it was compounded into the varnish-considered. 43.
4. Duty 8D plated silver cords, etc., stated. 47.
5. The "Foxhall" gold and silver cup is free of duty under sections
2499 and 2502, title XXXIII, Rev. Stat., as enacted by the act of
May 3, 1883, chap. 121. 62.
6. Boards and other artic]eg of sawed lumber of pine are dutiable at
$2 per thousand feet under the act of March 3, 113d3, chap. 121. 68.
7. Where a claimant was both seizor and informer under the act of
June 22, 1tl74, chap. 391, in the case of goods forfeited for violation of the customs laws, compensation may be allowed him
by the Secretary of the Treasury in either capacity; and the
fact that the claimant originally presented his claim as seizor
does not estop him from subsequently changing it~ form and
making claim as informer. 69.
8. A lot of rum was exported December 3, 1883, and reimpol'ted October 20, 1884, which had been manufactured within the United
States from imported molasses whereon drawback was allowed
upon the exportation of the rum : Advised that the rum is dutiable under1 section 2500, Rev. Stat., and not under the act of
March 3, 181::!3, chap. 121 ; furthermore, that the importers are
entitled to remove the same under section 34:33 Rev. Stat. 82. .
9. "Alizarine assistant," an article used in dyeing, is dutiable, as a
chemical compound, at 25 per centum ad valorem. 106.
10. Reconsideration of former opinion (see ante, p. 43) in regard to the
duty upon certain shellac varnish ir:1ported from Canada; and
adviBed that the warehouse value in Canada is to be taken as a
basis for computing the duty thereon. 109.
tt. New legislation is not required by the proviso in section 7 of the act
of June 10, 1880, chap. 190, in order to give the privilege ofimmediate transportation to any of the pla~es named in that section which at the time of the passage of that act was without
the "necessary officers" therein referred to, but which thereafter
has such officers assigned thereto. 120.
12. Where meat of American production, cured with foreign salt, was
exported to Europe (the duty upon the salt being refunded), and
subsequently brought back to this cpuntry: AdviBed that, on the
duties upon the salt being re-refunded, the meat may be admitted
duty free under the act of :March 3, 1883, chap. 121. 139.
13. Silver ore, ground, is not dutiable under the tariff act of March 3,.
1883. 148.
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14 . .An artist of foreign birth, but who has resided in the United States
for fourteen years and has declared his intention to become a citizen thereof, may properly be treated as an .American artist
within the meaning of the provision in the act of March 3, 1883,
chapter 121, declaril'lg free of duty" works of art, painting, etc.,
the production of .American artists." 163.
15. Opinion of Attorney-General Devens, of October 4, 187H (16 Opin.,
158), that imported merchandise entered upon projorrna invoices,
in the absence of regular invoices authenticated by United
States consular officers, when advanced in value on appraisement
more than 10 per cent., is not liable to the 20 per cent. ad valorem additionrtl duty under section 2900, Revised Statutes~ concurred in. 259.
16. In the case of merchandise of domestic production shipped at ports
on the Great Lake~:> to other portE> in the United States, by routes
through Canadian territory, the issue of a certificate by the collector of customs Hhowing that the merchandise so shipped is of
domestic production is not authorized by law. 261.
17. The expense of brokerage, auctioneer's commissions, and packing,
incurred at the place of exportation, are, by the act of March 3,
1883, chapter 121, not to be ostimated in de1ermining the dutiable value of impor· eu merchandise. 288.
18. Periodical publications bound in stiff covers in regular book form
(each volume containing several numbers of any such publication) lose their character as periodicals and become dutiable as
books under the act of ]\larch 3, 1883, chapter 121. 315.
1~. The values of foreign coins, as annually estimated and proclaimed
by the Secretary of the Treasury under the provh;ion of section
3564, Revised Statutes, constitute the only lawful basis for computing the invoiced value of importations, and duties on the latter are necessarily required to be collected on the values of foreign coins so estimated and proclaimed. 322.
~
20. Where an importation of packages was entered at the custom-house
as containing personal effects only and not subject to duty, but
it turned out on examination that the packages contained dutiable merchandise of considerable value: Beld that the entire
packages were not forfeitable but only the dutiable merchandise;
the case being gove1·ued by section 2802, Revised Statutes, which
is unaffected by the provisions of section 12 of the act of June 22,
• 1b74, chapter 391. 326.
21. "Medicinal soap" is dutiable as soaps not otherwise provided for
at 20 per centum ad valorem, or at 25 per centum as a medicinal
preparation or compound. 344.
22. Statutory provisions relating to the appraisement and re-appraislilment of imports subje~t to duty considered, and held that, in the
absence of any regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury to that
effect, the law does not permit importers to appear before the
appraisers, with counsel or otherwise, for the purpose of produc~73-VOL XVIII--40
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ing wit.nesses to be exammed in their own behalf, or to ut·ossexamine witnesses called by such appraisers. The entire matter
is under the control of the Secretary, and subject to such rules
and regulations as he may from time to time establish in relation thereto. 360.
23. Cement barrels being deemed non-dutiable charges, it is recommended that the instructions oft he Treasury Department of J oly
20, 1885, be so amen<ted as to apply to cases of exaction of duties
on such barrels where the value thereof was added by the importer at the time of entry under a requirement made by the
order of April 10, 18.J4, as contained in the circular of that. Department of April 12, 1884. 36:t
24. Where certain merchandise, consisting of a fabric comp'osed of silk,
cotton, and worsted, met all the requirements of Schedule L of
the act of March 3, 181:l3, chapter 121, and also fulfilled all the
conditions imposed by Schedule K of the same act for classification for duty thereunder: Held that under section 2499, Revised Statutes, it should be classified for duty under Schedul~ L,
which imposes the higher rate. 367.
25. Where domestic merchandise, exported in good faith has been imported back again, and is subject to duty, it is entitled to be admittell to entry for storage in a bonded warehouse under section
2962, Revised Statutes. 381.
26. The article .called toluidine, being a product of coal-tar, is within
the provision of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 121, covering
all preparations of coal-tar not colors or dye, not specially enumerated or provided for," and is dutiable thereunder. 38:3.
'27. Where certain law reports, printed in the year 1840-'41, were imported into the United States in an unbound condition, the
printed sheets not even being stitched together: Held that they
come within the provision of the act of March 3, 188:3, chapter
121, exempting from duty "books "
* bound or nn bound
*
which shall have been printed and ~panufactured more
than twenty years at the date of importation," and were therefore not dutiable. 461.
28. In determining the meaning of" iron ore," as used in the provision
of the al}t of March :3, 1883, chapter 121, which imposes a duty
thereon, regard should be had to the commercial signification
of the term, as Congress must be understood to have used the
same in its commercial sense. 466.
'29. Sacks, lJoxes, or coverings of any ki uds, the duty on which as chm·ges
was repealed by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter
121, are not subject to duty, either separately from or as a part
of the value of the goods· imported therein, excepting where they
come under the proviso in that section or fall within some special
provision oflaw. 468.
30. The 100 per centum ad valorem, mentioned in said proviso, can be
imposed upon sacks, boxes, or other coverings of imported mer-
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chandise only where their material or form justifies the conclusion that they were used as coverings to evade duties, or where
they were designed or contemplated ,to be applied to some use
otlter than that of coverings for imported merchandise, even
though their use as coverings only should continue after the
goods had passed beyond the custom-house to the market or consumer. Ibid.
31. The mere fact that the boxes, sacks, etc., are, after importation,
put to other uses, if such uses were not designed at or before the
time of importatiun, and if there was no design to evade duty
in using them as coverings, will not subject them to the 100 per
centum ad valorem duty. Ibid.
32. The proper classifications for duty of certain articles of imported
merchandise, consisting ofT beams, girders, joists, columns,
posts, and other mltnufactures of iron used in the construction
of buildings, considered. 475
33. Under the clause in the act of March 3, 11383, chapter 121, providing a duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem on ginger-ale or gingerbeer, etc., no separate or additional duty is to be collected on
bottles or jugs containing the same. But where the ale or beer
is bottled, the ad valorem duty should be levied upon the wholesale value thereof as bottled ale or beer in the general market
of the country whence it is imported. 478.
34. Certain boxes or cases containing zithers, piccolos, cornets, trial
glasses, etc., used as coverings for sue~ instruments, held not
subject to the 100 per cent. ad valorem duty prescribed in the
proviso of section 7 of the act of March :3, 1883, chapter 121. 479.
35. Tin cans containing French peas, prepared meats, fish, fruit, vegetables, and milk food-being neither of material nor form designed to evade the duties thereon, nor designed for use otherwise than in the bona fide transportation of goods to the United
States- -are not subject to the 100 per cent. ad valorem duty prescribed by the proviso to the seventh section of the act of March
3, 1883, chapter 121. 483.
36. Spools on which thread is wound for transportation or shipment
are duty free, under the provisions of section 7 of the act of
March 3, 1883, chapter 121. 496.
37. Boxes in which safety aud ordinary matches are usually imported
are not dutiable as part of the merchandise which they contain,
but (being composed in part of a material designed for a use
other than that of a bona fide transportation of their contents)
they are subject to the duty of 100 per centum ad valorem prescribed by the proviso in the seventh section of the act of March
3, lb83, chapter 121. 510.
38. The cost of winding on spools, or skeining, yarn or thr~ad, is one
of the usual charges for preparing and packing the merchandise
for transportation, which, by section 7 of the act of March 3,
1ts83, chap. 121, are not to be included as part of the dutiable
value of such merchandise. 515.
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39. The provisions of section 2984, Rev. Stat., authorizing the abate··
ment or refund of duty on imported merchandise which, under
the circumstances therein stated, is injured or destroyed by
accidental fire or other casualty, extend to a loss caused by
freezing. 519.
40. Hair of the common goat, which is unfit for combing purposes,
should be admitted free of duty under the provisions in the free
list for hair of horses and cattle, and hair of all kinds not specifically enumerated, act of March :~, 1883, chap. 121. 527.
41. Principles of law stated for determining what is comprehended by
the terms "iron ore," a~ used in the act of March 3, 1883, chap.
121. 530.
42. Wool-tops, imported in the ordinary condition of scoured wool, are ·
not subject to the penal double duty imposed by the act of March
3, 1883, chap. 121, on " wool of the sheep, etc., w hie1h shall be
imported in any other than ordinary condition as now and heretofore practiced," etc. 534.
43. Mahogany boards and planks are not dutiable as manufactures of
mahogany, under the clause in ScheduleD (act oiMarch 3, 1883,
chap. 121) imposing a duty on "manufactures of cedar wood,"
etc.; but they fall within the designation of lumber in the clause
in same schedule which imposes a duty on'' sawed boards, planks,
deals," etc., and are dutiable under the latter clause. 535.
44. A steam-pump and boring apparatus, used in deep prospecting for
oil and coal, with connecting iron tubes, etc., brought into this
country by a coal and petroleum seeker for the purpose of pursuing his profession here, do not come within tile meaning and intent of the clause in the act of March 31 1883, chapter 121,
exempting from duty "implements, instruments, and tools of
trade, occupation, or employment of persons arriving in the
United States," and should not be admitted free. 5:~8.
45. The article known as "Cooper's Sheep Dipping Powder" is dutiable at 50 per centum ad valorem under the act of March 3,
1883, chap. 121. 552.
46. In December, 1855, several hundred packages of seeds were imported, which were entered for consumption and the estimated
duties thereon paid. Some of the packages were sent to the appraiser's store for examination and appraisement, and the remainder delivered to the importer, who (having given bond as
required by section 2899 Rev. Stat.) took possession thereof
and stored them in his warehouse. Pe:Jding the appraisement
and liquidation of the entry the warehouse took :fire and
was totally destroyed, with all contents. Thereupon the importer applied fQr a refund of the duty paid on the packages so
destroyed under section 2984 Rev. Stat. : Held that he is not
entitled to the relief asked, the merchandise destroyed not
having been at the time of its destruction, in t.h~ custody of the
officers of the customs, as contemplated by said section 2984. 578.
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47. The act of March 3, 1887, chap. 348, amending sections 2533 and
2534 Rev Stat., and making Hartford a port of entry in place
of Middletown, creates a new collection district and also a new
office (that of collector), requiring a new commission and a new
bond. 591.
48. Confectionery known as" fruit tablets" is dutiable under the clause
in the act of March 3, 1883, chap. 121, namely: "Sugar candy
not colored, five cents per pound." 606.
DESERTION.
See ARMY, 6.
DISABILITY.
See PARDON, l.
DISCHARGE FROM MILITARY SERVICE.
See ARMY, 4, 5, 6.
DISPATCH-BOAT DOLPHIN.
See CoNTRACT, 6.
DISTILLED SPIRITS.
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 1, 2.
DISTILLERY WARE HOUSE.
See INTERNAL HEVENUE, 1, 2.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
See BOARD OF IMMIGRATION i COMPENSATION, 3, 4, 6.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. The watchmen employed by the Government under the act of August 5, 1882, chap. 389, for service in the public squares or reservations in the District of Columbia, are by that act invested
with the powers of the metropolitan police, and may make arrests outside of such squares and reservations for offenses committed within the ~:~arne 433.
2. Semble that the Chief of Engineers of the Army is not and never
has been vested with authority to grant licenses for the erection
of wharves along the river front of the city of Washington, D.
c. 441.
DOUBLE PAYMENT.
H. and others were mail contractors for certain routes in t.he State
of Arkansas, service on which was discontinued May 31, 1861,
up to which time from January 1, 1861, they were paid by the
Governme-nt in full what was due them. Afterwards they collected from the State of Arkansas for the same period of service
(January 1 to May ::H, 1861) certain amounts, which were paid out
of moneys belonging to the United States that had been seized
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by the State: Advised that the contractors are under a legal liability to make restitution to the United States of the amounts
so collected, but that their sureties can not be held responsible
therefor upon the undertakiug of the latter. 414.
DRAGOON BARRACKS LOT .AT ST. .AUGUSTINE.
The piece of land known as the Dragoon Barracks lot, in St . .Augustine, Fla., and the buildings thereon, being the property of
the United States, may be appraised and disposed of in the manner provided by the second and third sections of the act of July
5, 1884, -chap. 214. 543.
DUTIABLE V .ALUE OF IMPORTS.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 17, 19.
EIGHT-HOUR L.AW.
1. Construction of the act of June 25, 1868, chap. 72, known as the
eight-hour law, as given by former .Attorney-Generals, and also
by the Court of Claims and Supreme Court, stated, and in particular cases of alleged violation of the act considered with reference thereto. 389.
2. The ac.; is a legislative declaration that for the persons described
therein eight hours a day is a reasonable day's labor; and where
the public interests can be snbserved, this should be a guide to
officers, both civil and military, in contracting for the public
service. Ibid.
ELIGIBILITY FOR .APPOINTMENT.
See CIVIL SERVICE, 1 ; .APPOINTMENT, 6.
EMERGENCY PURCH.ARES.
See ARMY SUPPLIES, PURCHASE OF.
EMIGRANT HALF-BREED INDIANS.
See IMMIGRANT, 2.

•
EMINENT DOMAIN.
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 5 j FORT BROWN RESERVATION, 3.
EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL.
See CouRT-MARTIAL, 2, 3.
ESTATE OF JAMES B. E.ADS.
See PAYMENT, 2.
EXPORTATION BOND.
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 3, 4, 5, 6.
EXTRA COMPENSATION.
See COMPENSATION, 8.
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EXTRA-DUTY PAY.
See ARMY, 2.• 3.
FEES OF CONSULS.
See SHIPPING, 2, 3.

•

FEES OF PENSION AGENTS.
See COMPENSATION, 7.

FERRY-BOAT.
See INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS,

2.

FINE, REFUNDING OF.
See SHIPPING AcT.

FINES, PENAL1'IES, AND FORFEITURES.
1. The power conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by section
26 of the act uf June 26, 1~84, chap. 121, to refund'' a fine,
penaHy, forfeiture, exaction, or charge ari!?ing under the laws
relating to vessels or seamen," which has been paid to any collector of customs or consular officer, does not extend to the case
of a fine, penalty, etc., exacted and paid prior to the date of
that act, and of which an application for remission was made
within a year from the date of payment. 282.
2. Nor does the power of remitting fines, pP-ualties, etc., so arising,
given hy the same section to the Secretary of the Treasury, extend to cases where a competent judicial tribunal shall have
deciderl that such fines, penalties, tltc., were legally imposed.
Ibid.
3. Where an importation of packages was entered at the customhouse as containing personal effects only and not subject to
duty, but it turned out on examination that the packages contained dutiable merchandise of considera~le value : Held, that
the entdre packages were not forfeitable, but only the dutiable
merchandise; the case being governed by section 2802 Rev.
Stat., which is unaffected by the provisions of section 12 of the
act of June 22, 1674, chap. 391. 326.
4. The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to remit the forfeiture
of articles contained in the same package with other articles
imported in violation of section 2491, Rev. Stat. 424.
5. Under the eighth section of the act of June 19, Hl86, chap. 421,
a foreign vessel is liable to a fine of $2 for every passenger
transported hy it from one port in the United States to another
port in the United States, though the continuity of the voyage
may havf' been broken by the vessel touching at an intermediate
foreign port. 445.
6. Section 1%8, Rev. Stat., does not confer upon the Secretary of
the Treasury authority to remit the forfeiture of a vessel condemned by the United States districtconrt for Alaska, for being
engaged in killing fur seals. 584.
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7. Under section 5293, Rev. Stat., fifth paragraph, he has power
to remit in such case, but only where the forfeiture was imposed" by virtue of any provisions of law relating to fur seals
upon the islands of St. Paul and St. George." Ibid.
FITZ JOHN PORTER, RELIEF OF.
The bill" for the relief of Fit,z John Porter, ' 1 passed at the first
session ofthe Forty-eighth Congress, considered, and objections
thereto, constitutional and other, stated. 18.
"FOREIGNER. "
The word "foreigner, " in section 2134, Rev. Stat., is used in its
ordinary signification-meaning one who is born out of the
United States and is not naturalized, or who owes allegiauc~ to
any other government than that of the United States. 555.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
Consideration of certain propositions relating to the enforcement
of judgments of foreign tribunals iu civil and commercial matters, suggested by a resolution adopted at the Conference held at
Milan in 1H83 by the Association for the Reformation and Codification of International Law. 84.
FORFEITURE.
See CUSTOMS

LAWS,

7;

FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES.

FORT BROWN RESERVATION.
1. The act of March 3, 1885, chap. 360, appropriated a large sum of
money ''to enable the Secretary of War to acquire good and valid
title for the United States to the ~,ort Brown Reservation, Tex.,
and to pay and extinguish all claims for the use and occupation
of said reservation by tbe United St11tes;" with a proviso that
no part of said snm shall be paid "until a complete title is vested
in the United States," and that ''the full amount of the price,
including rent, shall be paid directly to the owners of the property.'1 327.
2. Claims of ownership of the property, or some portion thereof, having been asserted by different parties, who propose to convey the •
same to the Government, their titlPs, respectively, at the request
of the Secretary of \Var, examined and considered by the Attorney-General, who indicates in his opinion the pbrsons by whom
and points out the mode by which::- good and valid title to the
whole of the reservation can be conveyed to the United States
and all claims for the use and occupancy thereof extinguished,
as contemplated by the said act of 1885. 328.
3. The provisions of that act do not authorize acquisition of title by
condemnation under the eminent domain power of the United
States. Ibid.
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4. Deed of conveyance executed by James Stillman and Thomas Carson (the latter as administrator with the will annexed of Maria
Josefa Cavazos, deceased), dated May 12, 1886, and deed of release executed by Kate M. Combe and others, by their attorney
in fact, James B. Wells, jr., dated April 17, 1886, not deemed
sufficient to impart a valid title to the whole of the Fort Brown
Reservation, for reasons stated. 400.
FORT KEOGH RESERVATION.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company has no interest in any of
the lands within the boundaries of the Fort Keogh military reservation, excepting the right of way therein granted to that
company by the second section of the act of July 2, 1864, chap.
217, to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of its road,
including all necessary ground for station buildings, workshops,
depots, etc. · 357.
FRANCHISE, SALE OF.
The Covington and Cincinnati Elevated Railway Transportation
and Bridge Company, authorized by act of May 20, 1866, chap.
363, to erect bridge across the Ohio between Covington and Cincinnati, has no power under that act to t;ell the franchise granted
to it thereby. Such power is not to be implied from the words
"successors or assigns" in the act. 512.
•
FREE LIST.
See CUSTOMS LAws, 5, 13, 27, 36, 40.
GENERAL SWAIM'S CASE.
See CouRT-MARTIAL, 1.
GUILFORD MILLER'S CASE.
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 3.
HAZING.
See NAVAL ACADEMY; COURT-MARTIAL, 6.
HEAD TAX.
1. The duty imposed by the act of 1882, chap. 376, upon passengers,
other than citizen~, coming to any port within the United States,
is to be exacted of convicts, lunatics, etc., although by the
terms of the statute thfly are not to be permitted to land and
are required to be returned to whence they came. 135.
2. The tax of 50 cents imposed by the act of August 3, 1882, chap.
376, is applicable to all passengers, not citizens of the United
States, who shall come by steamer or sail vessel from a foreign
port to any port within the United States, whether as immigrants or merely as tourists. 185.
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3. The duty of 50 cents a passenger, imposed by the act of August 3t
1882, chap. 376, should be exacted from itinerant persons, not
citizens of the United States, toties quoties any such person enters one of our ports from a foreign port. 196.
HOLDING STATE OFFICE.
See STATE OFFICE.
HOSPITAL.
See SuRGEON-GENERAL.
HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARK.
1. The Secretary of the Interior has power, under the act of December 16, 1878, chap. 5, to lease sites upon the Hot Springs Reservation in Arkansas for the term of five years, and to relet the
premises for the same term, from time to time, as the leases expire. 266.
2. Upon the facts stated : Ai£vised that the Secretary may accept a.
surrender of a lease of a bath-house site heretofore made to S.,
and cancel the same, and then enter into a new lease of the premises with the same party for the term of five sears. Ibid.
3. During the term of the lease, and while the tenant is in possession
under the same, be may remove from the premises whatever improvements he bas ·erected thereon for the purpose of trade,
whether machinery or buildings; but if he leaves the premises
without removing such improvements, and the Government
should take possession, they would become the property of the
latt,er. Ibid.
IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION IN BOND.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 11.
IMMIGRANT.
1. When it appear~d that an immigrant from a foreign State was convicted of an offense there, sentenced to imprisonment, and after
having served a portion of his sentence was given an unconditional pardon : Held that section 4 of the act of August 3, 1H82,
chap. 376, and section 5 of the act of March 3, lt~75, chap. 141, do
not forbid his landing in the United States. 239.
2. Half-breed Indians emigrating to the United States from Canada
are not precluded by existing legislation from retaining the
bounty of the United States in addition to that of the Dominion
of Canada. 423.
3. Provision of the second section of the act of August 3, 1882, chap.
376, viz, that if among the passengers of a vessel arriving at
one of our ports is found a ;, convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming
a public charge," such person shall not be permitted to land,
considered; and held not to apply to the case of a lunatic whose
father will engage satisfactorily that he will not become a public charge. 500.
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IMPLEMENTS, INSTRUMENTS, AND TOOLS OP TRADE.
See CUSTOMS LAWS1 44.
IMPORTATION BY MAIL.
Precious stones and other articles, where the same are liable to
customs duty, are prohibited by the postal convention of June,
1878, to be sent through the mail; and if imported by mail they
become subject to seizure and forfeiture under section 3061 Rev.
Stat. 457.
IMPROVEMENT OP NAVIGABLE WATERS.
Right of the United States to occupy and use soil within the bed
of a river for the improvement of its navigation affirmed. 64.
INDIAN CONTRACT.
1. Where a contr'act made by three attorneys-in-fact of certain persons of the Pottawatomie tribe of Indians with E., an attorneyat-law, :(or services of the latter, was not executed by one of
the attorneys-in-fact until some months after it had been executed by the other two and by E., nor until after the services
stipulated therefor had been performed by E. : Held that the
Secret,ary of the Interior was not authorized to approve the contract or recognize the claim of E. for compensation thereunder.
517.
2. Secretary of the Interior has no power to approve the contract in
the case presenteli for any purpose. 518.
See CONTRACT, 8; POWER OF ATTORNEY, 11 2.
INDIAN IMMIGRATION.
See IMMIGRANT, 2; INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 9.
INDIAN POLICE.
The powers and duties of the Indian police· authorized by the act
of M~ 15, 1R86, chap. 333, can not be exercised outside of th&--.....
reservation to which they may be assigned. 440.
INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS.
1. In the absence of treaty or statutory provisions to the contrary,
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations have power to regulate
their own rights of ocoopanoy, and to say who shall participate
therein and upon what conditions; and hence may require
permits to reside in the nation from citizens of the United Stat¥s,
and levy a pecuniary exaction therefor. --34
2. Treaties of 1855 and 1866, in so far as they relate to this snbjec
considered and construed. Ibid.
3. Sheep are "cattle'' within the meaning of section 2117 Rev. Sta .,'
which imposes a penalty for driving any stock, etc., to range and
feed on Indian lands without the consent of the tribe. 91.
4. The contiguous tracts of land lying on the east bank of the
Missouri River in the Territory of Dakota, known as the Old
Winnebago and Crow Creek Reservations, are protected by the
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provisions of the treaty of April29, 1868, with the Sioux Indians
and the executive order of February 27, 1885, restoring portions
of such tracts to the public domains is in violation of that treaty,
and consequently inoperative and void. 141.
5. There is no law en-: powerip.g the Interior Department to authorize
Indians to lease their lands for grazing purposes. 235.
6. Neither the President nor the Secretary has authority to make-a
lease, for such purposes, of auy part of an Indian reservation;
nor would their app•·oval of any such lease made by Indians
render it lawful and valid. Ibid.
7. Adt•ised that certain mining leases maae by citizens of the Choctaw
Nation of Indians, in the Indian Territory, and the Osage Coal
and Mining Company, a Missouri corporation for the mining of
coal, etc., in said Territory, are not such as may properly receive
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior under existing laws.
486.
8. The inhibition contained in section 2116, Rev. Stat., has the same
application to individual Indians that it has to Indian nations
and tribes. Ibid.
9. A body of Indians born and dwelling outside of the territorial
limits of the United States, and still maintaining their tribal relations, can not, without authority of Congress, enter upon and
occupy our public domain as emigrants. 557.
10. The power of the President to set apart a port.ion of the public
domain fort he exclusive occupancy of Indians does not include
the case of a reservation for Indians not born Qr commorant iu
the United States. Ibid.
11. Where Indians on a reservation made by order of the President
are organized tribes or bands, and placed under the charge of
an agent appointed by the Government, the laws applicable to
Indian reservations must be regarded as applicable to them.
563.
12. By the ninth section of the act of February 7, 1887, chap. 119,
an appropriation is made " for the purpose of making the surveys and resurveys mentioned in section two'' of that act. In
section 2 there is no mention of "surveys and resurveys." But
8ection one of the same act contains a provision for "surveys and
resurveys." Advised that the appropriation made as above is
applicable to the making of ' 'surveys and resurveys," as provided for in said section 1-such being the clear intent of Congress. 593.
INDIAN TERRITORY.
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 1.
INDIAN TRUST FUNDS.
1. Where bonds of the State of North Carolina, held by the Treasurer
of the United States for the benefit of certain Indian tribes,
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were nast due and payment thereof demanded and refused: AdviBed that the Secretary of the Interior may authorize the acceptance of a proposition of a third party (a c'itizen of the State) to
pay the principal and accrued interest of the bonds, provided
their market value does not exceed their face value with the
accrued interest, and provided the acceptance will best su bserve
the trust. 581.
2. Ifthe United Sta,tes has advanced for the State any money on account of interest due on said bonds, and there is "any moneys
due on any account from the United States to su.ch State," it is
the duty of the Treasurer to retain the interest upon such advances from such moneys. Ibid.
INFORMER.
See CusTOMS IJAWS, 7.
INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS.
1. The word ''charter" covers the case of boats licensed, under a
gem;rallaw, by a county court to traverse ferry routes established by such courts. 16.
2. Steam-vessels plying regularly between Albany and Troy, in New
York, for freight and passengers, would be ferry-boats under the
second clause of rule VII, paragraph 2, of " General Rules, «>tc.,
of the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steam-Vessels.'' Ibid.
3. The provision for assistant inspectors in section 4414, Rev. Stat.,
is not controlled by the details of section 4415 as to either
the method of their appointment or the professional qualifications which may be required by the appointing power. 30.
4. Should an inspection of life-preservers be found necessary, and in
order to effect this some assistant to the local board must needs
be appointed, the appointment of such assistant would be warranted by law. Ibid.
INSPECTORS OF CUSTOMS.
Inspectors of customs can not lawfully be prevented by the local
health officers from landing at quarantine stations in the discharge of their duties; but the former, while visiting andremaining at such stations, should observe all reasonable regulations in the interest of public health. 15.
INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
1. A judgment against the United States for the sum of $44,800.74
was given by the Court of Claims in favor of a claimant on
April20, 1885, ~nd on same day the latter presented this judgment
to the Treasury Department for payment. On July 14, 1885, the
United States were allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court, and
on the next day a cross appeal to the Supreme Court was
allowed the claimant. On January 31,1889, the judgment was re-

638

INDEX.

INTEREST ON .JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS-Cont'd.
versed uy the Supreme Court, and a mandate subsequently issued
therefrom directing the Court of Claims to enter judgment in
favor of the claimant for the sum of $130,196.98. Pursuant to
such mandate judgment for this sum was entered by the Court
of Claims on February 10, 1887, and claimant thereupon presented the judgment so entered to the Treasury Department for
payment, demanding interest on the latter sum from April 20,
18tl5, at 5 per cent. per annum: Held that as the judgment of
the Court of Clains· was not ajfi?'Yned, but on the contrary was reversed by the Supreme Court, interest is not allowable thereon
under the provisions of section 1090 Rev Stat. 548.
2. Only such judgmen~s of the Court of Claims as have been appealed
from to the Supreme Court and affirmed by the latter are interestbearing under that section, and they become interest-bearing
from the date of their presentation in gooi faith for payment. Ibid.
3. Se'rnble that a presentation made by a claimant who afterwards
takes an appeal from the judgment is of no avail. Ibid.
INTERNAL REVENUE.
1. Internal-revenue taxes on distilled spir!ts, fermented liquors, tobacco, etc., produced in the Indian Territory, and special taxes
on ·the manufacture and sale of those articles in that Territory,
may lawfull: be collected within the same. 66.
2. The Secretary of the Treasury bas power to make a regulation under which distilled spirits may be permitted to remain in warehouse after the expiration of three years, upon the distiller or
owner of the spirits filing a declaration of his purpose to export
the same m good faith, and giving a bond to do so within a given
period. 92.
3. Where the holders of distilled spirits, bonded for ~xportation, shall
have failed within the seven months specified in the bond (given
under the regulations of internal-revenue circular No. 282) to
withdraw such spirits in fact from the distillery warehouse, a
forfeiture of the bond follows and the spirits are not protected
from the domestic tax. 246.
4. Upon application of the principal and sureties on such bond, and
for good cause shown, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
may, under existing regulations, extend the time named in the
bond beyond seven months. Ibid.
5. The spirits covered by an exportation bond, after the failure to
withdraw them and after the forfeiture of the bond, are liable
to distraint under the act of May 28, 1880, chap. 108. Ibid.
6. The condition of the bond having been broken by the failure to
withdraw the spirits, the Government may also proceed upon
the bond. Ibid.
7. A large quantity of whisky, part of which had been in warehouse
beyond the bonded period of three years, was accidentally destroyed by fire in July, 1884, without any fraud, collusion, or neg-
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ligence of the distillers, and while the same remained under
custody of an internal-revenue officer in a distillery warehouse.
The tax thereon had not been paid. Application having been
made to the Secretary of the Treasury for an abatement of the
tax under section 3221 Rev. Stat.: Advised that the Secretary
has authority, by the terms of that section, unoer the state
of facts shown, to abate the tax on said spirits. 379.
INTERNAL-REVENUE STAMPS.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue iR authorized, under certain conditions, to cause internal-revenue stamps, forth~ payment of t.ax upon tobacco, to be prepared elsewhere than in the
Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 62.
INTERNAL-REVENUE STORE-KEEPER.
See COMPENSATION, 9.
INTERSTATE-COMMERCE ACT.
The provisions of the interstate-commerce act of February 4, 1887,
chap. 104, do not extend to the post.al service of the United
States, nor prohibit the transportation by railroad companies,
free of charge, of such officers or agents of the Government as
are employed in that service. 587. ·
JAMES S. MORGAN'S CASE.
See PARDON, 2.
JURISDICTION.
Where an Apache Indian, charged with murdering another Indian
of the same tribe on an Indian reservation in Arizona, was in
custody of the Territorial authorities: Advised that the accused
should be delivered up for trial and punishment to the authorities of his tribe. 138.
See CONSULAR COURT.
KANSAS.
1. In construing the act of August 15, 1876, chap. 305, entitled "An
act relieving the State [of Kansas," etc., the preamble thereto
may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning
of the enacting clause. 316.
2. In compliance with the provisions of that act the State is entitled
to a credit of $11,4~5 thereunder, and no more. Ibid.
LAKE SUPERIOR AND MISSISSIPPI RAILROAD COMPANY.
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 1.
LAND-GRANT RAILROADS.
1. The provision in the act of March 3, 1877, chap. 101, requiring certain contracts for the transportation of goods for Indian tribes,
etc., to be let to the lowest bidder after advertisement, does not
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supersede or repeal the act of March 3, 1R75, chap. 133, section
5260 Rev. Stat., touching payments to land-grant railroads for
services to the Government. 41.
2. Wherever it h; practicable to obtain for the Government the benefit
. of the act of 1877, without yielding the benefits secured to it by
the other legislation referred to, this should be done. Ibid.
3. Upon the facts stated: Advised that so much of the road of the St.
Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company as lies between St.
Louis and Pacific (a distance of about thirty-fiv'e miles) should
not be treated as a land-grant road. 47.
4. Under the circumstances and for the reasons stated : Advised that
the suspension of the issue of land patents to the New Orleans
and Pacific Railway Company, heretofore made, be continued
until the proper trib'l.nals, courts or Congress, definitely settle
the rights of the parties in the premises. 221.
LAND GRANT TO GARLAND COUNTY. ARK.
Under the circumstances existing in the ~ase, and for reasons
stated, the institution of proceedings on behalf of the United
States to recover the title and possession of certain land (part
of the Hot Springs Reservation) granted to the county of Garland, Arkansas, for the site of a public building, would n6t be
warranted. 264.
LANDS, PUBLIC.
1. 'fhe Land Department has authority to make seizure, through its
officers or agents, of timber unlawfully cut on the public lands.
434.
~. Timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, which has been seized
by duly authorized agents of the Land Department, and is in
their custody, may be disposed of by that Department, and
whet~er this be done by public or private sale, with or without
previous advertisement, is a matter entirely discretionary therewith. Ibid.
3. On December 29, Ul84, M. made a homestead entry of part of an
odd section of land lying within the indemnity limits of the
Northern Pacific Railroad laud-grant, alleging that his settlement thereon commenced June 15, 1878. Said odd section was
included in a withdrawal from pre-emption or homestead entry,
etc., made by the Land Department March 30, 1872, for the benefit of said grant, upon the filing of the map of general route.
On the definite location of the road, of which a plat wa$ filed
October 4, 1880, it fell within the "indemnity" limits of the
grant; but the withdrawal aforesaid, in so far as it included
odd sections which thus came within those limits, continued in
force thereafter, no, restoration of such odd sections to entry
having since been made. The said odd section was selected as
"lieu land" by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company December 17, 1883: Held, that the land entered by M., being in a, state
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of reservation from the date of the withdrawal in 1872 until its
selection by the company in 1883, was not during that period
open to homestead settlement, and consequently that he could
acquire no right adverse to the claim of the company by his alleged settlement commencing in 1t178. 5il.
4. When public lands have been once withdrawn by competent authority from private appropriation under the general land laws,
they do not again become subject to such appropriation until
restored to entry by like authorit.y. Ibid.
LAWTON'S CASE.
See PARDON, 1.
LEASE.
1. Certain leases of post-offices, made by the Postmaster-General prior
to the act of March 3, Ul85, chapter 342, for terms of twenty
years, hdd not to be obligatory upon the Government. 215.
2. Where the tenancy of the Government is from year to year, it may
be terminated by giving such notice as is required by the law of
the State in which the property is situated. Ibid.
3. There is no law empowering the Interior Department to authorize
Indians to leasA their lands for grazing purposes. 235.
4. Neither the President nor the Secretary of the Interior bas authority to make a lease for such purposes, of any part of an Indian
reservation; nor would their approval of any such lease made by
Indians render it lawful aud valid. lbid.
5. Advised that certain mining leases made by citizens of the Choctaw
nation of Indians, in the Indian Territory, and the Osage Coal
and Mining Company, a Missouri corporation, for the mining of·
coal, etc., iu said nation, are not such as may properly receive •
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior under existing.
laws. 486.
6. The inhibition contained in section 2116, Rev. Stat., has the same·
application to individual Indians that it bas to Indian nationa
and tribes. Ibid.
See HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARK.; INDIANS AND INDIAN
LANDS, 5, 6.
LEAVE OF ABSENCE.
Provisions of section 4 of the act of March 3, 1883, chapter 128, relating to leave of absence of Department clerks and other em~
ployes, construed. 352.
LIEUTENANT ROBERTSON'S CASE.
See ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS, 2, 6.
LIGHT-HOUFlE BOARD.
See LIGHT-HOUSE ESTABLISHMENT.
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LIGHT-HOUSE ESTABLISHMENT.
1. Legislation ofCongre~s in regard to the appointment of Hght,-house
keepers considered. 344.
2. Section 4669, Rev. Stat., confines the power of the Light-House
Board to the adoption and enforcement of such regulations as
concern the management and control of light-house keepers,
inspectors, and employes for the purpose of properly administering the Light-House EAtablisbment. Ibid.
3. The statute does not authorize the Board to adopt and enforce regulations controlling in any manner the appointment ofligbt-bouse
keepers or other inferior officers, or to designate the appointees.
Ibid.
4. Neither the Light-House Board nor the collector of customs bas a
legal right to nominate assistant light-bouse keepers. 528.
5. The Secretary oft he Treasury is not restrict,ed to such appointments
as the Board recommends, but may appoint any one who, in his
judgment, will best discharge the duties of the office. Ibid.
6. Where a regulation, made under and within the power granted by
section 4669, Rev. Stat., is regularly approved, neither the Board
without the approval of the Secretary nor the Secretary without the approval of the Board can change it. But such regulation can not abridge or control in any manner the power of appointment conferred by law upon the Secretary. Ibid.
LIGHT-HOUSE KEEPER.
See LIGHT-HOUSE ESTABLISHMENT.
LOTTERY.
See PosTAL SERVICE, 6, 7, 8, 9.
MAIL CONTRACT.
See CoNTRACT, 4, 5, 9.
MARSHAL.
1. Allowances for travel by United States marshals, provided by section S29, Rev. Stat., are" fees" within the meaning of section 83:~
Rev. Stat., and should be included in the emolument returns
required by the latter section to be made by those officers. 12:1.
2. In the adjnstment of a marshal's emolument account, he may he
. allowed credit for expenses of travel incurred by himself while
serving process. 290.
3. So a depnty marsl!almay be re-imbursed for expenses incurred while
serving process, and also be allowed three-fourths of the profits
arising from his services. Ibid.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS.
See SuRETY, 1.
MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION.
See A:'IIEJUCAN A~D MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION.
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MILEAGF..
An officer of the Revenue-Cutter Service is not entitled to mileage
for travel on duty, bnt may be allowed actual traveling expenses. 121.
MISbiSSIPPI RIVER COMMISSION.
The salaries and traveling expenses of the members of the Mississippi River Commission appointed from civil life (9ongresshaving failed to make a specific appropriation therefor) can not be
lawfully defrayed out of the fund provided for the Mississippi
River improvement. The application of such fund to that object would be inconsistent with section 3678 Rev. Stat. 463.
MONEY-ORDER FUNDS.
1. The act of March 17, 1882, chap. 41, which authorizes the Postmaster-General to grant relief to postmasters for the loss of
money-order funds in certain cases, does not annul the requirements of regulation 1099of the "Postal Laws and R'3gulations,"
whereby the postmaster is to make good the loss should be fail
to comply with such regulation. 369.
2. Nor is the Postmaster-General at liberty, so long as the regulation is in force, to disregard it in a case where he is satisfied
that the postmaster had in fact remitted the money lost, but
did not have the remittance witnessed as the regulation requires. Ibid.
3. The authority to credit postmasters with lost remittances being
limited by the act of 1882 to cases where the remittance is
made "in compliance with the instructions of the PostmasterGeneral," such compliance forms a necessary element in each
case to bring it within the statute. 370.
MONONGAHELA RIVER IMPROVEMENT.
The clause in the provision ofthe act of August 5, 1886, chap. 929,
making an appropriation for the improvement of the Monongahela River, which declares that "no charges or tolls shall be
collected on any other part of the river ou any commerce on
saicl riYer which originates above the works herein appropriated
for," does not impose any condition affecting the ex11enditure of
the appropriation. The.re is nothing in its language which requires the assent thereto ofanyperson, company, or corporation
claiming a right to collect charges or tolls, or the relinquishment
by any person, company, or corporation of such right, before the
money aJ'propriuted can l1ecome available for expenditure. 481.
NATIONAL . BANKING ASSOCIATIONS.
Where certain;) per cent. bonds of the United States, held by the
United States Treasurer as security for the circulating notes of
a national bank, we:re called in for redemption and ceased to be
1
interest bearing: Advised that unless the hank substitute interest-bearing bonds for the called bvnds, the proceeds of the latter must be applied to retiring the circulation secured thereby.
493.
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NA V.AL ACADEMY.
1. To constitute the offense of "hazing" at the Naval Academy,
under the act of June 23, 1874, chap. 4[>3, it is essential that
the victim sh<]uld be a new cadet of the fourth clat,;s. Hence,
unless the charge against the accused alleges that the victim
was a new cadet of the fourth class, a court-martial organized
under the statute would have no jurisdiction over it. .An allegation that the victim was a candidate for appointment or admission to the Academy is insufficient. 292.
2. Where a cadet entered the Naval Academy and became a member
of the fourth class in 1885, and also remained a member of the
same class in 1886, he is at the latter period as much an "older
cadet" within the definition of the offense of "hazing" as a
cadet who, having entered the Academy at the same time (1885 ),
has since been advanced to a higher class, and (equally with
the latter) is capable of committing that offense. 507.
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
See BRIDGE.
NAVY.
1. An officer retired on furlough pay under section 1454 Rev. Stat.,
can not be transferred to the retired pay-list under section 1594
Rev. Stat., with increase of pay; such increase is forbidden by
the act of August 5, 1882, chap. 391. 96.
2. Nor can an officer be simultaneously retired on furlough pay and
transferred to the retired pay-list, so as to give him the pay of
the latter. Ibid.
3. No designation other than that made by the President entitles a
naval paymaster to the place and perquiMites of paymaster of
the fleet. 156.
4. The cadet engineers in the Navy (graduates of the classes of 1881
and 1882) who were discharged under a misconstruction of the
act of August 5, 1882, chap.391, not having been legally removed,
are still the lawful incumbents of their respective offices, and
should be recognized as in the immediate line of promotion, in
their prop~r order, to fill the vacancies that may occur in the
office of as~ist~nt engineers. 373.
5. On February 18, 1886, E., a rear-admiral, was, under section 1444
Rev. Stat., transferred from the active to the retired list of the
· Navy, and T .. a commodore (being first in the line of promotion), was, after having successfully passed an examination,
nominated by t!Je President to be a rear-admiral to fill the vacancy caused by the retirement of E. While this nomination
was before the Senate awaiting action thereon, T. attained the
age of sixty-two years, and under said section was transferred
from tbe active to the retired list to rank as commodore: .Advised that, according t.o the law and usage of the service, T. was
entitled to be a rear-admiral from the 18th of February, 1886, by
relation, and to receive the pay of a rear-admiral from that date,
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and, if the Senate should confirm his nomination, might be commissioned as a rear-admiral and placed on the retired list as of
that grade. 393.
6. Cases of Robert B. Higgins, Clarence H. Matthews, ann William
B. Day for reinstatement in the Navy as ·cadet engineers considered. 395.
NEW ORLEANS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY.
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS. 4.
NORTHERN PACIFlC RAILROAD COMPANY.
See Fo:litT KEOGH RESERVATION.
OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION.
1. Obstruction to navigation of certain rivers within the State of California, caused by hydraulic mining, considered; and advised that
the case is one calling for the interposition of the restraining arm
of equity in an appropriate action on behalf of the United States,
with a view to remedying the evll. 404.
2. A State may authorize a navigable stream within its limits to be obstructed by a bridge in the absence of any legislation by Congress on the subject. 425.
See BRIDGE, 5.
DFFICE.
1. Where the office of Sixth Auditor became vacant by the death of
the incumbent, and the duties thereof devolved by operation of
the statute upon the deputy auditor: Advised that the period
during which such duties may be discharged by the deputy is
limited by statute to ten days. 50.
2. In the case of a vacancy in the office of Secretary of the Treasury,
caused by the death of the incumbent: Advised that the duties of
the office can not be performed by some other officer, under sections 177, 179, 180, and 181, Revised Statutes, for a longer period
than ten days. 58.
3. The office of special examiner of the Pension Bureau is newly created by the act of March 3, 18135, chap. 334, as it was by the act
of July 7, 1A84, chap. 331; the term under each act being for one
year only. 172.
4. The office of chief examiner in the Civil Service Commission 3 created by the act of January 16, 1138:3, chapter 27, is to be filled
by appointment by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate. 409.
5. The act of March 3, 1887, chapter 348, amending sectwns 2533 and
2534, Revised Statutes, and making Hartford a port of entry ip.
place of Middletown, creates a new collection district and also a
new office (that of collector), requiring a new commission and a
new bond. 591.
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OFFICER.
See STATE OFFICE.
OFFICIAL BOND.
See RoND, 1, 2, 3, 4.
OLEOMARGARINE.
The varioussimpleand compound substances mentioned in section
2 of the act of August~. 1886, chapter 840, must be ''made in
imitation or semblance of butter, or, when so made, calculated,
or intended to be sold as butter or for butter," before any of them
can be regarded as taxable under that act. 489.
PARDON.
1. L., having been commissioned a lieutenant in the United Sl;ates
Army, and taken an oath as such officer. to support the Constitution ofthe United States, afterwards bore arms against the United
States in the war of the rebellion, but on the 6th of February,
1867, received a full pardon from the President for the part he
bad taken therein: Held, that the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution (section 3), which did not take effect until more
than a year after such pardon was granted, does not operate to
exclude L. from holding office under the United States. 149.
2. Effect of the President's proclamations of amnesty of September 7,
1867 and December 25, 1868, considered in connection with the
case of James S. Morgan as submitted. 180.
PASSENGERS.
See HEAD TAX; IMMIGRANT, 3.
PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION IN FOREIGN VESSEL.
See FINES, PENALITIES, AND FOREITURES, 5.
PAYMASTER OF THE FLEET.
See NAVY, 3.
PAYMENT.
1. Section 3648, Revised Statutes, does not preclude a payment in
any case where the money has been actually earned and the Government has received au equivalent therefor; its object ls to
prevent payment being made to contractors in advance of the
performance of their contracts, whether for services or supplies.
105.
2. Payment of amount due the estate of Jaines B. Eads, deceased, for
services in connection with the improvement of the South Pass
of the Mississippi River, may lawfully be mad~ to James F. How
and Estill McHenry, the executors and trustees under his will,
if the certificate of the engineer officer in charge shows satisfactorily the performance of the services. 604.
See AMERICAN AND MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION.
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PENALTY.
See PINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES.
PENSION.
1. A pensioner, previous to his death, was in receipt of a pension of
$72 per month under the provisions of the act of June 16, 1880,
chapter 236, and after his death a pension certificate granting
$30 per month was issued to his widow under section 4702, Revised Statutes; but the latter claims to be entitled under that
section, as widow, to the same amount of pension which her
husband was in receipt of, viz: $72 per month: Held that the
widow's pension is limited to the amount given for "total disability" by section 469!1, Revised Statutes. 39.
2. The claim of Mrs. Burnett for a pension, as widow, considered in
connection with the acts of June 18, 1874, chapter 298, and June
16, 1880, chapter 236; and held that th<>Be acts did not change
or increase her rights, which are still governed, as to the amount
of the pension to which she is entitled, by section 4695, Revised
Statutes. 73.
PENSION AGENT.
See COMPENSATION, 7.
PERFORMING DUTIES OF VA CANT OFFICE.
See OFFICE 1, 2.
PERSONAL EFFECTS.
See CUSTOMS LAws, 20.
PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS.
See CusTOMs LAws, 18.
PLEURO-PNEUMONIA.
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 4.
POINT PETER, GEORGIA.
History of the title of the United States to the tract of land known
as ''Point Peter," situated at the mouth of St. Mary's River.
Georgia, given, and adverse claims to ownership of the premises
set up by one Alex. Curtis, a resident of Georgia, shown to be
utterly groundless. 384.
POSTAL SERVICE.
1. Mode of ascertaining the average of the weight of mails transported. 71.
2. Contracts entered into by the Post-Office Department for carrying
the mail should be in the name of the United States as directed by
statute. (See sec. 3949 Rev. Stat.; also sec. 403, ibid.). 11~.
3. The express condition mentioned in section 3741 Rev. Stat. need
not be inserted in these contracts made with railroad corporations. Ibid.
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4. The Postmaster-General is authorized by the act of June 20, 1878,
chap. 359, to substitute, for the black printing inks and writing fluids used under section 721, Postal Regulations, any canceling ink which is uniform and which actual experiment and
test have shown to his satisfaction to be best calculated to guard
against fraud, and to order its use in all post-offices where stamps
are canceled. 131.
5. The authority to make contracts for carrying the mail between
ports of the United States and foreign ports, given by section
4007, Rev. Stat., is limited by section 4009, Rev. Stat., with respect to the amount of compensation; so that in such contracts
under the former section no greater compensation can be allowed
to American steam-ship lines than the sea and inland postage
upon the mail transported. 24d.
6. Letters and circulars known (nut merely supposed or suspected) to
concern lott~ries are non-'llailable, and may properly be excluded from the mails. 306.
7. But letters addressed w lottery associations or lottery agents can
not, simply because they are thus addressed, be deemed to be
letters concerning lotteries and as such excluded. Ibid.
8. Newspapers or pel'iodicals containing lottery advertisements are
not therl:lby rendered non-mailable. Ibid.
9. A postmaster can not lawfully refuse to receive and forward registered packages addressed to lottery companies or persons described as agents, officers, or managers therof; nor can he lawfully refuse to issue money-orders payable to such companies or
to persons described in the orders as agents, officers, or managers thereof. 307.
10. The power conferred upon the Postmaster-General by section 39!52
Rev. Stat. to make deduct,ions from the pay of mail contractors
in the cases therein mentioned is discretionary. 313.
11. Where a deduction has been ordered by the Postmaster-General
and he afterwards becomes satisfied that the order was made
under a misapprehenl3ion of the facts, it is within his power eituer
to directly rescind the order or to refer the matter to the Sixth
Auditor under the provisions of section 409 Rev. Stat. Ibid.
12. Until the Postmaster-General has found, upon evidence satisfactory to himself, that any lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme is a
means of fraudulently obtaining money through the mails, be is
not authorizeu to instruct postmasters to return registered letters
or to forbid them to pay money-orders because the same are addressed or made payable to an individual conduct,i ng such lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme. 325.
13. The authority to credit postmasters with lost remittances being
limited by the act of 1882 to cases where the remittance is made
"in compliance with the instructions of the Postmaster-Gen.e ral," such compliance forms a necessary element in each case
to bring it within the statute. 370
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14. The clause in the act of March 3, 1885, chap. 342, authorizing the
Postmaster-General " to contract for inland and foreign steamboat mail service, when it can be confined in one route, where
the foreign office or offices are not more than two hundred miles
distant from the domestic office, on the same terms and conclitions as inland steam-boat service, and pay for the same out of
the appropriation for inland steam-boat service," is permanent
in character and amendatory ot the gener.al law; but the authority of the Postmaster-General thereunder is limited by the
terms and conditions imposed in the latter part of the same
clause. 411.
15. Precious stoneFl and other articles, where the same are liable to
customs duty, are prohibited by the Universal Postal Union
Convention of J nne 1, 1878, to be sent through the mail; and if
imported by mail they become subject to seizure and forfeiture
under section 3061, Rev. Stat. 457.
16. The provisions of the iuterstate-commerce act of February 4,1887,
chap. 104, do not extend to the postal service of the United
States, nor prohibit the transportation by railroad companies,
free of charge, of such officers or agents of the Government as
are employed in that service. 587.
POSTAGE-STAMP, CANCELLATION OF.
See PosTAL SERVICE, 2.
POSTMASTER.
See APPOINTMENT, 7; POSTAL SERVICE, 9.
POSTMASTER-GENERAL.
1. The Postmaster-General is authorized by the act of June 20, V378,
chap. 359, to substitute, for the black printing inks and writing
:fluids used under section 721, Postal Regulations, auy canceling
ink which is uniform and which a.ctual experiment and test have
shown to his satisfaction to be best calculated to guard against
fraud, and to order its use in all post-offices where stamps are
canceled. 131.
2. The power conferred npon the Postmaster-General by section 3962,
Rev. Stat. to make deductions from the pay of mail contractors
in the cases therein mentioned is discretionary. 313.
3. When a deduction has been ordered by the Postmaster-General,
and he afterwards becomes satisfied that. the order was made
under a misapprehension of the facts, it is within his power
either to directly rescind the order or to refer the matter to the
Sixth Auditor under the provisions of section 409, Rev. Stat.
Ibid.
4. Until the Postmaster-General has found, upon evidence satisfactory to himself, that ~ny lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme is a
means of fraudulently obtaining money through the mails, he is
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not authorized to instruct postmasters to return registered let·ters or to forbid them to pay money-orders because the same
are addressed or made payable to an individual conducting such
lottery, gift-enterprise, or scheme. 32fi.
5. The act of March 17, 1882, chap. 41, which authorizes the Postmaster-General to grant relief to postmasters for the loss of
money-order funds in certain cases, does not annul the requirements of regulation 1099 of the "Postal Laws and Regulations,"
whereby the postmaster is to make good the loss should he fail
to comply with such regulation. :369.
6. Nor is the Postmaster-General at liberty, so long as the regulation
is in force, to disregard it in a case where he is satisfied that the
postmaster had in fact remitted the money lost, but did not have
the remittance witnessed as the regulation requires. Ibid.
7. The clause in the act of March 3, 1885, chapter 34:2, authorizing the
Postmaster-General "to contract for inland and foreign steamboat mail service, when it can be confined in one route, where
the foreign office or· offices are not more than two hundred miles
distant from the domestic office, on the same terms and conditions as inland steam-boat service, and pay for the same out of
the appropriation for inland steam-boat service,·' is permanent
in character and amendatory of the general law; but the
authority of the Postmaster-General thereunder is limited by
the terms and conditions imposed in the latter part of the same
clause. 411.
See MONEY-ORDER FUNDS.
POSTMASTER'S SALARY, RE-ADJUSTMENT OF.See CoMPENSATION, 1.
POST-OFFICE LEASES.
See LEASE.
POTOMAC FLATS.
1. The existence of certain claims of title to the HPotomac flats" is not
an obstacle to the expenditure of the appropriation made by the
act of July 5, 1884, chap. 229. 66.
2. Title of the United States to certain parts (Sections II and Ill) of
the Potomac Flats impr~vement considered, and adviBed that the
prohibition contained in the acts of August 5, 1886, chap. 929
and 930, against the expenditure of money appropriated for the
improvement, does not apply to such parts. 437.

POTTAW ATOMIE INDIANS.
See POWER OF ATTORNEY; INDIAN CoNTRACT.
POWER OF ATTORNEY.
1. Under the authority granted to the agents and attorneys named in
the letter of attorney made by certain heads of families and individual members of the Pottawatomie Indians, the powers and
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duties committed to such agents and attorneys can not be performed by any two of them in the absence or without the concurrence of the third. 447.
2. Opinion of September 9, 1ssr {ante p. 447), as to the validity of a
certain contract with Potta" atomie Indians, cited and reaffirmed; and advised that the approval of such contract by the
"business committee of th~ Citizen Pottawatomies" does not
cure the defect therein or authorize the Secretary of the Interior
to approve it. 497.
PRESIDENT.
1. An appeal does not lie to the President from a decision made by
the Secretary of the Interior touching the correctness or validity of a resurvey of a private land claim. 31.
2. The President can not appoint an honorary commissioner to the
"Inventions International Exposition" at London, such office
not existing by virtue of any law of the United States. 171.
3. The power of the President to set apart a portion of the public
domain for the exclusive occupancy of Indians does not include
the case of a reservation for Indians not born or commorant in the
United States. 557.
See APPOINTMENT ; INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 6, ll ; PARDON,
PRINTING.
1. The joint resolution of July 7, 1882, "to provide for the printing of
public documents," etc., applies to all documents or reports ordered to be printed by Congress, whether by special act or otherwise, so that such legislation does not forbid the printing of the
"usual number" ofthe document. 51.
2. The "usual number," within the meaning of the resolution, indicated. Ibid.
PROMOTION.
See NAVY, 5.
PROSECUTION OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
See CLAIMS, 2.
PUBLIC BUILDING SITE.
See PURCHASE OF LAND.
PUBLIC DOCUMENT.
See PRINTING.
PUBLIC LANDS.
See LANDS, PUBLIC.
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PURCHASE OF LAND.
1. Under an act of the legislature of' New York, passed April2, 1885,
a valid title to certain lands situated in the cities of Troy and
Auburn, in that State, which have heretofore been selected for
the sites of Government buildings authorized by Congress to be
erected there, may be acquired by the United States by condemnation proceedings instituted in the State court pursuant to its
provisions. 352.
2. The acts of Congress of March 3, 1885, chap. 331 and 360, providing for the purchase of such sites, may properly be taken to
authorize the acquisition thereof in any mode which is in conformity to the laws of the State. Hence where, by a law of the
State, the property may be condemned and title thereto acquired
under the eminent domain power of the State, recourse may be
had as well to this mode of acquisition as to any other, under the
authority conferred by those acts. 353.
3. Title to the additional ground authorized to be purchased by the
act of July 10, 1886, chap. 761, for the site of a public building
to be erected in Williamsport, Pa., may be acquired by the institution of condemnation proceedings under the laws of the
State of Pennsylvania, in case no agreement for the purchase
thereof can be made with the owner. 484.
QUARANTINE.
See INSPECTORS

OF

CUSTOMS.

RAILROAD BRIDGE AT ST. PAUL, MINN.
See BRIDGE.
REBELLION, CLAIM OF PARTICIPANT IN.
See CLAIMS, 6.
REFUND OF DUTY.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 23, 39, 46.
REGISTRY OF LETTERS AND PACKETS.
1. Under the second proviso of section 3 of the act of July 5, 1884,
chap. 234, a departmental officer, in the discharge of his official
duties, may register letters and packeti'J elsewhere than in the
post-office at Washington. 49.
2. That section does not authorize Indian agents or receivers and
registers of land offices to register, free, official letters and
packets. 54.
REGISTRY OF VESSEL.
1. A registered vessel of the United States which has been altered in
form or burden in a foreign port may be registered anew on her
arrival in the United States; but the new registry can not be
made unless the ship and owners conform to the requirements
necessary for an original registry. 560.
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REGISTRY OF VESSEL-Continued.
2. If the alteration amounts to such a substantial rebuilding of the
vessel as that the owner could not truthfully make oath that it
was built in the United States it would not be entitled to registry. Ibid.
REIMPORTATION.
See CuSTOMS LAws, 8, 12, 25.
REMISSION OF FORFEITURE.
See FINES, PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES, 1, 2, 6, 7.
RESERVATION.
See FORT BROWN RESERVATION; FORT KEOGH RESERVATION;
HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARK.; SHEYENNE ISLAND.
RESURVEY OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.
See APPEAL.
RETIRED LIST.
See NAVY, 1, 2.
RETIRED OFFICERS OF THE NAVY.
See NAVY.
REVENUE-CUTTER SERVICE.
See MILEAGE.
REVISED STATUTES CONST.R UED, REFERRED TO, ETC.
Page.

Section 12.. . . . . • • • • • • . • ..
252
Section 163. .. .. .. • • . . . . ..
245
Section 164 .......•...... 245, 246
Section 177. . . . . . • • • •.. • • • .
59
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RIGHT OF WAY.
See STATEN IsLAND RAPID TRANSIT RAILROAD.
RIVER-BED.
See IMPROVEMENT OF NAVIGABLE WATERS.
SEAMEN.
See SHIPPING AcT, 2, 3 ; SHIPPING CoMMISSIONER.
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
See HOT SPRINGS RESERVATION, ARK. ; INDIAN
SWAMP LAND INDEMNITY, 1.

CONTRACT;

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
The Secretary of the Navy may assent to a modification of the
contract for building the new cruisers where the interests of the
Government will not be prejudiced or any statutory provision
violated thereby. 101.
See CONTRACT, 6, 7.
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
1. The Secretary of the Treasury has power to make a regulation
under which distilled spirits may be permitted to remain in
warehouse after the expiration of three years, upon the distiller
or owner of the spirits filing a declaration of his purpose to export the same in good faith, and giving a bond to do so within
a given period. 92.
2. Section tl38 Rev. Stat. does not authorize an allowance to be made
by the Secretary of the Treasury to a district attorney for serv·ices in internal-revenue case reported to the latter, wherein no
judicial proceedings have been mstituted. 126.
3. The Secretary of the Treasury has no power to remit the forfeiture of articles contained in the same package with other articles
imported in violation of section 2491 Rev. Stat. 424.
See COMPtWMISE; FINES, PENALTIES, AND FoRFEITURES; INTER·
NAL REVENUE, 7 j LIGHT-HOUSE ESTABLISHMENT, fi, 6.
SECRETARY OF WAR.
Under the provisions of the acts of December 17, 1872, chap. 4, and
February 14, 1883, chap. 44, authorizing and regulating the construction of bridges over the Ohio River, the Secretary of War
has power to disapprove ofthe plans of such bridges where he is
of the opinion that £ihey would unduly obstruct the navigation
of the river. 512.
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LAWS, 7.

SEIZURES IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY.
1. Where property is seized by the military authorities in the Indian
country for violation of the laws relating to the Indians, pn or
as soon as practicable after report is made to the United States
attorney it should be placed in the custody of the proper civil
officers. 544.
2. The provision of section 3086 Rev. Stat., by which property seized
under any law relating to the customs is left in the custody of the
collector or principal officer of the customs of the district, is not
to be considered as embraced in the proceedings contemplated
in section 2125 Rev. Stat., so as to permit the military employed
in making seizures to retain the custody of the property to abide
adjudication. Ibid.
3. Property seized by the military under the provisions of section 2137
Rev. Stat., should, as soon as praticable, after report of seizure
to the United States attorney, be placed in the custody of the
proper civil officers. 555.
4. Section 5388 Rev. Stat., makes no provision for seizure of property belonging to a wrong-doer. Ibid.
SHEYENN.E ISLAND.
At the date of the Sioux treaty of April 29, 1868, Sheyenne Island
was within the reservation thereby established, the east line of
which was the east ban'k of the Missouri River at low-water
mark. The island having since gradually become attached t.o
the mainland on the east bank of the river, so that it is wholly
surrounded by water only in seasons when the water is high,
the low-water mark is now on the west side of the island instead
of the east side as formerly : Held that the island is still a part of
the reservation, notwithstanding the abandonment of its former
channel on the east side of the same; whether the island now
belongs to the reservation being determinable by the line of lowwater mark on the east bank of the Missouri, not according tO>
the present course of that river, but according to its course at
the date of the treaty. 230.
SHIPPING.
1. Meaning of the terms ''A.nerican vessel" as used in the act of June
26, 1884, chap. 121. 99.
2. Foreign-built vessels owned by citizens of the United States are not
exempted by the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, from the payment of fees for services of consuls. 111.
3. Foreign-built vessels owned by citizens of the United States are
not within the provisions of the act of June 26, 1884, chap.
121, forbidding the collection of fees by consular officers from
American vessels. 234.
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SHIPPING-Continued.
4. Section 14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, "to remove certain burdens on the American merchant marine and to encourage
the American carrying trade," etc., considered in connection with
the eighth article of the treaty of 1827 with Sweden and Norway. 382.
, 5. No warrant is found in the treaty for the claim that the shipping
of that power is entitled to the benefits of the act without submitting to its conditions. Ibid.
6. A registered vessel of the United States which has been altered in
form or burden in a foreign port may bo registered anew on her
arrival in the United States; but the new registry can not be
made unless the ship and owners conform to the requirements
necessary for an original registry. 560.
7. If the alteration amounts to such a substantial rebuilding of the
vessel as that the owner could not truthfully make oath that it
was built in the United States it would not be entitled to registry. Ibid.
8. Vessels used exclusively for pleasure, and not carrying freight or
passengers for pay, are not liabl~=~ to the penalty prescribed in
section 4371 Rev. Stat. 564.
9. Nor are such vessels, when navigating waters of the United States
between district and district, or between different places in the
same d istrict, subject to the duties prescribed by section 4219
Rev. Stat. Ibid.
SHIPPING ACT.
1. Section 26 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, does not require
that a protest shall have accompanied the payment of the :fine,
etc., a refunding of which by the Secretary of the Treasury is
asked. 63.
2. The provisions of section 10 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap.
121, prohibiting the payment of advance wages to seamen hired
in our ports, in so far as those provisions apply to foreign s*pping, are not in conflict with the stipulations of article 8 of the
consular convention with France of February 23, 1853. 253.
3. Nor do such provisions come in conflict with any rights which, upon
principles of international law, other nations are entitled to exercise within our ports as regards their merchant vessels. Ibid. •
SHIPPING COMMISSIONER.
1. A shipping commissioner has no ant,hority to ship seamen on ''sail
or steam vessels engaged in the coastwise trade," unless such
vessels come within the exceptions of the act of June 9, 1874,
chap. 260; nor will the consent of the master and seaman
operate to give such authority. 54.
2. He should not receive fees for shipping seamen on coasting vessels
E.ot within said exceptions. Ibid.
3. Anything received by a shipping commissioner for such serv.ice is
not required to be acounted for by the terms of section 27 of the
act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121. Ibid.
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SINKI.KG FUNDS.
1. Section '5 of the act of March 3, 1887, chap. 345, relating to the
sinking funds of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific Railroad
Companies, applies to moneys belonging to those funds which
are uninvested, and such moneys may be invested as therein provided. 598.
2. But that section does not authorize a sale of the United States
bonds in which the funds are already invested for the purpose
of re-investment in the first-mortgage bonds of said companies.
Ibid.
3. Money paid into the sinking funds of said companies, under said
act, may be invested (1) in United States bonds, as provided in
act of May 7, 1878, chap. 96; (2) in any United States railroad
subsidy bonds of any of the aided roads described in the act of
July 1, 1862, chap. 120, and its supplements; and (3) in any
of the first-mortgage bonds of said companies, such as are described in section 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, chap. 345.
Ibid.
SOUTH PASS OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER IMPROVEMENT.
See PAYMENT, 2.
SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE TREASURY.
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF1 8.
SPECIAL EXAMINERS OF THE PENSION OFFICE.
See CIVIL SERVICE, 2; OFFICE, 3.
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT RAILROAD.
A tunnel constructed in the manner proposed by the Staten Island
Rapid Transit Railroad Company across a part of the lighthouse grounds at New Brighton, Staten Island, is within the
provisions of the act of February 9, 1881, chap. 41, granting
right of way through said grounds. 76.
STATE OFFICE.
1. The holding of a State office by an officer or employe in the civil
service of the United States is not prohibited by any act of
Congress. 3.
2. But by Executive orders dated January 17 and 28, 1873, which have
not been revoked, persons holding any civil office under the
United States are expected, while holding such office, not to accept or hold any State, Territorial, or municipal office, with
certain exceptions ; otherwise they will be regarded as having
resigned the office held under the United States. Ibid.
3. In the case of an employe of the United States Fish Commission,
not in the service by appointment, who holds the office of village
constable : Advised that he may properly exercise the functions
of the latter office, provided this does not interfere with the regular and efficient discharge of his employment under the Government. Ibid.
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STATE TAX.
1. Where a State imposed a tax upon the registration of deeds, and a.
deed to the United States conveying land within such State was
put on record by an agent of the Guvernment: Advised that, there
being no provision in the State law exempting t,he registration
of deeds to the United States from the tax, the Government is
properly chargeable therewith, and that it should be paid. 491.
2. The tax referred to is not, strictly speaking, a tax upon either the
instrumentalities, -agencies, or property of the United States.
Ibid.
STATUTEf\, INTERPRETATION OF.
1. The first section of the act of Aprilll, 1882, chap. 75, authorized
a public building to be erected at Minneapolis, Minn., limiting
the cost of the building, inclusive of its site, to $175,000, and the
second section of same act appropriated $60,000 for purchase of
site and toward construction of building; by act of March 3, 1883,
chap. 143, an appropriation of $60,000 was made for continuation of the building; and, by act of July 7, 1884, chap. 332, a
further appropriation of $70,000 was made for extension of site
and continuation of building-the whole of the appropriations
aggregating $190,000: Advised that the limitation fixed by the
act of 1882 as to cost of the building, etc., is not repealed by the
subsequent appropriation acts, the only additional expenditure
allowable bting for an "extension of site." 79.
2. The appropriation made by the act of March 3, 1885, chap. 366,
in aid of the World's Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition, held in New Orleans, La., is not applicable to any objects
other than those specifically enumerated in the act. 146.
3. Opinion of April 2! 18t:35 (ante, p. 146), relative to the appropriation
for the World'~:~ Industrial and Cotton Centennial Exposition at
New Orleans, La., reaffirmed. 153.
4 . The provision in the act of May 29, 1884, chap. 60, giving the
Commissioner of Agriculture power to expend money in such
disinfection and quarantine measures as may be necessary to prevent the spread of pleuro-pneumonia from one State or Territory
into another, does not authorize him to purchase animals infected with that disease for the purpose of slaughter. 154.
5. The provision in the act of March 3,1883, chap. 143, authorizing
the Secretary of the Treasury "to acquire by private purchase
or condemnation the necessary lands for public buildings and
light-houses to be constructed, and for which money is appropriated, including all public building sites authorized to be acquired under any of the acts of the first session of the Fortyseventh Congress," does not empower him to acquire by condemnation the site for the proposed public building authorized
to be erected at La Crosse, Wis., by the act of February 28, 1885,
chap, 260. 174.
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STATUTES, INTERPRETATION 01!'-Continued.
6. That provision is limited to lands for public buildings for which
money is then (i.e., by said act of March 3, 1883) appropriated,
including building sites authorized to be acquired under acts
of the previous session, and does not extend to other cases. Ibid.
7. The indefinite appropriation made by the fourth section of the act
of July 5, 1884, chap. 229, is not applicable to river and harbor
improvements generally, but only to a particular class of public
works, such as canals, locks, etc., in the use of which both
operating expenses and expenses for repairs are necessarily incurred. 188.
8. The appropriation for "contingent expenses, independent treasury,'' is not applicable to the payment of expenses of special
agents of the Treasury employed to investigate the affairs of subtreasurers. 232.
9. Where a statute authorizes the building of vessels by the Navy
Department, but makes no provision for procuring the necessary
plans and specifications therefor, it is to be com;;trued as impliedly authorizing the head of the Department to procure such
plans and specifications in the mode and manner which he shall
deem best. 244.
10. In construing the act of August 15, 1876, chap. 305, the preamble
thereto may be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the
meaning of the enacting clause. 316.
11. Tho terms "persons engaged in navigating the vessel," as used in
section 4419 Rev. Stat., comprehend the officers and crew, those
who are in the service of the vessel, and employed in its management, the working of its machinery, etc., during the voyage.
365.
12. In determining the meaning of '' iron ore,'' as used in the provision
of the act of March S, 1883, chap. 121, which imposes a duty
thereon, regard should be bad to the commercial signification of
the term, as Congress must be understood to have US<)d the same
in its commercial sense. 466.
13. The claur:;e in the provision of the act of August 5, 1886, chap.
929, making an appropriation for the improvement of the Monongahela ~iver, which declares that "no charges or toile shall
be collected on any other part of the river on any commerce on
said river which originates above the works herein appropriated for," does not impose any condition affecting the expenditure of the approprilltion. There is nothing in its language
which requires the assent thereto of any person, company, or
corporation claiming a right to collect charges or tolls, or the
relinquishment by any person, company, or corporation of such
right, before the money appropriated can become available for
expenditure. 481.
14. The act of August 4, 1886, chap. 907, made an appropriation to pay
certain claims, and directetl the Secretary of the Treasury to pay
~o "Martin and P. B. Murphy $10,000." It being alleged that
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STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF-Continued.
this was intended by Congress to satisfy a claim for that amount,.
of which Martin Murphy was a joint owner with Patrick W.
Murphy: Advised that should the identity of their claim with
that provided for in the act be clearly established, the fact that
"B" is used in the act instead of "W" as the initial letter of
the middle name of Patrick ,V. Murphy, is immaterial, and may
be disregarded. 501.
15. In the act of June 19, 1878, chap. 329, which repeals section 1861
Rev. Stat., the clause, "one enrolling and engrossing clerk,_
at $5 per day," is to be construed as providing for the employment of but one clerk at the per diem mentioned. 540.
16. By the ninth section of the act of February 8, 1887, chap. 119,.
an appropriation is made ''for the purpose of making the surveys and resurveys mentioned in section ttvo" of that act. In section 2 there is no mention of" surveys and resurveys." But section one of the same act contains a provision for ''surveys and resurveys." Advised that the appropriation made as above is applicable to the making of "surveys and resurveys," as provided
for in sai.:l. section 1--such being the clear intent of Congress.
593.

,

STEAM REGISTER.
1. Sections 4418, 4419, and 4491, Rev. Stat., concerning steam registers.
used on vessels propelleu by steam, considered ; and held that a
steam register, in order to be the subject of approval under section 4419, must be of a description which satisfies the:requirements.
of both section 441o and section 4419. 365.
2. The terms ''persons engaged in navigating vessels," as used in section 4419, comprehend the officers and crew, those who are in the
service of the vessel, and employed in its management, the working of its machinery, etc., during the voyage. The register is not
only to be taken from the control of all persons so employed,_
but to be secured from such control by the inspectors. Ibid.
S'fEAM-VESSELS.
See INSPECTION OF STEAM-VESSELS; STEAM REGISTER.
ST. LOUIS AND SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COMPANY.
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 3.
SUPERVISORS OF ELECTIONS.
See COMPENSATION, 2.
SURETY.
1. The provisions of sections 3739, 3740, and 3741, Rev. Stat., considered, and held that, upon a fair construction thereof, a member of Congress may be lawfully accepted as a surety on the
bond of a contractor with the United States. 286.
2. H. and others were mail contractors for certain routes in the State
of Arkansas, service on which was discontinued May 31, 1861,
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SURETY-Continued.
up to which time from January 1, 1861, they were paid by the.
Government in full what was due them. Afterwards they collected from the State of Arkansas for the same period of service
(January 1 to May 31, 1861) certain amounts, which were paid
out of moneys belonging to the United ~tates that had been
seized by the State: Advised that the contractors are under a
legal liability to make restitution to the United States of. the
amounts so collected, but t,hat their sureties can not be held responsible therefor upon the undertaking of the latter. 414 .
SURGEON-GENERAL.
Under a statutory provision making an appropriation "for the
care, support, and medical treatment of seventy-five transien,
paupers, medical and surgical patients in the city of Washington
under a contract to be made with such institution as the Surgeon-General of the Army may select," etc., that officer may,
within the limits of such appropriation, contract with one or
more hospitals, as in his judgment will best fulfill its purposes. 33.
SUSPENSION OF OFFICER.
1. Case of the suspension of Marshall B. Blake as collector of internal
revenue for the second district .o f New York, and the designation
of John A. Sullivan to perform the duties of that officer, considered. 318.
2. The suspension of an officer involves a suspension ofhis bond; the
bond required of the person designated to take the place of the
former being substituted therefor while the person so designated
is performing the duties of the office. Ibid.
SWAMP-LAND INDEMNITY.
1. The Secretary of the Interior is warranted in approving certain
statements of account between the United States and the State'
of Ohio, made by the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
for cash indemnity for swamp lands sold during the period intervening between the passage of the swamp-land act of September 28, 1850, and March 3, 1857. 170.
2. Under the provisions of the acts of March 2, 1855, chap. 147,
and March 3, 1857, chap. 117, the State of Louisiana is entit}ed
to indemnity for any swamp lands granted theret·o by the act of
March 2, 1849, chap. 87, which were sold by the United States
between the date of this act and the 28th of September, 1850.
522.
3. But as to such swamp lands as were excepted out of the grant
made by the said act of 1849 (viz, "lands fronting on rivers,
creeks, bayous, water-courses," etc.), and as were first granted to
that State by the act of September 28, !1:::50, chap. 84, it is entitled to indemnity only for those. which have heen sold by the
United States since the 28th of September, 1850. Ibid.
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TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT.
See APPOINTMENT, 1, 2) 3.
TENURE-OF-OFFICE LAW.
1. The act of March 3, 1887, chap. 353, repealing the tenure-of-office
law (sections 1767 to 1772, Rev. Stat., leaves unaffected such
designations, nominations, and appointments as shall have been
made before the repeal, and requires all business begun but unfinished before the repeal to be completed under the law as it
then stood. 576.
2. Appointments and removals after the repeal are to be made under
the law as it now exists. Ibid.
TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE.
In the act of June 19, 1878, chap. 329, which repeals section 1861;
Rev. Stat., the clause, "one enrolling and engrossing ' clerk,
at $5 per day," is to be construed as providing for the employment of but one clerk at the per diem mentioned. 540.
TIMBER UNLAWFULLY CUT ON PUBLIC LANDS.
Timber unlawfully cut on the public lands, which has been seized
by duly-authorized agents of the Land Department, and is in
their custody, may be disposed of by that Department; and
whether this be done by public or private sale, with or without
previous advertisement, is a matter entirely discretionary therewith. 434.
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 1.
'I'OBACCO.
See CUSTOMS LAWS, 1 ; INTERNAL REVENUE, 1.
TONNAGE DUTY.
1. Section 14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, does not subject the suspensiOn mentwned in its first proviso to the discretion of the President. 53.
2. Meaning of the phrase "government of the foreign country,'' in
the same section. Ibid.
3. The right to a reduction of tonnage duty under the first proviso of
section 14 of the act of June 26, 1884, chap. 121, takes effect
from the proclamation of the President, and not before.
4. By virtue of the third section of the act of July 5, 1884, chap.
221, the decision of the Commis!'.'ioner of Navigation on questions
involving a refund of the tonnage tax is final. That section supersedes or repeals the previous law vesting the Secretary of
the Trea~mry with appellate power in t:iUCh cases. Ibid.
5. The discrimination as to tonnage duty in favor of vessels sailing
from the regions mentioned in the act of June 26, 1884, chap.
121, and entered in our ports, is purely geographical in character,
inuring to the ad vantage of any vessel of any power that ;nay
choose to transport between this country and any port embraced by the fourteenth section of that act. 260.
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TRADE-DOLLAR.
The United States Treasurer is not authorized to receive "tradedollars" at par in exchange for silver certificates under the third
section of the act of February 2R, 1878, chap. 20. · Nor are such
dollars receivable lltt par in payment of public dues. 417.
TRANSFER.
See ASSIGNMENT.
TRANSPORTATION.
See LAND-GRANT RAILROADS, 1, 2.
TRANSPORTATION OF THE MAIL.
See CONTRACT, 4, 5, 9.
TRANSPORTATION OVER BOND-SUBSIDIZED RAILROADS.
In the settlement of the accounts of the Sioux City and Pacific
Railroad Company (whose road was in part constructed with
the aid of subsidy bonds issued under the acts of July 1, 1862,
chap. 120, and July 2, 1864, chap. 216) for Government transportation over the subsidized portion of its road: Advised, that
that the direction in the second section of the act of March 3,
1873, chap. 226 (sec. 5260, Rev. Stat.), "to withhold all payments," etc., is now, November 12, 1886, no longer applicable
thereto; that only one-half the amount of compensation due the
company for such transportation should be withheld, to be applied as required by the act of J1.1ly 2, 1864; a!ld that the remaining one-half should be paid over to the company. 503.
TRAVELING ALLOWANCES.
See MARSHAL i MILEAGE.
TREATIES WITH FOREIGN NATIONS.'
See SHIPPING, 4, 5
TREATIES WITH INDIAN TRIBES.
See INDIANS AND INDIAN LANDS, 2, 4 i SHEYENNE ISLAND.
TRUST.
See INDIAN TRUST FUNDS.
UN~XPENDED

BALANCES OF APPROPRIATIONS.
1. Unexpended balances of moneys appropriated for the pay of the
Navy and Marine Corps for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1884,
are not available for payment of the Navy and Marine Corps for
services rendered during the fiscal :year ending :June 30, 1885.
412.
2. The unexpended balances of the appropriations made by the act of
March 3, 1883, chap. 97, under the headings " Bureau of Construction and Repair," and "Bureau of Steam Engineering,"
may be used in completing the hulls and machinery of the cruis·
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UNEXPENDED BALANCES OF APPROPRIATIONS-Continued.
ers Chicago, Boston, and .Atlap,ta, provided the total expenditure
shall not exceed the total estimated cost thereof, as reported by
the Naval Advisory Board. 566.
3. The balance of an appropriation made for a .specific purpose may
be used for that purpose in the discharge of obligations imposed
by a lawful continuous contract. Ibid.
UNiON PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
See SINKING FUND.
UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION CONGRESS.
See ADVANCES.
UNMAILABLE MATTER.
See PosTAL SERVICE, 6, 7, 8, !>.
UTAH COMMISSION.
See UTAH TERRITORY.
UTAH TERRITORY.
1. The Utah Commission, appointed under the act of March 22, 1882,
chap. 47, have no duties or powers as regards the echool meetings in Utah Territory. 94.
2. Voting at meetingi of tax-payers called to fix the rate of taxation
for school purposes is not voting at an ''election '' within the
meaning of that act. Hence polygamists may vote at such meetings, provided they are property-tax payers and residents of the
school district in which the meeting is held. Ibid.
3. The superintendent of district schools, auditor•of public accounts,
and treasurer of Utah Territory should, in conformity to the organic law of the Territory, be appointed by the governor, with
the advice and consent of the legislative conncil. The Territorial statutes, in so far as they require sucb officers to be elected,
are in conflict with the organic law and void. 193.
4. The commissioners to locate the university lands, created by the
Territorial legislature under the powers given by the act of Congress of l!...,ebruary 21, 1855, chap. 117, should be elected in the
manner prescribed by the Territorial statute. Ibid.
5. Officers in the Territory of Utah who were commissioned and holding office previous to the passage of the act of March 3, 1887,
chap. 397, are not required' to take the oath prescribed by the
twenty-fourth section of that act. 595.
6. The provision of that section making such oath a "condition precedent to hold office in or under said Territory" applies as well
to officers thereafter appointed by the General Government as to
those thereafter a.ppointed by the Territorial government or
elected in the Territory. Ibid.
·
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VACANCY IN OFFICE.
See APPOINTMENT; OFFICE.

VANN A:ND ADAIR, CLAIM OF.
See CLAIMS, 1.

WASHINGTON CITY.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1.

WATCHMEN IN PUBLIC SQUARES OR RESERVATIONS,
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1.

WHARVES IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON CITY.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2.
WIDOW'S PENSION.
See PENSION, 1, 2.
WITHDRAWAL OF PUBLIC LANDS.
See LANDS, PUBLIC, 4.
WITNESS.
See COURT-MARTIAL,

5, 6.

WORKS OF ART.
See CUSTOMS LAWS,

14.

WORLD'S INDUSTRIAL AND COTTON CENTENNIAL EXPOSITION.
See STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF, 2, 3.
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